APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The notice of appeal in this case was not timely filed. Therefore, this Court lacks
jurisdiction to consider this appeal. The appeal is dismissed.

Appellant David Hutchins challenges the trial court's denial of his Motion to
continue a summary judgment hearing and its denial of his Motion to Alter or Amend
the Court's summary judgment. The appeal was referred to the Special Workers'
Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and
conclusions of law pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51. We affirm.

The appellant is the Mayor of Shelby County. He filed a complaint for divorce, and the
Shelby County chancellor originally assigned to the case recused herself. The case was
reassigned to another Shelby County chancellor who accepted the case. Six months later,
the appellant filed a motion to recuse the chancellor based on the Mayor’s budgetary duties
regarding Shelby County government, including the chancery court and the chancery court
clerk. The chancellor denied the motion, finding that it was not filed promptly in
accordance with Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10B. We affirm.

Bobby V. Summers, Petitioner, appeals the post-conviction court’s summary dismissal of his petition as time-barred. Upon review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Christopher Laron Matthews, Defendant, appeals the trial court’s consecutive alignment of twelve-year sentences for sale of methamphetamine in Case No. 27504 and Case No. 27505 for an effective twenty-four-year sentence. The trial court based the consecutive sentencing on its finding that Defendant was an offender whose record of criminal activity was extensive. We affirm.

Syeda C. (“Mother”) and Hosea T. (“Father”) (Mother and Father collectively, “Parents”) are the biological parents of Gabrella T. (the “Child”).  The Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) petitioned the Juvenile Court of Memphis and Shelby County (the “Juvenile Court”) for an adjudication that the Child was dependent and neglected in the care of Parents and for an award of temporary legal custody of the Child to DCS.  The Juvenile Court granted DCS’s petition, adjudicated the Child dependent and neglected, and awarded temporary legal custody of the Child to DCS.  Mother appealed the Juvenile Court order to the Shelby County Circuit Court (the “Circuit Court”).  Mother failed to appear at the hearing in the Circuit Court on her appeal; upon oral motion made by DCS, the Circuit Court dismissed Mother’s appeal.  Mother now appeals to this Court.  Upon thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the Circuit Court.

This is an appeal of a trial court’s valuation of a marital asset, division of a marital estate, and award of alimony in solido as a result of the divorce of Eric Wayne Barton (“Husband”) and Mechelle Scholmer Barton (“Wife”). In its 2018 Final Judgment of Divorce (“2018 Judgment”), the Chancery Court for Blount County (“the Trial Court”) found that Husband’s 100% interest in Vanquish Worldwide, LLC, (“Vanquish Worldwide”) was marital property and that Vanquish Worldwide’s outstanding claim for potentially $32 million against the U.S. Government (“Government Claim”) was marital property. The Trial Court accordingly awarded to Wife a portion of the Government Claim. In Husband’s first appeal, this Court reversed the Trial Court’s finding that the Government Claim was marital property and its awarded portion to Wife. This Court, concluding that the Government Claim was nevertheless relevant to an accurate valuation of Vanquish Worldwide and the total value of the parties’ marital business interests, instructed the Trial Court on remand to revalue Vanquish Worldwide, and in doing so, to consider the Government Claim. On remand, the Trial Court found that Husband had dissipated $12.375 million of the Government Claim proceeds by using the funds to satisfy a personal judgment against him. The Trial Court accordingly added the dissipated $12.375 million to its $4 million valuation of Vanquish Worldwide. Husband has appealed, contesting the Trial Court’s consideration of the Government Claim proceeds in its valuation of Vanquish Worldwide, as well as its overall division of the marital estate, award of alimony in solido, and placement of a lien and an assignment in trust to Wife on Husband’s ownership interests in his numerous LLCs, including Vanquish Worldwide. We affirm the Trial Court’s finding that Husband dissipated marital property and its valuation of Vanquish Worldwide but modify the Trial Court’s judgment to the extent it awarded interest on Wife’s award of alimony in solido. The balance of the Trial Court’s judgment is affirmed, including its division of the marital estate and award of alimony in solido to Wife. We further decline to award Wife attorney’s fees on appeal.

