APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This is an appeal from the final divorce decree of Rathnasabapathy Mohan ("the Husband") and Mathivathani Mohan ("the Wife") which was entered by  the lower court in December of 1996. The contested divorce action initiated by the Wife involved issues of custody, visitation, child support, alimony,  classification and division of marital property, and apportionment of marital debt. This appeal by the Husband emanates from the fact the Husband was not present when the final hearing took place.

I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion because I do not think the trial judge abused her discretion in denying the appellant’s motion for a new trial. The appellant’s motion does not set out what proof he would offer at a new trial and how that might change the result below. Therefore, I think the trial judge justifiably overruled the motion.

The defendant was found guilty by a Davidson County jury of burglary and theft of property over $1,000. The trial court sentenced defendant to Range II sentences of six years on each count and ordered them served consecutively for an effective twelve-year sentence. The defendant contends that the trial court erred in finding and weighing the enhancement and mitigating factors and in ordering the sentences served consecutively instead of concurrently. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the sentence as imposed.

A jury found the defendant guilty of conspiracy to possess with the intent to deliver over seventy pounds of marijuana; two counts of possession with the intent to deliver one-half ounce to ten pounds of marijuana; and delivery of ten pounds, one gram to seventy pounds of marijuana. The trial court imposed an effective sentence of thirtynine years incarceration, with a total fine of one hundred sixty thousand dollars ($160,000). On appeal, the defendant presents ten issues for review, most of which deal with the sufficiency of the convicting evidence or the propriety of the defendant’s sentence. We affirm the defendant’s convictions and sentence.

This appeal involves the enforcement of a judgment lien where, subsequent to the attachment of the judgment lien, the encumbered real property was sold to a buyer who simultaneously granted a purchase money mortgage to a financial institution.

The petitioner pled guilty to six counts of drug charges in Davidson County case number 92-A-647 on May 16, 1995. He was sentenced as a Range I offender to concurrent ten year sentences to be served in the Community Corrections program. On January 19, 1996, the petitioner was found guilty of violating his community corrections sentence and the court increased his sentence from ten years to twenty years to serve. On December 11, 1996, the petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief. The petition was dismissed by the trial court on the grounds that it was filed outside the applicable statute of limitations. The petitioner now appeals and argues the postconviction court erred when it dismissed the petition. We agree and reverse the judgment of the court below and remand this cause for a hearing on the merits of the petition.

This appeal involves a dispute over the duration of a lease. Defendant John A. McCaskill (McCaskill), doing business as City Sign Company (City Sign), appeals the Chancellor’s order granting partial summary judgment to plaintiffs Max Norton (Norton) and Long Outdoor Advertising (LOA).

The Defendant, Timothy R. Powell, appeals as of right from the order of the trial court summarily dismissing his second petition for post-conviction relief. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner was convicted by a jury of first degree murder in 1975 and sentenced to death. This Court affirmed the conviction, but the sentence was commuted to life imprisonment by executive action. Hamilton v. State, 555 S.W.2d 724 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1977).

In this legal malpractice action, the plaintiffs, John Kohl & Company P.C., John B. Kohl, III and Helen H. Kohl, Individually, and John B. Kohl, III, Trustee, as Trustee of the John Kohl & Company, P.C. Profit Sharing Plan, (collectively referred to as the “plaintiffs”), appeal from the Court of Appeals’ decision affirming the trial court’s finding that the statute of limitations barred the plaintiffs’ recovery for negligently provided legal advice pertaining to certain business matters. The plaintiffs have also appealed from the denial of legal fees associated with prosecuting this action against the defendant, Dearborn and Ewing, and one of its associates, Dan Huffstutter. The issues before us are: (1) whether certain of the plaintiffs’ claims are barred by the one-year statute of limitations applicable to legal malpractice actions, see Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-3-104, and (2) whether the plaintiffs are entitled to recover legal fees associated with prosecuting this action. For the reasons explained hereafter, the decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.

