APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The defendant, Orlando Crayton, was convicted of aggravated assault, reckless endangerment, unlawful carrying or possession of a weapon, and two counts of vandalism under $500.00. The trial court sentenced the defendant to 11 months, 29 days for each vandalism count, six years for aggravated assault, two years for reckless endangerment and 11 months, 29 days for unlawful possession of a weapon. Because the sentences were ordered to be served concurrently, the effective sentence is six years. In this appeal of right, the defendant challenges (1) the admissibility of evidence indicating the defendant's gang affiliation; (2) the admission of an estimate regarding the damage to a vehicle; and (3) the admission of a hearsay statement. The judgment is affirmed.

On November 24, 1998, the Shelby County Grand Jury indicted the Defendant for one count of aggravated robbery and one count of aggravated assault. Following a subsequent jury trial, the Defendant was convicted on both counts. On September 30, 1998, after a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced the Defendant as a career offender to serve thirty years incarceration for the aggravated robbery consecutively to fifteen years for the aggravated assault. The court also ordered both sentences served consecutively to a sentence for which the Defendant was on parole. On appeal, the Defendant claims that the trial court should have instructed the jury to consider robbery and theft as lesser-included offenses of aggravated robbery and that the trial court should have instructed the jury to consider reckless endangerment, reckless aggravated assault and simple assault as lesser-included offenses of aggravated assault. After a review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.as lesser-included offenses of aggravated assault. After a review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court., we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Eric D. Thomas, pled guilty to four counts of robbery and was sentenced to six years for each conviction. The sentences were ordered to run consecutively, which ruling the Defendant now appeals. The judgment of the trial court ordering the Defendant's sentences to run consecutively is reversed, and this matter is remanded for resentencing on the issue of consecutive sentences.

The defendant appeals and asserts that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for first degree premeditated murder. After review, we hold that the evidence is sufficient; therefore, we affirm the defendant's conviction.

In 1999, a Shelby County jury found the Defendant guilty of aggravated robbery, and the trial court sentenced him as a Range I, standard offender to eight years incarceration. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant presents the following issues for our review: (1) whether the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to support his conviction; (2) whether the trial court erred by admitting into evidence the gun alleged to have been used in the robbery; (3) whether the trial court erred by allowing testimony by the victim concerning the death of the victim's mother; (4) whether the trial court improperly instructed the jury; and (5) whether the cumulative effect of errors at trial warrants a new trial. Having reviewed the record, we find no error and accordingly affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, a construction company payroll clerk, was convicted of fourteen counts of forgery, Class E felonies, and one count of theft of property over $1000, a Class D felony, for utilizing her position at the company to write and cash invalid checks on her employer's account. She was sentenced as a Range II, multiple offender to three years on each forgery conviction, and six years on the theft conviction, to be served concurrently for an effective sentence of six years. In this appeal as of right, the defendant argues that the trial court erred in allowing evidence of her prior crimes to be admitted at trial, and that the evidence was not sufficient to support her convictions. After a careful review, we conclude that the trial court did not err in allowing the State to impeach the defendant's credibility by questioning her about her prior convictions, and that the evidence was sufficient to support the jury's verdict. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Jerry L. Luster, appeals pro se the summary dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. Because the petition was filed in the wrong county, we affirm the trial court's dismissal of the request for habeas corpus relief.

Petitioner appeals the denial by the trial court of his writ of habeas corpus and writ of certiorari. Petitioner contended in his petition that he previously pled guilty in the Criminal Court of Madison County to the offenses of facilitation of first degree murder, conspiracy to commit especially aggravated robbery, and arson, and received an effective sentence of 60 years. He further contended that court did not have jurisdiction to try him as an adult; his rights to double jeopardy were violated as a result of his transfer to the Criminal Court; and he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel. On appeal, he claims the trial court erred in dismissing his petition without appointing counsel, without conducting a hearing, and by failing to make findings of fact and conclusions of law. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

After a jury trial, Defendants were convicted of one count of attempt to manufacture methamphetamine and two counts of possession of methamphetamine. The trial court sentenced each Defendant to three (3) years in the Department of Correction for attempt to manufacture methamphetamine and eleven (11) months and twenty-nine (29) days for possession of methamphetamine. In this appeal as of right, Defendants assert that the trial court erred as to whether Defendant, Sammy Wilson, gave Investigator Markin consent to search his truck. From our review of the transcript of the motion to suppress, the trial record, briefs of the parties and applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant was convicted by a Knox County jury of aggravated assault, a Class C felony. The Defendant was sentenced as a Range II multiple offender to nine years incarceration in the state penitentiary. The Defendant now appeals, arguing that insufficient evidence was presented at trial to convict him of aggravated assault. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

William Butler Bolling appeals from the Sullivan County Criminal Court's determination that he serve his plea bargained, effective two-year sentence for gambling crimes in the Department of Correction. He claims he should have received some form of alternative sentencing, preferably probation, for his felony conviction. Because Bolling has failed to demonstrate the error of the trial court's determination, we affirm.

The defendant, Rhonda Grills, was convicted of facilitation of the felony rape of a child less than 13 years of age. The trial court imposed a Range I sentence of 10 years. The defendant was fined $25,000.00. In this appeal of right, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence. Because the evidence is adequate to support the facilitation of the rape of a child, the judgment is affirmed.

I respectfully dissent. I agree with the majority opinion that the granting or denial of a mistrial is a matter within the sound discretion of the trial court and that a trial court should grant a mistrial only when it is of “manifest necessity.” I would add that the burden of establishing a “manifest necessity” is upon the appellant. State v. Williams, 929 S.W.2d 385, 388 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1996).

A Knox County jury convicted the defendant of aggravated robbery, and the trial court sentenced him as a Range I offender to eleven years incarceration. The defendant now appeals and raises the following issues: (1) whether the trial court erred by not granting a mistrial when a detective improperly testified that the Defendant was “well known for home invasions,” (2) whether the state failed to disclose fingerprint evidence in a timely fashion, and (3) whether sufficient evidence supported the defendant’s conviction for aggravated robbery. Finding that the trial court erred in denying the motion to declare a mistrial, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand for a new trial.