APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Following a bench trial, the Defendant, Cameo Antoinette Edwards, was convicted in the Haywood County Circuit Court of assault and contributing to the delinquency of a minor, both Class A misdemeanors. The trial court subsequently sentenced her to concurrent terms of eleven months, twenty-nine days for each conviction, suspended to supervised probation following service of thirty days in the county jail. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the evidence is insufficient to sustain her convictions and that the trial court erred by not granting her full probation. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant, Christopher Orlando Lyles, was convicted by a Madison County Circuit Court jury of first degree felony murder; second degree murder, a Class A felony; two counts of especially aggravated kidnapping, Class A felonies; three counts of attempted aggravated robbery, Class C felonies; and aggravated burglary, a Class C felony, and was sentenced to an effective term of life imprisonment. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court erred in granting the State two continuances and that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his convictions. After review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The pro se Petitioner, Jermaine Rashad Carpenter, appeals the summary dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. Following our review, we affirm the dismissal of the petition.

The Tennessee Health Care Liability Act, Tennessee Code Annotated section 29 26 121(a)(1) (2012 & Supp. 2017), requires a person who asserts a potential health care liability claim to give written pre-suit notice of the claim to each health care provider that will be named a defendant at least sixty days before the complaint is filed. The question we address is whether the trial court erred by allowing the plaintiff to amend her complaint, after the expiration of the statute of limitations, to substitute as a defendant a health care provider to which the plaintiff had not sent pre-suit notice. The health care provider the plaintiff sought to substitute had knowledge of the claim based on pre-suit notice the plaintiff had mistakenly sent to another potential defendant. We hold that the plaintiff did not comply with the mandatory pre-suit notice provision of Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-26-121(a)(1) because she did not give written pre suit notice of the potential claim to the health care provider she later sought to substitute as a defendant after the expiration of the statute of limitations. Although the health care provider learned about the claim based on the pre-suit notice the plaintiff sent to another potential defendant, this form of notification did not comply with the notice requirement of section 29-26-121(a)(1). Because the plaintiff did not comply with Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-26-121(a)(1), the 120-day filing extension under Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-26-121(c) is not applicable. Under Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 15.03, the filing date of the proposed amended complaint may relate back to the filing date of the original complaint. The plaintiff, however, filed the original complaint after the expiration of the statute of limitations. As a result, the plaintiff’s motion to substitute the health care provider is futile because the amended suit would be subject to dismissal based on the expiration of the one-year statute of limitations. The trial court erred by allowing the plaintiff to amend her complaint. We reverse the trial court and the Court of Appeals and remand this case to the trial court for further proceedings. 

The Petitioner, Michael D. Williams, appeals from the post-conviction court’s summary dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief. The Petitioner argues, for the first time on appeal, that summary dismissal was improper because principles of due process require due process tolling. Upon review, we conclude that the Petitioner has waived his due process claim and affirm summary dismissal.

A Williamson County jury convicted the Defendant, Brian C. Frelix, of four counts of aggravated robbery, four counts of aggravated assault, one count of aggravated burglary, and one count of theft of property valued at one thousand dollars or more, but less than ten thousand dollars. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced the Defendant to an effective sentence of thirty-eight years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant asserts that the trial court improperly: (1) denied his motion to suppress; (2) allowed Special Agent Andrew Vallee to testify based upon unreliable phone records; (3) admitted letters and testimony constituting hearsay; (4) admitted the victim’s stolen credit cards; (5) admitted information from a co-defendant’s Facebook page; and (6) imposed consecutive sentences. After review, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

Defendant, Timothy Wayne Tidwell, was indicted by the Bedford County Grand Jury for one count of arson. Defendant was convicted as charged by a jury and sentenced by the trial court as a Range III offender to 15 years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. In this appeal as of right, Defendant contends that the evidence at trial was insufficient to support his conviction and that his sentence was excessive. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Richmond Lebron Madden, Sr., was convicted by a jury of one count of possession of 0.5 grams or more of methamphetamine with intent to sell or deliver. On appeal, the Defendant contends that (1) the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support his conviction; (2) the trial court erred in allowing a witness to testify about the Defendant’s relationship with his co-defendant and his living arrangements; (3) the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress, which challenged the legality of the stop resulting in the Defendant’s arrest; and (4) the trial court abused its discretion by denying the Defendant an alternative sentence and sentencing him to nine years and six months of incarceration. Following our review, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed and remanded for entry of a corrected judgment.

A Knox County jury convicted the Defendant, Ernesto Delgadilo Rodriguez, of resisting arrest and assault. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to six months for the resisting arrest conviction and to eleven months and twenty-nine days for the assault conviction. On appeal, the Defendant challenges (1) a jury instruction of the definition of “arrest”; (2) the sufficiency of the evidence; and (3) the admissibility of evidence regarding alcohol and drug use. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Appellant, Mario Perkins, is appealing the trial court’s denial of his motion to withdraw his guilty plea and to correct an illegal sentence. The State has filed a motion asking this Court to affirm pursuant to Court of Criminal Appeals Rule 20. Said motion is hereby granted.

The Appellant, Miko T. Burl, is appealing the trial court’s denial of his motion to correct an illegal sentence. The State has filed a motion asking this Court to affirm pursuant to Court of Criminal Appeals Rule 20. Said motion is hereby granted.

Appellant sought disqualification of the trial court judge pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10B. Finding no error, we affirm.

This appeal involves a premises liability suit filed by a customer of a Goodwill store after the customer sat on an item of furniture that was for sale and it collapsed. The trial court granted summary judgment to Goodwill, finding no genuine issue of material fact and concluding that Goodwill did not create or have actual or constructive knowledge of any alleged defect. The plaintiff appeals. We affirm.     

This appeal arises from a modification of a permanent parenting plan established in 2010 in which Mother was designated as the primary residential parent. In December of 2012, Father filed a petition to modify the parenting plan alleging that Mother’s mental health impeded her ability to properly care for their child. He also alleged that Mother alienated the child from Father due to numerous false allegations that Father abused the child, which resulted in temporary but substantial decreases in his parenting time. Although no evidence was produced indicating that Father abused the child, Mother continued to accuse Father of abuse and to take the child for repeated evaluations and physical exams. Following a three-day trial, the trial court designated Father as the primary residential parent, established a temporary parenting plan, and ordered Mother to attend counseling until the court was satisfied with her mental health so that it could issue a permanent parenting plan. Mother appealed that order; however, we dismissed the appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because the order appealed from was not a final judgment. On remand, following an assessment of Mother’s compliance with the court-ordered intensive therapy, the trial court entered a final judgment that included a permanent parenting plan from which Mother appeals. Mother contends the trial court erred in holding, inter alia, that there was a substantial and material change in circumstances requiring a modification of the parties’ permanent parenting plan. She also contends the court erred in holding that it was in the child’s best interest to change the primary residential parent to Father due, in part, to the fact the court failed to consider factors added to Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-106 pursuant to the 2014 amendment that became law on July 1, 2014. Finding no error, we affirm.

After entering guilty pleas to four counts of aggravated statutory rape, Defendant, Thomas A. Ryan, was sentenced to four years for each conviction. After a lengthy sentencing hearing, the trial court ordered the sentences to be served consecutively, for a total effective sentence of sixteen years and denied all forms of alternative sentencing. Defendant appeals his sentence to this Court. Because we determine that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing Defendant to an effective sentence of sixteen years, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Petitioner, James Odell Osborne, appeals the Marshall County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his 2015 convictions for three counts of failure to appear, misdemeanor theft, and felony theft and his effective nine-year sentence. The Petitioner contends that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Petitioner, Leopold Mpawinayo, appeals the Davidson County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his 2015 convictions for two counts of violating the habitual motor vehicle offender (HMVO) law and his effective six-year sentence. The Petitioner contends that the court erred by denying relief because he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Defendant, Nelson Troglin, appeals the Bledsoe County Circuit Court’s summary dismissal of his pro se motion to correct an illegal sentence for his 2000 conviction for second degree murder, for which he received a sentence of 23 years. Defendant contends the trial court erred by summarily dismissing his motion. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The State, pursuant to Rule 9 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure, appeals the trial court’s grant of Defendant’s motion to suppress inculpatory statements made during his post-polygraph interview. The trial court found that the statements were voluntary but determined that they were inadmissible under Tennessee Rule of Evidence 403 because Defendant would be required to reference the polygraph examination to provide context for Defendant’s statements made during the post-polygraph interview. Concluding that the trial court abused its discretion by excluding the statements, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand this case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

The Petitioner, Charles D. Johnson, appeals the habeas corpus court’s dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus in which the Petitioner argued that he was never indicted on his convicted offense. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the dismissal of his petition in accordance with Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals.

The Petitioner, Danny Anderson, appeals the habeas corpus court’s dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. We conclude that the Petitioner’s notice of appeal was untimely filed, and the interest of justice does not support waiver of the timely filing requirement. Therefore, we dismiss the appeal.

The Petitioner, Quincy Moutry, appeals the post-conviction court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief in which he challenged his convictions for carjacking, aggravated robbery, and possession of a firearm with the intent to go armed during the commission of a dangerous felony and his effective twenty-seven-year sentence. On appeal, the Petitioner asserts that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. Upon reviewing the record and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the postconviction court.

This is an appeal from an order granting summary judgment to one of several defendants. Because the order does not dispose of the plaintiff’s claims against all of the defendants, we dismiss the appeal for lack of a final judgment.

The defendant, John Baskins, appeals his Knox County Criminal Court guilty-pleaded convictions of rape of a child and especially aggravated sexual exploitation of a minor, claiming that the trial court erred in the misapplication of an enhancement factor and that the 40-year sentence imposed was excessive. Discerning no error, we affirm.

This appeal deals only with the trial court’s award of treble damages pursuant to the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act. Finding no error, we affirm.