APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Mark Winslow brought suit against Charles Fleischmann and his campaign advertising consultant, John Saltsman, to recover for allegedly false and defamatory statements made in the course of Mr. Fleishman’s campaign for election to the United States Congress, and related contractual claims. Mr. Fleishman and Mr. Saltsman moved for summary judgment on the grounds that the statements were not false or capable of defamatory meaning or published with actual malice, and that they took no action to induce a breach of contract or otherwise interfere with the relationship between Mr. Winslow and the Tennessee Republican Party. Mr. Winslow did not contest the grant of summary judgment on the contract claims; the trial court granted the motion as to the defamation and false light claims, holding that there was no evidence from which to infer malice, that the statements were not defamatory or capable of a defamatory meaning, and that any statements upon which the action was based which related to Mr. Winslow were either true or substantially true and, therefore, not actionable. Mr. Winslow appeals. Because Mr. Fleishman and Mr. Saltsman demonstrated that the undisputed facts negate the element of actual malice which is essential to the defamation and false light claims, we affirm the trial court’s grant of summary judgment. 

This appeal arises from a decision by the Tennessee Board of Parole (the “Board”) to deny an inmate parole after his initial parole review hearing. In 2009, the inmate pled guilty to two counts of attempted rape of a child and two counts of incest and was sentenced to 20 years in prison with parole eligibility after serving 30% of his sentence. Apparently because of his good behavior, the Board considered the inmate for release on parole after he had served only 20% of his sentence. Without further explanation, the Board denied the inmate parole based solely on its finding that “[t]he release from custody at this time would depreciate the seriousness of the crime of which the offender stands convicted or promote disrespect of the law,” and deferred review of his parole application for five years. The inmate filed a petition for common-law writ of certiorari, arguing, among other things, that the Board acted arbitrarily in denying him parole based solely on the seriousness of the crime without providing any support or explanation for its decision. The trial court affirmed the Board’s decision and this appeal followed. On appeal, we conclude that the Board acted arbitrarily in deferring further review of the inmate’s parole application beyond the time when he would have otherwise been parole eligible—at 30% of his 20-year sentence. Because the inmate has already served more than 30% of his 20-year sentence, we hold that he should immediately be granted a new parole hearing. We therefore vacate the judgment of the trial court and remand this case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 

The petitioner, Mathew Dixon, appeals the summary dismissal of his petition to reopen his petition for post-conviction relief as time-barred. The petitioner was convicted of first degree murder and two counts of especially aggravated kidnapping. He subsequently filed both a direct appeal and a petition for post-conviction relief in his case. He has now filed the instant petition to reopen his petition for post-conviction relief, alleging a later-arising claim. Specifically, he contends that he subsequently learned that a witness at trial against him had an agreement with the prosecution. He contends that the post-conviction court erred in not finding that the statute of limitations should be tolled. Following review of the record, we conclude we are without jurisdiction to review the challenged issue. Accordingly, the summary dismissal is affirmed.

The defendant, Edward Sample, was convicted of one count of aggravated robbery, a Class B felony, one count of attempted aggravated robbery, a Class C felony, and two counts of aggravated assault, Class C felonies. On appeal, the defendant argues that the trial court erred in admitting evidence of his other crimes, that the trial court erred in failing to declare a mistrial, and that he was improperly fingerprinted during trial without counsel present. Following our review of the briefs of the parties, the record, and the applicable law, we conclude that the trial court erred in admitting the evidence of other crimes, and we reverse the defendant’s convictions and remand for a new trial.

The defendant, Michael Smith, was convicted of aggravated burglary and sentenced as a Range II, multiple offender to ten years, the sentence to be served consecutively to a sentence previously imposed in another matter. On appeal, he argues that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction and that the trial court erred by the following rulings: (1) instructing as to flight; (2) concluding that the defendant could be impeached with prior convictions for rape and attempted rape; (3) engaging in an ex parte communication with the jury; (4) refusing to grant a mistrial; (5) concluding the defendant could receive a fair trial even though the State had lost or destroyed recordings of telephone calls and jail visits; and (6) not allowing the defendant to present certain proof to impeach one of the State's witnesses. Following our review, we conclude that the issues raised on appeal are without merit and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Father appeals the termination of his parental rights. After a thorough review of the record, we reverse as to the ground of substantial noncompliance with the permanency plan, vacate as to the grounds of abandonment by failure to visit and support by an incarcerated parent, and affirm as to the grounds of abandonment by failure to establish a suitable home and persistent conditions. We also affirm the trial court's finding that termination is in the child's best interest. Accordingly we affirm the termination of Father's parental rights

Petitioner, Jason Charles Austin, appeals from the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. Petitioner was indicted for one count of first degree murder. Petitioner was convicted by a jury of second degree murder and sentenced by the trial court to 23 years incarceration. Petitioner's conviction and sentence were affirmed by this court on direct appeal. State v. Charles Austin, No. E2010-00796-CCA-R3-CD, 2012 WL 2445058 (Tenn. Crim. App., June 28, 2012), perm. app. denied (Tenn., Nov. 21, 2012). Petitioner sought post-conviction relief, alleging that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance. Following an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief. Having reviewed the entire record before us and the briefs of the parties, we conclude that the evidence does not preponderate against the post-conviction court's findings and conclusions. Accordingly, the judgment of the post-conviction court is affirmed.

