State of Tennessee v. Shanthony Mays
The Petitioner, Shanthony Mays, filed a petition for post-conviction relief challenging his convictions for aggravated robbery, aggravated assault, and unlawful possession of a weapon and the resulting twelve-year sentence. The post-conviction court denied relief, and the Petitioner appeals. On appeal, the Petitioner alleges the following: (1) that he provided new evidence establishing an improper jury venire; (2) that trial counsel was ineffective by failing to provide statistical information to show the systematic exclusion of African-Americans in the jury venire of Obion County; (3) that trial counsel was ineffective by failing to properly examine the State’s witnesses regarding the admissibility of evidence and impeachment; (4) that trial counsel was ineffective by failing to file a pretrial motion regarding the chain of custody for “tainted evidence”; and (5) that the post-conviction court should have given more weight to the co-defendant’s recantation of his trial testimony. After our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court denying the Petitioner relief. |
Obion | Court of Criminal Appeals | ||
In re Anna H., et al.
This case involves a petition to terminate parental rights. The petition was filed by the children’s biological father and stepmother against the biological mother. The trial court terminated the mother’s rights, finding that the mother abandoned the children under Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-1-113(g)(1) and -102(1)(A)(iv) and that termination was in the best interest of the children. We affirm the trial court’s decision and remand. |
Anderson | Court of Appeals | ||
Tracy Roberson v. State of Tennessee
Tracy Roberson, Petitioner, was convicted of one count of aggravated burglary, one count of especially aggravated kidnapping, one count of aggravated robbery, two counts of aggravated rape, and three counts of theft. The trial court sentenced Petitioner to an effective sentence of sixty years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On direct appeal, this court modified one of the theft counts and merged the three theft convictions, affirming all other judgments. Petitioner filed a pro se post-conviction petition and three amended petitions through counsel. Following a hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief. On appeal, Petitioner argues that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel and due process. After a thorough review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Hamilton | Court of Criminal Appeals | ||
In Re Brittany W. Et Al.
This appeal concerns the termination of a mother’s parental rights. The Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) filed a petition in the Juvenile Court for Cocke County (“the Juvenile Court”) seeking to terminate the parental rights of Jamie W. (“Mother”) to her minor children, Brittany W. and Isaiah W. (“the Children,” collectively). After a hearing, the Juvenile Court entered an order terminating Mother’s parental rights on three grounds. Mother appeals, arguing that termination of her parental rights is not in the Children’s best interest. We find, first, that the grounds found against Mother were proven by clear and convincing evidence. We find further, also by clear and convincing evidence, that termination of Mother’s parental rights is in the Children’s best interest. We affirm the Juvenile Court. |
Cocke | Court of Appeals | ||
Angela Varner Nickerson v. Knox County, Tennessee
Employee filed a workers’ compensation claim against Employer alleging mental injury resulting from traumatic work-related experiences that occurred years earlier. Employer denied the claim and moved for summary judgment citing the statute of limitations. The Court of Workers’ Compensation Claims denied the motion. The Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board vacated the order and remanded for the court to consider whether it had subject matter jurisdiction based on Employee’s alleged date of injury. After a second hearing, the court again denied summary judgment, concluding the date of Employee’s mental injury should be determined by the “discovery rule” and the “last day worked” rule. The Appeals Board reversed and remanded for entry of an order of dismissal based on lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Employee appealed. The appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51. We affirm the judgment of the Appeals Board and adopt its opinion as set forth in the attached Appendix. |
Workers Compensation Panel | |||
State of Tennessee v. Ricky Allen Davis
