State of Tennessee v. Deewaine Mikel Bumpas
In October 2013, the Davidson County Grand Jury indicted the Defendant-Appellant, Deewaine Mikel Bumpas, in count one for aggravated robbery occurring on June 19, 2013; in count two for attempted aggravated robbery occurring on June 26, 2013; and in count three for aggravated robbery occurring on July 3, 2013. The trial court, at the State’s request, severed counts one and two, and the parties proceeded to trial on count three. A jury subsequently convicted Bumpas, as charged, of the July 3, 2013 aggravated robbery, and the trial court imposed a sentence of twelve years at 85% release eligibility. See T.C.A. §§ 39-13-402, 40-35-501(k)(1). On appeal, Bumpas contends: (1) the trial court erred in denying his motion to exclude the photographic lineup and accompanying testimony; (2) the trial court erred in denying his motion to exclude the surveillance video and accompanying testimony; (3) the trial court abused its discretion in sustaining the State’s objection to questions regarding Sergeant Williams’ personnel record; (4) the trial court erred in denying his motion for a mistrial; (5) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction; (6) the trial court imposed an excessive sentence; and (7) the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion for new trial. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Vernica Shabree Calloway, AKA Vernica S. Ward, AKA Vernica Jackson v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Vernica Shabree Calloway, a.k.a. Vernica S. Ward, a.k.a. Vernica Jackson, appeals the denial of her post-conviction petition, arguing trial counsels’ strategy regarding the use of expert witnesses on behalf of her defense was ineffective. Following our review, we affirm the denial of the petition. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In Re Tennessee Walking Horse Forfeiture Litigation
This is the second appeal involving the attempted forfeiture of horses that had allegedly been the victims of animal abuse. The State appeals the trial court’s finding that Appellee owners had standing to contest the forfeiture and the grant of summary judgment to Appellee owners on the ground that the State failed to comply with applicable procedural requirements. We conclude that because Appellees are “owners” as defined by Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-11-702(3), they have standing to contest the forfeiture. We also conclude that the undisputed facts establish that the attempted forfeiture did not comply with the substantive and procedural requirements of the applicable forfeiture statutes. The trial court’s ruling is, therefore, affirmed. |
Fayette | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Savanna C.
This is a termination of parental rights case involving the parental rights of the father, Jason C. (“Father”), to his minor child, Savanna C. (“the Child”), who was two years of age at the time of trial. The Child was born in 2014 to Father and Katie N. (“Mother”). On November 10, 2014, the Hamilton County Juvenile Court (“juvenile court”) granted temporary legal custody of the Child to the maternal grandmother, Kathryn N. (“Maternal Grandmother”). The maternal grandfather, Tommy N. (“Maternal Grandfather”), was later added as a joint petitioner. The juvenile court adjudicated the Child dependent and neglected on August 20, 2015, and ordered that the Child remain in the custody of the Maternal Grandmother and Maternal Grandfather (collectively, “Maternal Grandparents”). On September 21, 2015, Maternal Grandparents filed a petition to terminate Father’s parental rights to the Child in the Hamilton County Circuit Court (“trial court”). Following a bench trial, the trial court terminated Father’s parental rights to the Child upon determining by clear and convincing evidence that Father had abandoned the Child by willfully failing to visit during the four months preceding the filing of the termination petition. The court also found clear and convincing evidence that termination of Father’s parental rights was in the best interest of the Child. Father has appealed.1 Discerning no reversible error, we affirm. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Anthony M. Crawford
A Wilson County jury convicted the Defendant, Anthony M. Crawford, of aggravated assault and child abuse. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to consecutive prison terms of six and four years, for a total effective sentence of ten years. On appeal, the Defendant asserts that: (1) the trial court erred when it denied his motion to dismiss the indictment on double jeopardy grounds; (2) the trial court improperly commented on the evidence; (3) the trial court erred when it precluded the Defendant’s expert witness from testifying at the suppression hearing; (4) the trial court erred when it denied the Defendant’s motion to suppress his October 19, 2012 statement; (5) the evidence is insufficient to support the convictions; (6) the trial court erred when it allowed the State to cross-examine witnesses about “highly prejudicial statements” the Defendant made about the victim; (7) the State did not properly make an election of offenses, thus depriving the Defendant of a unanimous verdict; (8) the cumulative effect of the errors deprived the Defendant of a fair trial; and (9) the trial court improperly ordered consecutive sentencing. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Wilson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Anthony M. Crawford - Concurring
I respectfully concur in results only. My concern in this case is that inadmissible polygraph testing evidence was presented at the suppression hearing. |
