Joanna L. Golden, ET Al. v. Cynthia D. Powers
This appeal concerns a jury verdict in a personal injury case. Joanna L. Golden (“Golden”) was jogging in the dark early one morning when she was struck accidentally by a car driven by Cynthia D. Powers (“Powers”). Golden and her husband, Douglas K. Rice (“Rice”) (“Plaintiffs,” collectively), sued Powers in the Circuit Court for Hawkins County (“the Trial Court”), asserting various claims including negligence. The matter was tried before a jury. The jury found Golden to be 80% and Powers 20% at fault. Plaintiffs filed a motion for a new trial, which the Trial Court denied. Plaintiffs appeal to this Court arguing that the Trial Court failed to act as thirteenth juror and that the jury’s allocation of fault was unsupported by material evidence. Plaintiffs argue also that the jury was prejudiced against them for their being well-off out-of-towners. We find, first, that the Trial Court independently weighed the evidence and acted properly as thirteenth juror. We find further that the jury’s allocation of fault is supported by material evidence. Finally, Plaintiffs’ claim of jury prejudice is speculative, at best. We affirm the judgment of the Trial Court. |
Hawkins | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Marvin Stinnett
The Defendant, Marvin Stinnett, was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of two counts of attempted first degree murder, two counts of employment of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, three counts of aggravated assault, one count of reckless endangerment and one count of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, for which he received an effective sentence of thirty years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence in support of his convictions for attempted first degree murder, aggravated assault, employment of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Terence Dewayne Borum
The Defendant, Terence Dewayne Borum, pleaded guilty to burglary, vandalism, and theft of property valued at more than $500 and after an appeal of the trial court’s initial ten-year sentence on probation received a twelve-year sentence on remand. He filed a motion pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1 alleging that his sentence was illegal because the trial court improperly sentenced him as career offender. The trial court summarily dismissed the motion after determining that the sentence was not illegal and that this issue had been determined in a previous appeal. On appeal, he contends that the trial court erred by denying relief because he was improperly sentenced as a career offender. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Tipton | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Atu Campbell
The Defendant-Appellant, Atu Campbell, appeals the trial court’s denial of his motion to withdraw his guilty plea, alleging that his guilty plea was unknowing and involuntary. Because the trial court failed to provide the Defendant with an evidentiary hearing, the State concedes error. Upon our review, we reverse the determination of the trial court and remand for a hearing on the allegations raised in the Defendant’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Ernest Ervin
Defendant, Ernest Ervin, was convicted by a Shelby County jury of burglary of a motor vehicle. The trial court imposed a sentence of six years as a Career Offender to be served in confinement. On appeal, Defendant argues that the trial court erred by admitting surveillance video without sufficient authentication and that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction. Having reviewed the entire record and the briefs of the parties, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Estate of Clarence Turnage, Et Al. v. Dole Refrigerating Co., Inc.
On August 3, 2017, Clarence Turnage (“Employee”) died as a result of injuries arising out of and in the course of his employment with Dole Refrigerating Co., Inc. (“Employer”). Employee was unmarried at the time of his death, but resided with and had a child |
Workers Compensation Panel | ||
Joanna L. Golden et al. v. Cynthia D. Powers
This appeal concerns a jury verdict in a personal injury case. Joanna L. Golden (“Golden”) was jogging in the dark early one morning when she was struck accidentally by a car driven by Cynthia D. Powers (“Powers”). Golden and her husband, Douglas K. Rice (“Rice”) (“Plaintiffs,” collectively), sued Powers in the Circuit Court for Hawkins County (“the Trial Court”), asserting various claims including negligence. The matter was tried before a jury. The jury found Golden to be 80% and Powers 20% at fault. Plaintiffs filed a motion for a new trial, which the Trial Court denied. Plaintiffs appeal to this Court arguing that the Trial Court failed to act as thirteenth juror and that the jury’s allocation of fault was unsupported by material evidence. Plaintiffs argue also that the jury was prejudiced against them for their being well-off out-of-towners. We find, first, that the Trial Court independently weighed the evidence and acted properly as thirteenth juror. We find further that the jury’s allocation of fault is supported by material evidence. Finally, Plaintiffs’ claim of jury prejudice is speculative, at best. We affirm the judgment of the Trial Court. |
Hawkins | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Karlus Montrezz Branch
A Davidson County Grand Jury indicted the Defendant-Appellant, Karlus Montrezz Branch, with first-degree premeditated murder, and he was later convicted of the lesser included offense of second-degree murder. The Defendant received an effective sentence of twenty-nine years imprisonment. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant raises the following issues for our review: (1) whether the evidence is sufficient as a matter of law to support the Defendant’s conviction for second degree murder, and (2) whether the Defendant is entitled to plain error review of the trial court’s admissions of statements made by Tierra Braden as excited utterances, and whether these admissions violated the Confrontation Clause. Upon our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Raymond Lee Pryor
The Defendant, Raymond Lee Pryor, appeals the Knox County Criminal Court’s order revoking his probation for his conviction for attempt to commit second degree murder and ordering him to serve the remainder of his ten-year sentence in confinement. The Defendant contends that the trial court abused its discretion by ordering his sentence into execution. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Nicholas Todd Sutton
