APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

I join with the majority on all issues with the exception of their holding that the hearsay statement of the victim was admissible. The majority finds that the deceased victim's statement "that he was tired of the lifestyle, being in that environment, and he didn't want to be a part of it anymore" was admissible to establish the victim's existing state of mind.

The defendant, Erick Darnell Bailey, appeals his first-degree murder convictions imposed following a jury trial in the Davidson County Criminal Court. The defendant was tried and convicted on both felony-murder and premeditated-murder counts in the indictment, and the  trial court merged the convictions into a single conviction of first-degree murder. The single issue raised on appeal is whether the convicting evidence is sufficient to support the verdicts. We modify the conviction for premeditated murder to second-degree murder and affirm the conviction for first-degree, felony murder. The second-degree  murder conviction merges into the felony murder conviction.

Defendant, William C. Bentley, was convicted by a Davidson County jury of attempted aggravated robbery. In this appeal, he challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the conviction, and argues that the trial court committed reversible error by admitting hearsay testimony. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Brenda Lee Hicks, was convicted of vehicular homicide and entered a plea of guilt to one count of driving without a license. The trial court imposed a sentence of six years for the vehicular homicide and ordered service of 11 months and 29 days in jail. The balance of the sentence is to be served on supervised probation. The trial court imposed a concurrent sentence of 30 days incarceration for the charge of driving without a license. In this appeal as of right, the defendant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support the vehicular homicide conviction and questions the propriety of the sentence for that offense. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The Appellant, Eric B. Blakemore, was convicted by a Shelby County jury of one count of second degree murder and one count of attempted second degree murder. After a sentencing hearing, Blakemore received concurrent sentences of twenty-two years for the murder conviction and ten years for the attempted murder conviction. On appeal, Blakemore asserts that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support his conviction for second degree murder. Specifically, he argues that the evidence presented supports the lesser offense of voluntary manslaughter. After review, we find the evidence legally sufficient; accordingly, the judgment of conviction is affirmed.

The defendant, David Tyrone Dowell, appeals the sentence imposed by the trial court on his guilty-plea-based aggravated assault conviction. Because the record supports the trial court's sentencing determination, we affirm.

The defendant, Fredrick Devill Rice, was convicted by a Hamilton County Criminal Court jury of first degree premeditated murder and first degree felony murder. The trial court merged the two convictions and sentenced the defendant to life imprisonment. The defendant appeals, claiming that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his merged convictions; (2) the trial court erred by admitting a videotaped search of the defendant's residence into evidence; and (3) the state argued outside of the record twice during closing argument. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, David W. Bass, was indicted for driving under the influence, violation of the implied consent law, failure to appear, and operating a motor vehicle with an improper taillight. Pursuant to a plea agreement, the defendant entered a plea of guilt to driving under the influence, first offense. After the entry of his plea but before sentencing, the defendant sought to withdraw his plea, arguing that it was not knowingly and voluntarily made. The trial court denied the motion and imposed a sentence of eleven months and twenty-nine days, with all but three days suspended. In this appeal of right, the defendant contends that the trial court erred by denying the motion to withdraw the guilty plea. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Pursuant to a plea agreement, the Petitioner pled guilty to four felony drug offenses and received an effective sentence of sixteen years. After a hearing, the trial court ordered the sentence to be served in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, which the trial court dismissed without a hearing for failure to state a colorable claim. Concluding that the Petitioner stated a colorable claim, we reverse and remand for a hearing.

The petitioner appeals pro se from the Davidson County Criminal Court’s denying him habeas corpus relief from his three 1999 convictions for the sale or delivery of more than one-half gram of crack cocaine for which he received an effective sentence of twenty-four  years. The petitioner contends that the convictions are void because the presentment “does not charge the overt act, offense of knowingly possession with intent to sell or deliver a Schedule II controlled substance, and nor, does it charge, knowingly possessed a Schedule II controlled substance, exceeding one-half gram.” He also asserts that evidence “seized and manufactured through an informant, after-the-fact, through inducement” is insufficient to show probable cause in Tennessee. The trial court denied relief.

The petitioner appeals the post-conviction court's denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. He claims that counsel was ineffective for failing to timely discover the existence of another individual who was questioned regarding the aggravated assault and for failing to interview or cross-examine the victim of the assault. After review, we affirm the judgment from the post-conviction court.

The appellant, John Wesley Johnson, was indicted by the Gibson County Grand Jury for one count of desecration of a venerated object, to wit: a place of burial, a class A misdemeanor. He was convicted by a jury, sentenced to eleven months and twenty-nine days in the county jail, placed on probation, and ordered to pay restitution in the amount of $2,574. The appellant, proceeding pro se, filed an untimely notice of appeal. This court, upon motion of the appellant, waived timely filing
of the appeal; accordingly, the appeal is properly before this court. On appeal, the appellant raises the following issues: (1) “w[h]ether the trial court reviewed the record”; (2) “w[h]ether the (State) conspira[cy] used their position to withhold facts in order to receive a conviction”; (3) “w[h]ether the public officers used the court to reach their gold”; and  (4) “w[h]ether the trial court erred in its review of the records and facts of law as to this case.” Upon review of the record and the parties’
briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant pled guilty to second degree murder, and the trial court imposed an agreed sentence of fifteen years in the Department of Correction. The Defendant subsequently filed for post-conviction relief, alleging that she did not enter a voluntary and knowing guilty plea and alleging that she received ineffective assistance of counsel in conjunction with her plea. After an evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied relief. This appeal followed. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.