State of Tennessee v. George Lorenzo Cartwright
01C01-9608-CR-00338
The appellant, George Lorenzo Cartwright (defendant), appeals as of right from a judgment of the trial court revoking his community corrections sentence and reinstating the sentence previously imposed by the court. The trial court found the defendant had violated the terms of his house arrest, he admitted he had ingested marijuana, and he had been arrested for the possession of cocaine.
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Joe B. Jones
Originating Judge:Judge Jane W. Wheatcraft |
Sumner County | Court of Criminal Appeals | 09/02/97 | |
William J. Snyder v. Ltg. Lufttechnische Gmb; and HSM Pressen-GmbH
01S01-9607-FD-00143
Pursuant to Rule 23 of the Rules of the Supreme Court of Tennessee,1 this Court has accepted two questions certified to us by the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee. The questions are as follows: 1. Whether products liability defendants in a suit for personal injuries based on allegations of negligence and strict liability in tort may introduce evidence at trial that the plaintiff’s employer’s alteration, change, improper maintenance, or abnormal use of the defendants’ product proximately caused or contributed to the plaintiff’s injuries. 2. If “no,” of what effect is Tenn. Code Ann. § 29- 28-108? 3 As explained below, the answer to the first certified question is that products liability defendants in a suit for personal injuries based on allegations of negligence and strict liability in tort may introduce relevant evidence at trial that the plaintiff’s employer’s alteration, change, improper maintenance, or abnormal use of the defendants’ product was the cause in fact of the plaintiff’s injuries. The jury may consider all evidence relevant to the actions of the employer with respect to the defendants’ product in assessing whether the plaintiff has met his burden of establishing the elements necessary to recover against the defendants. However, in making that determination, the jury may not assess fault against the employer. Our answer to the first question makes it unnecessary to reach the second one.
Authoring Judge: Justice Frank W. Drowota, III
Originating Judge:Magistrate Denis H. Inman |
Knox County | Supreme Court | 09/02/97 | |
James R. Fruge and Jane Fruge v. John and Jane Doe
02S01-9601-CV-00005
This case presents for review the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the trial court's award of summary judgment denying the plaintiff's claims under the uninsured motorist statute. That decision is reversed, and the case is remanded.
Authoring Judge: Justice Lyle Reid
Originating Judge:Judge George H. Brown, Jr. |
Supreme Court | 09/02/97 | ||
Mary Blake v. Plus Mark, Inc. and Sue Ann Head, Director of the Division of Worker's Compensation, Tennessee Department of Labor
03S01-9512-CH-00137
This is an appeal from the decision of the Chancery Court in a worker's compensation case, in which the trial court granted the employee's motion for non-suit and then entered a judgment of no liability for the employer on its counterclaim. The judgment of the trial court is reversed, and the case is remanded.
Authoring Judge: Justice Lyle Reid
Originating Judge:Chancellor Dennis H. Inman |
Supreme Court | 09/02/97 | ||
Pack vs. State
03C01-9611-CR-00440
Originating Judge:Douglas A. Meyer |
Hamilton County | Court of Criminal Appeals | 08/29/97 | |
State v. Worley
03C01-9608-CR-00322
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Sullivan County | Court of Criminal Appeals | 08/29/97 | |
State vs. Colson
03C01-9612-CR-00465
Originating Judge:Leon C. Burns, Jr. |
Court of Criminal Appeals | 08/29/97 | ||
IN RE: Ross
03A01-9703-CH-00099
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Court of Appeals | 08/29/97 | ||
Charles C. Jones v. Tridon, Inc., et al.
01S01-9703-CV-00057
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. section 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting of findings of fact and conclusions of law. In this appeal, the defendants-appellants contend (1) the evidence preponderates against the trial court's finding of an injury by accident, (2) the evidence preponderates against the trial court's finding that the claimant's injury was one arising out of the employment, (3) the trial court exceeded its authority under an agreed order, and (4) the evidence preponderates against the trial court's award of medical and temporary total disability benefits. As discussed below, the panel has concluded the award of medical and temporary total disability benefits should be reversed and the judgment otherwise affirmed. The claimant, Jones, was an employee of the employer, Tridon, on January 3, 1993, when he suffered a compensable back injury and was provided some medical benefits by the employer's insurer, Royal. He continued to work and, in January of 1994, requested additional benefits, claiming a new injury. He was given a list of approved physicians but chose, without further consulting the employer or its insurer, to see a chiropractor who was not on the list. The trial court found that a compensable injury occurred on January 21, 1994 and awarded the medical expenses for treatment by Dr. McCombs, 36 weeks of temporary total disability benefits and permanent partial disability benefits based on 15% to the body as a whole. No issue has been raised with respect to the extent of permanent partial disability. Appellate review is de novo upon the record of the trial court, accompanied by a presumption of correctness of the findings of fact, unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise. Tenn. Code Ann. section 5-6- 225(e)(2). This panel is required to conduct an independent examination of the record to determine where the preponderance of the evidence lies.
Authoring Judge: Joe C. Loser, Jr., Special Judge
Originating Judge:Hon. Robert Corlew, |
Rutherford County | Workers Compensation Panel | 08/29/97 | |
Walter A. Dickman v. Meadows Homes, Inc.
