APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

A Shelby County jury convicted the defendant of second degree murder, and the trial court sentenced him to 25 years as a Violent Offender. In this appeal, the defendant alleges (1) the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction, and (2) the trial court erroneously admitted the defendant's custodial confession. We conclude that the defendant's initial arrest was without probable cause, and that the defendant's confession was obtained approximately 53 hours from his arrest without a judicial determination of probable cause. The defendant's confession was, therefore, erroneously admitted, and the error was not harmless. We reverse the defendant's conviction and remand for a new trial.

The defendant was charged in a two-count indictment with one count of the unlawful possession of more than .5 grams of cocaine with the intent to sell, and one count of the unlawful possession of more than 26 grams of cocaine with the intent to deliver. A separate indictment returned the same day charged one count of the unlawful possession of marijuana. Pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement, he subsequently pled guilty to two misdemeanor drug possession offenses in connection with the charges, and was sentenced to concurrent sentences of 11 months, 29 days. The trial court refused his request for judicial diversion, but granted him probation, with the condition that he spend 90 days in a halfway house. In a timely filed appeal to this court, the defendant raises two issues: (1) whether the trial court erred in denying his request for judicial diversion; and (2) whether the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing him to three months in the halfway house as a condition of probation. Based upon a careful review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. However, we remand to the trial court for entry of a corrected judgment form to reflect the disposition of all charges against the defendant.

Defendant challenges the denial of pretrial diversion by the District Attorney General and subsequent denial of relief by the trial court. We conclude that the defendant failed to file a petition for writ of certiorari and improperly sought to have the trial court consider matters not presented to the District Attorney General; thus, defendant has failed to establish that the District Attorney General abused his discretion in denying pretrial diversion. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Charles R. Blackstock, pled guilty to especially aggravated kidnapping and two counts of rape of a child. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-13-305, 39-13-522. The trial court imposed 25-year sentences on each offense. The sentences were ordered to be served consecutively, for an effective sentence of 75 years. The sentence for especially aggravated kidnapping and the consecutive sentencing order are affirmed. Because the trial court erroneously applied certain enhancement factors to each of the sentences for rape of a child, the terms are modified to 23 years.

The appellant, Charles Shelton, appeals the dismissal of his habeas corpus petition by the Johnson County, Tennessee, Criminal Court. Following a review of the petition and the record herein we find that the judgment of the trial court should be AFFIRMED.

The Defendant was convicted of second offense driving under the influence and violation of the open container law. The trial court sentenced her to eleven months, twenty-nine days incarceration for the DUI conviction, suspended after service of ninety days, and to thirty days incarceration, suspended, for violation of the open container law. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant argues that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support her convictions. Having reviewed the record, we conclude that sufficient evidence was presented to support the jury’s findings of guilt and therefore affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The appellant, Kelly A. Hancock appeals as a matter of right from her conviction for driving under the influence. She contends the evidence is insufficient to support the jury's verdict of guilt. After a review of the evidence we affirm the conviction pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals.

Defendant entered pleas of guilty to the rape of a child in Counts 1, 6, and 7 of the indictment and in Count 3, a plea of guilty to aggravated sexual battery. At the conclusion of a sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed sentences of 24 years for each count of rape of a child and 12 years for the offense of aggravated sexual battery. The trial court ordered that the sentences be served consecutively, resulting in a sentence of 84 years. On direct appeal, Defendant asserts that the trial court erred in imposing an inappropriate sentence on each count and erred in imposing consecutive sentencing on all charges. After a review of the record, we affirm the trial court's judgment.

A Marshall County grand jury indicted the petitioner on two counts of aggravated burglary, two counts of theft, and one count of evading arrest. On October 29, 1997, the petitioner entered an open plea of guilt, reserving the determination of the length and manner of sentencing for the trial court.  Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced the petitioner to a total of thirty-four years as a Range III persistent offender. In making its sentencing determination, the trial court ran several of the offenses consecutively. On direct appeal, the petitioner challenged his sentence as excessive.  State v. Hayes, No. 01C01-9804-CC-00176, 1999 WL 126650 at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. at Nashville, March 11, 1999). Finding that the record supported the trial court’s sentence determination, this Court affirmed the trial court’s judgment. Id. at *2. The petitioner then unsuccessfully applied for
permission to appeal the trial court’s sentence determination to the Tennessee Supreme Court.  Thereafter, the petitioner filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief, alleging that he received ineffective assistance of counsel and that the trial court judge who imposed his sentence should have recused himself due to his personal knowledge of the facts of and victims in the case. The court
appointed counsel for the petitioner, and the petitioner’s newly appointed counsel then filed an amendment to the earlier petition, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel by both trial and appellate counsel. The trial court conducted an evidentiary hearing on the petition and dismissed the petition for post-conviction relief. The petitioner now appeals the trial court’s dismissal of his petition, alleging that he received both ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel and that the trial judge erred in denying his motion for recusal. After the reviewing the record and applicable case law, we find these issues to be without merit and therefore affirm the trial court’s denial of the petition for post-conviction relief.

The defendant, Stella Rodifer, was convicted of forgery, a felony; six counts of worthless checks under $500.00, misdemeanors; and one count of worthless checks over $1,000.00, a felony. The defendant was sentenced to consecutive terms of two and four years, respectively, on each of the felonies. The trial court imposed concurrent sentences of 11 months and 29 days on each misdemeanor, two of which were ordered to be served consecutively for an effective sentence of seven years, 11 months, and 27 days. The trial court granted probation on the misdemeanors and sentenced the defendant to a Community Corrections program on the felonies. Four months later, the trial court revoked the alternative sentences and ordered the defendant to serve four years for forgery; eight years for felony worthless checks; and 11 months and 29 days (two consecutive) for each of the six counts of worthless checks, for an effective sentence of 13 years, 11 months, and 27 days. In this appeal of right, the defendant argues that the trial court erred by revoking her alternative sentences and by imposing lengthier, consecutive sentences. The judgments are affirmed.

The petitioner appeals the denial of post-conviction relief on his second degree murder conviction, arguing that the post-conviction court erred in finding that he had effective assistance of trial counsel. Following his entry of a plea of guilty to second degree murder, the petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. Specifically, he alleged that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to thoroughly investigate and prepare his case, and that were it not for the deficiencies in counsel's representation, he would not have entered his plea of guilty. At the conclusion of an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court dismissed the petition, finding that the petitioner had failed to offer any proof to support his allegations. After a careful review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The defendant, Bobby Gene Tucker, appeals from the revocation of his probation received for his conviction for driving under the influence of an intoxicant (DUI) after having served fifteen days in confinement. He contends (1) that the revocation warrant and affidavit are void, thereby voiding his probation revocation and (2) that the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing him to serve the maximum term of eleven months, twenty-nine days with credit for time served. We affirm the trial court.

The State of Tennessee has applied to this court for permission to pursue an interlocutory appeal pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 10. In its application, the State complains that because the grand jury had yet to take action to charge the respondents in connection with a homicide, the Greene County Circuit Court was not empowered to conduct pretrial conferences, to enter pretrial orders, to set a trial date, or to order the state to file its notice of intent to seek the death penalty or life without possibility of parole. We grant the Rule 10 appeal and generally vacate the lower court's pretrial conference orders.