In this capital case, the defendant, Christa Gail Pike, was convicted of premeditated first degree murder and conspiracy to commit first degree murder. Following a sentencing hearing on the conviction for first degree murder, the jury found two aggravating circumstances: (1) “[t]he murder was especially heinous, atrocious or cruel in that it involved torture or serious physical abuse beyond that necessary to produce death;” and (2) “[t]he murder was committed for the purpose of avoiding, interfering with or preventing a lawful arrest or prosecution of the defendant or another.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-204(i)(5) and (6) (1997 Repl.). Finding that the two aggravating circumstances outweighed mitigating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt, the jury sentenced the defendant to death by electrocution. With respect to the defendant’s conviction of conspiracy to commit first degree murder, the trial judge imposed a consecutive twenty-five-year sentence.

The Court has considered the Petition for Rehearing filed by the defendant/appellee, and it is the decision of a majority of this Court that the petition is without merit. The Petition for Rehearing is denied.

In this legal malpractice action, the defendant, John P. Roberts, appeals from the Court of Appeals’ reversal of summary judgment entered by the trial court in his favor based on the expiration of the statute of limitations. The issue for our determination is whether the present action is barred by the one-year statute of limitations applicable to legal malpractice actions, Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-3-104.1 After carefully examining the record before us and considering the relevant authorities, we conclude that the instant suit is time-barred. Accordingly, for the reasons explained hereafter, the decision of the Court of Appeals to reverse the trial court’s grant of summary judgment to the defendant is reversed.

The plaintiff, Jeremy P. Crye, seeks to impose liability on Mary B. Morton for the act of her son, Lloyd C. Norton, in shooting him. The trial judge granted her motion for summary judgment without enlargement. The plaintiff appeals, and presents for review the issue of whether the proof relevant to the motion established a genuine dispute of a material fact, thus requiring a merit trial.

A. L. Moneymaker, Jr., and his wife Roberta Moneymaker appeal a judgment rendered by the Trial Court against them in the amount of $36,000 as a result of personal injuries sustained by Karen Lynn Pilcher and loss of consortium of her husband, Keith A. Pilcher. The suit arose as a result of a collision occurring on September 3, 1994, about 10:00 a.m., between a female dog named Spec, alleged to be owned by Mr. and Mrs. Moneymaker, and a bicycle being ridden by Mrs. Pilcher on Dutch Valley Road in Anderson County.

The Sevier County Grand Jury indicted sixteen-year old Cecil Eugene McGuire for aggravated rape, aggravated sexual battery, and aggravated burglary. After a trial, the jury acquitted the defendant of aggravated rape and aggravated burglary but found him guilty of aggravated sexual battery and aggravated criminal trespass, a lesser grade offense of aggravated burglary. The trial court sentenced him to serve eleven years in the custody of the Department of Correction as a Range I, standard offender for the Class B felony, concurrently with eleven months and twenty-nine days for the Class A misdemeanor. Pursuant to Rule 3 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure, the defendant presents the following issues:

1. Whether the indictments are fatally defective and thereby deprive the trial court of jurisdiction in this case.
2. Whether the evidence as a matter of law was insufficient to support the convictions.
3. Whether the trial court improperly credited and weighed the enhancement factors and imposed an excessive sentence.

After a careful review of the record and the applicable law, we find no error warranting reversal of the defendant’s convictions. We affirm the convictions, but for reasons explained below, we modify the felony sentence from eleven years to ten years.

Larry G. Relford, an employee of William DeRochie, sued Mr. DeRochie and Steve LaFon, seeking damages for injuries received by him when he fell from a scaffold while framing a personal residence being erected for Mr. LaFon under a contract with Mr. DeRochie, the general contractor. As best we understand the complaint, it is grounded upon two theories-- first, that Mr. LaFon failed to provide a safe place for Mr. Relford to work and, second, that Mr. LaFon was, as contemplated by T.C.A. 50-6-111, a statutory employer and subject to the provisions of the Tennessee Workers' Compensation Statute.

In this adoption case, Danny Alan Kratochvil (respondent) appeals the trial court's order terminating his parental rights regarding his son, Damon Alan Kratochvil. The biological mother's parental rights were terminated by default judgment, and she is not a party to this appeal. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.