APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Appellant, Mark Edward Greene, appeals the denial of his Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36 motion to correct a clerical error.  He alleges that the trial court should have granted pretrial jail credits from the time that Williamson County lodged a detainer against him until the date he was sentenced.  Following our review, we affirm the circuit court’s decision.

Appellant, Kevin Lamont French, was convicted by a Davidson County jury of premeditated murder, felony murder, and especially aggravated robbery.  He received life sentences for the murder convictions, and the trial court sentenced him to a concurrent sentence of twenty-one years for his especially aggravated robbery conviction.  On appeal, he argues that: (1) the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions; (2) the trial court erred by admitting prior bad act testimony; (3) the trial court erred by admitting a letter purportedly written by appellant; (4) the trial court erred by admitting testimony regarding weapons found in appellant’s home; (5) the assistant district attorney general committed prosecutorial misconduct during closing arguments; and (6) the trial court erred by admitting certain autopsy photographs.  Following our review of the record, the arguments of the parties, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court but remand the case for the trial court to merge the two murder convictions.

The petitioner, Blake Delaney Tallant, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that he was denied the effective assistance of trial and appellate counsel due to counsel’s failure to properly educate him on the importance of testifying in his own defense, to press the issue of the bill of particulars in the trial court or to raise it as an issue on direct appeal, and to include the jury questionnaires in the record on direct appeal. Following our review, we affirm the denial of the petition.

This appeal involves the manner in which a trial court granted motions for summary judgment in a proceeding involving the death of a patient whose treatment for viral encephalitis was delayed because he was also being assessed for involuntary commitment to a psychiatric hospital. The widow of the deceased patient filed suit against three health care providers in the Circuit Court for Shelby County. In her original complaint and four subsequent amended complaints, the widow asserted eight causes of action against one or more of the providers. The trial court eventually granted a series of summary judgments dismissing all the claims against one of the providers without explaining the grounds for its decisions and requested counsel for the provider to prepare appropriate orders “establish[ing] the rationale for the [c]ourt’s ruling in quite specific detail.” The provider’s counsel prepared detailed orders adopting all the arguments the provider had made in favor of its summary judgment motions, and the trial court signed these orders over the widow’s objections. The widow appealed, arguing that the trial court had failed to provide reasons for its decisions and that the orders did not accurately reflect what had occurred at the summary judgment hearings. The Court of Appeals vacated the disputed orders because the trial court had failed to state the legal grounds for its decisions as required by Tenn. R. Civ. P. 56.04 and remanded the case to the trial court. Smith v. UHS of Lakeside, Inc., No. W2011-02405-COA-R3-CV, 2013 WL 210250, at *12-13 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 18, 2013). We granted the provider’s application for permission to appeal. We have determined that the record establishes that the contested orders were not the product of the trial court’s independent judgment, and therefore, we hold that the trial court failed to comply with Tenn. R. Civ. P. 56.04.

The Petitioner, George A. Wylie, appeals the Criminal Court for Shelby County’s denial of his pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus. The State has filed a motion requesting that this court affirm the trial court’s judgment pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Following our review, we grant the State’s motion and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Wendell Guinn, was indicted for aggravated kidnapping, a Class B felony; rape, a Class B felony; aggravated burglary, a Class C felony; and domestic assault, a Class A misdemeanor. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-13-111, -13-304, -13-503, -14-403. The State ultimately dismissed the domestic assault charge, and, following a jury trial, the Defendant was acquitted of the aggravated kidnapping and aggravated burglary charges. The jury convicted the Defendant of rape as charged in the indictment. The trial court imposed a sentence of nine years, with two years to be served in confinement and the remainder on probation. On appeal, the Defendant contends (1) that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction; (2) that the trial court improperly admitted hearsay evidence; and (3) that the trial court erred in providing a supplemental instruction to the jury in response to a question from the jury during deliberations. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This case presents an issue regarding the proper interpretation of a policy of insurance. The insurance company filed a declaratory judgment action against the defendants, seeking a determination from the trial court regarding whether the insurance policy afforded coverage for an accident involving a four-wheeler vehicle owned by one of the defendants. The accident resulted in the death of a minor, Ryan Casey. The child’s father intervened in the declaratory judgment action. Following a hearing, the trial court concluded that the policy did not provide coverage. The intervenor has appealed. Discerning no error, we affirm.

After a jury trial, appellant, Dwight James, was convicted of failing to register as a sex offender.  The trial court sentenced appellant to two years in confinement, suspended to probation after 150 days of incarceration.  On appeal, appellant argues that the trial court erred by denying his motion to vacate his prior guilty plea to two counts of sexual battery in 1989 and that the requirement that he register as a sex offender violates the Ex Post Facto Clause and his procedural due process rights.  Following our review of the parties’ briefs, the record, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The trial court fashioned a parenting plan that designated the mother of five year old twins as their primary residential parent and gave the father 91 days of visitation each year. The father argues on appeal that the trial court should have divided parenting time equally between the parties, or, in the alternative, simply granted him additional parenting time. He relies on language in the child custody statute,Tenn.Code Ann.§ 36-6-106(a),which directs the court to “order a custody arrangement that permits both parents to enjoy the maximum participation possible in the life of the child . . .” For her part, the mother argues that the parenting plan adopted by the trial court is in the best interest of the children. We affirm, but we remand this case to the trial court for correction of a clerical error.