The Appellant, Ricky Allen Davis, was convicted in the Knox County Criminal Court of first degree premediated murder and unlawful possession of a firearm and received concurrent sentences of life and eight years, respectively. On appeal, the Appellant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support the convictions and that the trial court committed plain error by admitting a witness’s hearsay statement into evidence, by allowing a witness to testify that she saw the Appellant with a gun prior to the shooting when there was no evidence that it was the same gun used in the shooting, and by allowing a witness to testify that low-income people often shared cellular telephones and did not help the police due to fear of retribution. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | ||
P.H. v. Gregory O. Cole
P.H. and Gregory O. Cole dated for a period of time between 2014 and 2018. P.H. learned in 2018 that she had become infected with HSV-2, a sexually transmitted disease commonly known as genital herpes. P.H. believed she contracted HSV-2 from Mr. Cole and filed a complaint against him asserting claims for battery, intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligent infliction of emotional distress, negligence per se, and fraud. Mr. Cole denied transmitting HSV-2 to P.H. and underwent blood tests to determine whether or not he was infected. When his blood test came back negative for HSV-2, Mr. Cole moved for summary judgment and attached as an exhibit the declaration of Dr. Fritz Wawa, the physician in charge of the medical center where Mr. Cole had his blood drawn, as well as the test results showing his negative status for HSV-2. P.H. opposed the motion for summary judgment and suggested that Mr. Cole’s test results may have shown a false negative, and not be reliable, if he were immunocompromised. In response, Mr. Cole returned to the medical center to have additional blood drawn and tested for HIV. The additional test results showed that Mr. Cole did not have HIV and that he was not immunocompromised. Mr. Cole filed a reply to P.H.’s opposition to his motion for summary judgment and attached a second declaration from Dr. Wawa and a copy of his second blood test to show that he was not immunocompromised. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | ||
Flora Gordon v. Cherie Felps Harwood Et Al.
The notice of appeal filed by the appellant, Flora Gordon, stated that the appellant was appealing the judgment entered on April 1, 2021. Because the order appealed from does not constitute a final appealable judgment, this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider this appeal. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | ||
State of Tennessee v. Desmond Price
Desmond Price, Defendant, entered a guilty plea to one count of attempted conspiracy to possess more than 150 grams of heroin in exchange for a nine-year sentence and the dismissal of the remaining three counts of the indictment. The parties agreed that Defendant would serve his sentence consecutively to the sentence for another unrelated conviction. Subsequently, Defendant filed a motion pursuant to Rule 35 of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure, arguing that he was a candidate for split confinement. The trial court denied the motion. This appeal followed. After our review, we determine that the trial court properly denied the relief sought by Defendant in the Rule 35 motion. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. The matter is remanded to the trial court for entry of judgments dismissing the remaining three counts of the indictment. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | ||
State of Tennessee v. Eric Manzenberger
A jury convicted the Defendant of driving under the influence of an intoxicant, driving in excess of the speed limit, and violating the light law, and he received an effective sentence of eleven months and twenty-nine days, with the sentence to be suspended after fourteen days in confinement. On appeal, the Defendant asserts that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress certain statements made to law enforcement. After a review of the record, we conclude that the Defendant was not in custody under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), and we affirm the judgments. |
Sevier | Court of Criminal Appeals | ||
State of Tennessee v. Crystal Michelle Rickman
Defendant, Crystal Rickman, was convicted by a jury of aggravated assault by strangulation or attempted strangulation and domestic assault. The trial court imposed an effective fifteen-year sentence, as a Range III persistent offender, to be served in the Department of Correction. On appeal, Defendant argues: that the evidence was insufficient to support her convictions; that she was denied a fair and impartial trial because of inadmissible hearsay; that she was denied the right to a fair and impartial trial because neither the State nor the defense called the victim to testify at trial; that the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury as to the missing witness rule; that the trial court erred by not allowing her to call witnesses to testify at the motion for new trial hearing; and that her sentence was excessive. Following our review of the entire record and the briefs of the parties, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | ||
In Re Jayden L.