01S01-9703-CC-00061
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. section 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting of findings of fact and conclusions of law. In this appeal, the employer, Meadows Homes, Inc., contends the evidence preponderates against the trial court's finding that the claimant was a covered employee and in favor of a finding that he was an independent contractor. As discussed below, the panel has concluded the claimant was an independent contractor. On June 13, 1994, the claimant, Walter Dickman, and Meadows Homes, Inc., entered into the following: CONTRACTOR AGREEMENT I/We Walter Dickman do state that I/We are general contractors who are duly licensed to perform the services for which we are offering to Meadows Homes. Our services are being offered to the general public. As a contractor, I/We provide our own commercial automobile, workmen compensation and liability insurance,and hereby release Meadows Homes from any and all liabilities concerning our contract and any employees and their properties. As a contractor I/We agree to provide all necessary tools, equipment and transportation necessary to complete any services required. As a general contractor I/We affirm that we are responsible to report and pay any local, state or federal taxes which may be due on income from services rendered. The paper writing was dated and signed by the claimant and a representative of Meadows Homes, Inc. Thereafter, Dickman bid on and was awarded work at property owned by Meadows Homes in Jackson County. Then, beginning on June 27, 1994, the parties agreed that he would be compensated on an hourly rather than a per job basis. He would perform the work, then bill Meadows for his time. 2
Authoring Judge: William S. Russell, Retired Judge
Originating Judge:Hon. J. O. Bond, |
Workers Compensation Panel | 08/29/97 | ||
Kay Perryman v. Cosmolab, Inc.
01S01-9703-CH-00069
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court inaccordance with Tenn. Code Ann. section 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting of findings of fact and conclusions of law. In this appeal, the employer contends the evidence preponderates against the trial court's award of permanent partial disability benefits and temporary total disability benefits. The employee concedes the award of temporary total disability benefits is excessive, but contends the trial court used an incorrect compensation rate. As discussed below, the panel has concluded the award of permanent partial disability benefits should be affirmed and the award of temporary total disability benefits modified. The case is remanded for additional proof as to the correct compensation rate. The employee or claimant, Perryman, is forty years old with a high school education. She has worked for the employer for twenty years. In 1994, she injured her elbow at work. As part of her treatment, she was required to take medication which contained blue and yellow dyes, which were also used in the employer's manufacturing process. She had an allergic reaction to the dyes after taking the medication. As a consequence, she is no longer able to work for the employer. She returned to gainful employment on October 31, 1994, thirteen weeks after the beginning of her inability to work because of the injury and treatment. The proof of permanency consisted of the following from the testimony of Dr. Samuel Rowe Marney, Jr., a board certified specialist in Allergy and Immunology: Q. Dr. Marney, Ms. Perryman now has these allergies. Do you have an opinion based upon a reasonable degree of medical certainty as to whether she will have those in the future? A. Based on the usual course of allergies, she's almost certain to carry these allergies the rest of her life. The trial judge awarded permanent partial disability benefits based on forty percent to the body as a whole and temporary total disability benefits for sixty-five weeks. The compensation rate was fixed at $216.22. Appellate review is de novo upon the record of the trial court, accompanied by a presumption of correctness of the findings of fact, unless the preponderance of 2
Authoring Judge: Joe C. Loser, Jr., Special Judge
Originating Judge:Hon. Lee Russell, |
Perry County | Workers Compensation Panel | 08/29/97 | |
01A01-9610-CV-00491
01A01-9610-CV-00491
Originating Judge:Don R. Ash |
Rutherford County | Court of Appeals | 08/29/97 | |
01A01-9612-CH-00540
01A01-9612-CH-00540
Originating Judge:Robert E. Burch |
Humphreys County | Court of Appeals | 08/29/97 | |
01A01-9702-CV-00069
01A01-9702-CV-00069
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Court of Appeals | 08/29/97 | ||
01A01-9702-CV-00069
01A01-9702-CV-00069
Originating Judge:Walter C. Kurtz |
Davidson County | Court of Appeals | 08/29/97 | |
01A01-9610-JV-00469
01A01-9610-JV-00469
Originating Judge:Andrew J. Shookhoff |
Davidson County | Court of Appeals | 08/29/97 | |
01A01-9611-CH-00530
01A01-9611-CH-00530
Originating Judge:Robert S. Brandt |
Davidson County | Court of Appeals | 08/29/97 | |
State vs. Vaughn Mixon
02C01-9507-CC-00204
Originating Judge:John Franklin Murchison |
Chester County | Court of Criminal Appeals | 08/28/97 | |
State vs. Larry Carr
02C01-9605-CR-00137
Originating Judge:Arthur T. Bennett |
Shelby County | Court of Criminal Appeals | 08/28/97 | |
State vs. Larry Dawson
02C01-9704-CC-00156
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Lauderdale County | Court of Criminal Appeals | 08/28/97 | |
State vs. Vaughn Mixon
02C01-9507-CC-00204
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Chester County | Court of Criminal Appeals | 08/28/97 | |
Jenkins v. Goddard
03A01-9704-CH-00139
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Court of Appeals | 08/28/97 | ||
Sanders vs. Springs
03A01-9701-JV-00036
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Anderson County | Court of Appeals | 08/28/97 | |
Jenkins v. Goddard
03A01-9704-CH-00139
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Court of Appeals | 08/28/97 | ||
Fortson vs. Fortson
03A01-9611-CV-00363
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McMinn County | Court of Appeals | 08/28/97 |