Tucker v. Ercl 03S01-9603-CV-00025
Authoring Judge: Roger E. Thayer, Special Judge
Trial Court Judge: Hon. Rex Henry Ogle
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Plaintiff, Dorothy Tucker, has appealed from the action of the trial court in dismissing her complaint and refusing to reconsider the issue of whether disputed material issues of fact exist. Defendant employer, ERCL, Inc., and defendant insurance carrier, Lumbermen's Mutual Casualty Company, have filed a motion to dismiss the appeal on the ground a notice of appeal was not timely filed within thirty days after the entry of an order sustaining a motion for summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The motion for summary judgment was filed on January 13, 1995, and was supported by a deposition from plaintiff's treating doctor stating that there was no permanent impairment as a result of plaintiff's injury. Temporary total disability benefits as well as existing authorized medical expenses had been paid. Plaintiff did not file an opposing affidavit or deposition and an order was eventually entered on March 22, 1995, sustaining the motion and dismissing the case. On April 2, 1995, plaintiff filed a motion pursuant to Rule 59, T.R.Civ.P., requesting the court to reconsider, vacate the order of dismissal and set the case for trial. The motion was styled "Motion for Reconsideration" and was supported by an affidavit from Dr. Scott L. Parson, a chiropractor, stating his examination of plaintiff indicated she had a l% impairment due to the injury of her elbow. The trial court denied the motion stating the affidavit came too late. This order was entered on January 5, 1996, and a notice of appeal was filed on January 1, 1996, reciting the appeal was being taken from the entry of the two orders of the trial court. Defendants contend it is well established a motion to reconsider will not toll the thirty day period after entry of a final judgment and cite the cases of Anthony v. Kelly Foods Inc., 74 S.W.2d 35 (Tenn. 1986) and Daugherty v. Lumbermen's Underwriting Alliance, 798 S.W.2d 754 (Tenn. 199). In the Anthony case, a 2
Gregory Eidson vs. State M2004-02528-CCA-R3-HC
Authoring Judge: Judge Robert W. Wedemeyer
Trial Court Judge: Jane W. Wheatcraft
The Petitioner, Gregory Eidson, appeals from the dismissal of his petition for the writ of habeas corpus. The State has filed a motion requesting that the Court affirm the trial court's denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. We find the State's motion has merit. Accordingly, the motion is granted and the appeal is affirmed pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals.
Sumner
Court of Criminal Appeals
Atwell v. Colonial 03S01-9609-CV-00090
Authoring Judge: Roger E. Thayer, Special Judge
Trial Court Judge: Hon. Harold W Imberly,
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Plaintiff, S. Scott Atwell, has appealed from the trial court's action in modifying a portion of a judgment which provided for a structured settlement of a workers' compensation claim. Originally the parties to this action entered a judgment on September 17, 1993, finding plaintiff to be totally (1%) disabled and providing the award would be payable as follows: a. Lump sum payment of $55,235. upon the entry of judgment. b. Payment of $588. every two weeks for a one year period. c. Lump sum payment of $14,34. on August 3, 1994. d. Lump sum payment of $14,34. on February 28, 1995. e. Lump sum payment of $15,37. on February 28, 1996. Upon learning plaintiff was engaged in certain work activities, the defendant, Colonial Freight Systems, Inc., filed a motion on March 8, 1995, to modify the last two annual payments upon the ground the evidence indicated the employee was not totally disabled. This motion was filed pursuant to the provisions of T. C. A. _ 5-6- 231 and Rule 6, T. R. Civ. P. After conducting a hearing, the trial court found there had been a "change of circumstances" and entered an order relieving the employer of the responsibility of paying the last two annual payments. The order did not state whether relief was granted pursuant to the statute or Rule 6 or both. This ruling was based upon evidence the employee had been working at a construction site in South Carolina over a certain period of time. Evidence of this nature was produced at the hearing by a private investigator who had observed the employee and a video made at the construction site. On appeal the employee argues the payments which the court abated were classified as lump sum payments and were not subject to modification under the statutory language and further that the evidence did not justify relief under Rule 6. 2
Knox
Workers Compensation Panel
