APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code3 Ann. § 50-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law.  The employer, Modine Manufacturing Company, Inc., has appealed from the action of the trial court in awarding the employee, Jamia B. Gardner, 80% permanent partial disability to each arm.  The trial court dismissed the case against the Second Injury Fund. On appeal the employer contends (1) there was no evidence of a permanent injury to the employee’s left arm, (2) the award of 80% to each arm was excessive and (3) the trial court was in error in dismissing the case against the Second Injury Fund.  The Second Injury Fund also contends the awards of disability are not supported by the evidence but insists the court was correct in holding it was not liable for payment of benefits.

This cause came on to be heard upon the record on appeal from the Special Worker’s Compensation Appeals Panel, and the briefs and argument of counsel; and upon consideration thereof, this Court is of the opinion that the 1996 amendment to Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-114 of the Workers’ Compensation Act is not retroactive and the employer is not entitled to an offset against the worker’s compensation award in this case.

We granted this appeal to determine whether the Tennessee claims commission has subject matter jurisdiction over the plaintiffs’ challenge to certain Medicaid reimbursements paid to them by the State. Upon review, we hold that the Tennessee claims commission lacks subject matter jurisdiction over this case. Because the plaintiffs’ challenge is based upon an assertion that a state Medicaid regulation is invalid under federal law, the Tennessee Department of Health was the agency with subject matter jurisdiction over this case pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-5-223 of the Uniform Administrative Procedures Act ("UAPA").

This dispute concerns an award of alimony and attorney’s fees. Appellant, Dennis T. Crouse (Husband), appeals from the trial court’s order granting alimony in futuro and attorney’s fees to Appellee, Charlane Allen Crouse (Wife).

We granted this post-conviction appeal to determine whether there is ineffective assistance of counsel where, at the express instruction of a competent and fully informed defendant, defense counsel does not investigate or present mitigating evidence at the sentencing phase of a capital trial. For the reasons provided herein, we hold that there is not.

The appellant, Jimmy Jones, Jr., appeals the dismissal of his pro se motion to reopen post-conviction petition or in the alternative a petition for habeas corpus relief by the Sumner County Criminal Court. In December, 1987, the appellant was convicted by a Sumner County jury on two counts of armed robbery and one count of burglary. The appellant received concurrent Range II sentences of forty-five years for the armed robbery convictions and fourteen years for the burglary conviction to run consecutively. On direct appeal, the appellant alleged trial errors as to (1) the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the verdicts, (2) whether the trial court erred in limiting production of police reports, and (3) whether his effective sentence of fifty-nine years was excessive. In January, 1989, this court affirmed the judgment of the trial court in State v. Jimmy Jones, Jr., Sumner County No. 88-58-III (Tenn. Crim. App., Nashville, January 11, 1989) per. app. denied (Tenn. 1989).

We granted this appeal to address whether the State may be liable for discretionary costs pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 54.04(2) in a workers' compensation case. We hold that the State may only be taxed for costs expressly permitted by either the Tennessee claims commission statute or the Workers' Compensation Act.

We granted this appeal to determine whether an employer is entitled to an offset of long-term disability payments against a workers’ compensation award for permanent total disability. A 1996 amendment to Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-114 permits offsets against workers’ compensation benefits for payments made to an employee under an employer-funded disability plan. The plaintiff’s injury pre-dated the effective date of the statute. We hold that the amendment is not retroactive and the employer is not entitled to an offset in this case.
 

We granted this appeal to address whether the State may be liable for discretionary costs pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 54.04(2) in a workers' compensation case. We hold that the State may only be taxed for costs expressly permitted by either the Tennessee claims commission statute or the Workers' Compensation Act.

On December 6, 1996, a W illiamson County jury convicted Appellant, Darrell Wentzel, of two counts of aggravated robbery, one count of aggravated burglary, and one count of aggravated kidnapping. After a sentencing hearing on January 31, 1997, Appellant was sentenced to twelve years for each count of aggravated robbery, twelve years for aggravated kidnapping, and six years for aggravated burglary, with all sentenc es to be served concurrently. On February 18, 1997, Appellant filed a motion for judgment of acquittal or, in the alternative, a motion for a new trial, claiming that the evidence was insufficient for a conviction, that the aggravating kidnapping conviction should be dismissed because it was incidental to the robbery, that several of the trial court’s evidentiary rulings were erroneous, and that the trial court had misapplied enhancement factors to arrive at maximum sentences on all four convictions.  The trial court denied the motion. Appellant challenges both his convictions and his sentence, raising the following issues:

1) whether the trial court comm itted plain error by adm itting the in-court identification of the Appellant by Mary Ethel Veach;

2) whether there was sufficient evidence to corroborate the accomplice testimony of Edward Mitchem;

3) whether Appellant’s convictions for two counts of aggravated robbery constituted dou ble jeopardy;

4) whether the trial court correctly rejected Appellant’s argument that he could not be convicted of aggravated kidnapping because it was only incidental to the robbery;

5) whether the trial court correctly sentenced the Appellant.