Appellant, Curtis W. Hammock was indicted for initiating a process intended to result in the manufacture of methamphetamine, being a felon in possession of a handgun, and child neglect.  He pleaded guilty to the first two counts and received a sentence of ten years on the drug charge to be served in community corrections and a concurrent sentence of two years in community corrections for the handgun charge.  The State dismissed the child neglect charge.  As a condition of his guilty plea, appellant, with agreement from the State and the trial court, reserved a certified question of law for our consideration:  “Whether the trial court correctly ruled[,] following a suppression hearing[,] that the Defendant did voluntarily consent to a search of his residence subsequent to the unlawful entry of law enforcement on June 12, 2012?”  Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

A Shelby County Criminal Court Jury convicted the appellant, Keith Collins, of conspiracy to possess with intent to sell more than 300 grams of cocaine, a Class A felony, and attempt to possess more than 300 grams of cocaine with intent to sell, a Class B felony. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced him as a Range II, multiple offender to consecutive sentences of forty and twenty years, respectively. On appeal, the appellant contends that (1) the trial court should have given an accomplice instruction with regard to one of the State’s witnesses; (2) the evidence is insufficient to support the convictions; (3) the trial court improperly allowed a State witness to testify about a bad act pursuant to 404(b), Tennessee Rules of Evidence; (4) he is entitled to a new trial based on a witness’s false testimony; and (5) consecutive sentencing was improper. Based upon the oral arguments, the record, and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Tennessee Supreme Court has remanded this case for reconsideration in light of State v. James Allen Pollard, — S.W.3d —, No. M2011-00332-SC-R11-CD (Tenn. Dec. 20, 2013). See State v. Everett Russ, No. M2012-00461-CCA-R3-CD (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 9, 2013), perm. app. granted, case remanded (Tenn. May 15, 2014). Relevant to the current remand, this court concluded in the previous appeal that the trial court erred in imposing consecutive sentences when only one of the statutory aggravating factors applied to the Defendant’s two offenses involving the sexual abuse of a minor. See T.C.A. § 40-35-115(b)(5) (2010). Upon further review, we conclude that the aggravating factors were sufficient to support the trial court’s imposition of consecutive sentences. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant, Christina Lee Jones Thomas, was convicted by a Washington County jury of especially aggravated robbery and especially aggravated kidnapping. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed concurrent terms of eighteen years at 100% for these convictions. On appeal, the Defendant claims that she had not abandoned her residence as the trial court determined and that, therefore, it was error to deny her motion to suppress the evidence found inside her home obtained without a search warrant. The Defendant also contends that the evidence adduced at trial is insufficient to support her convictions and that the trial court abused its discretion in enhancing the length of her sentences. After reviewing the record, we conclude that trial court did not err in denying the Defendant’s motion to suppress because the Defendant had abandoned the property, that the evidence produced at trial was sufficient to support the Defendant’s convictions, and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in setting the length of the Defendant’s sentences. Accordingly, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed.

Petitioner, Craig L. Beene, pleaded guilty to attempted first degree murder, especially aggravated kidnapping, and aggravated assault.  Craig Lamont Beene v. State, No. M2005-01322-CCA-R3-PC, 2006 WL 680919, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 17, 2006).  Pursuant to the plea agreement, petitioner was sentenced to seventeen years in confinement.  Id. Subsequently, he filed the instant petition for a writ of error coram nobis, claiming that affidavits and two pictures constitute newly discovered evidence.  The coram nobis court denied the petition.  Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the coram nobis court.

Defendant, Cory Meeks, appeals the trial court’s revocation of his community corrections sentence and the imposition of a sentence of confinement.  Following our review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This is a Rule 9, Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure, interlocutory appeal by the State of Tennessee of the trial court’s granting in part the defendant’s motion to suppress. On March 1, 2012, the Shelby County Grand Jury returned a two-count indictment charging the defendant, Marvin Roscoe, with DUI and DUI over .08%. The defendant filed a motion to suppress any evidence seized or statements made as a result of his stop and arrest. The trial court entered an order denying in part the defendant’s motion to suppress any evidence pertaining to the initial traffic stop and granting in part the  defendant’s motion to suppress any evidence pertaining to the defendant’s subsequent arrest. The State now appeals, arguing that the trial court erred in granting in part the defendant’s motion to suppress the evidence regarding his subsequent arrest. Based upon our review, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

I concur in the result reached by the majority. I write separately to respectfully depart from the majority’s undertaking an analysis of the sufficiency of the evidence of passion and provocation. In my view, the reference to passion and provocation in the voluntary manslaughter statue does not denote an essential element of the offense. It describes a dispensation to a defendant who, having intentionally or knowingly killed another, would otherwise be guilty of first degree or second degree murder respectively.

A Shelby County Jury convicted Defendant, Khaliq Ra-el, of attempted voluntary manslaughter, reckless aggravated assault, and employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony. He received concurrent sentences of three years each for attempted voluntary manslaughter and reckless aggravated assault to be served consecutively to a six-year sentence for employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony. On appeal, Defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions for attempted voluntary manslaughter and employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony. After a thorough review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant, Ladarion Pearson, entered guilty pleas to one count of aggravated criminal trespassing, two counts of assault, one count of aggravated burglary, and one count of robbery. He received an effective sentence of five years to be served in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying his request for alternative sentencing. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The petitioner, Ricardo Dale, filed a petition in the Shelby County Criminal Court, seeking post-conviction relief on the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel. The post-conviction court denied the petition, and the petitioner appeals this ruling. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

A Madison County Circuit Court jury convicted the Defendant-Appellant, Bobby Joe Croom, as charged of three counts of rape of a child, a Class A felony, and three counts of aggravated sexual battery, a Class B felony. See State v. Bobby Joe Croom, No. W2011-00461-CCA-R3-CD, 2012 WL 1656718, at *1 Tenn. Crim. App. May 10, 2012). In his first direct appeal, Croom argued that the trial court erred in failing to require the State to elect the particular instances of rape and sexual battery on which it was relying for each conviction and that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions. Id. at *1. In counts 1 through 4, which charged Croom with rape of a child and aggravated sexual battery during the period of July 1-4, 2009, and with rape of a child and aggravated sexual battery during the period of July 5-11, 2009, this court reversed Croom’s convictions, dismissed his charges, and vacated his sentences after concluding that there was no proof presented at trial that the offenses occurred within the time periods charged. Id. at *8. The court also reversed Croom’s convictions in counts 5 and 6, which charged Croom with rape of a child and aggravated sexual battery during the period of July 12-18, 2009, and remanded the case for a new trial on those counts. Id. Following a retrial on counts 5 and 6, Croom was again convicted as charged, and the trial court imposed consecutive sentences of thirty-five years for the rape of a child conviction and fifteen years for the aggravated sexual battery conviction. In this direct appeal, Croom argues that (1) the trial court erred in allowing a physician to testify about the statements made by the victim and the victim’s mother during a medical examination and erred in admitting the physician’s medical report containing those statements because the statements were not made for the purposes of medical diagnosis and treatment pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Evidence 803(4), and (2) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his convictions. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This appeal involves private condemnation of an easement. The plaintiffs and the defendant both owned property on an island in the Tennessee River. There was a causeway or land bridge across the river, connecting the island to the mainland. The trial court rejected the defendant’s claim for private condemnation of an easement on the plaintiffs’ property to enable the defendant to access the causeway.  It also enjoined the defendant from using the causeway or from entering onto the plaintiffs’ property to get to the causeway. The defendant appeals. We hold that the causeway is accessible by the public and so vacate the injunction. We reverse the trial court’s decision on the defendant’s private condemnation claim and hold that the defendant is entitled to condemnation of an appropriate easement under the facts of this case.

This is a medical negligence/wrongful death case. Following their mother’s death, Appellants’ filed the instant lawsuit against several doctors who provided treatment to their mother. During discovery, Appellants allegedly learned that the Appellee physician had amended his original consultation report to correct a mis-diagnosis of the Decedent’s condition. Appellants were granted leave to amend their complaint to add the Appellee and his medical practice as defendants to the lawsuit. The amended complaint naming the Appellees was filed some five years after the filing of the original lawsuit. Appellees moved for summary judgment on the ground that the statutes of limitations and repose barred Appellants’ case. The trial court granted summary judgment, finding that the Appellants had not shown facts sufficient to establish fraudulent concealment on the part of the Appellee physician so as to toll the applicable one-year statute of limitations and three-year statute of repose under Tennessee Code Annotated Section 29-26-116. The trial court also found that Appellants had failed to exercise due diligence in discovering the alleged fraudulent concealment. Appellants appeal. For the reasons stated herein, we affirm and remand.

Employee settled her workers’ compensation claim in 1997, with her employer agreeing to provide future medical benefits. Her authorized treating physician later retired, and in November 2007, the employee selected a new physician from a panel provided by her employer. The new physician recommended a home exercise program, which the employee believed was not adequate treatment. She filed a petition requesting a new panel of physicians. Her employer opposed the petition, contending that it had provided treatment in accordance with the law and the terms of the settlement. The trial court ordered the employer to provide a panel of orthopaedic surgeons to evaluate the employee’s current need for treatment. The employer has appealed, and the appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51. We affirm the judgment of the trial court and remand for further proceedings.

The petitioner, Charles McHaney, filed a petition in the Davidson County Criminal Court, seeking post-conviction relief.  The post-conviction court dismissed the petition as untimely. On appeal, the petitioner challenges the dismissal.  Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.