Sidney W. White, et al. v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company
Appellants were injured in a car accident and, with the permission of their insurance company, Appellee State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company (“State Farm”), settled with the at-fault driver for his policy limits under his coverage with United Services Automobile Association (“USAA”). To fully recover for their injuries, Appellants notified State Farm of their willingness to settle or submit their underinsured motorist (“UIM”) claim to binding arbitration. After evaluating Appellants’ claim, State Farm informed Appellants that it would not offer a settlement for the UIM claim because it believed they had been fully compensated by the payment from USAA. Appellants, in response, demanded that State Farm elect to either participate in binding arbitration or decline arbitration and preserve its subrogation rights under Tennessee Code Annotated section 56-7-1206 (“the Statute”). Believing that its obligation under the Statute was never triggered, State Farm refused to make an election. Appellants filed an action for declaratory judgment asking the trial court to declare that State Farm failed to comply with the Statute. On competing motions for summary judgment, the trial court granted State Farm’s motion and denied Appellants’ motion. Finding no error, we affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Aaron Patrick Taylor v. Joseph Winston Harsh
Plaintiff filed claims of slander, defamation, and interference with prospective economic advantage against defendant deputy sheriff in his individual capacity. The defendant filed a motion for summary judgment on the basis that he was entitled to immunity. The trial court granted the motion and dismissed plaintiff’s claims on the basis of immunity. Because we cannot discern whether the trial court relied on the proper law in its ruling, we vacate the trial court’s judgment. |
Putnam | Court of Appeals | |
Tyler Cole Deaton v. Katlyn Nicole Williams
This appeal involves a contentious dispute over the designation of the primary residential parent for a child born to the unmarried parties. Having carefully reviewed the voluminous record before us, we reverse the decision of the trial court and designate the mother as the primary residential parent. The case is remanded for entry of a permanent parenting plan consistent with this court’s opinion. |
Madison | Court of Appeals | |
Tennessee Democratic Party v. Hamilton County Election Commission; Mark Goins In His Official Capacity As State Election Coordinator; And Robin Smith
Political party filed suit against the county election commission and the State election coordinator requesting injunctive relief to prevent a county election commission from allowing a replacement for a candidate in another party’s primary election for the office of state representative who had withdrawn from the race after the qualifying deadline; the plaintiff party also sought a declaration that the withdrawal of the original candidate did not allow for a replacement under the circumstances presented. The primary election ensued, and the replacement candidate advanced to the general election; thereafter, the trial court denied the injunction and granted the defendants’ motions to dismiss the action. After the appeal was filed but before argument, the general election was held and the other party’s candidate was elected. We have determined that this case is moot and, accordingly, dismiss the appeal; we deny the request for damages for a frivolous appeal. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Anthony Dowlen v. State Of Tennessee
The petitioner, Anthony Dowlen, appeals the summary dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing the petition stated a colorable claim for relief and the post-conviction court erred in dismissing the petition without the appointment of counsel. Following our review, we find the trial court erred in dismissing the petition as it stated a colorable claim thus warranting the appointment of counsel. Accordingly, we reverse the order of summary dismissal and remand the case for further proceedings pursuant to the |
Rutherford | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Christina Lee Cain-Swope v. Robert David Swope
This is the second appeal stemming from the divorce of the parties. After a remand from this Court, the trial court established the amount of alimony in futuro that Wife owed to Husband based on Wife’s ability to pay and Husband’s need for alimony. The trial court also declined to grant a downward deviation in Wife’s child support payments based on her payment of extraordinary educational expenses. The trial court’s ruling was based on a proposed parenting plan never agreed upon by the parties yet referenced by this Court in its initial opinion. We affirm the trial court’s award of alimony in futuro. However, we vacate the trial court’s denial of a downward deviation and remand the decision to the trial court for further consideration. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Glenn Fred Glatz
The defendant, Glenn Fred Glatz, appeals his Sevier County Circuit Court jury convictions of attempted sexual exploitation of a minor and contributing to the delinquency of a minor, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions and that the trial court erred by admitting certain testimony into evidence. Because the evidence was insufficient to support the defendant’s conviction of attempted sexual exploitation of a minor, that count is reversed, and the charge is dismissed. We affirm the defendant’s conviction of contributing to the delinquency of a minor. |
Sevier | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Glenn Fred Glatz - separate opinion
