APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The Petitioner, Antonio Oliver, appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his first degree murder conviction, for which he is serving a life sentence. The Petitioner contends that he received the ineffective assistance of trial counsel. We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

A mother and her husband petitioned the court to terminate the biological father’s parental rights to his son on the grounds of abandonment by failure to visit and failure to support. After a trial, the court terminated Father’s rights on those grounds and upon its holding that termination of Father’s rights would be in the best interest of the child. Father appeals. Upon our review, we affirm the judgment in all respects.

Petitioner, Demarcus Nelson, appeals the denial of his post-conviction petition. Petitioner argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel in litigating his motion to suppress; that the State presented false testimony at the suppression hearing; that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to provide accurate advice concerning the gang enhancement statute; and that his guilty plea was involuntary. Following a review of the briefs of the parties and the entire record, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

In this matter involving a petition for writ of certiorari filed by a self-represented petitioner, the trial court dismissed the petition for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Determining that the petitioner failed to properly verify the truth of the contents of his petition in accordance with the requirements of Article VI, Section 10 of the Tennessee Constitution and Tennessee Code Annotated
§ 27-8-104(a), we affirm the dismissal of the petition.

A commercial landlord filed suit against its tenant and the guarantor of the lease. After obtaining a default judgment against the tenant, the landlord moved for partial summary judgment on the question of the guarantor’s liability. The chancery court concluded that the guarantor was liable under the guaranty. And following a trial on damages, the court entered judgment against the tenant and the guarantor. The guarantor appeals solely on the issue of his personal liability, arguing that his guaranty was conditional. Because the guaranty was an absolute undertaking, we affirm.  

Defendant appeals the trial court’s refusal to dismiss the State’s claim that he violated Tennessee’s implied consent statute. Discerning no error, we affirm.

Purchasers of real property brought this action against the sellers alleging fraud, fraudulent misrepresentation, fraudulent inducement, and fraudulent concealment. The alleged misrepresentations and concealment related to severe water damage to one wall of the purchased house. The trial court found in favor of the purchasers with respect to each claim. After our thorough review of the record, we conclude that because the purchasers were on notice of potential defects and failed to exercise ordinary diligence, the evidence preponderates against the trial court’s finding that the purchasers reasonably relied on the sellers’ misrepresentations and concealment. We reverse and remand for further proceedings.

This appeal involves the Appellant’s liability for franchise and excise taxes assessed against it by the Tennessee Department of Revenue. The trial court determined that the Appellant’s incorporation in the State of Florida did not afford it the right to apportionment for tax purposes, and entered a judgment against it in an amount over $2,000,000.00. The trial court also determined that the Commissioner of Revenue was entitled to an award of attorneys’ fees and litigation expenses as the prevailing party under Tennessee Code Annotated section 67-1-1803(d). For the reasons stated herein, we reverse the trial court’s ruling on apportionment, vacate the monetary judgment and award of attorneys’ fees, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion.

A rehabilitation hospital hired a medical transportation company to take a patient to a doctor’s appointment. Before the transport, the company’s driver required the patient to sign an agreement that, in part, released the company from any liability. After the appointment, the patient fell as he was getting into the company’s van. He sued the medical transportation company, which moved to dismiss based on the exculpatory provisions of the agreement. The trial court and the Court of Appeals ruled that the exculpatory provisions were enforceable. We hold that to determine the enforceability of an exculpatory agreement, a court should consider the totality of the circumstances and weigh these non-exclusive factors: (1) relative bargaining power of the parties; (2) clarity of the exculpatory language, which should be clear, unambiguous, and unmistakable about what the party who signs the agreement is giving up; and (3) public policy and public interest implications. We hold that the exculpatory provisions in the agreement between the medical transportation company and the patient are unenforceable based on the unequal bargaining power of the parties, the overly broad and unclear language of the agreement, and the important public interest implicated by the agreement. Thus, the exculpatory language in the agreement does not, as a matter of law, bar the patient’s claim. We vacate the judgment of the trial court, reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals, and remand this case to the trial court for further proceedings. 

The trial court entered an order terminating Father’s parental rights to his two minor children based upon the statutory grounds of abandonment by willful failure to visit, abandonment by willful failure to support, and persistence of conditions, as well as a finding that termination was in both children’s best interest. From this order, Father appeals. We affirm the trial court’s findings as to the grounds of willful failure to visit and willful failure to support, but reverse the finding that clear and convincing evidence supports termination based upon the statutory ground of persistence of conditions. Because we conclude that termination is in the children’s best interest, we affirm the termination of Father’s parental rights.

This declaratory judgment action involves a multi-million dollar trust and a co-beneficiary and co-trustee’s request for a detailed accounting and a liquidation plan. The case was dismissed, and the managing trustee filed a motion for Rule 11 sanctions. The trial court found multiple Rule 11 violations by the petitioner and awarded $200,000 in sanctions. Finding no abuse of discretion, we affirm.

In November 2013, a Montgomery County grand jury returned a ten-count indictment against the defendant, Coray Eugene Knight, and his two co-defendants, Kelley Hufford and Frederick Persinger, charging them with conspiracy to commit first degree murder, first degree premeditated murder, first degree felony murder, two counts of especially aggravated kidnapping, three counts of aggravated kidnapping, abuse of a corpse, and tampering with evidence. A jury convicted the defendant as charged on all counts and he received an effective life sentence. On appeal, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction for first degree premeditated murder. He also challenges the jurisdiction of the trial court and several of its rulings, including: the denial of his motion to suppress the statements he made prior to trial; the ruling finding Mr. Persinger competent to testify at trial; the denial of his motions for a mistrial, for judgment of acquittal, and for a new trial; and the denial of his request for a jury instruction on the defense of others. Based upon our review of the record, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant, Tequan Laquarious Evans, was convicted after a bench trial of possession with the intent to sell or to deliver not less than one-half ounce nor more than ten pounds of marijuana, a Class E felony, possession of a firearm with the intent to go armed during the commission of a dangerous felony, a Class D felony, possession of alprazolam, a Class A misdemeanor, possession of drug paraphernalia, a Class A misdemeanor, and escape, a Class A misdemeanor. See T.C.A. §§ 39-17-417(a)(4) (2018) (possession with intent to sell and to deliver), 39-17-1324(a) (2018) (unlawful possession of firearm), 39-17-418 (2018) (misdemeanor drug possession), 39-17-425 (possession of drug paraphernalia); 39-16-605 (2018) (escape). The trial court imposed sentences of one year at 30% service for possession with the intent to sell or to deliver, three years at 100% service for unlawful firearm possession, and eleven months, twenty-nine days at 75% service each for possession of Alprazolam, possession of drug paraphernalia, and escape. The court ordered consecutive service of the firearm and escape convictions, for an effective sentence of three years, eleven months, and twenty-nine days. The possession with the intent to sell or to deliver conviction was ordered to be served consecutively to a conviction in an unrelated case. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions for possession with the intent to sell or to deliver not less than one-half ounce nor more than ten pounds of marijuana and possession of a firearm with the intent to go armed during the commission of a dangerous felony. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This action involves a termination petition filed by the father and stepmother of two minor children in an attempt to terminate the biological mother’s parental rights. Following a bench trial, the court found that clear and convincing evidence existed to support the statutory grounds of abandonment for failure to support and to visit and failure to manifest an ability and willingness to personally assume responsibility for the children. The court further found that termination was in the best interest of the children. We vacate the order of termination and remand for further proceedings. 

The Petitioner, Thomas Dowlen, appeals the Robertson County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his 2014 conviction for first degree murder and sentence of life imprisonment. The Petitioner contends that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

This contract dispute between CHS Development Corporation, Inc. d/b/a Bridge Documents (“CHS”), and Lakeview Neurorehab Center Midwest, Inc. d/b/a Lakeview Specialty Hospital (“Lakeview”), involves the interpretation of contract provisions regarding exclusivity and noncompetition. The trial court determined that the contract provisions at issue were clear and unambiguous and granted summary judgment in favor of CHS. Lakeview has appealed. Determining that the applicable contract provisions are ambiguous, we reverse the trial court’s grant of summary judgment to CHS and remand for an evidentiary hearing to determine the contractual intention of the parties with consideration of parol evidence as necessary. Consequently, we vacate the trial court’s award of damages and attorney’s fees to CHS. We affirm the trial court’s denial of summary judgment to Lakeview. We also deny CHS’s request for attorney’s fees on appeal.

This matter involves Hamilton County’s attempt to recover funds it paid, through its on-the- job injury program, on behalf of one of its employees, Shawn T. Slaughter. Mr. Slaughter was injured while riding in a County vehicle when that vehicle collided with another vehicle; he filed suit against the drivers and the County. Prior to trial, Mr. Slaughter settled with one of the defendant drivers. After trial, having been found not atfault by the jury, the County attempted to assert a lien against settlement. The trial court held that the County does not have a contractual or statutory basis for a lien against Mr. Slaughter’s settlement. It further held that, because Mr. Slaughter was not made whole by his settlement, the County is not entitled to subrogation. The County filed a motion for reconsideration and requested a ruling on its asserted constitutional basis for recovery. The court denied the County’s motion. The County appeals. We affirm

Plaintiffs filed suit against the owners of a neighboring property, claiming that wastewater from the neighbors’ septic system was pooling onto the plaintiffs’ property. The defendants moved for summary judgment on two grounds: (1) their use of the septic system was authorized by an implied easement from the previous common ownership of the two properties; and (2) they did not breach any duty to the plaintiffs because they were unaware that the septic tank existed. In response, the plaintiffs argued that, after the septic tank’s discovery, the defendants continued to use it even though it was failing. The plaintiffs also moved to amend their complaint to add claims for gross negligence, nuisance, and continuing trespass. The trial court granted summary judgment for the defendants on all claims and denied the motion to amend the complaint. On appeal, we affirm the grant of summary judgment on trespass but reverse the grant of summary judgment on negligence. In light of our decision on the summary judgment motion, we also vacate the denial of the motion to amend the complaint. 

Appellant, a beneficiary under the will of Decedent, brought this action in 2017 to recover funds that Appellee allegedly improperly safeguarded when he served as conservator for Decedent in 1980. On Appellee’s motion to dismiss, the trial court granted the motion finding that the complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The trial court also found that any cause of action arising from Appellee’s conduct as conservator was barred by the statute of limitations. Appellant then filed a motion to reconsider. Following a hearing, the trial court denied Appellant’s motion finding that Appellant’s action was barred by the statute of limitations. Discerning no error, we affirm.

The Tennessee Attorney General issued several civil investigative demands (“CIDs”) to several oil companies as part of an investigation into false claims and violations of the Tennessee Petroleum Underground Storage Tank Act, Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 68-215-101--204. Compliance was incomplete, but the Attorney General filed suit in 2015 in circuit court. Portions of the suit were dismissed, and the Attorney General took a nonsuit. The Attorney General then filed suit in the chancery court to enforce the CIDs. The oil companies sought a protective order, which the court granted. The Attorney General appealed. We reverse.

A company that loaned $100,000 to two individuals filed a complaint to collect the amount due. One defendant filed for bankruptcy, and his debt to the company was discharged. The other defendant asserted that the complaint was barred by the statute of limitations. The company argued that the remaining defendant was equitably estopped from relying on the statute of limitations because he had misled the company to delay filing suit by promising to pay the debt without the need for litigation. The trial court agreed with the company and ruled that the statute of limitations did not bar the company’s claim. We affirm the trial court’s judgment on appeal. 

The Appellant, Audrey Downs, appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court’s summary dismissal of his petition requesting DNA analysis of evidence pursuant to the Post-Conviction DNA Analysis Act of 2001. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, the judgment of the trial court is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Defendant, Willie Morgan, appeals from the trial court’s dismissal of his “Petition for Reduction of Sentence.” The trial court found that the petition was untimely under Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 35. Upon our review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Mother appeals the trial court’s determination that her parental rights to her daughter should be terminated on the grounds of substantial noncompliance with the permanency plans, abandonment by failure to provide a suitable home, and persistence of conditions. Having concluded that clear and convincing evidence supports the trial court’s decisions regarding grounds as well as its determination that termination is in the best interest of the child, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

Mother appeals the trial court’s decision to change custody to Father. Here, the trial court’s findings of fact and the evidence in the record support the trial court’s determination that naming Father the primary residential parent of the children is in their best interests. As such, we affirm.