APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This case arose out of the Petitioner/Appellant’s attempts to become a licensed physician in Tennessee. Appellant sent an application to the Tennessee Board of Medical Examiners but was ultimately rejected. After a contested hearing, the Board again determined that Appellant’s application should be rejected since Appellant had not engaged in direct patient care in many years. Thereafter, Appellant sought review of the Board’s decision in the Chancery Court of Davidson County pursuant to the Tennessee Uniform Administrative Procedures Act. The chancery court concluded that Appellant was not entitled to relief, and Appellant appealed to this Court. Discerning no error, we affirm. 

This appeal involves a visitor at a hospital who was injured when she slipped and fell in an icy parking lot. The visitor filed a claim against the hospital asserting that the hospital was negligent in failing to remedy the dangerous condition created by accumulated ice because the hospital did not take steps to prevent melted snow and ice from refreezing prior to the incident. The hospital filed a motion for summary judgment and, after determining that the hospital did not have a duty to prevent melted snow and ice from refreezing, the trial court granted the hospital’s motion. We affirm in part and reverse in part.

In this appeal, the father sought to revise the permanent parenting plan in order to permit him greater participation in the life of his daughter. The trial court denied the requested revision, finding that the father had failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that there had been a material change in circumstances that affected the child’s best interest. The father appeals. We affirm the trial court’s ruling regarding the permanent parenting plan, but we vacate the award of attorney’s fees and costs.

After a bench trial, a trial judge convicted the Petitioner, Yasin Solomon Hawkins, of aggravated robbery and sentenced him as a career offender to thirty years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The Petitioner appealed his conviction presenting only the issue of whether the trial court erred when it denied his motion to suppress his statement to police. This Court affirmed the trial court’s judgment. State v. Yasin S. Hawkins, No. M2017-02439-CCA-R3-CD, 2018 WL 4520949 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Nashville, Sept. 20, 2018), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Jan. 16, 2019). The Petitioner then filed a timely petition for writ of error coram nobis alleging that his arrest warrants were newly discovered evidence and that they were procedurally flawed and invalid. The trial court summarily dismissed the petition finding that the arrest warrants were not newly discovered evidence and that, even if the warrants were flawed, any defect was cured by the indictments. After review, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

This is an accelerated interlocutory appeal from the trial court’s denial of Appellant’s motion for recusal. Because the record contains insufficient evidence of bias requiring recusal under Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10B, we affirm.

Defendant, Larry Charles Hefner, Jr., was convicted following a jury trial of Class D felony burglary. The trial court sentenced Defendant as a career offender to twelve years to be served on community corrections. On appeal, Defendant claims that “burglary is applicable only to entry into buildings ‘not open to the public,’” that the trial court failed to instruct the jury on the lesser included offense of attempted theft, and that the trial court failed to properly instruct the jury as to the elements of burglary. After a thorough review of the record, the briefs, and applicable law, we affirm the judgment of conviction.

This lawyer-disciplinary proceeding stems from a Knoxville attorney’s conduct in a federal personal injury lawsuit where the attorney represented the plaintiff. The federal district court imposed a discovery sanction against the corporate defendant and ordered it to pay the attorney’s fees and costs the plaintiff had incurred in locating and deposing a witness the corporate defendant failed to disclose. When the plaintiff’s lawyer submitted an itemization of fees and costs to the federal district court, the lawyer falsely claimed as his own work the work that a paralegal had performed. The lawyer also submitted a written declaration along with the itemization falsely claiming that he had kept contemporaneous records of his time in the case and attesting to the truth and accuracy of the itemization. The lawyer also requested in the itemization “grossly exaggerated and unreasonable” attorney’s fees of more than $103,000 for work beyond the scope of the federal district court’s order. Later, the lawyer testified falsely in a hearing before the federal district court by reaffirming the truth and accuracy of the itemization and the written declaration. A Hearing Panel of the Board of Professional Responsibility (“Hearing Panel”) determined that the lawyer had violated four provisions of the Tennessee Rules of Professional Conduct (“RPC”)—RPC 1.5(a) (Fees); RPC 3.3(a) (Candor Toward the Tribunal); RPC 3.4(b) (Fairness to Opposing Party and Counsel); and RPC 8.4(a) and (c) (Misconduct). The Hearing Panel found six aggravating and two mitigating factors and sanctioned the lawyer with a one-year active suspension and twelve additional hours of ethics continuing legal education. The Board of Professional Responsibility (“Board”) and the lawyer appealed to the Chancery Court for Knox County. Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 9, § 1.3. The trial court affirmed the Hearing Panel’s findings of fact and conclusions of law but modified the sanction to disbarment. The trial court concluded that Standard 5.11 of the ABA Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions (“ABA Standards”), which identifies disbarment as the presumptive sanction, applies and that the aggravating and mitigating factors do not warrant a lesser sanction than disbarment. The lawyer appealed, and after carefully reviewing the record and applicable authorities, we affirm the trial court’s judgment in all respects, including its modification of the sanction to disbarment. 

A Cocke County jury found the Defendant, Coy Jewel Mayberry, guilty of rape of a child, and the trial court sentenced the Defendant to forty years of incarceration. The Defendant contends that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction and that the trial court erred when it imposed the maximum allowable sentence. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

A Knox County jury convicted the Petitioner, Joe Michael Turner, of two counts of aggravated rape, one count of especially aggravated kidnapping, three counts of aggravated kidnapping, and one count of aggravated assault, and the trial court imposed an effective sentence of 100 years. In 2017, the Petitioner filed a writ of error coram nobis, claiming newly discovered evidence in the form of a letter from the District Attorney’s office notifying him of a police officer’s misconduct. The trial court dismissed the petition finding the Petitioner had not presented a colorable claim. The Petitioner appeals, maintaining that he is entitled to relief. After review, we affirm the trial court.

The Defendant, Jamar Laquinn Frazier, was convicted by a Knox County Criminal Court jury of first degree premeditated murder. See T.C.A. § 39-13-202 (2014). He received a life sentence. On appeal, the Defendant contends that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction, (2) the trial court erred by admitting evidence in violation of the Tennessee Rules of Evidence, and (3) the trial court erred by providing a jury instruction on flight. Although we conclude that the evidence is sufficient to support the Defendant’s conviction, we conclude that the trial court erred by admitting evidence related to the Defendant’s previous gun possession and to the Defendant’s possible involvement in the killing of a witness to the shooting in this case. We reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand the case for a new trial.

This appeal arises from the trial court’s award of attorneys’ fees to three state employee defendants. The plaintiff, also a state employee, sued the defendants in their individual and official capacities related to the plaintiff’s termination from his employment. The defendants moved to dismiss the plaintiff’s claims for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(6). The trial court granted the motions and dismissed the plaintiff’s claims with prejudice. The defendants then filed a joint motion for attorneys’ fees, relying on Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-20-113, which permits a state employee to recover attorneys’ fees when the employee is the “prevailing party” on claims filed against the employee in the employee’s individual capacity. The trial court granted this motion and awarded reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs to the defendants. This appeal followed. We affirm.

The trial court convicted Defendant, Dominic Rodriguez, of one count of sexual battery following a bench trial. On appeal, Defendant argues that this court should reweigh the evidence because the State presented insufficient evidence for a rational juror to have found Defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. After a thorough review of the facts and applicable case law, we affirm.

This is an appeal from the dismissal of the plaintiffs’ second lawsuit against adjacent property owners arising from the discovery of a leaking septic tank on the plaintiffs’ property. In their first lawsuit, the plaintiffs sued their neighbors in chancery court for negligence and trespass after discovering that the leaking septic tank was connected to a mental health facility on their neighbors’ property. While the first action was still pending, the plaintiffs filed this action against their neighbors for continuing nuisance and trespass arising from the leaking septic tank. The defendants moved for summary judgment based on the doctrine of prior suit pending. The plaintiffs opposed the motion and requested additional time to conduct discovery. After the trial court granted summary judgment to the defendants, the plaintiffs appealed. We conclude that the requested discovery was unnecessary to respond to the defendants’ motion and that all the elements of the defense of prior suit pending were present. So we affirm.

The Defendant, Anthony Martin, alias, appeals his jury conviction for rape of a child. In this direct appeal, the Defendant alleges that the trial court erred when it allowed the State to question him about facts underlying a statutory rape by an authority figure conviction as a prior inconsistent statement. Following our review of the record and the applicable authorities, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The trial court granted a default judgment to the plaintiff in March 2009, which judgment invalidated a deed for real property transferred from the plaintiff to her son and daughterin- law. The trial court subsequently set aside the default judgment without making sufficient findings of fact and conclusions of law concerning the basis for the ruling. Following a consequent bench trial, the trial court upheld the deed from the plaintiff to her son, although the plaintiff sought to have the deed set aside based on undue influence and fraud. The plaintiff has appealed. Based upon our determination that the trial court failed to make sufficient findings of fact and conclusions of law in its order that set aside the default judgment, we vacate both the trial court’s final order and the order setting aside the default judgment. We remand this matter to the trial court for entry of sufficient findings of fact and conclusions of law regarding the legal basis of the trial court’s decision to set aside the default judgment, or, in the alternative, reconsideration of that judgment.

The plaintiff in this action is a retired employee of the defendant county. She filed a complaint in October 2009, asserting claims of negligence, breach of contract, intentional or negligent misrepresentation, and breach of fiduciary duty related to a county employee’s alleged faulty advice and lack of disclosure to her concerning the interplay of her disability benefits policy and her retirement plan. Upon the county’s motion, the trial court granted partial summary judgment in favor of the county in July 2016, dismissing the plaintiff’s claims of misrepresentation and breach of fiduciary duty. The trial court subsequently denied the county’s motion for judgment on the pleadings as to the remaining issues. Following a bench trial in July 2018, the trial court entered a judgment awarding to the plaintiff the amount of $13,985.52. The county timely appealed. Having determined that the trial court’s final order does not sufficiently explain the legal basis upon which the money judgment was awarded, we vacate the judgment and remand to the trial court for entry of findings of fact and conclusions of law explaining the basis of the judgment or, in the alternative, reconsideration of the judgment.

The Defendant, Michael Green was convicted by a Knox County Criminal Court jury of two counts of aggravated kidnapping, a Class B felony, and two counts of attempted aggravated kidnapping, a Class C felony. T.C.A. §§ 39-12-101(a)(1)-(3) (2018) (criminal attempt); 39-13-304(a) (2018) (aggravated kidnapping). The trial court merged the convictions into a single aggravated kidnapping judgment and sentenced the Defendant, a Range II offender, to fifteen years to be served at 100%. On appeal, the Defendant contends that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support a conviction of aggravated kidnapping or attempted aggravated kidnapping, (2) the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss the case due to the lack of a preliminary hearing or for a delayed preliminary hearing, (3) the court erred in denying his motion to suppress his pretrial statement, and (4) the court erred in denying his request for a jury instruction pursuant to State v. White, 362 S.W.3d 559, 578 (Tenn. 2012). Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This case involves the Commissioner of Revenue for the State of Tennessee’s audit and subsequent adjustment of sales tax due from Appellant, Check Printers, under the Tennessee Retailers Sales Tax Act, Tennessee Code Annotated section 67-6-101, et seq. The trial court granted the Commissioner’s motion for summary judgment finding that, although Appellant manufactured the disputed products in Tennessee and ultimately exported the products outside the state, under Appellant’s standard contract language, title passed to the customer in Tennessee at the time the product was tendered for shipping. Based on this intervening taxable event, i.e., the “sale,” as that term is defined in Tennessee Code Annotated section 67-6-102(80)(A), the trial court concluded that the products were not excluded from taxation under either the manufactured-for-export exemption, Tennessee Code Annotated section 67-6-313(a), or the sale-for-resale exemption, Tennessee Code Annotated section 67-6-102(75)(a). Because there is a dispute of material fact concerning whether Appellant’s sale of blow-in cards to its customer, AMI, was consummated in Tennessee, we vacate the trial court’s grant of summary judgment only as to the AMI blow-in cards; the trial court’s order is otherwise affirmed.

The key issue on appeal is the scope of a dragnet clause under Georgia law. Mortgagors refinanced debt secured by their real property with a new lender. Although the new lender sent the original mortgagee the requested payoff amount, the original mortgagee refused to release its deed of trust. The original mortgagee claimed that the real property was also security for other debts by virtue of an unrecorded instrument signed by one of the mortgagors that contained a dragnet clause. The mortgagee sought a declaratory judgment that its unrecorded instrument had priority over the deed of trust recorded by the new lender. The new lender counterclaimed, seeking the statutory penalty for the mortgagee’s failure to release its deed of trust and recovery of attorney’s fees and expenses. The trial court concluded that the unrecorded instrument was unenforceable and not effective as to the new lender due to a lack of actual notice. The court also ordered the original mortgagee to release its deed of trust and awarded the new lender the statutory penalty and attorney’s fees. On appeal by the original mortgagee, we conclude that the unrecorded instrument was enforceable, but under Georgia law, the dragnet clause was limited to the debts of the mortgagor who signed the instrument. Because of the lack of actual notice, the unrecorded instrument was not effective as to the new lender. Despite the new lender being a defendant in the declaratory judgment action, the new lender’s counterclaim for the statutory penalty entitled it to an award of attorney’s fees. We affirm the decision of the trial court as modified.

