APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

In this post-divorce proceeding, the Mother appeals the trial court’s rulings on several motions; finding no reversible error, we affirm the judgment in all respects, except the award of child support, which is not final and is subject to further review by the trial court.

This action involves the termination of a mother’s parental rights to her minor child. Following a bench trial, the court found that clear and convincing evidence existed to support the statutory grounds of abandonment for failure to support and to visit. The court further found that termination was in the best interest of the child. We reverse the trial court on its finding that the mother abandoned the child by failing to visit. We affirm the trial court on all other rulings.

Claimants to cash seized by the Rutherford County Sheriff’s Office moved to dismiss the related administrative forfeiture proceeding. They also requested an award of attorney’s fees. An administrative law judge granted the motion to dismiss but did not address the request for attorney’s fees. Claimants later filed a separate motion for attorney’s fees, which the ALJ denied. Claimants then filed a petition for judicial review. Claimants filed their petition within sixty days of the denial of the motion for attorney’s fees but over sixty days from the day the order granting the motion to dismiss became final. The chancery court reversed, awarding claimants part of the attorney’s fees requested. Because it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the petition, we vacate the decision of the chancery court.

This appeal arises from a dispute between a residential homeowner association and the owners of a lot in the subdivision. The trial court granted partial summary judgment to the association upon the determination that the subject property was encumbered by the Declaration of Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions (“CCRs”), due in part to the fact that the CCRs were expressly referenced and incorporated into the Special Warranty Deed conveyed to the homeowners. The court also granted summary judgment upon the finding it was undisputed that the challenged improvements made to the property by the homeowners, the parking of commercial vehicles on the street in front of the house, and operating a business out of the home were in violation of the CCRs. Following a hearing on damages and injunctive relief, the trial court issued an injunction ordering the homeowners to remove the unauthorized improvements, stop parking commercial vehicles on the street in front of the home, and cease conducting their business out of the home, and awarded unpaid assessments and attorney’s fees to the association. On appeal, the homeowners argue that their lot is not encumbered by the restrictive covenants, the association did not have standing or authority to enforce the restrictions, and the homeowners did not violate the restrictions. Additionally, the homeowners take issue with the court’s failure to apply the doctrine of laches, its decision to summarily dismiss their slander of title claim against the homeowner association, and the award of attorney’s fees. We have determined there is a genuine dispute of fact concerning whether the homeowners were conducting their business out of the home in violation of the CCRs which precludes summary judgment; therefore, we reverse the grant of summary judgment on that claim. We affirm the trial court’s rulings in all other respects.

The benefit board of a metropolitan government denied injured-on-duty benefits to a police officer with post-traumatic stress disorder. On a petition for writ of certiorari, the trial court upheld the benefit board’s decision. Finding material evidence to support the action of the benefit board, we affirm the decision of the trial court.

On August 26, 2016, the Defendant, Heather Montgomery, was convicted of two counts of sale of less than fifteen grams of heroin within 1,000 feet of a park and two counts of delivery of less than fifteen grams of heroin within 1,000 feet of a park. Counts 2 and 4 were merged into Counts 1 and 3, and the Defendant was sentenced as a Range I, standard offender to an effective 8-year term, to be served at 100% in the Department of Correction. The Defendant argues on appeal that the trial court abused its discretion is neither excluding the testimony of a confidential informant or granting a continuance and that the evidence is insufficient to sustain her convictions. After thorough review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court but remand for entry of corrected judgments.

An inmate housed in a private prison filed a complaint naming several defendants including the Tennessee Department of Correction, the owner of the prison, and the owner’s employees. The complaint alleged several causes of action, including various violations of his constitutional rights, defamation, and breach of contract. All defendants filed motions to dismiss averring that the inmate failed to state any claims for which relief could be granted, and that the inmate failed to comply with the procedural requirements applicable to inmates bringing civil claims in forma pauperis. We affirm as modified.  

A bank extended a line of credit to a husband and wife in 2007 and obtained as security a parcel of undeveloped property. The bank foreclosed on the property in 2009 upon the couple’s default on the loan and filed suit in 2010 to collect a deficiency judgment. The trial court’s award of a deficiency judgment was reversed on appeal. The husband and wife then filed a complaint against the bank in 2014, based on the same line of credit agreement, claiming the bank had engaged in fraud and breach of contract. The trial court granted the bank’s motion for summary judgment and dismissed the 2014 complaint, and the couple appealed. We affirm the trial court’s judgment, finding (1) the couple waived their breach of contract claim by failing to assert it as a compulsory counterclaim in the 2010 litigation and (2) the couple’s fraud claims are barred by the statute of limitations.