The Petitioner, Nicholas Todd Sutton, appeals as of right from the Morgan County Criminal Court’s summary dismissal of his petition for a writ of error coram nobis. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that (1) the evidence of several jurors’ viewing the Petitioner in shackles and handcuffs during his capital trial and sentencing hearing is newly discovered, (2) the Petitioner is without fault for failing to present this evidence previously, (3) equitable tolling of the statute of limitations applies, (4) constitutional considerations require the coram nobis court to address this case on the merits, and (5) the coram nobis court abused its discretion by summarily dismissing the petition. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the coram nobis court. |
Morgan | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Rubalddi Espinoza Yoc
Defendant, Rubalddi Espinoza Yoc, appeals the revocation of his community corrections sentence and his subsequent resentencing to serve ten years in the Tennessee Department of Correction (“TDOC”). Defendant argues that the original violation warrant was invalid because his detention and deportation by immigration authorities was a civil matter rather than a criminal arrest or conviction; that the trial court abused its discretion in resentencing Defendant; and that he should receive sentencing credit until the date that he conceded a violation of community corrections. Based on our review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Bedford | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. John Anthony Meyer, III
Pursuant to a plea agreement, the Defendant, John Anthony Meyer, III, pleaded guilty to theft of property valued at $1,000 or less, in exchange for the dismissal of his remaining indicted counts and an agreed sentence of eleven months twenty-nine days of incarceration. Then Defendant subsequently filed a pro se motion to “modify/vacate sentence,” specifically asking the trial court to “vacate the part of his sentence ordering the forfieture [sic] of $8,000.00 because it was not part of his plea agreement.” The trial court correctly ruled that it was without jurisdiction to hear the motion because the motion was filed more than 30 days after the judgment of conviction became final and, in the interim, the Defendant had filed a notice of appeal with this court. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we choose to treat the Defendant’s motion as a timely petition for post-conviction relief, and we remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with the Tennessee Post-Conviction Procedure Act. T. C. A. § 40-30-101, et seq. |
Sumner | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Nicola Dalili v. Sam Dalili
This is an appeal from a divorce proceeding. While the case was pending, the trial court ordered the parties to sell commercial property they owned. After a two-day bench trial, the trial court divided the parties’ remaining marital estate. The wife appeals, arguing that the trial court denied her due process by ordering the sale of the commercial property and erred in dividing the marital estate. For the following reasons, we vacate and remand for further proceedings. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Richard Gleason
Defendant, Richard Gleason, was indicted by the Shelby County Grand Jury for rape of a child and aggravated sexual battery. Following a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of two counts of aggravated sexual battery. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced Defendant to concurrent sentences of 12 years’ imprisonment. Defendant raises ten issues in this appeal as of right. Defendant asserts that: 1) the trial court erred by not requiring the State to provide him a bill of particulars; 2) the trial court erred by not excluding the narrative portion of a medical report admitted as an exhibit; 3) the trial court erred by allowing the victim’s mother to testify about a prior consistent statement of the victim; 4) the trial court erred by not permitting evidence of domestic violence between the victim’s mother and the victim’s mother’s boyfriend; 5) the State made improper statements during closing argument; 6) Defendant’s due process rights were violated by a pre-indictment delay; 7) the State’s election of offenses was overly vague and insufficient; 8) the trial court erred by considering non-statutory factors in sentencing Defendant; 9) the evidence at trial was insufficient to support Defendant’s convictions; and 10) Defendant is entitled to relief for cumulative error. Having reviewed the entire record, we conclude that the trial court erred by admitting into evidence statements made by the victim to her mother. The two times hearsay evidence was admitted were through a medical report and also during the mother’s testimony during trial. The statements should have been excluded as hearsay, and it was error for the trial court to allow the statements. We conclude, however, that both errors were harmless and did not affect the outcome of the trial. Accordingly, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Curtis Taylor v. State of Tennessee
A Shelby County jury convicted the Petitioner, Curtis Taylor, of voluntary manslaughter, attempted first degree murder, possession of a firearm after having been convicted of a felony, and use of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony. The trial court imposed an effective thirty-five-year sentence. The Petitioner appealed, and this court affirmed the convictions and sentence. See State v. Curtis Taylor, No. W2013-01820-CCA-R3-CD, 2014 WL 4244024 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Jackson, Aug. 7, 2014), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Dec. 18, 2014). The Petitioner filed a post-conviction petition, claiming he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. After a hearing, the postconviction court denied relief. The Petitioner appeals the denial, maintaining that his counsel was ineffective. After review, we affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Javon Jolarry Spivey
A Davidson County Criminal Court Jury convicted the Appellant, Javon Jolarry Spivey, of first degree premeditated murder, felony murder, attempted first degree murder, especially aggravated burglary, employment of a firearm during the commission of or attempt to commit a dangerous felony, and robbery. After merging the first degree premeditated murder and felony murder convictions, the trial court imposed a total effective sentence of life plus thirty-seven years. On appeal, the Appellant contends that the trial court erred by allowing the State to introduce a video and still photograph of him the police found on YouTube without proper authentication. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
James A. Dunlap, Jr. v. Board of Professional Responsibility Of The Supreme Court of Tennessee
A Board of Professional Responsibility hearing panel decided that an attorney should be suspended for one year for violating Tennessee Rules of Professional Conduct 3.3 (candor toward the tribunal), 3.5(a) (impartiality and decorum of the tribunal), 8.4(c) (conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation), and 8.4(d) (conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice). The attorney appealed, and the trial court affirmed. After careful review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Davidson | Supreme Court | |
Cecilia Gonzalez v. Mauricio Gonzalez
This is an appeal from a final decree of divorce. Husband/Appellant argues that the trial court erred in granting a divorce and in enforcing the parties’ Marital Dissolution Agreement (“MDA”). The basis of Husband’s argument is that the parties’ marriage is void as bigamous because Wife/Appellee was married at the time the parties married. The trial court held that Wife’s Chilean marriage was void ab initio, thus rendering the parties’ marriage valid. As such, the trial court granted Wife a divorce and enforced the MDA. Husband appeals. We vacate the amount of attorney’s fees awarded to Wife under the MDA due to a lack of findings concerning the amount and reasonableness thereof. The trial court’s order is otherwise affirmed. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
In Re James D., et al.
This is a termination of parental rights case, wherein mother and stepfather petitioned to terminate father’s parental rights as to his two minor children on the grounds that he had abandoned the children by failing to visit and by failing to support them. Additionally, mother and stepfather petitioned that stepfather be allowed to adopt the children. The trial court denied the termination petition, finding that father had not willfully abandoned the children because mother had thwarted his attempts to visit and support them. On appeal, we find that father did willfully abandon the children. Accordingly, we reverse and remand for a determination of whether termination of father’s parental rights is in the best interests of the children. The trial court’s decision regarding stepfather’s petition to adopt the minor children must await the trial court’s determination on remand as to whether or not termination of father’s parental rights is in the best interest of the children. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Gregory Cook
The defendant, Gregory Cook, appeals the order of the trial court revoking his probation and ordering him to serve his original |
Blount | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Chad Jeremy Kilgore
The Defendant, Chad Jeremy Kilgore, appeals the trial court’s order imposing confinement after finding a violation of his probation. In December 2016, the Defendant pleaded guilty to two counts of forgery of over $1,000 in exchange for an effective threeyear sentence, suspended, and the trial court placed him on probation for two years and eleven months. In February 2019, a probation violation warrant, the Defendant’s third, was issued alleging multiple violations, including a new arrest. After a hearing, the trial court revoked the Defendant’s probation, ordering him to serve the balance of his sentence in confinement. On appeal, the Defendant asserts that the trial court abused its discretion when it revoked his probation and when it ordered him to confinement. After review, we affirm the trial court’s judgment. |
Blount | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Henry Darnell Talley v. State of Tennessee
In 2016, the Petitioner, Henry Darnell Talley, pleaded guilty to attempted first degree murder, reckless aggravated assault, reckless endangerment, being a convicted felon in possession of a weapon, employing a weapon during the commission of a dangerous felony, and violation of a protective order. The trial court imposed an effective sentence of thirty-three years. The Petitioner appealed his sentence as excessive, and this court affirmed. State v. Henry Darnell Talley, No. M2016-01632-CCA-R3-CD, 2017 WL 1830100, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Nashville, May 5, 2017), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Aug. 16, 2017). In 2017, the Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. Following a hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief. After review, we affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. William K. Lawrence, Jr.
Defendant, William K. Lawrence, Jr., was convicted of first-degree murder during the attempt to perpetrate a robbery. The trial court imposed a sentence of life imprisonment. In this appeal as of right, Defendant contends: 1) that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction; 2) that the trial court erred by excluding the testimony of Timothy Harlan; and 3) that the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury on all lesser-included offenses. Having reviewed the entire record and the briefs of the parties, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Edward Spencer III
The defendant, Edward Spencer III, was indicted for one count of aggravated burglary and one count of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon. Following a bench trial, the defendant was convicted of both offenses as charged. The trial court sentenced the defendant as a Range II offender and imposed an eight-year split confinement sentence, with the defendant to serve one year in jail followed by seven years of community corrections. On appeal, the defendant argues the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions. The defendant also contends the sentence of eight years was excessive. After our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Bank of New York Mellon v. Helen E. Chamberlain
Appellant homeowner appeals the trial court’s grant of summary judgment to the purchaser bank in an unlawful detainer action. Because the homeowner presented specific evidence to show a genuine dispute of material fact as to the whether certain mandatory provisions of the deed of trust were complied with prior to foreclosure, we reverse the judgment of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals |