Barbara J. Hand, Administratrix of Estate of Charles D. Hand, Deceased, v. Norfolk Southern Railway Company
03A01-9704-CV-00123
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Houston M. Goddard
Trial Court Judge: Judge Robert M. Summitt

This is a suit brought under the Federal Employers Liability Act. It was brought by Plaintiff Barbara J. Hand, Administratrix of the estate of her deceased husband, Charles D. Hand, against his employer, Defendant Norfolk Southern Railway Company. The jury rendered a verdict in favor of the Plaintiff and assessed damages in the amount of $3,250,000. The Defendant appeals, raising nine separate issues. Although many do not merit a protracted discussion, others raise substantial questions.

Greg Swafford,M.D., v. Memphis Individual Practive Association, Southern Health Plan, Inc., The Apple Plan, et al.
02A01-9612-CV-00311
Authoring Judge: Judge Holly Kirby Lillard
Trial Court Judge: Judge Robert L. Childers

This is a libel suit brought by a physician against a health maintenance organization and related health insurance entities. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants based on the statute of limitations. The lawsuit involves allegedly false information reported to the National Practitioner Data Bank. In an issue of first impression, we hold that each dissemination of the allegedly defamatory information by the Data Bank gives rise to a separate cause of action. The grant of summary judgment is affirmed in part and reversed in part, and the cause is remanded.

Raymond Mitchell v. Camelot Utility District for Hawkins County, Tennessee
03A01-9709-CH-00394
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Houston M. Goddard
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Thomas R. Frierson

Plaintiff  Raymond Mitchell sues Defendant Camelot Utility District of Hawkins County, Tennessee. He alleges that Camelot, in acquiring a quit claim deed from him conveying two tracts of land, one that contains an artesian well and the other equipment in connection with distribution of water to the adjacent area.  He contends that as a consideration for the quit claim deed, John Valetta, President of Camelot, represented to him that Camelot would provide water taps for two of his lots free of charge and, upon acquisition of an alternate water source, would re-convey the quit claimed lots to him.

Win Myint and wife Patti KI. Myint v. Allstate Insurance Company
01S01-9612-CH-00238
Authoring Judge: Justice Aldolpho A. Birch, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Special Chancellor Christina Norris

In this cause, the insuror refused to pay a claim under a policy of insurance. The insured contends that such refusal constitutes an “unfair or deceptive act or practice,” in violation
of the Consumer Protection Act, Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 47-18-101, et seq.1 In contrast, the insuror insists that Tenn. Code Ann. § 56- 7-105,2 commonly known as the “bad faith statute,” is the exclusive remedy for the bad faith denial of an insurance claim. Because Title 56, Chapters 7 and 8 of the Tennessee Code comprehensively regulates the insurance industry, the insuror insists that the acts and practices of an insurance company are never subject to the Consumer Protection Act.

Win Myint and Patti Kay Myint, et. ux. v. Allstate Insurance Company
01S01-9612-CH-00238
Authoring Judge: Justice Adolpho A. Birch, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Special Chancellor Christina Norris

In this cause, the insuror refused to pay a claim under a policy of insurance. The insured contends that such refusal constitutes an “unfair or deceptive act or practice,” in violation of the Consumer Protection Act, Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 47-18-101, et seq.1 In contrast, the insuror insists that Tenn. Code Ann. § 56- 7-105,2 commonly known as the “bad faith statute,” is the exclusive remedy for the bad faith denial of an insurance claim. Because Title 56, Chapters 7 and 8 of the Tennessee Code comprehensively regulates the insurance industry, the insuror insists that the acts and practices of an insurance company are never subject to the Consumer Protection Act.

Castlewood Inc., v. Anderson County, Tennessee; Patsy Stair, Trustee; Owen K. Richardson, Tax Assessor, City of Oak Ridge, Tennessee, and the Tennessee State Board of Equalization
03S01-9705-CH-00053
Authoring Judge: Special Justice Lyle Reid
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor William W. Lantrip

This case presents for review the Court of Appeals' decision that the classificatin as industrial and commercial of two or more condominiums units rented by the owners to others for their use as residences does not violate Article II, Section 28 of the Tennessee Constitution. Nor does the statute violate the equal protection clause of the United States Constitution. That decision is affirmed.

Robert Harold Bomely, Jr. v. Mid-America Corporation, D/B/A Burger King
03S01-9605-CH-00059
Authoring Judge: Justice Frank W. Drowota, III
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Frederick D. McDonald

In this workers’ compensation action the Second Injury Fund, defendant-appellant, has appealed from a judgment of the Chancery Court of Knox County which found the employee, Robert Bomely, plaintiff-appellee, to be totally and permanently disabled. The award was apportioned 65 percent to the employer, Mid- America Corporation, d/b/a Burger King, defendant-appellee, and 35 percent to the Second Injury Fund under Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-208(b). The trial court assessed
the employer’s liability based on 400 weeks of benefits and held the Second Injury Fund liable for the remaining 938 weeks of benefits (until the employee reached the age of 651). Thus, the employer’s liability was limited to 65 percent of 400 weeks rather than 65 percent of the total number of weeks to age 65. We transferred this case from the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel to decide whether it was proper to have limited the employer’s liability in this fashion. After carefully examining the record before us and considering the relevant authorities, we conclude that the award should be apportioned between the employer and the Second Injury
Fund based on the total number of weeks to age 65 rather than limiting the employer’s liability to a percentage of 400 weeks. Accordingly, that portion of the trial court’s judgment is reversed. We shall also address (1) whether an award of permanent total disability is subject to the monetary cap imposed by the 400 week maximum total benefit provision of Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-102(a)(6) and (2) whether the apportionment of benefits between the employer and the Second Injury Fund in this case is controlled by subsection (a) or (b) of Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-208.

Patricia Love v. American Olean Tile Company and Liberty Mutual Insurance Company and Sue Ann Head, Director of the Div of Worker's Comp, Division of Worker's Compensation - State of Tennessee
02S01-9508-CV-00077
Authoring Judge: Justice Frank F. Drowota, III
Trial Court Judge: Judge Whit A. Lafon

In this workers’ compensation action, the employee, Patricia Love, plaintiff-appellant, has appealed from a judgment of the Circuit Court of Madison County awarding her permanent total disability benefits to age 65 or until the payment of such benefits reached the maximum total benefit. The trial court apportioned the award 67.5 percent to the Second Injury Fund and 32.5 percent to the employer, American Olean Tile Company, and its insurer, Liberty Mutual Insurance Company, defendants-appellees. The Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel, upon reference for findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-225(e)(5), affirmed the trial court. Thereafter, the employee filed a motion for full Court review of the Panel’s decision. We granted the motion for review to determine (1) whether it was error not to have awarded benefits payable to age 65 notwithstanding the maximum total benefit, and (2) whether the apportionment between the employer and the Second Injury Fund was correct. After examining the record before us and considering the relevant authorities, we reverse the decision of the lower courts to subject the employee’s award to the maximum total benefit. However, we affirm the apportionment of the award between the employer and the Second Injury Fund under Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-208(a).

Patricia Love vs. American Olean Tile Company and Liberty Mutual Insurance Company, and Sue Ann Head, Director of the Divison of Workers' Compensation, State of Tennessee - Concurring/Dissenting
02-S-01-9508-CV-00077
Authoring Judge: Justice Janice M. Holder
Trial Court Judge: Judge Whit A. Lafon

I rely on my concurring and dissenting opinion in Bomely v. Mid-American Corp., ___ S.W.2d ___ (Tenn. 1998). While I agree with the majority's conclusion that awards of permanent and total disability are payable to age sixtyfive, I continue to disagree, as voiced in my Bomely dissent, with the majority's analysis of apportionment which discourages employers from hiring the handicapped and is contrary to the stated legislative purpose behind the Second Injury Fund legislation. An employer's liability should be limited to the first 400 weeks of benefits unless the subsequent injury would have in and of itself caused permanent and total disability in the absence of any prior injuries or disabilities. In such cases, the employer should bear responsibility for the entire award to age sixty-five.

Northwest Airlines, Inc., Federal Express Corp., American Airlines, Inc., Flagship Airlines, and Delta Airlines, Inc. v. Tennessee State Bd. of Equalization and CSX Transportation et al.
01S01-9702-FD-00030
Authoring Judge: Special Justice Lyle Reid
Trial Court Judge: Judge Thomas A. Wiseman, Jr.

This Court has accepted from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee, certified question of law regarding the effect of the 1996 amendment to Tenn. Code Ann. §
467 - 5 - 1512 ( b ) ( 2 ) on the calculation of interest on property tax paymens and refunds. 

James J. Benson v. State of Tennessee
01S01-9704-CC-00089
Authoring Judge: Special Justice Lyle Reid
Trial Court Judge: Judge Donald Harris

This case presents for review the appeal by the petitioner, James J. Benson, from the judgment of the Cour tof Criminal Appeals affirming the trila court's denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. The petitioner asserts that he was denied the right to a fair trial before an impartial judge because the judge who presided over his criminal trial solicitated a bribe from him. The judment denying the petition is reversed, and the petioner is granted a new trial.

Jimmy Elliott v. Jackie Evans Trucking, Inc.
03S01-9709-CV-00108
Authoring Judge: William H. Inman, Senior Judge
Trial Court Judge: Hon. Carroll L. Ross,
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The plaintiff alleged and testified that on April 7, 1995 he jumped from a truck bed approximately four feet to the ground, twisting his left leg in the process. Sharp pain and swelling immediately occurred and he received emergency room treatment. Seven days later Dr. Robert Beasly, an orthopedic surgeon, performed a meniscectomy for a torn medial meniscus, followed by a left patellectomy and valgus osteomy with metal plate emplacement. The defendant responded that the plaintiff's knee problem pre-existed the alleged injury, and that the torn meniscus was of many years duration. The trial court found that the injury occurred as alleged, and awarded benefits based on "4 percent impairment to the lower body; 16 percent to the body as a whole," later amended to a finding of 1 percent leg impairment with benefits calculated on that basis. Both parties appealed; the plaintiff complains of the refusal of the trial judge to find whole body disability with resultant benefits, and the defendant complains that the finding of the trial court is contrary to the preponderance of the evidence. The judgment is affirmed. Review of the findings of fact made by the trial court is de novo upon the record of the trial court, accompanied by a presumption of the correctness of the finding, unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise. T.C.A. _ 5-6- 225(e)(2). Stone v. City of McMinnville, 896 S.W.2d 548, 55 (Tenn. 1995). Although there is evidence that the plaintiff's knee problem pre-existed his alleged injury, and that it was not job-related, there is evidence accredited 2

Hon. Frank v. Williams, Iii,
03S01-9706-CH-00062
Authoring Judge: William H. Inman, Senior Judge
Trial Court Judge: Hon. Billy Joe White,
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with T.C.A. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Plaintiff filed suit in 1989 for work-related injury to his left hand and alleged a related psychiatric disability. By final judgment entered September 5, 1991, the trial court awarded accrued and future medical and psychiatric benefits and permanent partial disability to his hand but found he had failed to prove any permanent psychiatric disability. The judgment was not appealed. On January 2, 1995, plaintiff filed this suit alleging that (1) under T.C.A. _ 5-6-231 he was entitled to modification of the 1991 final judgment due to increased psychiatric impairment, or (2) in the alternative, he was entitled to benefits for a new accidental [psychiatric] injury which occurred on September 2, 1994. The trial court found that plaintiff had failed to prove that he gave timely notice to the employer of a new work-related accident, had failed to prove a new compensable injury, and was barred from reopening the prior case for modification of the award owing to the doctrine of res judicata and the statute of limitations, since the denial of permanent psychiatric disability in that case was never appealed. The plaintiff appeals, insisting that notice of a new injury was provided to the defendant in a letter to the employer from his doctor and by comments made by the plaintiff at work, and that a particular stressful incident at work was a sufficient mental stimulus to constitute a new psychiatric injury. Defendant insists the trial judge correctly decided those issues and correctly held that the denial of permanent psychiatric disability in 1991 was not subject 2

Curtis R. Thrapp vs. Mary Elizabeth Thrapp
E2006-00088-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Herschel P. Franks
Trial Court Judge: W. Dale Young
The parties were divorced in Oregon where the Court ordered the custodial arrangement for the only child of the marriage. The Mother then moved to Colorado, where she filed suit in Colorado in the custody dispute. She then moved to Tennessee, where the Father sued her over the ongoing dispute. The Colorado Court ultimately declined jurisdiction and the Tennessee Court ordered a change of the custody. The mother has appealed. We affirm the change of custody.

Ogilvie vs. Metro Gov't. vs. Nashille Electric Svc.
01A01-9709-CV-00466
Trial Court Judge: Thomas W. Brothers

McMahan vs. Whisman
01A01-9711-CH-00681
Trial Court Judge: Ellen Hobbs Lyle

Ramsey vs. Burkhalter & Ryan
01A01-9707-CH-00318
Trial Court Judge: Ellen Hobbs Lyle

TN. Real Estate Comm. vs. Hamilton
01A01-9707-CH-00320
Trial Court Judge: Ellen Hobbs Lyle

Coastcom, Inc. vs. Cruzen, et.ux.
01A01-9707-CH-00349
Trial Court Judge: H. Denmark Bell

Hawkins & Gossett vs. Hart, et. al.
01A01-9707-CV-00294
Trial Court Judge: Barbara N. Haynes

J.B. Hinson, et. ux. vs. Beechview Corp.
01A01-9709-CH-00498
Trial Court Judge: Robert L. Jones

Moore, et. ux. vs. Phillips, Sr.
01A01-9605-CH-00197
Trial Court Judge: Jeffrey F. Stewart

Dept. of Children's Svcs. vs. Stanfill
01A01-9710-JV-00616
Trial Court Judge: Andrew J. Shookhoff

Montague vs. Dept. of Corrections
01A01-9711-CH-00667
Trial Court Judge: Ellen Hobbs Lyle

Charles Montague, v. Tennessee Department of Corrections, and Warden Howard Carlton
01A01-9711-CH-00667
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Henry F. Todd
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Ellen Hobbs Lyle

The plaintiff, a prisoner in the custody of the Tennessee Department of Correction, brought this action against the Department and its Commissioner seeking a declaratory judgment that he is entitled to a refund of $64.00 charged against his custodial account for a key lost by the prisoner.