State of Tennessee v. Shanada Nicole Snipes
The Defendant, Shanada Nicole Snipes, pled guilty in the Madison County Circuit Court to aggravated robbery, aggravated assault, and multiple drug offenses. After a sentencing hearing, she received an effective ten-year sentence to be served in confinement. On appeal, the Defendant claims that the trial court erred by failing to apply mitigating factor (13) to her convictions. Upon review, we conclude that the trial court properly sentenced the Defendant. However, we also conclude that the Defendant’s conviction of possession of a Schedule II controlled substance with intent to sell in count three must be reversed and vacated because the Defendant was not charged with that offense and that the case must be remanded to the trial court for correction of the judgment in count four to reflect that the Defendant received a ten-year sentence for possession of a Schedule II controlled substance with intent to deliver. The Defendant’s convictions and effective ten-year sentence are affirmed in all other respects. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Robert Howard v. Monica Howard
This appeal concerns the trial court’s dismissal of a petition for an order of protection filed by the appellant |
Sullivan | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Tad F.
This action involves the termination of a mother’s parental rights to her minor child. Following a bench trial, the court found that clear and convincing evidence existed to establish the following statutory grounds of termination: (1) abandonment by failure to visit; (2) substantial noncompliance with the permanency plans; and (3) failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody of the child. The court also found that termination was in the best interest of the child. We affirm the trial court’s decision. |
Anderson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Jamie Rebecca Ryan
Defendant, Jamie Rebecca Ryan, pleaded guilty in Bedford County Circuit Court to one count of possession of 0.5 grams or more of methamphetamine with intent to sell, a Class B felony. The parties agreed to an eight-year sentence, with the manner of service of sentence left to the trial court’s discretion. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court ordered Defendant to serve her full sentence in the custody of the Tennessee Department of Correction (TDOC), consecutive to a five-year sentence for a prior unrelated offense. On appeal, Defendant argues the trial court abused its discretion in ordering Defendant to serve a sentence of full incarceration and in imposing consecutive sentences. After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Bedford | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
LaNorris O'Brien Chambers v. State of Tennessee
Petitioner, LaNorris O’Brien Chambers, appeals as of right from the Williamson County Circuit Court’s summary dismissal of his pro se petition for post-conviction relief, wherein he challenged his guilty-pleaded convictions for robbery and fraudulent use of a credit or debit card between $1,000 and $2,500 and resulting fifteen-year sentence. After appointed post-conviction counsel filed a notice that no amended petition would be filed, the post-conviction court found that Petitioner had raised a colorable claim of ineffective assistance of counsel; however, the court summarily dismissed the petition, reasoning that Petitioner had “fail[ed] to demonstrate any actual prejudice whatsoever” because he sought to be resentenced rather than rescind his guilty pleas and proceed to trial. On appeal, Petitioner asserts that he is entitled to an evidentiary hearing based upon his claims of having entered an unknowing and involuntary guilty plea after receiving ineffective assistance of counsel. Following our review, we affirm. |
Williamson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Tori Shannon (Barnes) Cole v. Skin RN Aesthetics, LLC Et Al.
An employer called the police after finding company property in an employee’s purse. The employee was arrested and charged with felony theft of property. She was later acquitted. After the acquittal, the employee sued her former employer for malicious prosecution. A jury found the employer liable for malicious continuation of the criminal proceedings. Because there is material evidence in the record to support the jury verdict, we affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Silva F.
Mother appeals the termination of her parental rights. The trial court found three grounds for termination: abandonment by failure to visit, abandonment by failure to support, and failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody. The trial court also concluded that terminating Mother’s parental rights was in the child’s best interest. We conclude that the trial court did not err in concluding either that a ground for termination was established or that termination is in the child’s best interest. |
Cumberland | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Richard Caldwell
Following a trial, a jury found Defendant, Richard Caldwell, guilty of felony evading arrest, reckless driving, and driving on a revoked or suspended license, for which Defendant received an effective two-year sentence. On appeal, Defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying his request for a jury instruction regarding the State’s duty to preserve evidence. After a thorough review of the record and applicable case law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Rutherford | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Jamie M. Cooper v. Bradley Cooper
In this divorce action, the trial court, inter alia, denied Husband any contact with the parties’ children until he follows all recommendations from a complete psychiatric evaluation and granted Wife a lifetime restraining order. Husband now appeals. We affirm the trial court’s decision to limit Husband’s parenting time pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-6-406. We vacate the lifetime restraining order and remand for the trial court to enter a more specific order pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 65.02. |
Henry | Court of Appeals | |
Robert Howard v. Monica Howard
This is an accelerated interlocutory appeal as of right pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10B section 2.02 from the trial court’s denial of a motion for recusal. Having reviewed the petition for recusal appeal, we affirm the trial court’s decision to deny the motion for recusal. |
Sullivan | Court of Appeals | |
Angel Marie White v. Jennifer C. Goodfred, D.O. ET AL.
