APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The appellant, Albert D. Wilson, II, pled guilty in the Blount County Circuit Court to possession of a Schedule II controlled substance and was sentenced to eight years incarceration in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The appellant reserved two certified questions of law relating to the propriety of the search of his motel room. Upon review of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

At a joint trial, a Hawkins County jury convicted each Defendant of numerous drug-related offenses. The same jury also convicted Defendant Wolfe of tampering with evidence and convicted Defendant Barnett of two theft offenses. Wolfe received an effective sentence of five years of incarceration, and Barnett's effective sentence was twelve years of incarceration. On appeal, both Defendants challenge the sufficiency of the convicting evidence and the propriety of the sentences imposed by the trial court. Finding no error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Defendant, Kenneth Nolan Humphries, appeals the trial court's revocation of probation. Defendant was separately indicted for three counts of Class D theft. On September 17, 1993, Defendant entered guilty pleas to all three charges, and the trial court sentenced him to serve three consecutive sentences of four years each and ordered him to pay restitution. Defendant's sentences were suspended, and he was placed on probation for twelve years. A probation violation warrant was filed and later amended. The revocation warrant was dismissed, and the trial court ordered Defendant to complete a drug and alcohol rehabilitation program. Subsequently, a second probation violation warrant was filed and later amended to include additional allegations. On April 16, 1997, Defendant pled guilty to two more charges of theft and received two six-year sentences to be served concurrently with each other and consecutively to Defendant's previous twelve-year sentence, for a total effective sentence of eighteen years. The trial court ordered that Defendant's sentence be supervised by the Community Alternatives to Prison Program (CAPP), to expire on April 16, 2015. A warrant for violation of CAPP was filed. Defendant was ordered to serve the remainder of his sentence on regular probation. A fourth probation violation warrant was filed. Following a hearing, the trial court found that Defendant had violated the conditions of probation and ordered Defendant to serve the remainder of his sentence in confinement. Defendant appeals the trial court's decision. After reviewing the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court in part and reverse in part.

The defendant was convicted by a Sequatchie County Circuit Court jury of first degree premeditated murder for shooting his wife's boyfriend to death outside a gasoline station and convenience store. Because the State did not seek either the death penalty or life without parole, the trial court automatically sentenced him to life imprisonment in the Department of Correction. In this appeal as of right, the defendant raises essentially three issues: (1) whether the evidence was sufficient to support his conviction; (2) whether the trial court erred in admitting into evidence enhanced versions of the store surveillance videotape of the shooting; and (3) whether the trial court erred in its jury instructions on intentionally and knowingly. Following our review, we conclude that the evidence is sufficient to sustain the defendant's conviction for premeditated murder, the trial court did not err in admitting the videotapes, and any deficiency in the jury instructions constituted harmless error. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The appeal involves a claim for property damages by Shirley Secrest ("Secrest" or "Plaintiff") against Kenneth Smith and Tera Haynes, who were driving separate vehicles involved in a multi-vehicle accident with a vehicle owned by Plaintiff. After a trial, the Trial Court concluded that while the driver of Plaintiff's vehicle was not at fault and that either one or both of the Defendants were at fault, the complaint nevertheless should be dismissed because: (1) Plaintiff failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that Kenneth Smith was negligent; and (2) Plaintiff failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that Tera Haynes was negligent. Plaintiff appeals, claiming the Trial Court was required to allocate fault to Smith and/or Haynes once it concluded that Plaintiff was not at fault and either one or both of the Defendants were at fault. We affirm.

Plaintiff initiated this action alleging breach of contract, interference with contractual relations, and pursuant to the Governmental Tort Liability Act. The trial court dismissed the action for failure to state a claim. We affirm.

A Hamilton County Criminal Court jury convicted the defendant, Ralph Lamar Williams, of four counts of aggravated rape, a Class A felony; one count of rape, a Class B felony; and one count of aggravated kidnapping, a Class B felony. The trial court sentenced him as a violent offender to life without parole for each conviction. The defendant appeals, claiming that the prosecutor improperly suggested to the jury during closing argument that the defense bore the burden of establishing the defendant's innocence. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

We granted review to determine whether the Court of Criminal Appeals erred in concluding that defense counsel's dual roles as part-time assistant district attorney and defense counsel in this case created a conflict of interest requiring removal of counsel. The trial court found that defense counsel must be disqualified under the facts of this case because a "perceived" conflict of interest existed that could not be waived by the defendant. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed on the ground that an actual conflict of interest existed. After reviewing the record, we conclude that counsel's dual roles as prosecutor and defense counsel created an actual conflict of interest that required disqualification. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals is affirmed.