Wilson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Michael Terrell McKissack v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Michael Terrell McKissack, filed a petition for post-conviction relief from his convictions of especially aggravated robbery, aggravated robbery, and facilitation of attempted carjacking. In the petition, the Petitioner argued that his trial counsel was ineffective (1) by failing to call two of his co-defendants to testify on his behalf; (2) by failing to inform him that his third co-defendant would testify against him; and (3) by failing to adduce proof during the guilt phase regarding his lack of education and mental health issues. The post-conviction court denied relief, and the Petitioner appeals. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Reginald Bernard Coffee
The Defendant, Reginald Bernard Coffee, was convicted by a Davidson County Criminal Court jury of especially aggravated robbery, a Class A felony, and sentenced to fifteen years. See T.C.A. § 39-13-403 (2014). On appeal, he contends that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction and (2) the fingerprint evidence was admitted without a sufficient foundation. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Danny O. Owens v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Danny O. Owens, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his second degree murder conviction, alleging he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel. After review, we affirm the denial of the petition. |
Lawrence | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Shanthony Tywon Mays
Defendant, Shanthony Tywon Mays, was convicted by an Obion County Jury of one count of aggravated robbery, three counts of aggravated assault, and one count of unlawful possession of a weapon. The trial court imposed a sentence of twelve years for aggravated robbery, four years for each count of aggravated assault, and four years for unlawful possession of a weapon, to be served concurrently with each other and consecutively to the sentence in an unrelated case. On appeal, Defendant raises the following issues: (1) whether the trial court properly overruled Defendant’s objection to the jury venire; (2) whether the trial court properly instructed the jury concerning possession of recently stolen property; (3) whether the evidence was sufficient to support Defendant’s convictions; and (4) whether the trial court erred in denying Defendant’s motion for new trial based on newly discovered evidence. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Obion | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Timothy Baxter v. State of Tennessee
Petitioner, Timothy Baxter, appeals the dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief in which he alleged ineffective assistance of counsel at trial where he was convicted of felony failure to appear. More specifically, he contends that trial counsel failed to subpoena witnesses requested by Petitioner, did not present evidence that the circuit court clerk’s office failed to issue a criminal summons after his failure to appear, and trial counsel allowed himself to be intimidated by the trial court. After a thorough review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Maka Fuller, Jr.
A Madison County jury convicted the Defendant, Maka Fuller, Jr., of aggravated robbery. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced him to eleven years in prison. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction because he did not use a weapon to accomplish the robbery. Finding that there is sufficient evidence to support the Defendant’s conviction for aggravated robbery, we affirm the trial court. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Nero Oswald Jones
The Appellant, Nero Oswald Jones, appeals as of right from the Hardeman County Circuit Court’s summary denial of his Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1 motion to correct an illegal sentence. The Appellant contends that the trial court erred because his motion stated a colorable claim for relief. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Hardeman | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Kenneth Tucker v. State of Tennessee
Petitioner, Kenneth Tucker, appeals the post-conviction court’s dismissal of his postconviction petition alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. After a review, we determine Petitioner has failed to establish that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. Accordingly, the judgment of the post-conviction court is affirmed. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Carlos Richard Morris
The Defendant, Carlos Richard Morris, pleaded guilty to two counts of possession of .5 grams or more of cocaine with the intent to sell, one count of possession of one-half ounce or more of marijuana, one count of possession of drug paraphernalia, and one count of failing to obey a stop sign. The trial court merged the two possession with intent to sell convictions, and it sentenced the Defendant to an effective sentence of eight years. It ordered that the Defendant’s eight-year sentence from Madison County run concurrently with any remaining sentences from two previous Henderson County possession with intent to sell cocaine convictions. The Defendant filed a Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1 motion to correct his allegedly illegal sentence, which the trial court summarily dismissed. On appeal, we affirm the trial court’s judgment. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Kathryn J. Reitz v. City of Mt. Juliet
Plaintiff alleged that the City of Mt. Juliet breached a settlement agreement with her by violating a non-disparagement agreement. Because Plaintiff failed to prove the existence of damages, summary judgment was appropriate. We affirm. |
Wilson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re A.L.H., et al.