This is an appeal from a termination of parental rights case. While the trial court concluded that two grounds for termination existed in this case, it determined that there was a lack of clear and convincing evidence that the termination of the mother’s rights was in the child’s best interests. For the reasons stated herein, namely the absence of appropriate findings under Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-1-113(k), we vacate the trial court’s order with respect to the grounds for termination and remand the case for the preparation of appropriate findings of fact and conclusions of law. |
Hawkins | Court of Appeals | ||
Cynthia E.Yebuah, Et Al. v. Center For Urological Treatment, PLC
This is a healthcare liability action involving the application of the statutory cap on noneconomic damages to loss of consortium claims. The issue before the Court is whether the statutory cap on noneconomic damages applies separately to a spouse’s loss of consortium claim pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-39-102, thus allowing each plaintiff to receive an award of up to $750,000 in noneconomic damages. Here, the surgery patient filed suit for noneconomic damages resulting from the defendant physicians’ negligence, namely that a portion of a Gelport device was unintentionally left in her body after surgery. In the same suit, the patient’s spouse claimed damages for loss of consortium. The jury awarded the patient $4,000,000 in damages for pain and suffering and loss of enjoyment of life. The jury also awarded her husband $500,000 in damages for loss of consortium. The trial court initially applied the statutory cap on noneconomic damages by entering a judgment in favor of both plaintiffs collectively for a total judgment of $750,000. However, the trial court subsequently granted the plaintiffs’ motion to alter or amend and applied the statutory cap to each plaintiff separately, thereby entering a judgment of $750,000 for the patient and $500,000 for her husband. The Court of Appeals affirmed. We hold that the language of Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-39-102 allows both plaintiffs to recover only $750,000 in the aggregate for noneconomic damages. We therefore reverse the holding of the Court of Appeals and the trial court. |
Davidson | Supreme Court | ||
Cynthia E. Yebuah, Et Al. v. Center For Urological Treatment, PLC - Dissenting
This case illustrates how the damages cap statute, Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-39-102, deprives injured plaintiffs of fair compensation by arbitrarily limiting their awards for noneconomic damages. Cynthia Yebuah and her husband, Eric Yebuah, suffered noneconomic damages because of the carelessness of Mrs. Yebuah’s surgeon. Based on the evidence at trial, a jury awarded Mrs. Yebuah more than $750,000 in noneconomic damages for her pain and suffering and loss of enjoyment of life and awarded Mr. Yebuah less than $750,000 for his loss of consortium. The issue here is whether the trial court must apply the $750,000 statutory cap on noneconomic damages separately to each of the Yebuahs’ awards or to the combined total of their awards. If the cap is applied separately to each award, the trial court must slash the jury’s verdict to Mrs. Yebuah by 81% and allow Mr. Yebuah to recover all of the damages the jury awarded him. If the cap is applied to the combined total of the awards, then the trial court must cut the total award to the Yebuahs by 83%. Neither application can withstand constitutional scrutiny. I decline to choose between these two alternatives; both are unconstitutional violations of the Yebuahs’ right to trial by jury. See McClay v. Airport Mgmt. Servs., LLC, 596 S.W.3d 686, 701–09 (Tenn. 2020) (Lee, J., dissenting). |
Davidson | Supreme Court | ||
Kwame Leo Lillard v. James Walker, Et Al.