The Wilson County Grand Jury indicted the Defendant for one count of especially aggravated robbery, two counts of aggravated robbery, and two counts of aggravated assault. Following the trial court's denial of the Defendant's Motion to Suppress evidence, the Defendant pled guilty, reserving a certified question of law. The issues before us on appeal are: (1) whether the certified question of law is dispositive of this case; and, if so (2) whether police had reasonable suspicion to stop the Defendant's vehicle; and (3) whether the police had probable cause to take the Defendant into custody and to search the Defendant's vehicle. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Plaintiff filed a cause of action against several state employees for malicious prosecution. The trial court dismissed the action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. We reverse.

Sharron Johnson brought suit against her former husband, Rodney Lockhart, alleging breach of an oral contract to pay equal shares of the college expenses for their son, Paul G. Lockhart. The Circuit Court of Sumner County entered judgment for Ms. Johnson, and Mr. Lockhart appeals. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The appellant, James Ruben Conyers, was convicted by a jury in the Houston County Circuit Court of especially aggravated burglary, a Class B felony; especially aggravated robbery, a Class A felony; and attempted first degree murder, a Class A felony. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced the appellant to an effective sentence of eighty years incarceration in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the appellant raises numerous issues relating to the sufficiency of the evidence, the admission of evidence, the sufficiency of the indictment, the jury instructions, and sentencing. Upon review of the record and the parties' briefs, we find no merit to the appellant's contentions. However, we recognize as plain error that the appellant's conviction for especially aggravated burglary was prohibited under Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-14-404(d) (1997). Accordingly, we modify the conviction to aggravated burglary and reduce the appellant's sentence for this conviction to ten years incarceration, for a total effective sentence of eighty years.

John McConkey ("Plaintiff") had a vasectomy performed by a state-employed doctor. Plaintiff experienced swelling and pain after the operation, which he claimed caused him to lose time at work and caused problems in his marriage. Plaintiff underwent two subsequent surgeries including the removal of his left testicle. Plaintiff brought this claim against the doctor who performed the vasectomy. Plaintiff had no expert witness at trial. After trial, the Claims Commission ("Commission") entered an order holding, inter alia, that Plaintiff did not carry his burden of proof to establish a res ipsa loquitur case. Plaintiff appeals. We affirm.

Defendant, Marcus Johnson, was convicted by a jury in the Shelby County Criminal Court of felony murder and two counts of especially aggravated robbery. Defendant was sentenced to life imprisonment for the felony murder conviction and twenty years for each especially aggravated robbery conviction. The trial court ordered the twenty-year sentences to run consecutive to each other, and one twenty-year sentence to run concurrent with the life sentence, and the other to run consecutive with the life sentence. In this appeal as of right, Defendant argues that: (1) the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress incriminating statements made by Defendant to the police; (2) the evidence at trial was insufficient to support his convictions beyond a reasonable doubt; and (3) the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury as to the weight to be given to the supplemental jury charge. After a review of the record, we affirm Defendant's conviction for felony murder. We conclude, however, that the constitutional protections against double jeopardy require reversal of one of Defendant's convictions for especially aggravated robbery. Accordingly, we affirm one of Defendant's especially aggravated robbery convictions. We modify the other especially aggravated robbery conviction to aggravated assault and remand for resentencing, for the reasons stated herein.