This is an appeal from an order finding two children of S.B. (mother) and R.H. (father) to be the victims of severe child abuse in the couple’s care and control. On July 24, 2015, the Department of Children’s Services (DCS) received a referral alleging, in part, that the parties’ three children, A.L.H., A.G.B., and A.R.B. (collectively the children), were drug-exposed. On August 27, 2015, the children underwent hair follicle drug testing. A.G.B. and A.R.B. tested positive for methamphetamine. A.L.H. was negative for all substances. On September 23, 2015, DCS filed a petition to declare the children dependent and neglected. Mother and father stipulated that the children were dependent and neglected, but they expressly did not agree with the finding of severe child abuse. The Juvenile Court for Wayne County (the juvenile court) entered an order finding A.G.B. and A.R.B. to be the victims of severe abuse. Mother and father appealed to the Circuit Court for Wayne County (the trial court). On July 14, 2016, the trial court entered an order finding A.G.B. and A.R.B. to be the victims of severe child abuse in the care and control of mother and father. Mother and father appeal. We affirm. |
Wayne | Court of Appeals | |
Allstate Insurance Company v. Kaigler & Associates, Inc.
Declaratory judgment action in which an insurance company seeks a determination of its coverage obligations arising out of a business insurance policy it issued relative to a class action suit brought against the insured for sending unsolicited faxes in violation of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (“TCPA”). The court granted the insurance company’s motion for summary judgment in part, holding that the insurance company had no duty to indemnify under the “accidental event” coverage or the “personal injury” coverage, that the company had a duty to defend under the “advertising injury” coverage, and that the company had a duty to defend against all claims. The insured filed a motion to alter or amend, which was denied by the court. On appeal, the insured argues that the court issued an improper advisory opinion, erred in holding the company had no duty to indemnify under the “accidental event” coverage, and abused its discretion by failing to consider new evidence proffered in the insured’s motion to alter or amend the judgment. Finding no error, we affirm the trial court in all respects. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
Gregory White, et al. v. Jack Miller, et al.
Sellers of home and their listing agent brought suit against a real estate brokerage firm and an agent employed by the firm to recover for alleged violations of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act and Real Estate Broker License Act, undisclosed dual agency, and breach of fiduciary duty, arising from the sale of plaintiffs’ home. The brokerage firm agent procured a contract whereby the sellers agreed to purchase the buyers’ home, with the purchase price for the buyers’ home to be treated as a credit on the purchase price of the sellers’ home. Upon learning that the agent was also representing the buyers, the sellers brought suit, seeking forfeiture of the agent’s and brokerage firm’s commission; the sellers’ listing agent joined in the suit to recover the commission the brokerage firm agreed to pay her as a referral fee. The trial court dismissed all claims filed by the seller husband for lack of standing, granted summary judgment to seller wife on her claim of undisclosed dual agency, and ordered that the brokerage firm and agent forfeit the commission from the sale. The court awarded the listing agent the commission she sought and granted summary judgment to brokerage firm and agent on the seller wife’s claim under the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act and on the seller wife’s claim that she was entitled to the commission generated by the sale of the buyers’ home. Upon a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment in part and reverse in part, and remand the case for further proceedings. |
Wilson | Court of Appeals | |
Steven Padgett King v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Steven Padgett King, appeals the dismissal of his post-conviction petition, arguing the post-conviction court erred in dismissing the petition as time-barred. Following our review, we agree with the petitioner and reverse the order of the post-conviction court dismissing the petition as untimely. |
Montgomery | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Elbert Bryant Gleaves v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Elbert Bryant Gleaves, appeals the denial of his post-conviction petition. The petitioner argues he received ineffective assistance of counsel prior to trial forcing him to accept the State’s plea offer. Following our review, we affirm the denial of the petition. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Linda Beard v. James William Branson, et al.
We granted permission for this appeal to determine whether a surviving spouse who files a wrongful death lawsuit is acting as a legal representative of the decedent and whether a wrongful death lawsuit filed pro se by the surviving spouse is void ab initio based on the spouse’s pro se status. In this case, the decedent’s surviving spouse filed a pro se wrongful death health care liability lawsuit shortly before the one-year statute of limitations lapsed. After expiration of the limitations period, the spouse retained an attorney and filed an amended complaint. In the ensuing discovery, the defendants learned that the decedent had two daughters, both of whom were statutory beneficiaries in the wrongful death action. The defendants filed motions for summary judgment. They argued that the spouse’s initial pro se complaint was filed in a representative capacity on behalf of the decedent and the other statutory beneficiaries and that it was, therefore, void ab initio; thus, the filing of the amended complaint could not relate back to the date of the initial complaint, and the lawsuit was time-barred. The trial court denied the summary judgment motions and permitted the amended complaint to relate back to the date of the initial pro se complaint. It then conducted a jury trial; the jury found both defendants liable and awarded damages. The defendant hospital appealed the denial of summary judgment. Adopting the defendant’s argument, the Court of Appeals reversed. The plaintiff now appeals. Under the plain language of Tennessee’s wrongful death statutes, the decedent’s right of action “pass[es] to” the surviving spouse upon the decedent’s death, and the surviving spouse asserts the right of action for the benefit of himself and other beneficiaries. Tenn. Code Ann. § 20-5-106(a) (2009 & Supp. 2016). Consequently, we hold that the surviving spouse did not file the initial pro se complaint as the legal representative of either the decedent or the decedent’s estate. As we construe our wrongful death statutes, in filing the pro se complaint, the surviving spouse was acting to a large extent on his own behalf and for his own benefit pursuant to his right of self-representation. Under the facts of this case, we hold that the initial pro se complaint was not void ab initio, it served to toll the statute of limitations, and the trial court did not err in allowing the filing of the amended complaint to relate back to the date of the initial complaint. Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals, affirm the trial court’s denial of summary judgment, and remand to the Court of Appeals for consideration of the other issues that were properly raised on appeal but not addressed. |
Houston | Supreme Court | |
Kevin Tate v. Tennessee Department Of Correction
Kevin Tate was convicted of a first degree murder that took place on March 22, 1993. On November 22, 1995, he was sentenced to life in prison. In the current litigation, he filed a petition for declaratory judgment asking the trial court to review his release eligibility date as calculated by the Tennessee Department of Correction (TDOC). Petitioner claimed that TDOC incorrectly calculated his release eligibility date, and, in doing so, violated his rights under the ex post facto provisions of the state and federal constitutions. The trial court found that TDOC correctly calculated his release eligibility date. As a consequence, the court dismissed the petition. We modify the judgment of the trial court by vacating the court’s statement that “as Mr. Tate is serving a sentence of life for first degree murder, in no event can he become eligible for release prior to serving 25 years.” In all other respects, we affirm the trial court’s judgment |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Domingo C. L.
Obispo C.L. (“the Minor’s Uncle”) appeals the determination of the Chancery Court for Rutherford County (“the Trial Court”) finding that it lacked jurisdiction to make a finding regarding whether it is in the best interest of Domingo C.L. (“the Minor”) to be returned to his home country of Guatemala. We find and hold that the Trial Court had jurisdiction to make this finding, that the petition specifically requested a finding with regard to this issue, and that it was error to refuse to make a finding with regard to whether it was in the Minor’s best interest to be returned to Guatemala. We, therefore, modify the Trial Court’s October 31, 2016 Order Appointing Guardian Of A Minor by remanding this case to the Trial Court for a determination of whether it is in the Minor’s best interest to be returned to Guatemala. We affirm the remainder of the Trial Court’s order. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Miracle M., et al.
This is a termination of parental rights case. The trial court terminated Appellant Father’s parental rights to two minor children. The trial court found that clear and convincing evidence supported termination based on the statutory grounds of abandonment by willful failure to support, abandonment by willful failure to visit, and persistence of the conditions that led to the children’s removal to state custody. The trial court also found, by clear and convincing evidence, that termination of the Father’s parental rights was in the children’s best interests. Father appeals. As to the ground of persistence of conditions, we conclude that the Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) has not met its burden of proof, and therefore we reverse termination of Father’s parental rights on this ground. The Court affirms the juvenile court’s termination of Father’s parental rights on the grounds of abandonment by willful failure to support and abandonment by willful failure to visit. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals |