APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The defendant, Antonio Dewayne Carpenter, was indicted for premeditated murder, felony murder, especially aggravated kidnapping, and especially aggravated robbery. The state filed notice seeking the death penalty. The defendant was convicted on each count of the indictment and the trial court merged the felony murder conviction with the premeditated murder conviction. At the conclusion of the penalty phase of the trial, the jury imposed a sentence of life without the possibility of parole. The trial court ordered concurrent twenty-year sentences for especially aggravated kidnapping and especially aggravated robbery. All of these sentences were ordered to be served consecutively to three life sentences for federal convictions stemming from the same incident. In this appeal of right, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence and argues that the dual sovereignty doctrine, which permits successive federal and state prosecutions for the same acts, should be abandoned. The judgments are affirmed.

The Defendant was convicted in Wayne County Circuit Court of five counts of rape of a child and two counts of aggravated sexual battery. The Defendant received an effective sentence of seventy-five years incarceration. This Court subsequently reversed the five rape of a child convictions and remanded the case to the trial court to determine whether the remaining two twelve-year sentences for aggravated sexual battery should be served consecutively or concurrently. The trial court determined that the sentences should be served consecutively for an effective sentence of twenty-four years incarceration. The Defendant now appeals, arguing that the trial court erred in ordering that the Defendant's sentences for aggravated sexual battery run consecutively. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

On October 5, 1998, the defendant, Barry Dunham, pled guilty in the Macon County Criminal Court to one count of second degree murder and received a sentence of twenty-five years incarceration in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The defendant filed for post-conviction relief which was granted by the post-conviction court. The State now appeals. Upon review of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court and remand for new trial.

The defendant was convicted of first degree premeditated murder, first degree felony murder, and especially aggravated robbery, with the murder convictions merged into a single conviction for first degree murder following the jury's verdict. The jury sentenced him to life imprisonment on the murder conviction, and the trial court sentenced him to twenty-two years on the especially aggravated robbery conviction, to be served concurrently to the life sentence. Following the denial of his motion for a new trial, the defendant filed a timely appeal to this court, raising four issues: (1) whether the evidence was sufficient to support his convictions; (2) whether the trial court erred in allowing testimony about a statement of denial he made to police; (3) whether the trial court erred in allowing a photograph of the victim's body to be introduced into evidence; and (4) whether the jury should have been instructed that the State had taken the position, in a dismissed conspiracy indictment, that the defendant's accomplice was the shooter. After a careful review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court but remand for entry of corrected judgments.

Pursuant to a plea agreement, the Defendant pleaded guilty to one count of possessing with intent to sell less than 0.5 grams of a substance containing cocaine, and the trial court sentenced him as a Range I standard offender to five years incarceration in the workhouse. The trial court suspended the sentence and placed the Defendant on probation for five years. Approximately four months later, a warrant was issued against the Defendant alleging that he had violated the terms and conditions of his probation. The warrant alleged that the Defendant had been arrested for evading arrest and aggravated assault, that the Defendant had failed to report these arrests to his probation officer, and that the Defendant had failed to report to his probation officer after being released from jail. Following a hearing on the warrant, the trial court revoked the Defendant's probation and ordered him to serve the remainder of his sentence in confinement. The Defendant now brings this appeal, in which he challenges the trial court's order requiring him to serve the remainder of his sentence in confinement. Because we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This case returns to this court after remand by order of the Tennessee Supreme Court. The defendant appeals his jury convictions of attempted second degree murder, aggravated assault, and especially
aggravated robbery. He raises the following issues: (1) whether the trial judge erred in denying defendant’s request for a mistrial based on a juror’s response during voir dire; (2) whether the trial court erred in directing a witness to answer questions on cross-examination; (3) whether the evidence was sufficient to support his convictions; and (4) whether the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury as to certain lesser-included offenses. This court initially reversed the appellant’s
conviction for aggravated assault, based on double jeopardy considerations, and affirmed the judgment of the trial court on all other issues. See State v. Reginald Merriweather, No. W1999-
2050-CCA-R3-CD, 2001 WL 242570 (Tenn. Crim. App., Jackson, March 6, 2001) (perm. to appeal granted). On June 5, 2001, the Supreme Court released its decision in the case of State v. Curtis
Jason Ely and State v. Laconia Lamar Bowers, 48 S.W.3d 710 (Tenn. 2001). In Ely and Bowers, the Court announced new standards regarding the duty to instruct on lesser-included offenses. In
light of the decision in Ely and Bowers, the Supreme Court remanded the case to this court to determine whether error in not instructing facilitation was harmless. See State v. Reginald Merriweather, No. W2001-02206-CCA-RM-CD, Madison County (Tenn., September 10, 2001).  After revisiting this issue under the standards announced in Ely and Bowers, we reverse the defendant’s convictions and remand this matter for a new trial. 

Because Ely and Bowers involve the issue of lesser-included offenses only, the remand does not alter the analyses in our original opinion as to other issues. However, the necessity of a new trial does render premature our earlier determination to dismiss the conviction for aggravated assault. So as to avoid confusion, sections I and II from our original opinion will be restated in their entirety.  Sections III and IV, dealing with the conviction for aggravated assault and the issue of lesser-included offenses, have been changed.

The Defendant, Harold D. Arnold, pled guilty to driving under the influence of an intoxicant and failure to maintain an accurate log book after the trial court denied his motion to suppress the results of a breath analysis test. The Defendant properly reserved a certified question of law for this Court to determine whether the trial court erred in denying the Defendant's motion to suppress. We reverse the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Yevette Somerville, was convicted of theft of property valued under $500, a Class A misdemeanor, and was sentenced to eleven months, twenty-nine days in the county jail. As her sole issue on appeal, the defendant argues that the State’s failure to inquire about and preserve potentially exculpatory evidence violated her due process rights under the United States and Tennessee Constitutions. Having reviewed the entire record, we conclude that the loss of the evidence did not unfairly prejudice the defendant’s case. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.