This appeal concerns a lawsuit challenging the Tennessee Education Savings Account Pilot Program, Tenn. Code Ann. § 49-6-2601, et seq. (“the ESA Act”). A group of parents and taxpayers from Davidson and Shelby Counties (“Plaintiffs”) sued state officials (“State Defendants”) in the Chancery Court for Davidson County (“the Trial Court”). In their operative amended complaint, Plaintiffs alleged that the ESA Act violates the Tennessee Constitution and state law by diverting taxpayer funds appropriated for public schools in Davidson and Shelby Counties to private schools, resulting in unique harm to these localities. A group of parents with children eligible for the ESA Act (“Bah Defendants”) and another group (“Greater Praise Defendants”) (all defendants collectively, “Defendants”) intervened in defense of the ESA Act. Defendants filed motions to dismiss, which the Trial Court granted on grounds that Plaintiffs lack standing and their claims are not ripe for judicial review. In reaching its decision, the Trial Court found that the ESA Act has not caused the affected counties any unequal hardship. Plaintiffs appeal the dismissal of their first, second, and sixth causes of action only. We conclude that the Trial Court erred by deciding factual disputes over the impact of the ESA Act on Plaintiffs at the motion to dismiss stage. Plaintiffs alleged enough in their amended complaint to establish standing both as parents and taxpayers. Plaintiffs’ claims also are ripe for judicial review. We, therefore, reverse the judgment of the Trial Court as to Plaintiffs’ first, second, and sixth causes of action and remand for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion.

Mother appeals the termination of her parental rights based on Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-1-113(g)(14). Discerning no reversible error, we affirm.

While a prior lawsuit was still pending on appeal, the Plaintiff filed a nearly identical lawsuit. The trial court dismissed this second suit based on res judicata. Although the second suit was not barred by res judicata because the first suit was not final for res judicata purposes, we nevertheless affirm the dismissal on the basis of the prior suit pending doctrine.

The Petitioner, James Moore, was convicted by a Shelby County jury of attempted first
degree murder and employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, for
which he received an effective sentence of twenty-six years’ imprisonment. He now
appeals the post-conviction court’s denial of relief, arguing that trial counsel was
ineffective by failing to: (1) subpoena records that might have shown the victim’s
intoxication; and (2) adequately advise the Petitioner about testifying. Alternatively, he
argues that the cumulative effect of trial counsel’s deficiencies entitles him to relief. After
review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Plaintiff’s attorneys appeal the trial court’s imposition of sanctions against them in the amount of $68,617.28 and the denial of their second motion to disqualify the trial court judge. We affirm the trial court’s discretionary decision to impose sanctions, but we vacate the amount of sanctions awarded and remand for the trial court to calculate the reasonable amount of monetary sanctions in keeping with the procedures and considerations outlined in this opinion. We have determined that Plaintiff’s attorneys’ issue regarding the trial court’s denial of their second motion to recuse is moot. Finally, we decline to award attorney’s fees on appeal.

In this action initiated by the mother to modify the parties’ permanent parenting plan for their minor child, the trial court limited the father’s co-parenting time to include no overnight visitation with the child after finding by a preponderance of the evidence that the father had committed domestic abuse against two women whom he had previously dated. The trial court relied on Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-6-406 to restrict the father’s parenting time based on its determination that the father’s acts of domestic violence and hostility toward women had a negative effect on his ability to effectively parent the minor child. The father appealed, but this Court dismissed that appeal because the trial court’s order was not a final judgment. See McDonald v. Coffel, No. E2021-00460-COA-R3-CV, 2021 WL 4958475 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 26, 2021). On remand, the trial court addressed all pending matters and entered a final judgment, keeping in place the residential co-parenting schedule limiting the father’s parenting time to exclude overnight visitation. The father has again appealed, arguing that the trial court abused its discretion by denying him overnight co-parenting time and by relying on Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-6-406. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm.

The plaintiff filed an action for breach of contract and fraud against his former attorneys and the attorneys’ law firm. The defendants moved for a judgment on the pleadings, arguing that the plaintiff failed to state a claim for which relief can be granted, and that the action was untimely. The trial court granted the defendants’ motion, and, having determined that the plaintiff’s action is untimely under Tennessee Code Annotated section 28-3-104(c)(1), we affirm.

In this divorce appeal, the husband challenges the trial court’s classification of real estate as marital property. Following a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Five easement holders filed suit against two other easement holders and the servient estate owners seeking a declaratory judgment regarding whether the easements could be used for commercial logging activities. The trial court concluded that commercial logging activities were not a permissible use of the easements and entered an order restraining and enjoining use of the easements for such activities. Discerning no error, we affirm.

The Appellant, Kelvin Montgomery, was convicted of especially aggravated kidnapping
and aggravated sexual battery. The trial court imposed an effective sentence of thirtyseven
years’ confinement. On appeal, the Appellant argues that: (1) the evidence is
insufficient to support his convictions; (2) the trial court committed plain error by failing
to provide the jury instruction required under State v. White, 362 S.W.3d 559, 580-81
(Tenn. 2012), in connection with his aggravated rape charge; and (3) the trial court abused
its discretion by imposing the maximum within-range sentences and ordering that they be
served consecutively. Upon our review, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

This appeal arises from a pending petition for termination of parental rights and adoption. Two weeks after the maternal grandparents commenced their action to terminate the parental rights of the mother of their grandchild (the father being deceased), the paternal grandparents (“the Intervenors”) filed a motion to intervene for the purpose of filing a competing petition for adoption and termination of parental rights; they also sought to set aside an order granting permanent guardianship over the child to the maternal grandparents previously issued by the juvenile court in a separate proceeding. The Intervenors also filed a motion for leave to intervene for the purpose of filing a petition for grandparent visitation. The maternal grandparents opposed all relief sought by the Intervenors. The trial court denied the motion to set aside the juvenile court’s order of permanent guardianship for lack of jurisdiction, and it denied the motion to intervene for purposes of adoption on the ground that the Intervenors lacked standing because they did not meet the definition of prospective adoptive parents under Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-1-102(44). However, the court granted their motion to intervene for the purpose of grandparent visitation. The Intervenors appeal the denial of the motion to intervene for purposes of adoption, and the maternal grandparents appeal the order granting the Intervenors leave to intervene for the purpose of grandparent visitation. We have determined that the Intervenors have standing to file a petition for adoption and termination of parental rights; thus, we reverse the trial court’s ruling on that issue. We affirm the trial court in all other respects.

This is an appeal from a final order entered on July 19, 2023. The Notice of Appeal was not filed with the Appellate Court Clerk until September 7, 2023, more than thirty days from the date of entry of the order from which the appellant is seeking to appeal. Because the Notice of Appeal was not timely filed, we have no jurisdiction to consider this appeal.

In this Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 9 interlocutory appeal, we address whether
the trial court erred in denying Appellant Town’s motion for summary judgment on
Appellees’ negligence and joint-venture claims. We conclude that the public-duty doctrine
shields the Town from liability, and the special-duty exception does not apply.
Furthermore, Appellees’ “joint venture” claims are simply additional negligence claims
seeking to hold Appellant Town liable for the alleged negligence of other defendants.
Because the Tennessee Legislature has not waived governmental immunity under such
circumstances, Appellant Town’s immunity was never removed as to the “joint venture”
claims. As such, the trial court erred in denying Appellant Town’s motion for summary
judgment as to Appellees’ negligence and “joint venture” claims.

A man sued his arresting officers and others.  He claimed he was neither drunk nor violent when he was arrested and charged with public intoxication, resisting arrest, and assault on an officer.  During discovery, the man claimed to have no communications between him and a companion that were not protected by attorney-client privilege or as work product.  When such communications were uncovered, the defendants moved for sanctions and attorney’s fees.  The trial court awarded attorney’s fees to the defendants and the companion.  And it dismissed the case as a sanction.  Discerning no abuse of discretion, we affirm.

Defendant, Lanoris Cordell Carter, appeals his Lake County Circuit Court conviction for
tampering with evidence. He argues on appeal that the evidence was insufficient to support
his conviction. Defendant asserts that throwing items out of a car window during an
attempted traffic stop such that law enforcement could not recover the items is “mere
abandonment” rather than concealment or destruction for purposes of the evidence
tampering statute. After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A father and stepmother appeal from an order dismissing their petition to adopt a child and to terminate the mother’s parental rights. The trial court held that the evidence presented supported termination of the mother’s parental rights based on her failure to support and failure to visit the child. However, the trial court found that the alleged ground of failure to manifest an ability and willingness to personally assume custody or financial responsibility of the child had not been proven. The court also found that termination of the mother’s rights was not in the child’s best interest. We affirm.

The Defendant, Rusty Amos Long, appeals the Robertson County Circuit Court’s order revoking his community corrections sentence for his conviction for burglary other than a habitation and ordering him to serve the remainder of his five-year sentence in confinement. The Defendant contends that the trial court erred by failing to conduct a new sentencing hearing and by failing to consider whether revocation was in the interests of justice. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This is a breach of contract case involving the defendants’ purported failure to pay amounts
owed under a Future Receivables Sale and Purchase Agreement. Due to Appellant’s failure
to file a timely notice of appeal, we do not reach the substantive issues and dismiss the
appeal