This appeal specifically concerns health care liability claims arising from medical treatment that occurred in 2011 and 2012. After complaints were filed in 2019, the defendants at issue in this appeal sought to have the claims related to the 2011 and 2012 treatment dismissed. The trial court thereafter entered an order dismissing such claims, holding that they were barred by the three-year statute of repose. Although the plaintiff now appeals, her appellate brief is significantly noncompliant with applicable briefing requirements. In light of these briefing deficiencies, we hold that the plaintiff has waived any issues raised and that the appeal should therefore be dismissed. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Henry's Florist, Inc. v. Heather R. Knott
This case involves a disputed easement. Appellee filed a complaint for declaratory judgment asking the trial court to conclude that an easement existed in its favor. Appellant filed a counter complaint requesting a declaratory judgment that no easement existed and requesting an injunction prohibiting Appellee from using the disputed easement. On Appellee’s motion for summary judgment, the trial court concluded that an easement existed in favor of Appellee, and it denied the relief Appellant sought. Thereafter, the trial court granted Appellee’s motion to dismiss Appellant’s counter complaint. We agree that an easement exists, and we affirm the trial court’s order granting the motion for summary judgment. Because the summary judgment order granted relief in Appellee’s favor, Appellant’s request for relief in the counter complaint was denied on the merits, rendering the counter complaint moot. As such, we vacate the trial court’s order on the motion to dismiss. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
Albert Randall Worrell v. Obion County School District
Albert Randall Worrell injured his shoulder in the course and scope of his employment with Obion County School District. Mr. Worrell and Obion County entered into a settlement agreement. Among other things, the agreement required Obion County to pay for future medical expenses related to his work injury. Almost three years after his initial injury, Mr. Worrell’s doctors recommended that he undergo shoulder replacement surgery. The Court of Workers’ Compensation Claims concluded that Obion County was not required to pay for the shoulder replacement surgery because Mr. Worrell did not prove that the recommended surgery was causally related to his work injury. The Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board affirmed. In his appeal to this Panel, Mr. Worrell presses federal and state constitutional challenges to two provisions of Tennessee’s workers’ compensation law—Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-116 (2014), which instructs courts to construe the workers’ compensation law fairly and impartially, and Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-102(14) (Supp. 2016), which defines the term “injury.” Mr. Worrell argues that both provisions violate the substantive due process protections of the United States and Tennessee Constitutions and the Open Courts Clause of the Tennessee Constitution. He further argues that the definition of “injury” violates the equal protection guarantees of the federal and state constitutions. We hold that the challenged statutory provisions are constitutional and affirm the judgment of the Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board. |
Workers Compensation Panel | ||
Colleen Ann Hyder v. Board of Professional Responsibility of the Supreme Court of Tennessee
In this case, we review a trial court’s determination that a Montgomery County attorney violated Rule 5.5(a) of the Rules of Professional Conduct by practicing law while her license was suspended for failure to pay the professional privilege tax and the accompanying sanction of a public censure. Finding no abuse of discretion, we affirm. |
Montgomery | Supreme Court | |
Nashville Church of Christ, Inc., as successor-in-interest to Central Church of Christ v. Amy Grant Gill and Andrew M. Burton, as co-administrators of the Estate of A.M. Burton, et al.