This appeal arises out of a dispute over a mobile home and real property. Because the appealed order awards reasonable attorney’s fees but does not set the amount of those fees, we dismiss the appeal for lack of a final judgment. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | ||
Cedra Deanntre Potts (Taylor) v. Starr Anastasia Potts
This appeal arises from the denial of the plaintiff’s Tenn. R. Civ. P. 60.02 motion requesting relief from an agreed-upon permanent parenting plan that was approved by the court and incorporated into the final divorce decree. The plaintiff contended that the defendant spouse lacked standing to seek custody and visitation of the minor children, who were conceived by in vitro fertilization;[1] therefore, the permanent parenting plan was void for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, i.e., standing was jurisdictional. The material facts are that the couple entered into a contract with a reproductive clinic in October 2013 to perform an in vitro fertilization procedure, with each party signing the contract as “Prospective Parent.” The reproductive clinic impregnated the plaintiff with embryos created from the plaintiff’s eggs and donated sperm. As a result of the procedure, the plaintiff gave birth to twins in July 2014. The parties, a same-sex couple, married in June 2015, shortly following the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644 (2015). In August 2017, the plaintiff filed for divorce, contending there were no children born of the marriage, and the defendant filed an answer and a counter-complaint alleging there were two children born of the marriage and requesting that the court designate her as the primary residential parent. After the parties resolved all issues, the trial court entered a final divorce decree, incorporating an agreed-upon permanent parenting plan that (1) stated the children were a product of the parties’ marriage, (2) designated the plaintiff as the primary residential parent with 240 days of parenting time per year and designated the defendant as the alternate residential parent with 125 days of parenting time, (3) provided for joint decision-making authority, and (4) ordered the defendant to pay child support. Three months after the divorce decree became a final judgment, the plaintiff filed the Rule 60.02 motion at issue in this appeal. Following briefing and a hearing, the trial court determined that the defendant was able to establish parentage under Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-2-403 because she met the requirements of the statute, in that she was a party to the written contract consenting to the in vitro fertilization procedure, and she accepted full legal rights and responsibilities for the embryos and any children that resulted. The trial court also determined that the defendant was entitled to the presumption that she was the children’s parent in accordance with § 36-2-304(a)(4) because the defendant held the children out as her natural children. For these and other reasons, the trial court denied the plaintiff’s Rule 60.02 motion for relief. This appeal followed. Because the custody and visitation statutes specifically provide that only a parent has standing to seek custody and visitation in a divorce action, “the issue of standing is interwoven with that of subject matter jurisdiction and becomes a jurisdictional prerequisite.”Osborn v. Marr, 127 S.W.3d 737, 740 (Tenn. 2004). Therefore, the defendant must fit the statutory definition of “parent” for the court to have jurisdiction to grant visitation. Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-2-403 provides the single means of establishing the parentage of children born as a result of the in vitro fertilization procedure. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-2-401. Contrary to the plaintiff’s contention that all of the gametes (both the sperm and the egg) must be donated for § 36-2-403 to apply, we read the statute as addressing situations such as this one, where only half of the gametes are donated, as well as situations where all of the gametes are donated. Because the defendant contractually agreed to accept full legal rights and responsibilities for the embryos and any children produced as a result, the defendant is presumed to be the children’s parent under § 36-2-403(d); therefore, the defendant had standing to seek custody and visitation in the underlying divorce action. Accordingly, the trial court had subject matter jurisdiction over the controversy. For these reasons, we affirm the trial court’s decision to deny the plaintiff’s Rule 60.02 motion for relief from the judgment.
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Davidson | Court of Appeals | ||
Khalid Almuawi v. Antwan Gregory
The plaintiff and defendant were in a car accident when the defendant’s car rear-ended the plaintiff’s car. The defendant admitted liability, leaving only the issue of damages for trial. The jury awarded the plaintiff some damages, but the plaintiff argued he was entitled to a larger sum than the jury awarded. The plaintiff also argued that the defendant’s attorney misrepresented the evidence in his closing argument and that he was entitled to a new trial. We conclude that the jury’s verdict was supported by material evidence and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the plaintiff’s motion for a new trial. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | ||
State of Tennessee v. Bobby Wayne Centers