I join in the majority opinion except that portion of the opinion which examines the issue of evidence admitted in violation of Tennessee Rule of Evidence 404(b). This issue is waived. The State correctly argues it is waived. Defendant acknowledges the issue is waived, but seeks relief in plain error review. |
Sevier | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Edward Lee Hood, Jr. v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Edward Lee Hood, Jr., appeals the coram nobis court’s dismissal of his petition for writ of error coram nobis in which he challenged his 2009 convictions of two counts of rape of a child and two counts of incest. After a review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the coram nobis court. |
Henderson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Morrieo Allen
Defendant, Morrieo Allen, was indicted for the offense of first degree felony murder in the perpetration of robbery. At the conclusion of the State’s case-in-chief, Defendant moved for a judgment of acquittal, asserting that the State failed to prove venue in Shelby County and that the evidence was insufficient to support a conviction. The trial court denied Defendant’s motion. A jury found Defendant guilty as charged, and the trial court sentenced Defendant to life in prison. On appeal, Defendant argues that (1) the trial court erred by denying his motion for judgment of acquittal when the proof at trial was insufficient to prove venue in Shelby County; and (2) that there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction. Having reviewed the record on appeal and applicable law, we find no error. The judgment of the trial court is therefore affirmed. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Derrick Wade v. State of Tennessee
Pursuant to a plea agreement, the Petitioner, Derrick Wade, received an effective thirty-year sentence for his convictions for two counts of second degree murder, two counts of especially aggravated robbery, and attempted first degree murder. The Petitioner filed a timely post-conviction petition, which was denied after a hearing. On appeal, the Petitioner asserts that he received the ineffective assistance of trial counsel and that his pleas were not entered knowingly or voluntarily because he was under duress due to the circumstances of his plea. After a thorough review of the record, we discern no error and affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Mona Word v. Knox County, Tennessee, Et AL.
This appeal arises from a lawsuit alleging racial discrimination in the workplace. Mona Word (“Word”), an African-American woman who worked in the Knox County Clerk’s Office for 19 years, sued Knox County Clerk Foster D. Arnett, Jr. (“Arnett”) in his individual and official capacity, Knox County, Tennessee (“Knox County”), and the Knox County Clerk’s Office (“Defendants,” collectively) asserting a number of claims, including violations of the Tennessee Human Rights Act (“the THRA”). According to Word, she was denied opportunities for promotion because of her race, and was singled out for discipline because of her race, as well. Defendants filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings, which the Circuit Court for Knox County (“the Trial Court”) granted. Word appealed to this Court. Accepting Word’s factual allegations as true as is required at the motion for judgment on the pleadings stage, we hold that Word alleged enough to withstand Defendants’ motion with respect to certain of her claims against Knox County and Arnett in his individual capacity. However, we affirm the Trial Court’s dismissal of Word’s claims against Arnett in his official capacity and the Knox County Clerk’s Office, as well as Word’s claims for intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress. The judgment of the Trial Court thus is affirmed, in part, and reversed, in part, and this cause is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Garrick Graham
The Petitioner, Garrick Graham, filed a pro se motion to correct an illegal sentence pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1. The Sullivan County Criminal Court granted the motion in part and denied the motion in part, and the Petitioner appeals the trial court’s denial. Based upon our view of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Sullivan | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Bradley David Townsend v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Bradley Townsend, appeals the Roane County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his two convictions of aggravated sexual battery, a Class B felony, and resulting sentence of eight years. On appeal, he contends that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because trial counsel failed to request jury instructions on certain lesser-included offenses. Based upon the oral arguments, the record, and the parties’ briefs, we conclude that the Petitioner received the ineffective assistance of counsel with regard to his conviction of aggravated sexual battery in count twenty-one. Therefore, we reverse the judgment of the post-conviction court as to that count and remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. |
Roane | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Jamaal Mayes v. State of Tennessee
Petitioner, Jamaal Mayes, appeals the dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief from his 2003 guilty-pleaded conviction for attempted rape of a child. Petitioner argues that the statute of limitations should be tolled on due process grounds to assert a laterarising claim, namely that he did not become aware that he was subject to community supervision for life until more than ten years after his plea. After a hearing, the postconviction court dismissed the petition as untimely. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Hamilton | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Timothy J. Pagliara v. Marlene Moses et al.
