APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

A Knox County jury convicted the Petitioner, Richard Williams, III, of several offenses, including attempted first degree murder. He later filed a petition for post-conviction relief, asserting that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel. The post-conviction court dismissed the petition after finding that it was untimely and that principles of due process did not toll the running of the statute of limitations. On appeal, the Petitioner argues that the post-conviction court did not adequately consider the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on his ability to access the prison library and, therefore, to timely file his petition. We respectfully disagree and affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Tennessee Claims Commission dismissed appellant’s complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Discerning no error, we affirm.

This appeal came on to be heard upon the record from the Circuit Court for Meigs
County, arguments of counsel, and briefs filed on behalf of the respective parties. Upon
consideration thereof, this Court is of the opinion that there is no reversible error in the
trial court’s judgment.

This lawsuit arises from a real property/boundary dispute between the plaintiff and the defendants. The trial court found that a prior circuit court condemnation judgment vesting title to the Knoxville Community Development Corporation “bars the claim of [the plaintiff] as an impermissible collateral attack upon the condemnation judgment.” Thus, the trial court ruled that the condemnation judgment barred the plaintiff’s adverse possession claim against the defendants. The plaintiff appeals. We affirm.

In this divorce action, the court limited Wife’s proof at trial as a sanction for her failure to respond to pre-trial discovery. After the trial, the court granted the parties an absolute divorce, equitably divided the marital estate, adopted a permanent parenting plan for their minor children, and declined to award Wife spousal support. Wife argues that the court erred in limiting her proof at trial, dividing the marital estate, and denying her request for spousal support. Discerning no abuse of discretion in these decisions, we affirm.

This case concerns the procedure used by the Tennessee State Board of Equalization when it determined the 2018 appraisal ratio for Shelby County. In 2017, Shelby County real property was reappraised. Accordingly, the Board of Equalization set the County’s 2017 appraisal ratio at 1.000. In 2018, the Board of Equalization used the 2017 reappraisal to set the Shelby County 2018 appraisal ratio at 1.000. Appellants—owners of commercial tangible personal property in Shelby County—challenged the Board’s methodology as violative of Tennessee Code Annotated sections 67-5-1605 and 67-5-1606 and unsupported by substantial and material evidence. Following review under the Uniform Administrative Procedures Act, the trial court determined that: (1) the Board did not violate Tennessee Code Annotated sections 67-5-1605 and 67-5-1606 when it set the County’s appraisal ratio at 1.000 in 2018; (2) the Board’s decision was supported by substantial and material evidence; and (3) the Board’s decision was not arbitrary or capricious. Discerning no error, we affirm.

A father filed a petition to modify the existing parenting plan. The trial court found a material change in circumstances had occurred and it was in the child’s best interest to award custody to the father. Because the evidence does not preponderate against either finding, we affirm.

The Defendant, Deonta Baskin, was convicted of first degree murder and possession of a
firearm by a convicted felon. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to life without parole
pursuant to the repeat violent offender statute for his first degree murder conviction to be
served consecutively to thirty years’ confinement as a Range III, persistent offender for his
possession of a firearm by a convicted felon conviction. On appeal, the Defendant argues
that the trial court erred by imposing excessive sentences based on his prior convictions.
After review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This post-divorce appeal concerns the trial court’s finding of contempt against the father for his failure to pay child support and the court’s calculation of his support arrearage owed. We affirm.

In this health care liability action, the trial court granted summary judgment to the appellee
surgeon based on the expiration of the statute of limitations and the appellant patient’s
failure to show evidence of causation and damages. On appeal, we conclude that (1) there
is a genuine dispute of material fact as to when the appellant’s cause of action accrued; (2)
the trial court did not specifically rule on the propriety of appellant’s pre-suit notice; and
(3) there are genuine disputes of material facts as to the causation and damages elements
of the appellant’s claim. Accordingly, we reverse in part, vacate in part, and remand for
further proceedings.

The Appellant appeals his convictions of second degree murder and possession of a firearm
with a prior violent felony conviction, for which he received an effective sentence of fortyeight
years’ imprisonment. In this appeal, the Appellant argues that (1) the trial court erred
in denying the motion to suppress his confession; and (2) the evidence is insufficient to
establish his identity as the perpetrator of the offenses. After review, we affirm the trial
court’s judgments.

This appeal concerns an order of dismissal entered by the Tennessee Claims Commission. Though Appellant raises a number of issues on appeal, this Court is unable to review any of the issues due to Appellant’s noncompliance with applicable appellate briefing requirements. Because all of Appellant’s issues on appeal have been waived due to his failure to comply with the appellate briefing requirements, we affirm the judgment of the Tennessee Claims Commission.

The Defendant, Lance T. Sandifer, appeals the trial court’s summary dismissal of his motion to correct an illegal sentence pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1. In his motion, the Defendant argued that his sentences were illegal because he was not granted a juvenile transfer hearing and that the criminal court, therefore, lacked subject matter jurisdiction over him. Following our review, we affirm.

This appeal involves a contract for the removal of a tree. The trial court granted a motion to dismiss filed by the defendant tree company. We affirm and remand for further proceedings.

Because the circuit court orders from which the appellant has sought to appeal do not
constitute a final appealable judgment, this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider this appeal.

Appellants, Amelia Vaughn and Gemelia Johnson appeal the March 3, 2023 order of the
Shelby County Probate Court. Because the order appealed is not a final judgment, this
Court lacks jurisdiction to consider the appeal. Tenn. R. App. P. 3(a). The appeal is
dismissed.

This case involves an election contest filed by the plaintiff based on the defendant’s residency eligibility for the office of Lenoir City Municipal Court Judge. Following a hearing, the trial court determined that the defendant had complied with article VI, section 4 of the Tennessee Constitution because the clause required, inter alia, that he be a resident within the judicial district, not necessarily within the city limits, to preside over the municipal court, which has concurrent jurisdiction with a general sessions court. The
plaintiff has appealed. Upon review, we determine that the language of article VI, section 4 of the Tennessee Constitution requiring a judge elected to an inferior court to have been a resident of the “district or circuit” to which he or she is assigned means, under these circumstances, that the Lenoir City Municipal Judge must have been a resident of Loudon County for at least one year prior to the judge’s election because the Lenoir City Municipal Court has concurrent jurisdiction with the Loudon County General
Sessions Court. Accordingly, inasmuch as the defendant had been a resident of Loudon County for at least one year prior to the election, we affirm the trial court’s dismissal of the plaintiff’s election contest. However, we modify the trial court’s judgment to state that the defendant complied with the residency requirement at issue because he had been a resident of Loudon County for at least one year rather than because he had been a resident of the Ninth Judicial District for the prescribed time period.

Petitioner, Willie Nathan Jones, appeals from the Putnam County Criminal Court’s denying his petition for post-conviction relief, which petition challenged his convictions of second degree murder and attempted second degree murder. Petitioner argues trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to contemporaneously object to the prosecutor’s closing argument and failing to object to the prosecutor’s use of the term “victim” when referring to a State’s witness. We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

This is an accelerated interlocutory appeal as of right pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court
Rule 10B § 2.02 from the trial court’s denial of a motion for recusal. This appeal arises
from a civil action in which the plaintiff has brought claims of fraud and civil conspiracy
against his former counsel in a criminal case that resulted in a conviction and his counsel
in a pending post-conviction case. While this civil action was pending, the trial court
allowed the attorneys who were representing the plaintiff in the post-conviction case to
withdraw. Shortly thereafter, the plaintiff filed a recusal motion, contending that the trial
judge should be recused because he showed bias in favor of the plaintiff’s post-conviction
attorneys when he granted their motions to withdraw without a hearing, during which the
plaintiff wished to share his grievances about the attorneys. The trial court denied the
plaintiff’s recusal motion, and this Rule 10B appeal followed. We have concluded that
neither the legal grounds nor the evidence that the plaintiff relies upon in his affidavit in
support of the recusal motion are sufficient to prompt a reasonable, disinterested person to
reasonably question the judge’s impartiality. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court
denying the motion for recusal is affirmed.

This is an appeal from a divorce in the Chancery Court for Hamilton County (the “trial court”). Donna Booker (“Wife”) and Mike Booker (“Husband”) married for the first time in 1993 and divorced in 1998. They remarried shortly thereafter in February of 1999. The day of their second wedding, Husband and Wife executed a prenuptial agreement addressing Husband’s interest in his family’s steel erection business. Wife filed the current divorce action in the trial court in February of 2020, and a trial was held May 3 and 4, 2022, and July 6, 2022. The trial court ordered the parties divorced, divided the marital estate, and awarded Wife alimony in futuro. Finding that the prenuptial agreement was valid, the trial court determined that Husband’s interest in his family business was separate property. Wife appeals. Following thorough review, we affirm in part, reverse in part, vacate in part, and remand the case for further proceedings.

The plaintiff, John H. Packard, IV (“Plaintiff”) was struck by a vehicle driven by Jonathan
R. Bentley while Plaintiff attempted to walk across a roadway in Gatlinburg, Tennessee.
Plaintiff brought a suit arising in negligence against a number of parties, including the City
of Gatlinburg (“City”). As to City, Plaintiff alleged that it created an unreasonably
dangerous risk of harm to pedestrians attempting to use the crosswalk because it failed to
inspect and maintain LED lights it had previously installed on a nearby crosswalk sign.
The Circuit Court for Sevier County (“trial court”) granted summary judgment in favor of
City, finding that City negated an essential element of Plaintiff’s claim, that City was
entitled to immunity pursuant to the Tennessee Governmental Tort Liability Act
(“GTLA”), Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-20-101 et seq., and that City was also
immune pursuant to the public duty doctrine. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment of
the trial court.

Jason M. Peterson (“Plaintiff”) was the passenger in a vehicle driven by Jodi L. Carey
(“Defendant”) at the time of a motor vehicle accident. Plaintiff filed a personal injury
action against Defendant more than one year after the accident. Plaintiff argues that
Tennessee Code Annotated section 28-3-104(a)(2) extends the statute of limitations for his
action to two years because Defendant was cited for the violation of a traffic ordinance
contained in the Kingsport Municipal Code in relation to the accident. The Circuit Court
for Sullivan County (“trial court”) applied the one-year statute of limitations set forth in
section 28-3-104(a)(1) and granted summary judgment in favor of Defendant. Finding no
error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Defendant, Jimmy Dewayne Richards, was convicted by a Fentress County jury of burglary, theft of property, and vandalism. On appeal, the Defendant argues, among other things, that the trial court erred by denying the Defendant’s pretrial motion to suppress. We cannot adequately review on the record before us whether the search was supported by probable cause or whether Defendant lacked standing to challenge the search. The trial court sua sponte raised the standing issue after all the proof was presented at the hearing and did not comply with its duties to judge the credibility of witnesses, to weigh the evidence, and to resolve factual issues in deciding the motion to suppress. We therefore remand this case for a new hearing on the motion to suppress in accordance with the instructions in this opinion.

A mother appeals the termination of her parental rights on the grounds of abandonment by failure to support; abandonment by failure to provide a suitable home; substantial noncompliance with the permanency plans; persistent conditions; and failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody of the children. The mother also appeals the trial court’s finding that termination of her parental rights was in the best interest of the children. We reverse the trial court’s finding on the ground of substantial noncompliance with the permanency plans because the initial permanency plan does not appear in the record, but we affirm the trial court in all other respects.

This appeal concerns an inmate’s lawsuit over injuries he sustained from falling off a top
bunk bed in prison. Jody Higgins (“Plaintiff”) was an inmate at Silverdale Detention
Facility (“Silverdale”). CoreCivic, Inc. operated Silverdale through a contract with
Hamilton County. CoreCivic of Tennessee, LLC (the two CoreCivic entities together,
“CoreCivic”) employed security at Silverdale. Correct Care Solutions, LLC (“CCS”)
provided medical treatment to Silverdale inmates through a contract with CoreCivic.
Plaintiff sued CoreCivic, CCS, and Hamilton County (“Defendants,” collectively) in the
Circuit Court for Hamilton County (“the Trial Court”) asserting health care liability and
other claims. Defendants filed motions for summary judgment, which the Trial Court
granted based in part on a lack of expert proof. Plaintiff appeals. He argues among other
things that it is common knowledge that Plaintiff, who suffers from seizures, should have
been given a bottom bunk pass and anti-seizure medication. We hold, inter alia, that
Plaintiff failed to present competent, admissible expert proof in support of his health care
liability claim at the summary judgment stage, and that the issues of this case do not fall
under the common knowledge exception. Plaintiff’s other claims are barred by the statute
of limitations. We affirm.