The Oak Ridge City Court found the manager of three apartment buildings liable for several violations of the local building code. The manager appealed to the circuit court, and the City moved to amend the cause to add the purported owner of the properties as a defendant. The case proceeded to trial. After the City closed its proof, the trial court noticed that the purported owner of the property had not been properly made a party to the action. Accordingly, the trial court granted the City‟s motion to amend. Although the purported owner moved for a mistrial and/or a continuance, the trial court proceeded on to rule against the purported owner for several violations of the local building code. The purported owner appeals. We vacate the judgment of the trial court and remand for further proceedings to allow the purported owner of the properties an opportunity to meaningfully respond to the allegations against him in accordance with Rule 15.01 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure.

We granted this appeal to determine whether the courts below erred in concluding that the mother must be afforded relief from a void default judgment terminating her parental rights even though she did not seek relief from the void judgment under Rule 60.02(3) of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure until more than eight years after it was entered. We agree with the courts below that the default judgment is void for lack of personal jurisdiction and also conclude that the reasonable time filing requirement of Rule 60.02 does not apply to petitions seeking relief from void judgments under Rule 60.02(3). Nevertheless, we hold that relief from a void judgment should be denied if the following exceptional circumstances exist: “(1) [t]he party seeking relief, after having had actual notice of the judgment, manifested an intention to treat the judgment as valid; and (2) [g]ranting the relief would impair another person’s substantial interest of reliance on the judgment.” Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 66 (1982). We hold that the record has not been sufficiently developed to determine whether exceptional circumstances exist. Accordingly, we reverse the judgments of the trial court and the Court of Appeals and remand for the trial court to determine, after a hearing, whether exceptional circumstances justify denying relief in this case.

Pursuant to Rule 37(b) of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure, the defendant, Jon Michael Johnson, who pleaded guilty to one count of driving under the influence (“DUI”), appeals two related certified questions of law relative to the validity of the instrument used to measure his blood alcohol level following his arrest.  Because neither of the certified questions presented is dispositive of the defendant’s case, the appeal is dismissed.

This is an appeal from an order designating a primary residential parent and setting visitation and child support. The juvenile court found that naming Father as primary residential parent was in the child’s best interest and set child support accordingly. Mother appealed both the designation of primary residential parent and the amount of child support owed to father. We affirm.     

An individual who sought records from a county sheriff’s department was provided the records outside the seven business day period required by the Tennessee Public Records Act. The individual, who was acting pro se, requested an award of attorney’s fees and discretionary costs pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 10-7-505(g). The trial court denied the request because the individual plaintiff did not incur attorney’s fees and did not incur the types of costs contemplated by Rule 54 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure. The individual appealed, and we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

The petitioner, Jimmy W. Wilson, appeals the summary dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus, which challenged the life sentence imposed based upon a Sullivan County Criminal Court jury's finding that he was a habitual criminal following his 1985 conviction of rape. Discerning no error, we affirm.

Pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51, this workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The trial court found that Employee’s bilateral knee replacements related to a work-related injury she suffered on March 20, 2004, and that any claim for compensation related to an injury she sustained on February 6, 2011 was barred by the doctrines of judicial and equitable estoppel. Employee has appealed. We reverse the trial court’s judgment and remand for further proceedings.

A Davidson County jury convicted the Petitioner, Cyrus Randy Whitson, of first degree murder.  The Petitioner appealed, and this Court affirmed the conviction.  State of Tennessee v. Cyrus Randy Whitson, No. M2007-02197-CCA-R3-CD, 2009 WL 3787457, at *1-3 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Nashville, Nov. 12, 2009) perm. app. denied (Tenn. April 23, 2010).  Thereafter, the Petitioner timely filed a petition for post-conviction relief, and, after a hearing, the post-conviction court issued an order denying the petition.  On appeal, the Petitioner maintains that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel.  After a thorough review of the record and relevant law, we affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment.