Timothy J. Pagliara (“Plaintiff”) filed suit against Marlene Moses and MTR Family Law, PLLC (collectively, “Defendants”), alleging malicious prosecution, civil conspiracy, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and negligent infliction of emotional distress. Defendants filed a motion to dismiss, pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 12.02(6), which the Trial Court granted. Plaintiff timely appealed to this Court. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm the Trial Court’s dismissal of Plaintiff’s claims. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Marc Douglas Swindle ET AL. v. Karen Goodlow ET AL.
This appeal stems from a workplace injury on a construction site. On his first day on the job, Marc Douglas Swindle (“Plaintiff”) fell from the roof of a building that was under construction. It is undisputed that Plaintiff was authorized to work on the job site and that he was working in the course and scope of his employment when injured. What is disputed is the identity of his employer: whether he was in the employ of the general contractor or one of the subcontractors. Plaintiff initially filed a claim with the Tennessee Bureau of Workers’ Compensation, Court of Workers’ Compensation Claims, naming the general contractor as his employer; however, Plaintiff voluntarily dismissed his workers’ compensation claim when the general contractor filed a response stating that Plaintiff was not its employee. Thereafter, Plaintiff and his wife filed this tort action in circuit court to recover damages from the general contractor, two of its subcontractors, and the owner of the property for the injuries he sustained at the construction site. Finding it undisputed that Plaintiff’s injuries were sustained in the course and scope of his employment, the circuit court held that it was without jurisdiction to consider the tort claims because the workers’ compensation exclusive remedy doctrine applied. For these reasons, the court dismissed the complaint. Plaintiffs appeal. We affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Jeremy Randall C. Ledbetter
The Defendant, Jeremy Randall C. Ledbetter, was convicted by a Davidson County Criminal Court jury of two counts of rape of a child, a Class A felony; two counts of aggravated sexual battery, a Class B felony; two counts of soliciting sexual exploitation of a minor, a Class B felony; and one count of exploitation by displaying sexual acts to a minor, a Class C felony. See T.C.A. §§ 39-13-522 (2018) (rape of a child), 39-13-504 (2018) (aggravated sexual battery), 39-13-529(a) (soliciting sexual exploitation of a minor) (Supp. 2011, Supp. 2012, Supp. 2013), 39-13-529(b)(1) (displaying sexual acts to a minor). The Defendant is serving an effective eighty-one years for the convictions. On appeal, he contends that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions, (2) the State’s election of offenses was inadequate, (3) the trial court erred in denying his motion for a severance, (4) the court erred in admitting evidence, and (5) his sentence is excessive. We affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Timothy T. Millican
A Giles County jury convicted Timothy T. Millican, Defendant, of one count of theft of property with a value of at least $10,000 but less than $60,000. The trial court sentenced Defendant as a Range I standard offender to four years at thirty percent release eligibility, which the trial court suspended to five years’ supervised probation following the service of a year in jail. On appeal, Defendant asserts that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction. After a thorough review of the record and applicable case law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Giles | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Michael Delk v. State of Tennessee
On September 21, 2015, the Davidson County Grand Jury indicted Petitioner, Michael Delk, for aggravated rape of a child, aggravated sexual battery, sexual exploitation of a minor, and ten counts of aggravated sexual exploitation of a minor. On May 4, 2017, Petitioner pled guilty to one count of rape of a child and one count of especially aggravated sexual exploitation of a minor. Pursuant to the plea agreement, the trial court sentenced Petitioner to serve twenty-seven years at one hundred percent for rape of a child and eight years at one hundred percent for especially aggravated sexual exploitation of a minor, consecutive to the first count, for a total effective sentence of thirty-five years to serve at one hundred percent. On July 20, 2018, Petitioner filed an untimely pro se Petition for Post-Conviction Relief. After a hearing, the post-conviction court dismissed the petition as time-barred. Following a thorough review of the record and applicable case law, the judgment of the post-conviction court is affirmed. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Willard C. Land
