APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The appellant, Melissa Lee Sholtz, pled guilty in the Hamilton County Criminal Court to one count of telephone harassment, a Class A misdemeanor. Pursuant to the plea agreement, the appellant was sentenced to eleven months and twenty-nine days in the county workhouse, with the sentence to be suspended and served on unsupervised probation. As a condition of probation, the appellant was ordered to have no contact with the victim. The trial court subsequently revoked the appellant's probation after finding that the appellant had violated the terms of probation by having contact with the victim. On appeal, the appellant argues that the trial court abused its discretion in revoking her probation. Upon review of the record and the parties' brief, we reverse the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Jimmy Wayne Perkey, pled guilty to aggravated vehicular homicide. The trial court subsequently sentenced the defendant to serve twenty-five years as a Range I standard offender and ordered the defendant to pay a $50,000 fine. The defendant brings the instant appeal challenging his sentence and the imposition of his fine. After reviewing the record, we find that none of the defendant's claims merit relief.

The defendant, Ronald C. Floyd, pled guilty to possession of Diazepam, a Schedule IV controlled substance, with the intent to sell or deliver, a Class D felony. Pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 37, the defendant reserved as a certified question of law the issue of whether the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress. In this appeal, the issues presented are: (1) whether the failure to provide the defendant with a copy of the search warrant at or before the initiation of the search invalidated the search, and (2) whether the description of the property to be seized as stated in the warrant was so general as to render the warrant invalid. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

On January 10, 2000, defendant, Darlene Renee Blackhurst, pled guilty to a second offense of driving under the influence of an intoxicant ("DUI"), leaving the scene of an accident involving injury, and three counts of reckless aggravated assault. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed an effective sentence of three years, eleven months and twenty-nine days and ordered the sentence to be served on intensive supervised probation following a mandatory forty-five days in confinement for the DUI second offense. The State appealed the trial court's grant of full probation. After a de novo review, this Court reversed the trial court's judgment regarding the manner of service of defendant's sentence and remanded the matter to the trial court for the limited purpose of determining whether defendant should be incarcerated for the full term of her sentence, or, in the alternative, whether she should serve the balance of her sentence in split confinement. We directed the trial court to base its sentencing determination as to the manner of service of defendant's sentence on the current record without a further evidentiary hearing. State v. Blackhurst, 70 S.W.3d 88 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2001). On remand, the trial court found that defendant was not entitled to alternative sentencing and ordered defendant to serve her sentence in confinement. Defendant now appeals her sentence arguing that (1) the trial court erred in denying defendant's request for alternative sentencing; (2) the trial court erred in not considering additional evidence concerning defendant's post-sentencing behavior; (3) that the trial court erred in not allowing defendant credit for the time served on probation prior to resentencing; and (4) that the trial court improperly weighed the applicable mitigating and enhancement factors in determining the manner of service of defendant's sentence. After a thorough review of the record in this matter, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Defendant, Timothy Clayton Thompson, pled guilty to one count of especially aggravated kidnapping, a Class A felony, and one count of aggravated rape, a Class A felony, without a recommendation from the State as to sentencing. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced Defendant to twenty-two years for each felony count and ordered the sentences to run consecutively. Defendant now appeals the length of his sentence and the trial court's imposition of consecutive sentences. After a careful review of the record in this matter, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Defendant, Mark Howard Russell, was indicted by the Hamilton County Grand Jury for the following misdemeanor offenses: possession of cocaine, possession of methamphetamine, possession of drug paraphernalia, and operation of a motor vehicle without properly operating stop lights. Defendant sought to suppress evidence seized by a police officer during a traffic stop. Following an evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied Defendant's motion to suppress evidence. Defendant subsequently entered guilty pleas to three of the four counts. Defendant did not plead guilty to possession of methamphetamine. The charge was dismissed because the laboratory report was negative for that substance. Defendant reserved the right to appeal, pursuant to Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure 37(b)(2), the issue of whether the warrantless search was constitutional. We conclude that Defendant's Fourth Amendment rights were not violated and affirm the judgments of the trial court.

A Davidson County jury convicted the defendant, Brandy D. Forrest, of driving under the influence, first offense. The trial court imposed a sentence of eleven months and twenty-nine days with twenty days incarceration followed by probation. On appeal, the defendant asserts the trial court erred by allowing irrelevant and prejudicial testimony and a videotape to be presented to the jury. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A tenured professor successfully challenged his dismissal through a review in the Chancery Court of Davidson County. Subsequently he filed a claim against the state in the Claims Commission for breach of contract. The Commission dismissed the claim on jurisdictional grounds. We affirm the conclusion that the claim was not based on a "written contract."

The appellant, Walter Sanchez, Jr., pled guilty to violating an order declaring him to be an habitual motor vehicle offender. The plea agreement provided that the appellant would receive a sentence of two years incarceration in the Tennessee Department of Correction and pay a $500.00 fine. The manner of service of the sentence was to be determined by the trial court. On appeal, the appellant argues that the trial court erred in denying him probation or some other form of alternative sentencing. Upon review of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Defendant, Richard C. Rogers, appeals his convictions in the Lauderdale County Circuit Court for burglary of a vehicle, a class E felony, and theft of property in an amount over $1,000 and less than $10,000, a class D felony. Following a jury trial, Defendant was sentenced as a career offender to six years for his burglary conviction and twelve years for his theft conviction, to be served concurrently. In this appeal as of right, Defendant contends that the evidence at trial was insufficient to support his convictions beyond a reasonable doubt. After review of the record, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The petitioner, Terrell Lawrence, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his convictions for second degree murder, aggravated assault, and carjacking, arguing that his guilty pleas were not knowing, understanding, and voluntary and that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel during the plea process. The post-conviction court denied the petition and, following our review, we affirm.

This appeal involves a patron at a Nashville night spot who was seriously injured by a broken glass tray left unattended on a table. In addition to the laceration on his leg, the patron fell and hit his face against the floor. The patron later filed suit against the night spot in the Circuit Court for Davidson County seeking damages not only for the laceration of his leg but also for internal derangement of his temporomandibular joint caused by his fall. The night spot conceded its negligence, and, after conducting a bench trial on the question of damages, the trial court awarded the patron $8,937.00 for his medical expenses, pain and suffering, and loss of enjoyment of life. On this appeal, the patron takes issue with the trial court's refusal to award him $1,133.00 in medical expenses and with the amount of the award for pain and suffering and loss of enjoyment of life. We have determined that the trial court lacked any basis for declining to award the patron all his medical expenses and that the evidence does not preponderate against the award for pain and suffering and loss of enjoyment of life.

The Circuit Court of Wilson County awarded custody of a minor child to the paternal grandmother. The child's mother, to whom custody had been awarded in the divorce, asserts that the facts do not support such a drastic remedy. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Mother petitioned the court for change of child custody. The trial court found no material change of circumstances justifying such change and dismissed the petition. We affirm.

The defendant was convicted of incest and rape of a child and sentenced to twenty-three years at 100% for the rape of a child conviction and eight years as a Range II, multiple offender for the incest conviction, the sentences to be served concurrently. The defendant was also fined $50,000 for the rape of a child conviction and $10,000 for the incest conviction. On appeal, the defendant presents the following claims: (1) the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions; (2) the trial court erred in determining that the six-year-old victim was competent to testify and improperly vouched for the credibility of the child-victim; (3) the trial court erred in giving the expert witness instruction to the jury; and (4) the trial court denied the defendant a fair trial by refusing to let him conduct a voir dire examination of each juror individually and out of the presence of the other jurors. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court but remand for entry of corrected judgments to reflect that the defendant was convicted of Counts 3 and 4, rather than Counts 1 and 2, of the indictment and to reflect the defendant's fines which were omitted from the judgments.