The defendant, Gregory Dale, was convicted by a Williamson County Circuit Court jury of two counts of aggravated assault, Class C felonies, and simple assault, a Class A misdemeanor.  He was sentenced to four years, suspended to supervised probation after serving one year in the county jail.  On appeal, the defendant argues that the trial court erred in excluding evidence of the victim’s prior violent mood swings to corroborate his claim that the victim was the first aggressor and he acted in self-defense.  After review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This appeal concerns the termination of parental rights. The Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) filed a petition in the Juvenile Court for Knox County (“the Juvenile Court”) seeking to terminate the parental rights of Bridgetta M. (“Mother”) to her minor children Greg S. and Kaedince M. (“the Children”). The Juvenile Court terminated Mother’s parental rights to the Children on the grounds of wanton disregard and severe abuse. Mother appeals to this Court arguing only that it is not in the Children’s best interest for Mother’s parental rights to be terminated. We affirm the judgment of the Juvenile Court.

This appeal concerns the termination of a father’s parental rights. The Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) filed a petition in the Juvenile Court for Knox County (“the Juvenile Court”) seeking to terminate the parental rights of Greg S. (“Father”) to his minor child Greg S., Jr. (“the Child”). The Juvenile Court terminated Father’s parental rights to the Child on the ground of substantial noncompliance with the permanency plan. Father appeals to this Court arguing only that it is not in the Child’s best interest for Father’s parental rights to be terminated. We affirm the judgment of the Juvenile Court.

Plaintiff brought an action to pierce the corporate veil of defendant company and hold its sole shareholder personally liable for a debt. The trial court conducted a bench trial on the issue and found in favor of the defendant company and shareholder. The trial court initially declined to issue findings of fact in its final judgment. After both parties submitted their own proposed findings of fact, the trial court adopted the defendants‘ version nearly verbatim, incorporating two additional findings of fact of its own. However, because we find the trial court‘s findings of fact and conclusions of law insufficient to facilitate appellate review, we vacate the judgment of the trial court and remand for sufficient findings of fact and conclusions of law.

Following a bench trial, the Defendant-Appellant, Carl C. Dotson, was convicted of driving on a revoked license, eighth offense, and driving under the influence (DUI), third offense, in violation of Tennessee Code Annotated sections 55-50-504 and 55-10-401, respectively.  For these offenses, the trial court imposed concurrent sentences of eleven months and twenty-nine days, to be served consecutively to an unrelated matter.  In this appeal as of right, the Defendant-Appellant argues that the trial court erred by using a prior 1998 DUI conviction to enhance the instant DUI to a third offense and that the evidence was insufficient to support his DUI conviction.  Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Petitioner, Willis Holloway, was convicted of two counts of aggravated robbery, two counts of aggravated kidnapping, and one count of aggravated burglary. He was sentenced to 135 years, and this court affirmed the judgments against him on direct appeal. Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, which was denied by the post-conviction court after an evidentiary hearing. On appeal, petitioner has abandoned his original claims for post-conviction relief and now argues that he should be granted a new trial because his trial counsel passed away prior to his post-conviction hearing. He also contends that his constitutional rights were violated by the trial court's assignment to hear the post-conviction proceeding. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Following a transfer from juvenile court, the Madison County Grand Jury indicted Abraham Medina, Jr. (“the Defendant”), along with five other co-defendants, with three counts of aggravated robbery and one count of evading arrest. The Defendant was tried separately from his co-defendants and convicted as charged. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced the Defendant to an effective twelve years' incarceration. On appeal, the Defendant argues that (1) the evidence was insufficient to support the Defendant's convictions; (2) the trial court erred when it failed to include a lesser included jury instruction as to facilitation; and (3) the trial court erroneously imposed the maximum sentence. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant, Justin Terrell Knox, was convicted following a jury trial of aggravated statutory rape, a Class D felony. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-506(c). The trial court sentenced the Defendant to six years as a Range II, multiple offender. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant contends (1) that the State withheld exculpatory evidence in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963); (2) that the State knowingly presented false testimony at trial; (3) that the trial court erred in admitting testimony from two of the witnesses at trial; (4) that the State failed to file a timely notice of its intent to seek enhanced punishment; and (5) that the trial court erred by ordering his sentence in this case be served consecutively to his sentence for a prior felony conviction. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Michael Richardson, was indicted for one count of aggravated rape and one count of aggravated robbery. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-402, -502. Following a jury trial, the Defendant was convicted of aggravated rape. The jury was unable to reach a verdict on the aggravated robbery charge, a mistrial was declared with respect to that charge, and it was ultimately dismissed. The trial court sentenced the Defendant as a Range I, standard offender to twenty-two years for the aggravated rape conviction to be served at one hundred percent. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred “in ruling that if consent [was] raised as a defense,” then evidence of two other rapes committed by the Defendant “would be relevant to rebut the issue of consent.” Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.