The Appellant, Bobby Wayne Centers, was convicted by a jury in the White County Criminal Court of the sale of 26 grams or more of methamphetamine, the delivery of 26 grams or more of methamphetamine, the possession of 26 grams or more of methamphetamine with the intent to sell; and the possession of 26 grams or more of methamphetamine with the intent to deliver. The trial court merged the sale of methamphetamine conviction and the possession with intent to sell methamphetamine conviction into a single conviction and merged the delivery of methamphetamine conviction and the possession with intent to deliver methamphetamine conviction into a single conviction. The trial court imposed concurrent sentences of eighteen years as a Range II, multiple offender with release eligibility after service of thirty-five percent of the sentence in confinement. On appeal, the Appellant contends that the trial court erred by allowing Agent Eaton to narrate the video of the drug transaction. Upon review, we conclude that the case must be remanded to the trial court for the correction of the judgments to reflect the merger of all of the convictions into the sale of methamphetamine conviction. The judgments of the trial court are affirmed in all other respects. |
White | Court of Criminal Appeals | ||
Rico Huey v. State of Tennessee
Rico Huey, Petitioner, filed a pro se petition seeking post-conviction relief from his 2016 aggravated robbery conviction. Appointed counsel filed an amended petition. Following an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | ||
Calvin Jones v. State of Tennessee
Calvin Jones, Petitioner, filed a pro se petition seeking post-conviction relief from his 2012 convictions for aggravated child abuse and first degree felony murder. Following an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | ||
Diversified Financial Services, LLC v. Jeffrey Wayne Daniels
Defendant appeals the trial court’s decision to grant summary judgment to the plaintiff in this breach of contract case. Because Appellant failed to comply with Rule 27 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure and Rule 6 of the Rules of the Court of Appeals of Tennessee, we dismiss this appeal and remand to the trial court for a determination of the plaintiff’s damages incurred in defending a frivolous appeal. |
Lauderdale | Court of Appeals | ||
Ritchie Phillips, Et Al. v. Mark Hatfield
The issue in this case is whether restrictive covenants executed and recorded by the developers of a subdivision after they had sold the parties’ lots apply to the Defendant’s property. The developers platted a subdivision and sold the vast majority of lots with time-limited restrictions against non-residential use expressly stated in the deeds that conveyed the lots. Thereafter, the developers recorded a declaration of more fulsome, non-time-limited restrictive covenants—including a restriction against non-residential use—that purported to apply to all lots in the subdivision. Decades later, well after the expiration of the time-limited deed restrictions, the Defendant purchased lots and proposed to build a structure for the operation of a retail business. The Plaintiffs, who reside in a home on lots adjacent to the Defendant’s property, brought a declaratory judgment action to enforce the non-time-limited restriction against non-residential use contained in the recorded declaration. The trial court enjoined the Defendant’s proposed commercial use, concluding that the Defendant’s property was—through the declaration—subject to an implied negative reciprocal easement that prohibited non-residential use. The Court of Appeals affirmed. We hold that the developers lacked the authority to impose the declaration’s restrictions upon the Defendant’s property because they did not own those lots when they executed and recorded the declaration. We further hold that the developers’ mere re-acquisition and re-sale of some of the Defendant’s lots after the recording of the declaration did not retroactively restrict the Defendant’s property through the declaration. Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals. |
Sullivan | Supreme Court | ||
State of Tennessee v. Tyrone E. Murphy
The Hamilton County Grand Jury indicted Defendant, Tyrone E. Murphy, with one count of first degree premeditated murder and one count of tampering with evidence in the death of Ashley Cates, the victim. The State proceeded solely on the count of first degree premeditated murder. The jury convicted Defendant as charged, and the trial court sentenced Defendant to life imprisonment. On appeal, Defendant argues that the trial court erred by denying his motion in limine to exclude post-mortem photographs of the victim and that the evidence was insufficient to support the verdict. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. |
Hamilton | Court of Criminal Appeals | ||
State of Tennessee v. Xavier Montelious Riley
Xavier Montelious Riley, Defendant, entered a best interest guilty plea with the length and manner of the service of the sentence to be determined following a sentencing hearing. The trial court denied an alternative sentence and imposed an effective sentence of ten years and six months to be served in confinement. After a review of the record and applicable law and finding no error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | ||
State of Tennessee v. Jasper Lee Vick
The petitioner, Jasper Lee Vick, appeals from the summary dismissal of his petition for post-conviction DNA analysis. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court summarily dismissing the petition. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals |