APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Defendant, Montrekus Lamon Tiller, was convicted of aggravated assault. He received a sentence of six years’ incarceration to be suspended after 350 days. On appeal, he argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction. After review, we find that the evidence was sufficient to support his conviction. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The pro se appellant appeals as of right from the Morgan County Criminal Court's order denying post-judgment motions filed pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure "36 et seq." The trial court summarily denied the pleadings based upon the pro se appellant's earlier execution of a waiver of all direct, post-conviction, and collateral challenges to the conviction, in exchange for his codefendant-wife's receiving a more lenient sentence. Because this court has twice ruled that the waiver was knowingly and voluntarily entered, we sua sponte affirm the judgment of the trial court pursuant to Rule 20 of the Tennessee Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals.

The Defendant, Richard Adrian Vaughn, pleaded guilty to one count of hindering a secured creditor, one count of writing a worthless check, and four counts of theft. The trial court ordered the Defendant to serve an agreed upon five-year sentence, suspended to six years of probation. In December 2015 and May 2016, probation violation reports were filed with the trial court based upon multiple alleged violations. After a hearing, the trial court revoked the Defendant’s probation for absconding and testing positive for drugs. On appeal, the Defendant asserts that the trial court abused its discretion in revoking his probation. We affirm the trial court’s revocation.

This case should serve as a cautionary tale for any prosecutor, defense attorney, or trial court who attempts to negotiate or accept a guilty plea involving concurrent state and federal sentencing. Petitioner, Tyler James Schaeffer, pled guilty to two counts of vehicular homicide, two counts of aggravated assault, nine counts of vehicular assault, and one count of possession of a controlled substance analogue. He received an effective sentence of forty years to be served concurrently with a separate 100-year federal sentence. Now, Petitioner appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing the post-conviction court erred in finding that he received effective assistance of counsel due to trial counsel’s failure to retain a mental health expert, failure to request a change of venue, failure to properly investigate potential witnesses, and failure to adequately explain concurrent state and federal sentencing. The State concedes that Petitioner received ineffective assistance of counsel based on the sentencing issue alone. Following our review of the record and submissions of the parties, the majority concludes that Petitioner received ineffective assistance of counsel. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the post-conviction court.

This appeal involves an employment discrimination and retaliation lawsuit initiated by former employees of a hospital’s Security Services Department. The trial court granted summary judgment to the hospital defendants on all claims, holding that plaintiff employees had failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination or retaliation. The employees appeal. We affirm.

Petitioner, Stephen Nathan Clark, II, was indicted in case number 2011-D-2935 by the Davidson County Grand Jury for conspiracy to sell 300 pounds or more of marijuana and 300 grams or more of cocaine in a drug-free school zone. Petitioner was subsequently indicted in case number 2012-A-24 for possession with intent to sell or deliver not less than 0.5 ounces nor more than 10 pounds of marijuana in a drug-free school zone and possession with intent to sell or deliver 26 grams or more of cocaine in a drug-free school zone. Petitioner entered guilty pleas in both cases to conspiracy to sell 26 grams or more of cocaine and possession with intent to deliver 26 grams or more of cocaine. Petitioner agreed to serve 13 years in confinement as a multiple offender. Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel and that his pleas were unknowingly and involuntarily entered. Following an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief, and after review, we affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment.

Joshua Hunter Bargery (“the Defendant”) appeals his Lake County Circuit Court convictions for two counts of first degree felony murder and two counts of especially aggravated robbery, for which he received a total effective sentence of two consecutive life sentences. On appeal, the Defendant contends that: (1) his rights under the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I, section 7 of the Tennessee Constitution were violated by the trial court’s denial of his motions to suppress evidence obtained during the search of the Defendant and his automobile; (2) the trial court erroneously excluded as hearsay the Defendant’s testimony regarding statements made by Mr. Hill, Mr. Hernandez, and “the three Mexicans”; (3) the trial court erred in excluding relevant and material testimony from the Defendant’s crime scene expert; (4) the Defendant is entitled to a new trial based on prosecutorial misconduct; (5) the trial court erred in denying the Defendant’s motion to dismiss the indictment based on law enforcement’s intentional destruction of exculpatory evidence; (6) the Defendant’s due process rights were violated by the State’s failure to disclose Mr. Hernandez’s complete criminal record and the State’s agreement not to treat him as a “suspect”; (7) the trial court erred by admitting a copy of a letter written by the Defendant, which was not produced by the State during discovery; (8) the trial court erred in its instructions to the jury; (9) the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions; (10) the trial court erred when it imposed consecutive sentences; (11) the trial court erred in denying the Defendant’s motion for recusal; (12) the Defendant is entitled to a new trial based on violations of the trial court’s order of sequestration; and (13) cumulative error deprived the Defendant of due process and a fair trial. Following a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we reverse the judgments of the trial court and remand for a new trial.

The Defendant, Christopher Terrell Shipp, was convicted by a jury of one count of criminally negligent homicide, one count of felony murder, two counts of attempted aggravated robbery, and one count of attempted second degree murder, and he received an aggregate sentence of life in prison. The surviving victim of the crimes identified the Defendant as the perpetrator during her testimony at the preliminary hearing, but she died of natural causes prior to trial. The recorded testimony from the preliminary hearing was used to establish the identity of the Defendant at trial. The Defendant appeals his convictions, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to uphold the verdicts and that the victim’s testimony was admitted in error because at the time of the preliminary hearing, he had not had access to a police report which could have impeached her testimony. After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that the evidence is sufficient to uphold the verdicts and that the testimony was properly admitted, and we affirm the trial court’s judgments. We remand for merger of the criminally negligent homicide conviction into the felony murder conviction.

Plaintiff, the successor administrator for the decedent’s estate, brought a negligence suit against the Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County based on the probate clerk’s failure to cite the prior administrator in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 30-2-602. Following the Metropolitan Government’s filing of a motion for summary judgment, the trial court concluded that the asserted claims were barred by the Tennessee Governmental Tort Liability Act’s one-year statute of limitations. For the reasons stated herein, we reverse.   

The trial court granted summary judgment to the defendant medical provider based upon the expiration of the statute of limitations. On appeal, the appellant asserts that the statute of limitations was tolled because at the time the cause of action accrued, the decedent had been “adjudicated incompetent,” as required by Tennessee Code Annotated section 28-1- 106. We conclude that the appellant failed to meet her burden to show that the decedent was adjudicated incompetent at the time required to toll the statute of limitations. The trial court’s ruling is therefore affirmed.

We granted the application for permission to appeal of the Defendant, Antonio Henderson, in this case to determine whether the evidence is sufficient to support his conviction for especially aggravated robbery. The Defendant contends that the serious bodily injury to the victim occurred after the robbery was complete and that, as a result, he could have committed only an aggravated robbery. We hold that, under the facts and circumstances of this case, the victim’s serious bodily injury was inflicted before the Defendant had completed robbing the victim with a deadly weapon. Accordingly, the evidence supports the Defendant’s conviction of especially aggravated robbery. Therefore, albeit for different reasons, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals.  

The Defendant, Jamarius Deon Gant, was convicted by a Madison County Circuit Court jury of aggravated robbery, a Class B felony, aggravated kidnapping, a Class B felony, and facilitation of burglary of a vehicle, a Class A misdemeanor. See T.C.A. §§ 39-13-402 (2014) (aggravated robbery), 39-13-304 (2014) (aggravated kidnapping), 39-11-403 (2014) (facilitation of a felony), 39-14-402 (2014) (burglary of a vehicle). The Defendant also pleaded guilty to two counts of possession of a handgun by a convicted felon. See T.C.A. §§ 39-17-1307 (2014) (amended 2017). The trial court sentenced the Defendant as a Range I, standard offender to consecutive nine-year terms for the aggravated robbery and aggravated kidnapping convictions. The Defendant received concurrent sentences of four years for the firearm convictions and eleven months, twentynine days for the facilitation of burglary of a vehicle, for an effective eighteen years’ confinement. On appeal, the Defendant contends that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support a conviction for aggravated kidnapping, and (2) the trial court erred during sentencing. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Demarcus Jones, appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his 2015 guilty pleas in case number 14-02150 to especially aggravated robbery, attempted first degree murder, employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, aggravated burglary, theft of property, and setting fire to property and in case number 14-02151 to especially aggravated robbery, attempted first degree murder, and employment of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, and his effective forty-year sentence. The Petitioner contends that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel and that his guilty pleas were unknowingly and involuntarily entered. We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

This appeal concerns whether a tax on certain property containing oil and gas deposits constitutes an unlawful additional severance tax. The Coal Creek Company (“Coal Creek”) appealed the tax assessments of various county property assessors (“Assessors”). After administrative proceedings and appeals, the Tennessee Assessment Appeals Commission reinstated the original assessments. Coal Creek filed suit in the Chancery Court for Knox County (“the Trial Court”) seeking judicial review of the Appeals Commission’s decision. Following a bench trial, the Trial Court entered an order dismissing Coal Creek’s complaint. Coal Creek appeals to this Court. We hold, inter alia, that the taxes assessed upon Coal Creek’s property relative to oil and gas remaining in the ground are property taxes, not a severance tax. We affirm the judgment of the Trial Court.

Defendant, David Roger Petty, was indicted for aggravated burglary and theft of property valued at $1,000 or more, but less than $10,000. Following a jury trial, Defendant was convicted as charged. The trial court ordered concurrent sentencing for an effective sentence of 15 years in confinement. In this appeal as of right, Defendant contends that: 1) the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions; 2) the trial court erred in sentencing him; 3) the trial court erred by allowing a State’s witness to testify last despite having been present during the testimony of the two preceding witnesses; and 4) the trial court erred by allowing the State to use evidence of Defendant’s prior theft convictions for impeachment purposes. Having reviewed the entire record and the briefs of the parties, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This appeal involves the termination of a mother and father’s parental rights to their two minor children. Following a bench trial, the trial court found that clear and convincing evidence existed to support the termination of each parent’s parental rights on the statutory grounds of abandonment for failure to provide a suitable home, substantial noncompliance with the requirements of the permanency plan, and the persistence of conditions which led to removal. Relative to Mother, the court found clear and convincing evidence existed to support the additional grounds of abandonment for failure to visit and to pay child support. The court further found that termination of each parent’s rights was in the best interest of the children. The parents appeal. We affirm the trial court’s judgment as to grounds for termination but vacate the trial court’s judgment as to the best interest of the children and the trial court’s judgment terminating the mother and the father’s parental rights.

In this appeal, the trial court determined that the woman who claimed to be the decedent’s common law wife had failed to establish her status as his wife and heir. The alleged widow asserts that she presented satisfactory evidence to prove that she was the common law spouse. As modified, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The State of Tennessee appeals the Davidson County Criminal Court’s order dismissing the indictment, which charged the Defendant with domestic assault by causing bodily injury. On appeal, the State contends that the trial court erred by dismissing the indictment. We conclude that the trial court erred by dismissing the indictment. The order of the trial court is reversed, the domestic assault charge is reinstated, and the case is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings.

The Defendant, Gabriel Toban, was convicted by a Maury County Circuit Court jury of third offense driving under the influence (DUI), a Class A misdemeanor. See T.C.A. §55-10-401 (2012). The trial court sentenced the Defendant to eleven months, twenty-nine days in confinement. On appeal, the Defendant contends that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his DUI conviction, (2) the trial court erred by rejecting a negotiated plea agreement, (3) the indictment was invalid, and (4) the trial court erred by denying a motion to dismiss. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Brijesh Mukesh Desai, the Defendant, entered a negotiated guilty plea to Class C felony issuing or passing a worthless check in the amount of $10,000 or more but less than $60,000. The plea agreement provided that the Defendant would be sentenced as a Range I standard offender; the sentence would be between three and six years; there would be a possibility of diversion; restitution would be $18,871.34; and the manner of service was to be determined by the trial court at a later hearing. Following the sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced the Defendant to six years’ probation following the service of forty-five days in jail. The Defendant now appeals, claiming that the trial court erred in accepting his plea of guilty. However, the Defendant did not reserve the right to appeal a certified question of law or seek review of his sentence, nor do any other grounds for direct appeal under Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 3(b) exist. Because the Defendant has no right to a direct appeal from his guilty plea, the appeal is dismissed.

I concur in the majority’s holding that the trial court was within its discretion to place a condition on the grant of the motion to set aside the default judgment. I also concur in the conclusion that the attorney’s fees and expenses assessed by the trial court were reasonable. But I respectfully dissent from the grant of an additional thirty days for Frank Santa and Alta Horizon, Inc. (“Defendants’) to comply with the trial court’s January 10, 2017 order. Although the conduct of counsel might justify such relief, in my view, this Court lacks that authority.  

This appeal concerns an order to set aside a default judgment. Kristina Abolins and Christopher Heath Hawkins (“Plaintiffs”) sued Frank Santas (“Santas”), doing business as Gunner Inc., and Alta Horizon, Inc. (“Defendants,” collectively), asserting a number of causes of action arising out of Defendants’ work on a renovation project at Plaintiffs’ home. After several months with no responsive filing from Defendants, Plaintiffs moved for default judgment. The Chancery Court for Davidson County (“the Trial Court”) granted Plaintiffs’ motion for default judgment. Defendants filed a motion to set aside default judgment, raising certain defenses and taking issue with service of process. The Trial Court entered an order granting the motion to set aside on the condition that Defendants pay Plaintiffs’ attorney’s fees and expenses. Defendants did not pay, and instead appealed to this Court. We find no abuse of discretion by the Trial Court. We, therefore, affirm the judgment of the Trial Court.

Parents appeal the termination of their parental rights to their two children. The juvenile court found clear and convincing evidence of five grounds against the father and three grounds against the mother and that termination of parental rights was in the children’s best interest. DCS concedes on appeal that persistence of conditions was not an appropriate ground for terminating mother’s parental rights and that abandonment by failure to visit was not an appropriate ground for terminating father’s parental rights. We agree. As to the remaining grounds, we conclude that DCS failed to prove abandonment by failure to provide a suitable home and persistence of conditions as to the father. But the record contains clear and convincing evidence to support the grounds of abandonment for wanton disregard for the welfare of the children and substantial noncompliance with the requirements of the permanency plans as to both parents. We further conclude that the record contains clear and convincing evidence that termination is in the children’s best interest. Thus, we affirm the termination of parental rights.