APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The petitioner, Charles Thomas Johnson, appeals the denial of his post-conviction petition, arguing the post-conviction court erred in finding he received the effective assistance of counsel. Following a thorough review of the record, the briefs, and oral arguments of the parties, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

After a bench trial, Defendant, Christopher C. White, was found guilty of one count of theft valued at $10,000 or more but less than $60,000. The trial court imposed a four-year sentence, suspended to probation, and ordered Defendant to pay $10,228 in restitution. On appeal, Defendant argues (1) the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction; (2) this court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to consider Defendant’s appeal; and (3) collateral estoppel required the trial court to dismiss the case. After review, we conclude the evidence is insufficient to support Defendant’s conviction for theft. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the trial court, vacate Defendant’s conviction, and dismiss the case.

Tory Keith Mote, Defendant, appeals his convictions for aggravated assault, domestic
assault, and interference with a 911 call after a bench trial. On appeal, Defendant argues
that the evidence was insufficient to support the conviction for aggravated assault. Because
the evidence was sufficient, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This appeal arises out of a dispute between the homeowners’ association for a planned
development and the successor owner of the development over the obligations of the
successor owner. We agree with the trial court’s ruling that the successor owner assumed
all of the previous owner’s rights and responsibilities as the declarant under the
development’s recorded restrictive covenants. We affirm the trial court’s judgment in all
respects.

This is the second interlocutory recusal appeal in this conservatorship action, filed by two attorneys in the case. In the first recusal appeal, the Court of Appeals entered an order staying all trial court proceedings. The Court of Appeals then issued an opinion affirming denial of the recusal motion, stating that the stay was lifted, and remanding the case to the trial court. Before the appellate mandate issued, the attorneys filed a second motion for the trial court judge to recuse; this was denied as well. The attorneys then filed this second petition for recusal appeal. They later filed a motion in the Court of Appeals arguing that trial court orders entered after the Court of Appeals issued its opinion in the first recusal appeal, but before the mandate issued, are void for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The Court of Appeals agreed and held the orders were void. The counterpetitioners and co-conservators have filed an accelerated application for permission to appeal in this Court, and we ordered the attorneys to file a response. Having reviewed the application for permission to appeal, the answer, all appendices, and the applicable law, we grant the application, and dispense with additional briefing and oral argument. We hold that the stay imposed by the Court of Appeals in the first recusal appeal did not divest the trial court of subject matter jurisdiction over the case. We further hold that the attorneys waived any other argument that orders entered by the trial court should be vacated because they were entered prior to issuance of the mandate. Therefore, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand for further proceedings consistent with this decision.

This appeal concerns the denial of a motion to set aside default judgment and the award of
damages in a premises liability action. After sustaining injuries from a shooting in a
Nashville nightclub, Cedric Crutcher (“Plaintiff”), filed a premises liability action against
various co-defendants, including the owner and operator of the nightclub, Paul Eichel
(“Defendant”), and the owners of the building where the nightclub was located (“the
Ellises”). The Ellises filed an answer to Plaintiff’s complaint and a cross-claim against
Defendant. When Defendant failed to respond to Plaintiff’s complaint, Plaintiff filed a
motion for default judgment, which the trial court granted. When Defendant failed to
respond to the Ellises cross-claim, the Ellises also filed a motion for default judgment,
which the court granted. Thereafter, the only remaining issues were the amount of damages
that the Ellises and Plaintiff were entitled to recover from Defendant. Following a hearing
on damages, the court awarded Plaintiff $300,000 against Defendant for his pain and
suffering, and awarded the Ellises $31,745.76 against Defendant for the attorney’s fees
they incurred in defending the action as authorized under their lease agreement. Defendant
filed a motion to set aside the default judgment pertaining to Plaintiff’s premises liability
claim, which the court denied. Defendant then filed a motion to alter or amend the judgment
relating to Plaintiff’s damages, which the court granted. Following a second evidentiary
hearing on Plaintiff’s damages, the court awarded Plaintiff a judgment against Defendant
in the amount of $15,014.19 for medical expenses and $300,000 in noneconomic damages.
Defendant appeals the trial court’s denial of his motion to set aside default judgment in
favor of Plaintiff, as well as the award of damages to Plaintiff. Finding no error, we affirm.

A Davidson County jury convicted the Defendant, Tony Lamons Gooch, III, of two counts of aggravated robbery. The trial court imposed an effective sentence of twelve years in confinement. On appeal, the Defendant raises the following issues for our review: (1) whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion for a judgment of acquittal; (2) whether the stop and seizure were adequately supported by probable cause or reasonable suspicion and whether the length of the stop exceeded the scope of the stop; (3) whether the preliminary hearing was improperly conducted; (4) whether trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance; (5) whether the Metropolitan Nashville Police Department and the City of Nashville are liable for implementing unconstitutional policies; and (6) whether the United States District Court committed plain error by holding that the Defendant’s federal false imprisonment claims were untimely. Upon our review, we hold that the evidence is legally sufficient to support his convictions. We also hold that we lack jurisdiction to entertain an original civil action or to review federal court proceedings. Finally, because the Defendant has waived plenary review of the remaining issues and has not requested plain error review, we respectfully affirm the trial court’s judgments.

A widow received pension benefits that were payable only to her as a surviving spouse. A
trust company representing the decedent’s estate filed suit against the widow arguing that
she breached the antenuptial agreement between her and the decedent that required her to
disclaim any right she had in the decedent’s separate property. The trial court granted
summary judgment to the widow after concluding that the antenuptial agreement contained
an exception that allowed the widow to retain pension benefits that were payable only to
her as surviving spouse. The trust company appealed. Because the antenuptial agreement
is ambiguous, we reverse and remand for further proceedings.

John Milton Arledge (“Arledge”) filed a complaint seeking to quiet title to property he purported to own and the ejection of Darl Smith (“Smith”) from the disputed property. Smith filed a motion for summary judgment, which the Warren County Circuit Court (“the Trial Court”) granted. Arledge appeals. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm.

Upon competing motions for declaratory judgment in this action involving an oil and gas lease, the trial court granted declaratory judgment in favor of the plaintiff, who owned the mineral rights to the real property on which the oil well was located. The court found that although the oil well had been in production as required by the lease, the defendant corporation had failed to comply with the lease’s requirement that it make at least one oil sale within a one-year period. The court thereby found that the lease had terminated pursuant to its own terms. The defendant has appealed, and the plaintiff has raised an issue regarding the trial court’s finding that the well was in production as required by the lease. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm.

The Defendant, Richard Rand, Jr., was convicted of the possession of methamphetamine with intent to sell or deliver. The trial court sentenced him to a term of four years on probation. Thereafter, the Defendant violated the terms of his probation by absconding from supervision. Following a hearing, the trial court revoked his suspended sentence in full and ordered the original sentence into execution. On appeal, the Defendant argues that his conduct amounted only to a technical failure to report rather than an absconsion. We respectfully disagree and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Rutherford County jury convicted the defendant, Vernice Darlene Farrar, of three counts of first-degree felony murder, one count of especially aggravated kidnapping, one count of aggravated robbery, one count of aggravated burglary, and three counts of fraudulent use of a debit card, for which she received an effective sentence of life imprisonment plus twenty-five years. On appeal, the defendant contends the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support her convictions for first-degree felony murder during the perpetration of a kidnapping, especially aggravated kidnapping, and fraudulent use of a debit card. She also contends that the trial court erred in affirming her convictions as the thirteenth juror and that her sentence was excessive. After reviewing the record and considering the applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The petitioner, James E. Johnson, appeals from the Davidson County Criminal Court’s summary dismissal of his pro se motion to correct an illegal sentence pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Defendant, Mario Rogers, appeals his conviction for second degree murder, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction because the State failed to establish his identity as the perpetrator or that he acted with the requisite mental state. Upon review of the entire record, the briefs of the parties, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Circuit Court for Montgomery County sentenced the Defendant, Gustavio Rousseau, as a Range I offender to twenty-four years at thirty percent in the Tennessee Department of Correction following his guilty-pleaded conviction for attempted first degree murder. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion by sentencing him to one year less than the maximum sentence in the applicable range. The Defendant specifically argues that the trial court erred in applying the enhancement factor of Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-114(2), finding that the Defendant was a leader in the commission of an offense involving two or more criminal actors. The Defendant also argues that the trial court erred in not giving due consideration to sentencing principles since the Defendant had accepted responsibility in entering an open plea and had no prior felonies. The State contends that the Defendant has failed to show that the trial court abused its discretion because the Defendant did not overcome the presumption of reasonableness accorded to the trial court’s sentencing decision. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Marshall County jury convicted the Petitioner, Jeffrey Neal Olive, of second degree murder, and he was sentenced to a term of twenty years. Thereafter, the Petitioner filed for post-conviction relief, alleging that his trial counsel was ineffective and that he was denied his rights to a fair trial and due process of law. The post-conviction court denied the petition, and the Petitioner appealed. On appeal, the Petitioner asserts that trial counsel was ineffective by (1) failing to thoroughly investigate the case and potential defenses; (2) failing to discuss with the Petitioner his right to testify and allow him to testify at trial; (3) failing to challenge various pieces of evidence; and (4) encouraging the jury to convict the Petitioner of the lesser-included offense of voluntary manslaughter instead of the charged offense of second degree murder. The Petitioner also alleges that his rights to a fair trial and due process of law were violated in the taking of a pretrial statement and the faulty preservation of evidence. Finally, the Petitioner argues that the cumulative effect of the errors warrants post-conviction relief. Upon our review, we respectfully affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Defendant, Camden A. Miller, pled guilty to two counts of aggravated sexual battery of a victim under the age of thirteen and was sentenced to serve an effective sentence of twenty years. Thereafter, the Defendant filed a motion pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1, seeking to have his aggregate sentence declared illegal because it contravenes his status as a Range I, standard offender. The trial court summarily dismissed the motion, and the Defendant appealed to this court. Upon our review, we respectfully affirm the judgment of the trial court.

In this case, Mother appeals the trial court’s severe abuse finding, after one of her children was killed in a car accident while she was driving. The trial court found that Mother failed to protect her children when she failed to ensure that the children were properly restrained in the automobile. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm.

This appeal arises from a dispute over the construction of a swimming pool. The defendant entered into a written contract with the plaintiff for the construction of a pool at the defendant’s home. The plaintiff later filed a complaint alleging that the defendant failed to pay the amount due under the contract. The defendant filed a counter-complaint and alleged breach of contract, fraud and/or misrepresentation, and violations of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act. After a bench trial, the trial court found in favor of the plaintiff. The defendant subsequently filed a motion for relief from the judgment, which the trial court denied. The defendant appeals. We affirm the trial court’s decision and remand for determination of appellate attorney’s fees.

This appeal concerns the termination of a mother’s parental rights. Amanda L. W. (“Foster Mother”) and Brian L. W. (“Foster Father”) (“Foster Parents,” collectively) filed a petition in the Chancery Court for Madison County (“the Trial Court”) seeking to terminate the parental rights of Angel T. (“Mother”) and Fortrell C. (“Father”) to their minor children Treylynn T. and Amelia C. (“the Children,” collectively). The Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”), the Children’s legal custodian, supported the petition. This matter arose after Amelia received a suspicious head injury while in Father’s care. Mother never accepted that Father was responsible despite Father’s ensuing nolo contendere plea to attempted aggravated child abuse. After a hearing, the Trial Court terminated Mother’s parental rights on three grounds. The Trial Court found further that termination of Mother’s parental rights is in the Children’s best interest. Mother appeals, arguing only that the Trial Court erred in its best interest determination. We find, as did the Trial Court, that the grounds of substantial noncompliance with the permanency plan, persistent conditions, and failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody were proven against Mother by clear and convincing evidence. We further find by clear and convincing evidence, as did the Trial Court, that termination of Mother’s parental rights is in the Children’s best interest. We affirm.

This case involves the claimant’s pro se appeal from the Tennessee Claims Commission’s dismissal, on res judicata grounds, of his claims of libel and malicious prosecution against the State of Tennessee. The claimant timely appealed to this Court. Because the claimant’s appellate brief does not comply with Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 27 and Tennessee Court of Appeals Rule 6, we hereby dismiss the appeal.

A Montgomery County jury convicted the defendant, Kireek Kaseem Steele, of rape, sexual battery, rape of a child, and two counts of aggravated sexual battery for which he received an effective sentence of thirty years’ incarceration. On appeal, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence on all five counts. After review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This is a breach of contract action involving the sale of real property in which the plaintiff seller alleged that the defendant buyer withdrew from the sale in violation of the terms of the contract. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff. We affirm.

Because the order from which the appellant has filed an appeal does not constitute a final appealable judgment,
this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider this appeal.

Because no final order has been entered in the underlying trial court proceedings, this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider this appeal.