After a review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Plaintiff Chase Cavett Services, Inc. (Chase) appeals an order of the chancery court granting a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction filed by Defendant Brandon Apparel Group, Inc. (Brandon). Because we find that the chancery court may exercise personal jurisdiction over Brandon, we reverse the ruling of the chancellor.

This appeal involves a juvenile delinquency proceeding. Appellant, Lorenzo Carlos Pfeifer, appeals from the order of the Circuit Court in Obion County which found him a delinquent child because he was guilty of the offense of aggravated burglary and theft of property over $1,000.00. Appellant was committed to the Tennessee Department of Children’s Services for an indeterminate term. The only issue presented for review is whether the evidence is sufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Pfeifer committed the offense of aggravated burglary and theft of property over $1,000.00.

We granted this appeal to determine whether the Tennessee claims commission has subject matter jurisdiction over the plaintiffs’ challenge to certain Medicaid reimbursements paid to them by the State. Upon review, we hold that the Tennessee claims commission lacks subject matter jurisdiction over this case. Because the plaintiffs’ challenge is based upon an assertion that a state Medicaid regulation is invalid under federal law, the Tennessee Department of Health was the agency with subject matter jurisdiction over this case pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-5-223 of the Uniform Administrative Procedures Act ("UAPA").

Gehl Corporation filed suit in the Chancery Court of Davidson County to contest an assessment by the Commissioner of Revenue of the "Amusement Tax" imposed by Tennessee Code Annotated section 67-6-212(a)(2).

This is a domestic relations case. The appellant complains of the award of the residence to the appellee, and the award of the attorney’s fees. Our review of the findings of fact made by the trial Court is de novo upon the record of the trial Court, accompanied by a presumption of the correctness of the finding, unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise. TENN. R. APP. P., RULE 13(d); Campbell v. Florida Steel Corp., 919 S.W.2d 26 (Tenn. 1996). Where there is no conflict in the evidence as to any material fact, the question on appeal is one of law, and the scope of review is de novo with no presumption of correctness accompanying a chancellor's conclusions of law. Union Carbide Corp. v. Huddleston, 854 S.W.2d 87 (Tenn. 1993).

Steve Makris appeals the trial court’s denial of his claim for accrued and unpaid salaries in this partnership accounting and dissolution case. For the reasons stated hereafter, we reverse the trial court’s judgment.
 

This is a domestic relations dispute involving money only. The trial court held that a certificate of deposit and one investment account were the separate property of Husband and declined to award Wife alimony or the total amount of her attorney fees. She appeals and presents these issues for review.

Megan Harmon (“Megan” or “Appellant”), minor child born during the marriage of Plaintiff/Appellee, Todd Harmon (“Mr. Harmon” or “Appellee”) and Defendant Janet Harmon (“Mrs. Harmon”), by and through her Guardian Ad Litem (G.A.L.), appeals the decision of the trial court which found that Appellee was not the biological father of Appellant, and incorporated into the decree of divorce the marital dissolution agreement in which the parties agreed Appellee would have no further obligation to the child.

This appeal involves the validity of certain transactions entered into by the holder of a power of attorney. The trial court set aside the transactions finding that the attorney in fact had failed to rebut the presumption of undue influence which arose in light of these self-benefitting transactions. We affirm the decision of the trial court.

This is a divorce case. In the original divorce, years ago, the wife was awarded shares of stock from the husband’s p ension fund. Subs equently, the pension fund was distributed to the husband, with no monies going to the wife. In this action, the trial court awarded the wife a judgment for the value o f the stock at the time of the trial co urt’s order. The husband appeals. We affirm.

A Rutherford County grand jury indicted defendant for aggravated rape, two counts of aggravated sexual battery, and rape of a child for incidents involving his young female cousin. A negotiated plea agreement allowed defendant to plead to one count of rape, a Class B felony, and one count of incest, a Class C felony. The agreed upon sentences were eight years for rape and three years for incest to be served consecutively as a Range I, standard offender. The sole issue on appeal is the trial court’s denial of alternative sentencing. However, plain error dictates that the convictions be VACATED and the case REMANDED for further proceedings. The defendant pled guilty to incest which is neither a lesser included nor a lesser grade of child rape; nor do the acts of the defendant constitute the crime of incest.