This is a parental termination case. The trial court found that clear and convincing evidence existed to terminate mother and father’s parental rights on the grounds of abandonment by conduct exhibiting wanton disregard and persistence of conditions. The trial court further found that termination was in the best interests of the child. On appeal, however, the Department of Children’s Services did not defend the trial court’s ruling as to the ground of abandonment. Although we accordingly reverse as to that ground, we affirm as to the ground of persistence of conditions and with respect to the trial court’s determination that the termination of mother’s and father’s parental rights was in the child’s best interests.

The administrator of an estate appeals the trial court’s grant of a claim against the estate for the payment of funeral expenses. We affirm.

The unsuccessful bidder for certain municipal construction projects filed this action against the municipality, alleging, inter alia, that the municipality had violated its own competitive bidding ordinances and engaged in unlawful restraint of trade. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the municipality with regard to all claims except the bidder’s claim for damages for violation of the municipal ordinances and common law restraint of trade. In this interlocutory appeal, we have been asked to determine whether a cause of action exists against a governmental entity for common law restraint of trade and whether a bidder has a private right of action for damages against the municipality for alleged violations of municipal bidding ordinances. We determine that the municipality maintains sovereign immunity concerning any purported claim of common law restraint of trade. We further determine that because a petition for writ of certiorari would be the sole method of review of the City’s contract award, unsuccessful bidders are not authorized to bring a private cause of action for monetary damages for an alleged violation of the municipality’s competitive bidding ordinances. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s denial of the municipality’s motion for summary judgment and remand this matter to the trial court for entry of summary judgment in favor of the municipality.

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This action involves the petitioner’s termination of employment as a firefighter for the City of Cleveland. The petitioner filed a petition for writ of certiorari and sought partial summary judgment, alleging, inter alia, that the termination procedure was unlawful. The trial court agreed and granted partial summary judgment. The case proceeded to a hearing on damages, after which, the court found that the petitioner failed to exercise reasonable diligence in securing employment. The petitioner filed a motion to alter or amend. The court then altered its original order and held that material evidence existed in the record to support the termination decision, reversing the order for partial summary judgment and dismissing the action. The petitioner appeals. We reverse.

Defendant, Thomas Clinton Wood, was indicted by the Putnam County Grand Jury for one count of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon. Following a jury trial, Defendant was convicted as charged and sentenced by the trial court to three years in confinement as a Range I standard offender. On appeal, Defendant contends that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for aggravated assault, and that the trial court erred by denying alternative sentencing. After a careful review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This appeal concerns the unauthorized practice of law. The State of Tennessee (“the State”) filed a complaint in the Circuit Court for Knox County (“the Trial Court”) against Jonathon Trotter (“Trotter”) alleging that he engaged in the unauthorized practice of law. Trotter had advertised on Facebook and Craigslist that, for a fee, he would prepare various legal documents for customers. Trotter, however, was not an attorney. The State filed a motion for summary judgment, which Trotter failed to reply to in a manner compliant with the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure. The Trial Court granted the State’s motion with respect to liability. The Trial Court later assessed damages against Trotter. Trotter appeals, arguing material facts are disputed such that his case should survive summary judgment and proceed to trial. We find and hold that the State made a properly supported motion for summary judgment, and that Trotter failed to show that there is a genuine disputed issue of material fact. We affirm.

Defendant, Torvarius E. Mason, was found guilty of first degree premeditated murder and was sentenced to life imprisonment. On appeal, Defendant argues that the trial court erred by not instructing the jury on the lesser-included offense of voluntary manslaughter and that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction. After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

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This is a termination of parental rights case. The trial court found that the proof supported three grounds for termination as to both parents: substantial noncompliance with the permanency plan requirements pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-1-113(g)(2), persistence of conditions pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-1-113(g)(3), and failure to manifest an ability to parent pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-1-113(g)(14). The court further found that the termination of both parents’ parental rights was in the children’s best interests. Having reviewed the record on appeal, we affirm the trial court’s finding that the proof supported the substantial noncompliance ground as to Mother, reverse its finding that the proof supported the substantial noncompliance ground as to Father, vacate the other grounds for termination against both Mother and Father based upon insufficient findings by the trial court, affirm the trial court’s finding that termination of Mother’s parental rights is in the children’s best interests, and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with our direction in this Opinion.

A mother filed a complaint seeking to establish paternity. After years of litigation, the trial court established paternity and designated mother as the primary residential parent. The trial court determined that the father engaged in conduct that necessitated limiting his residential parenting time with the child. As a result, the trial court fashioned a residential parenting schedule that severely restricted the father’s parenting time, and the father appealed. We affirm the trial court’s judgment in all respects.

After entering an order granting Mother sole residential custody and providing Father restricted parenting time, the trial court awarded Mother discretionary costs in the amount of $45,238.85. Father appeals the trial court’s award of discretionary costs. Because Father failed to prove that the trial court abused its discretion, we affirm the award of discretionary costs.

After a state administrative law judge concluded the proper tax classification for the property owned and operated by a private pilot’s club in 2010 and 2011 to be “farm property,” the county property assessor reclassified it in 2013 as split property, commercial and farm. The club paid its 2013 to 2016 taxes “under protest” and filed consolidated complaints in chancery court, seeking a refund under Tennessee Code Annotated section 67-5-901. The club argued that the chancery court had jurisdiction over its claim because purely legal issues were involved and the doctrines of res judicata and/or collateral estoppel prevented such reclassification. Upon determining that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction, the trial court granted the government’s motion to dismiss. We affirm.

Earl Vantrease and Justin Howell, both of whom are inmates at Whiteville Correctional Facility, filed a complaint against several defendants alleging various claims, including the failure to provide a diet program that comports with the plaintiffs’ religious beliefs. Mr. Vantrease filed an affidavit of inability to pay costs and statutorily mandated accompanying documents. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 41-21-801, et seq. Defendants filed a motion to dismiss arguing that Mr. Vantrease failed to include all required information in his accompanying documents. The trial court agreed; it entered an order dismissing the complaint for failure to comply with Tenn. Code Ann. § 41-21-805. Mr. Vantrease appeals. We affirm the trial court’s dismissal of the complaint without prejudice.

The dispositive issue on appeal is whether the Probate Court of Davidson County, Tennessee has subject matter jurisdiction over the decedent’s estate. The decedent resided in Pennsylvania most of his life. Three weeks before his death, the decedent moved into an assisted living facility in Nashville, Tennessee to be near one of his sons. Shortly following his death, the son who was nominated to be the executor filed a Petition for Letters Testamentary in Davidson County Probate Court. The decedent’s daughter from Pennsylvania contested the court’s jurisdiction, arguing the decedent was domiciled in Pennsylvania at the time of death. Following a four-day evidentiary hearing on the issue of domicile, the probate court determined the decedent was domiciled in Tennessee and admitted the will to probate. Because the evidence preponderates in favor of the trial court’s determination that the decedent was domiciled in Tennessee, we affirm.

Petitioner, Charles Pennington, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his convictions for first degree felony murder and attempted especially aggravated robbery. On appeal, Petitioner asserts that he received ineffective assistance of counsel due to trial counsel’s failure to investigate and present a defense regarding the victim’s ownership of the gun and failure to
cross-examine his codefendants regarding the details of their plea agreements. Petitioner also asserts that his due process right to a fair trial was violated by the prosecutor’s knowing use of perjured testimony from one of his codefendants. Although we waive the timely filing of the notice of appeal in the interest of justice, we conclude that Petitioner’s grounds for relief are waived because they were not raised in the post-conviction court. Thus, we affirm the judgment of the postconviction court.

In this interlocutory appeal, we address whether the attorney-client privilege protects communications between a corporation’s legal counsel and a third-party nonemployee of the corporation. After acquiring four commercial properties, a corporation filed unlawful detainer actions against the properties’ tenants. The tenants subpoenaed documents from a property management company hired by the corporation to manage its properties. The corporation and the property management company objected to producing documents containing communications between the corporation’s legal counsel and the property management company, arguing that the attorney-client privilege protected the documents. The trial court held that the documents were protected because the attorney-client privilege extended to the property management company as an agent of the corporation. We hold that the attorney-client privilege applies to communications between an entity’s legal counsel and a third-party nonemployee of the entity if the nonemployee is the functional equivalent of the entity’s employee and when the communications relate to the subject matter of legal counsel’s representation of the entity and the communications were made with the intention that they would be kept confidential. Applying this framework, we hold that the property management company was the functional equivalent of an employee of the corporation, that the communications related to the subject matter of counsel’s representation of the corporation, and that the communications were made with the intention that they would be kept confidential. We affirm the ruling of the trial court and remand to the trial court for further proceedings.

This appeal follows the trial court’s denial of a motion to compel arbitration as to a claim for fraudulent inducement.  For the reasons stated herein, namely that there was no agreement to arbitrate such a claim, we affirm.

I concur in the opinion of the Court.  I write separately to address the appealability of an order compelling arbitration.