The Polk County Grand Jury indicted the Defendant for three counts of vehicular homicide, four counts of aggravated assault, and twelve counts of failure to stop a school bus at a railroad crossing. The Defendant filed an application for pretrial diversion, and the trial court ordered that a pretrial diversion report be completed. Upon completion of the report, the Assistant District Attorney General denied the application, and the Defendant appealed to the District Attorney General, who also denied the application. The trial court granted a writ of certiorari and, thereafter, affirmed the District Attorney General's decision. The Defendant sought, and was granted, permission to take an interlocutory appeal pursuant to Rule 9 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure. We granted the Defendant's application for interlocutory review to address the Defendant's contention that the State abused its discretion by denying her application for pretrial diversion. After a thorough consideration of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

In this Estate dispute, the Trial Court dismissed claims of two claimants. We affirm, dismissal of claimant who died on grounds his Estate had no standing to proceed. We reinstate the action of the other claimant on grounds she is not estopped to maintain her action.

In action against the State of Tennessee and a state employee, the Commissioner held he had no jurisdiction of the claims. On appeal, we affirm.

The Defendant, Gary S. Johnson, pled guilty to vehicular homicide, a Class B felony, on August 6, 1996. The trial judge originally sentenced him to twelve years of house arrest and community corrections. The State appealed, and this Court vacated the sentence because the Defendant was not eligible for community corrections. Upon re-sentencing the Defendant was ordered to serve ten years of incarceration. The Defendant did not immediately appeal, but filed a timely Motion for a Modification and/or Reduction of Sentence. Prior to the trial court ruling on the motion, the Defendant filed a Petition for Post Conviction Relief based on ineffective assistance of counsel. The trial court denied both the Defendant's motion and the Petition for Post Conviction Relief on June 12, 2002. The sole issue for appeal is whether the trial court erred in denying the Defendant's Petition for Post Conviction Relief. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This appeal questions whether the Trial Court erred in its judgment against the Appellant/Defendant, Water and Light Commission of the Town of Greeneville, Tennessee, for personal injuries sustained by a Greeneville resident as a result of the smoking of sewer lines by the Appellant. We affirm This appeal questions whether the Trial Court erred in its judgment against the Appellant/Defendant, Water and Light Commission of the Town of Greeneville, Tennessee, for personal injuries sustained by a Greeneville resident as a result of the smoking of sewer lines by the Appellant. We affirm the judgment of the Trial Court.
 

The defendant, John Lee Bellamy, pled guilty in the Sullivan County Criminal Court to reckless aggravated assault, a Class D felony; failure to appear, a Class E felony; driving under the influence, second offense, and leaving the scene of an accident, Class A misdemeanors; and driving on a revoked license, second offense, a Class B misdemeanor. The trial court sentenced him as a Range I, standard offender to an effective sentence of four years, eight months, twenty-nine days. The defendant appeals the trial court's ordering him to serve his two-year, nine-month-sentence for the reckless aggravated assault conviction and consecutive one-year sentence for the failure to appear conviction in confinement. He claims that he should have received alternative sentences or, at most, sentences of split confinement. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The State appeals the trial court's suppression of twenty-five rocks of cocaine seized from the defendant. Because the trial court "did not feel comfortable" in elaborating the reason why the evidence should be suppressed, we remand for the trial court to make findings of fact and conclusions of law.

Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-202(a) requires that the State notify the defendant of its intent to seek enhanced punishment. We accepted this cause in order to decide whether the State complied with this statutory mandate. The trial court ruled that the State's response to the defendant's discovery request met the statutory requirement and therefore, permitted the State to seek enhanced punishment outside of Range I. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed. On consideration, we conclude that the State did not meet the notice requirement. Accordingly, we reverse the Court of Criminal Appeals and remand this case to the trial court for re-sentencing.

A Carroll County jury convicted the Defendant of manufacturing the controlled substance methamphetamine. The trial court sentenced the Defendant as a standard offender to four years and six months of incarceration. The Defendant now appeals, contending the following: (1) that insufficient evidence was presented at trial to support the conviction; and (2) that the jury’s indication on the special verdict form showed its confusion with regard to the trial court’s instructions rendering the  verdict unsustainable or, in the alternative, constituting “plain error.”  Finding no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Rodrick Johnson, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, asserting that: (1) the post-conviction court erred by failing to make findings and conclusions as to each issue; (2) the jury instructions provided by the trial court lowered the State's burden of proof; (3) the trial court erred in not instructing as to the lesser-included offense of facilitation; and (4) he was denied the effective assistance of counsel on appeal. We affirm the order of the post-conviction court dismissing the petition.