Mcmahan v. City of Newport 03S01-9607-CV-00080
Authoring Judge: John K. Byers, Senior Judge
Trial Court Judge: Hon. William R. Holt, Jr.,
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The trial judge found that the plaintiff had sustained a ten percent permanent partial disability as a result of a work-related accident, although he did not have any additional assigned medical impairment. Plaintiff appeals, challenging the trial court's findings that plaintiff was not assigned an additional medical impairment rating and that plaintiff had a ten percent permanent partial disability. He also argues that the trial court should have reconsidered plaintiff's permanent partial disability award from his first injury. We affirm the trial court's judgment. Plaintiff, 45, has an eighth-grade education. He served with the Marines in Vietnam, has worked as a welder and has worked in maintenance. In 1983, he began working for the city of Newport, performing mostly maintenance tasks. He injured his back on October 8, 1992, for which surgery was performed; he returned to work after this surgery. He was awarded 4% permanent partial disability benefits for this injury. The trial court in that case found that plaintiff had a 15% medical impairment rating based on the testimony of Dr. Alan Whiton, plaintiff's treating orthopedic surgeon, that plaintiff's impairment could be as high as 15%. Plaintiff re-injured his back on July 12, 1994, when a power saw jerked while he was trimming trees. A surgical fusion was performed on plaintiff in October 1994. He did not return to work, although he was offered a position which would involve supervising prison inmates who were picking up litter. His supervisor, Tim Dockery, testified that this position was still available for plaintiff, although he admitted it had not yet been funded by the city council. Plaintiff testified that he experiences continuous pain in his back and down his right leg and that he does not believe that he can work. He also testified that Mr. Dockery told him he would be moved back into full duty after a few months; however, Mr. Dockery testified that he did not say this and that the position was intended to be permanent. 2
Knox
Workers Compensation Panel
Pemberton v. Campbell 03S01-9604-CH-00044
Authoring Judge: William H. Inman, Senior Judge
Trial Court Judge: Hon. Billy Joe White,
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The plaintiff was awarded lifetime benefits based on a finding of total, permanent vocational disability, with the employer and Second Injury Fund ordered de novo concurrent, pro rata payments for permanent disability until the plaintiff reaches age 65. Because we find that the preponderance of the evidence does not support a finding of total and permanent disability, but supports a finding of 75% permanent partial disability to her whole body, the judgment is modified to award the plaintiff weekly benefits for 3 weeks. Our review is de novo on the record, accompanied by the presumption that the trial court's findings of fact are correct unless the evidence preponderates otherwise. T.C.A. _ 5-6-225(e)(2). Seiber v. Greenbrier Ind., 96 S.W.2d 444, 446 (Tenn. 1995). The plaintiff injured her neck and shoulders on September 15, 1992, rupturing a cervical disc. Dr. Bernhard Kliefoth performed surgery and released the plaintiff to return to work with no restrictions on October 7, 1992. She was employed as a teacher's aide and suffered the injury while lifting a child. She was then 37 years old. On April 1, 1991, she had injured her neck but had not pursued a claim; in this connection, the orthopedic surgeon, Dr. William Kennedy, testified that about one- half of the plaintiff's impairment was attributable to the former injury. Because of ongoing shoulder pain, the plaintiff saw Dr. David Hauge, who performed surgery on July 7, 1994 for suprascapular nerve entrapment and testified that the plaintiff had a 9% impairment for the cervical injury and a 15% impairment for the nerve entrapment, for a total of 17% impairment to her whole body. Dr. Kennedy evaluated the plaintiff on May 5, 1993 and testified that she had a 2% impairment due to neck problems. As noted, he attributed one-half of the impairment to the 1991 injury. 2
Knox
Workers Compensation Panel
State vs. Gray M1998-00256-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Ben H. Cantrell
Trial Court Judge: Gale B. Robinson
The sole remaining question in this appeal is whether in October of 1998 the General Sessions Court of Davidson County had jurisdiction over a contempt warrant issued for violating the Davidson County Circuit Court's order of protection. We affirm the General Sessions Court's exercise of jurisdiction.