This appeal arises from an action for declaratory judgment as to the ownership of a business, defamation, and tortious interference with business relations. The plaintiff carpet cleaner alleged that the defendant entrepreneur and his wife loaned money to the plaintiff to expand his carpet cleaning business with the condition that the defendants handle the business’s finances and bookkeeping. The defendants asserted that they started a new carpet cleaning business and the plaintiff was merely an employee. Following a jury verdict for the plaintiff, the trial court denied the defendants’ motion for a new trial and remittitur. On appeal, the defendants contend that the trial judge failed to fulfill his duty as the thirteenth juror and there was no material evidence to support the jury’s verdict or award of damages. After reviewing the record, we find the trial judge fulfilled his role as the thirteenth juror and that there was material evidence to support the jury’s verdict and award of damages. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment against the defendants.

This appeal arises from the trial court’s entry of a default judgment against defendants and its denial of defendants’ motion to set aside the judgment. The trial court’s entry of default, however, was not a final judgment because it did not address the plaintiff’s claim for damages. Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

Defendant, Cordarious Franklin, was convicted of rape of a child, aggravated sexual battery, and child abuse. The trial court imposed consecutive sentences of forty years for rape of a child, twelve years for aggravated sexual battery, and eleven months, twentynine days for child abuse. On appeal, Defendant raises the following issues: (I) whether the trial court erred by admitting the victim’s forensic interview; (II) whether the evidence was sufficient to support Defendant’s convictions; (III) whether the trial court erred in denying Defendant’s request to review the victim’s medical records; (IV) whether the trial court erred by failing to give the jury a Ferguson instruction; (V) whether a juror’s questions amounted to extraneous prejudicial information; (VI) whether Defendant’s sentence was improper; and (VII) whether there was plain error due to an ex parte conversation between the State and the trial court and by the trial court’s exclusion of Defendant’s family from the courtroom during the victim’s testimony. After review, we conclude there is structural constitutional error by the trial court excluding the public from the courtroom and therefore reverse the judgments and remand for a new trial.

This appeal concerns the termination of a mother’s parental rights to her children. The Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) filed a petition in the Juvenile Court for Montgomery County (“the Juvenile Court”) seeking to terminate the parental rights of Matia P. (“Mother”) to her minor children Charlie-Lynn P. and Pharaoh P. (“the Children”). After a trial, the Juvenile Court entered an order terminating Mother’s parental rights on the grounds of failure to establish a suitable home, substantial noncompliance with the permanency plan, and persistent conditions. The Juvenile Court also found that termination of Mother’s parental rights is in the Children’s best interest. Mother appeals, arguing only that termination of her parental rights is not in the Children’s best interest because she has taken certain steps to address her mental health and domestic violence issues. We find and hold that the Juvenile Court did not err in finding that clear and convincing evidence was shown as to all three grounds. We find and hold further that, notwithstanding Mother’s purported improvements, the Juvenile Court did not err in finding by clear and convincing evidence that termination of Mother’s parental rights is in the Children’s best interest. We affirm the judgment of the Juvenile Court.

In this appeal, the parties were declared divorced in February 2013 when the trial court approved their marital dissolution agreement and entered a final decree of divorce; at the same time, the parties entered into a separate agreement which was to govern the transfer of the wife’s marital interest in four businesses operated by the husband. In July 2014, the husband filed a motion pursuant to Rule 60.02(5) of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure to have the decree set aside. The court granted the motion and vacated the decree, reinstating the marital relationship; the court also rescinded the agreement transferring the wife’s interest in the businesses on the ground of mutual mistake. Following a trial, the court entered a final decree of divorce in 2017. Both parties appeal. Wife asserts that the trial court erred in vacating the 2013 decree, in rescinding the parties’ agreement, and in failing to award her all of the attorney’s fees she incurred at the trial court level. Husband appeals the division of the marital estate in the 2017 decree, and contends that the trial court erred when it failed to order the return of payments he made to wife pursuant to the agreement that was rescinded and alimony payments he made pursuant to the 2013 decree that was vacated. Both parties seek their attorney’s fees on appeal. Upon our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court in all respects and decline to award fees on appeal.

A Shelby County Criminal Court Jury convicted the Appellant, Mario Walls, of attempted second degree murder, and the trial court imposed a sentence of thirty years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence sustaining his conviction, contending that the proof did not show he was aware his conduct was reasonably certain to result in the victim’s death. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.