In January 2015, the Sequatchie County Grand Jury indicted Defendant, Willard C. Land, for first degree premeditated murder. Following a trial in February 2018, a jury found Defendant guilty of the lesser-included offense of second degree murder, for which Defendant received a sentence of thirty-five years’ incarceration. On appeal, Defendant contends that the trial court erred in admitting evidence of Defendant’s prior threats and acts of violence against the victim and others, and he challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction. Following a thorough review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Sequatchie | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Javonta Marquis Perkins v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Javonta Marquis Perkins, appeals the post-conviction court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief in which he argued that juvenile counsel was ineffective for waiving the juvenile transfer hearing and failing to investigate his mental health in connection with the transfer. The Petitioner’s case was transferred to criminal court, and after two trials, he was convicted of aggravated robbery, carjacking, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony. He received an effective sentence of thirteen years. After a review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
John R. Fuller v. Allianz Life Insurance Company of North America
Plaintiff John R. Fuller initially brought this action, on July 15, 2015, for fraud, negligence, and violation of the Tennesee Consumer Protection Act (TCPA). After taking a voluntary nonsuit, he refiled on August 24, 2017. The trial court granted summary judgment to defendant Allianz Life Insurance Company of North America, holding that the fraud and negligence claims were time-barred by operation of Tenn. R. Civ. P. 4.01(3), which provides that “[i]f a plaintiff or counsel for a plaintiff . . . intentionally causes delay of prompt issuance or prompt service of a summons, the filing of the complaint . . . will not toll any applicable statutes of limitation or repose.” It is undisputed that plaintiff’s counsel, despite knowing how to properly serve process on defendant, delayed service for almost seven months, until after the applicable three-year statutes of limitations for fraud and negligence had run. The trial court further held that plaintiff’s TCPA claim was barred by an applicable statute of repose. We affirm. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Archer R.
A mother and stepfather filed a petition seeking to terminate the parental rights of a father based on abandonment by failure to visit and failure to support his child. The trial court found the petitioners proved the ground of abandonment by failure to support by clear and convincing evidence but did not prove the ground of abandonment by failure to visit because the mother interfered with the father’s attempts to visit the child. The trial court then found it was not in the child’s best interest for the father’s parental rights to be terminated and denied the petition to terminate. The mother and stepfather appealed, and we affirm the trial court’s judgment. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Abbie Leann Welch
This appeal concerns the propriety of the defendant’s burglary conviction. A Knox County grand jury indicted the defendant, Abbie Leann Welch, for misdemeanor theft in violation of Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-14-103, and burglary, a Class D felony, in violation of Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-14-402, for her involvement in a scheme to enter a Walmart retail store, steal merchandise, and have another individual return the merchandise for a gift card. The defendant previously had been banned from Walmart retail stores for prior acts of shoplifting. In this case, because the defendant entered Walmart without the effective consent of the owner—said consent having been revoked by letter—and committed a theft therein, the State sought an indictment for burglary rather than criminal trespass. We hold that the plain language of the burglary statute does not preclude its application to the scenario presented in this case and that, because the statute is clear and unambiguous on its face, we need not review the legislative history to ascertain its meaning. Application of the burglary statute in these circumstances does not violate due process or prosecutorial discretion. We affirm the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals. |
Knox | Supreme Court |