APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This is an appeal by defendant/appellant, Randall W. Swift, from the decision of the Cheatham County Circuit Court dismissing his appeal from the general sessions court. The facts out of which this matter arose are as follows

This is an appeal by plaintiff/appellant, Pig Improvement Co., Inc., from a decision of the Sixth Circuit Court for Davidson County dismissing Pig Improvements’s complaint against defendants/appellees, Curt Reaver and Richard Alan Tracey, Jr. The facts out of which this matter arose are as follows.

This is an appeal by the defendant, Michael George Long, from that portion of the trial court’s judgment which awarded alimony in futuro to his former wife, Diana Sue Long, who was the plaintiff below.

This is an appeal from an interlocutory ruling which the Trial Judge rendered final as provided by TRCP Rule 54.02. The controversy on appeal is between St. Paul Insurance Company, a/k/a Economy Fire and Casualty Company, (hereafter St. Paul), and Tennessee Farmers Mutual Insurance  Company (hereafter Tennessee Farmers). The plaintiffs have filed a brief in support of their interest in the disposition of the appeal.

This is an appeal from the decision of the Williamson County Chancery Court. Plaintiff/appellant, Susanna Gregg, claims the chancery court erred when it denied her claim to attorney’s fees, and defendant/appellee, Steven D. Graham, claims the chancery court erred when it failed to dismiss the claim as outside the statute of limitations. The facts out of which this matter arose are as follows: Defendant and his ex-wife, Lori G. Graham, entered into an agreement with Plaintiff and her husband, Donald Kanatack, for the lease/purchase of a piece of real estate. Defendant executed a note and a deed of trust in favor of Plaintiff and her husband on 15 March 1986. In exchange for the note, Plaintiff and her husband gave Defendant and Ms. Graham $10,477.17, which they used to pay real estate commissions and to set up an escrow account for repairs. The note listed the date of maturity as “on or at closing,” and the lease/purchase agreement listed the date of closing as 17 February 1988. Both the note and the deed contained provisions allowing Plaintiff to recover attorney’s fees if Plaintiff had to file suit to recover under each agreement. At the time of execution, however, the parties modified the note by drawing an “X” over five consecutive paragraphs. One of these paragraphs included the provision allowing the note holder to recover costs and expenses under certain circumstances.1 The parties failed to pay the note on 17 February 1988. The parties extended the original lease/purchase agreement for an additional year by executing an addendum on 27 May 1988. The new closing date passed without incident and both parties continued as they had in the contract for two additional years. A fire occurred on the property in 1990 while Plaintiff still occupied it.  After the insurance company paid the settlement to Defendant, he evicted Plaintiff from the property.

This matter appears appropriate for consideration pursuant to Rule 10(a) of the Rules of the Court of Appeals of Tennessee.1 In this case, the decedent, Ora Sloan Blankenship (“Blankenship”), 84 years old, died on June 24, 1994. Subsequently, a petition was filed to probate Blankenship’s alleged holographic will. The purported holographic will named one of Blankenship’s sisters, Kathryn Braden (“Braden”) and Blankenship’s nephew, Steve Sloan (“Sloan”) as co-representatives of the estate.

The purchaser of a subdivision lot sued his agent and the sellers’ agent because the lot could not be approved for a septic tank. His complaint stated causes of action for fraud, negligence, and a violation of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act. The Chancery Court of Sumner County granted summary judgment to both agents. We reverse the simple negligence claim as to the purchaser’s own agent. In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed.

This is an appeal by the defendant, Michael George Long, from that portion of the trial court’s judgment which awarded alimony in futuro to his former wife, Diana Sue Long, who was the plaintiff below.

This interlocutory appeal involves a boundary line dispute between neighbors who live along Wilmouth Creek in Cannon County. Following inconclusive litigation between two of their neighbors, the owners of one of the tracts filed a boundary line action in the Chancery Court for Cannon County against the owners of one of the adjoining tracts that had been involved in the earlier litigation. The defending landowners moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the decision in the earlier litigation was res judicata as to the plaintiff landowners’ claims. The trial court denied the motion but grante permission to seek an interlocutory appeal. We granted the application for permission to appeal and now affirm the denial of the motion to dismiss because the parties in this case and the former case are not the same.

This appeal involves a woman who broke both ankles in a fall at church. The woman and her husband filed suit in the Circuit Court for Williamson County against the church and others. The trial court granted the church’s motion for summary judgment based on the statute of limitations and the joint enterprise rule.The woman and her husband perfected this appeal after obtaining post-judgment relief from an inappropriate interlocutory appeal. We have determined that the trial court properly granted the post-judgment relief but erred in summarily dismissing the complaint.

This is an appeal by petitioner/appellant, Mary Jane Bohlen Duggan, from the decision of the trial court modifying the child support obligation of respondent/appellee, Frederick Louis Bohlen, III, and interpreting the parties’ marital dissolution agreement (“MDA”) and a later amendment to the MDA. The court concluded Mr. Bohlen was not in contempt and required him to pay $860.00 per month for the parties’ youngest child, $250.00 per month for each child over eighteen and under twenty-two provided the child is receiving a postgraduate education, andone-half of the children’s postgraduate education expenses. The facts out of which this matter arose are as follows.

Defendant, Joseph L. Fletcher, appeals as of right a jury conviction for driving under the influence (DUI), second offense. He was sentenced to eleven months and twenty-nine days and fined $610. Fletcher presents four issues for our review: 1) whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain the conviction; 2) whether the state is required to prove a culpable mental state for a DUI conviction; 3) whether the trial court abused its discretion in allowing testimony about certain drugs; and 4) whether the sentence is excessive. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Clinton Darrell Turner, appeals as of right his conviction and sentence for DUI. Following a jury trial, the Defendant was convicted of driving a motor vehicle while under the influence of an intoxicant and driving on a revoked license in the Cocke County Circuit Court. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to eleven (11) months and twenty-nine (29) days on the charge of driving while under the influence and six months for the charge of driving on a revoked license. The sentences were ordered to be served concurrently. The trial court suspended the entire sentence for the conviction of driving on a revoked license. On the DUI, the Defendant was ordered to serve seven days in jail with the balance to be served on probation. In addition to challenging the sufficiency of the evidence, Defendant also argues the trial court erred by allowing an officer to testify as to field sobriety tests when the officer was not trained to administer those tests. The last issue the Defendant raises is that the trial court erred by sentencing him to serve seven days rather than the two (2) day minimum provided by law. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Teri L. Hopson,1 was convicted after a bench trial of DUI second offense. The trial court sentenced her to eleven months, twenty-nine days; the defendant is to serve forty-five days in jail at 100 percent with the possibility for work release. Her driver's license was revoked for two years. Proof on a defense motion to suppress evidence was presented during the course of the bench trial; a ruling that the arrest was lawful was made at the conclusion of the trial.

This controversy arose as a result of a contract entered into between Robert E. Leonard and his wife, Vickie J. Leonard and Butler Markland. The contract provided that Mr. Markland would build a house on a lot owned by the Leonards at a total cost of $96,000.

We granted this appeal to determine whether Tenn. Code Ann. § 13-7-105(a) mandates submission of a newly proposed zoning classification amendment to the regional planning commission following the commission's rejection of a similar but different proposed classification. The Court of Appeals held that the statute does not require futile resubmissions of revised proposals. We, however, find that the proposal in question was not merely a revised prior
proposal but was a new and previously unsubmitted proposal. The statute clearly mandates submission of new proposals to the regional planning commission. We reverse the Appellate Court and hold that the new zoning proposal should have been submitted to the regional planning commission.

This is an action for breach of an employment contract and deprivation of civil rights under
42 U.S.C. § 1983. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff employee. We
reverse.

The question in this case is whether a state employee protected by civil service has a right to be heard before being reclassified to the unprotected executive service. The Chancery Court of Davidson County held that the employee had a right to grieve the reclassification. We affirm.

In this action for separate maintenance, the trial court awarded Ann Elizabeth 2 Dudenhoeffer (“Wife”) a decree of separate maintenance and dismissed George Daniel Dudenhoeffer’s (“Husband”) counter-complaint for divorce. The trial court ordered Husband
 to maintain Wife as an insured on his medical insurance policy until Wife reaches age sixty-five and ordered Husband to maintain his three preexisting life insurance policies designating Wife as the sole irrevocable beneficiary. Wife was awarded the following: the marital residence, an automobile, Wife’s IRA account, Husband’s IRA account, one-half of Husband’s retirement benefits, the remaining balance of Husband’s 401-K account, a certificate of deposit, eighty-eight shares of Tenneco stock, the proceeds from a savings account, all savings bonds in Wife’s possession, two burial plots, an annuity, and the parties’ jointly owned personal property and household goods which Wife had in her possession. Husband was awarded the personal property which he had in his possession, a truck, a bass boat, a motor, a trailer, boating accessories, and proceeds previously withdrawn by him from his 401-K account. The trial court awarded Wife $6,638.50 as alimony in solido to aid Wife in paying her attorney fees and alimony in futuro in the following amounts:
$2,000.00 per month beginning 10/1/95 and ending 12/31/95;
$1,800.00 per month beginning 1/1/96 and ending 12/31/96;
$1,500.00 per month beginning 1/1/97 and ending 12/31/98;
$1,200.00 per month beginning 1/1/99 and ending 9/5/2001,

Wife’s sixty-fifth birthday; and $600.00 per month from 9/2001 until Wife’s death or remarriage.