This appeal involves a complaint to quiet title and for declaratory and injunctive relief filed by a church. The church had purchased property in 1925 pursuant to a deed providing that if the property ceased to be used for the purposes and objects described in the deed, it would “revert” to the estate of an individual who was then serving as a trustee of the church. In 2019, an attorney informed the church that he represented several individuals who were heirs of said trustee and were concerned that the property was not being used in a manner consistent with the deed. Thus, the church filed the instant complaint and sought a declaration that the restriction in the deed was no longer valid and enforceable, or in the alternative, it had not violated the restriction by utilizing the property in a manner inconsistent with the deed. The parties filed cross motions for partial summary judgment on the issues surrounding the validity of the deed restriction. The trial court granted partial summary judgment to the defendants, concluding that the restriction remained enforceable. Thus, the trial court noted that the remaining issue to be decided was whether the church had adhered to the applicable restriction. The church filed a motion asking the trial court to either certify its partial summary judgment order as final pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 54.02 or grant it permission to seek an interlocutory appeal pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 9. Before this motion was heard, however, an agreed order was entered certifying the trial court’s partial summary judgment order as final pursuant to Rule 54.02. The church appealed. We conclude that the trial court improvidently certified its order as final and dismiss the appeal. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Mazahir Hamadani v. Meshreky Meshreky
A landlord obtained a judgment from a General Sessions Court against his tenant for back rent and other damages. The tenant appealed, and the Circuit Court reduced the damages award. The landlord appeals to this court. The landlord, who is pro se, disregards the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure in his filings. His filings render his argument indiscernible. The landlord also failed to provide a record that fully and accurately depicts the underlying proceedings. Because the landlord’s deviations from the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure prevent this court from providing meaningful appellate review, we dismiss his appeal. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Gary Viles Motors, LLC v. Shawna M. Chance
This is an appeal from a jury verdict wherein the jury found that the defendant had met the burden to prove her |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Estate of Susan Ballard ET AL. v. State Farm Fire and Casualty CO.
This appeal concerns a breach of contract claim filed by an insured in relation to a homeowner’s insurance policy. The insurer filed a motion for summary judgment which the trial court initially denied, having determined that there were issues of material fact in dispute. Upon the filing of a renewed motion for summary judgment accompanied by two affidavits from an employee of the insurer that offered interpretations of the evidence in dispute, the trial court granted the insurer’s motion, determining that the affidavits resolved the factual disputes. Because we conclude that there are disputed issues of material fact such that summary judgment should not have been granted, we reverse the trial court’s judgment. |
Tipton | Court of Appeals | |
Alyssia Arnold et al. v. Jay Witt
This appeal arises out of a petition filed by Alyssia Arnold and Donavan Levenhagen (collectively, “Appellants”) seeking visitation with three minor children, Appellants’ half-siblings. The respondent moved to dismiss Appellants’ petition for visitation due to a lack of standing. The Lincoln County Juvenile Court (“juvenile court”) granted the motion to dismiss. Appellants appealed to the Lincoln County Circuit Court (“circuit court”), which also granted a motion to dismiss. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Lincoln | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Isaiah Jamal Simmons
The Defendant, Isaiah Jamal Simmons, appeals from his guilty-pleaded convictions in the |
Hamilton | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Linda R. Kerley v. George Olin Kerley
This is an appeal from a final decree of divorce in which the trial court determined that the assets accumulated |
Bledsoe | Court of Appeals | |
Moye Jones et al. v. Cathleen M. Craddock
This auto accident case involves an insurer’s claim that its limit of liability for uninsured motorist coverage should be offset due to the availability of payable workers’ compensation benefits. The trial court granted summary judgment to the insurer. We reverse and remand for further proceedings. |
Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Bentley R.
The Chancery Court for Madison County (“the Trial Court”) terminated the parental rights of River M. (“Mother”) to her son, Bentley R. (“the Child”). Mother appeals, challenging the Trial Court’s finding that termination of Mother’s parental rights was in the Child’s best interest. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm. |
Madison | Court of Appeals | |
Brittney C. Shedd v. Tennessee Board of Nursing
This is an appeal from an order dismissing a complaint for judicial review. Because the appellant did not file her notice of appeal with the clerk of the appellate court within thirty days after entry of the order as required by Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a), we dismiss the appeal. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Buford Dudley Creighton
Defendant, Buford Dudley Creighton, claims that the evidence presented at his bench trial was insufficient to support his conviction for identity theft. We determine that the proof was sufficient to show that Defendant used the personal identifying information of another with the intent to avoid criminal prosecution and affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals |