APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This interlocutory appeal involves ex parte communications between defense counsel for a defendant medical entity and non-party physicians who treated the plaintiff’s decedent and are employed by the defendant medical entity. The plaintiff filed this healthcare liability action against the defendant medical entity arising out of treatment of the plaintiff’s decedent. The trial court held that the attorneys for the defendant medical entity are barred under Alsip v. Johnson City Medical Center, 197 S.W.3d 722 (Tenn. 2006), from conferring ex parte with treating physicians employed by the defendant medical entity who are not named as defendants in the lawsuit. The defendant medical entity was granted permission for this interlocutory appeal. We hold that the defendant medical entity has an independent right to communicate privately with its employees, and this right is not abrogated by the filing of the plaintiff’s healthcare liability lawsuit. Therefore, Alsip does not bar the medical entity’s attorneys from communicating ex parte with physicians employed by the medical entity about the physician employee’s medical treatment of the plaintiff’s decedent. Accordingly, we reverse.

This interlocutory appeal involves ex parte communications between defense counsel for a defendant medical entity and non-party physicians who treated the plaintiff’s decedent and are employed by the defendant medical entity. The plaintiff filed this healthcare liability action against the defendant medical entity arising out of treatment of the plaintiff’s decedent. The trial court held that the attorneys for the defendant medical entity are barred under Alsip v. Johnson City Medical Center, 197 S.W.3d 722 (Tenn. 2006), from conferring ex parte with treating physicians employed by the defendant medical entity who are not named as defendants in the lawsuit. The defendant medical entity was granted permission for this interlocutory appeal. We hold that the defendant medical entity has an independent right to communicate privately with its employees, and this right is not abrogated by the filing of the plaintiff’s healthcare liability lawsuit. Therefore, Alsip does not bar the medical entity’s attorneys from communicating ex parte with physicians employed by the medical entity about the physician employee’s medical treatment of the plaintiff’s decedent. Accordingly, we reverse.

In this contract dispute, the parties disagree as to whether the signatory of the contracts may be personally liable thereon, as well as to whether the contract provides for a fuel surcharge. We affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand for further proceedings.

This appeal involves the interpretation of two marital dissolution agreements. The parties married, divorced , and then remarried each other. They stayed remarried for a few years and then divorced again. In both divorces, the parties entered into a marital dissolution agreement. Years later, after the husband retired from military service, this litigation was commenced regarding the award of a portion of the husband’s military retirement benefits to the wife. The trial court held that the wife’s award of benefits was based on the combined duration of both marriages. Both parties appeal. The husband argues that the trial court erred in not limiting the wife’s award to the duration of the first marriage only. We construe the parties’ marital dissolution agreement as awarding the wife the agreed percentage of all of the husband’s military retirement benefits, irrespective of the duration of marriage. Thus, we decline to adopt the husband’s argument. The wife does not argue on appeal that the trial court erred in failing to award her the agreed percentage of all of the husband’s military retirement benefits. Accordingly, we are constrained to affirm the trial court’s decision to base the award on the combined duration of both of the parties’ marriages.

The Petitioner, Johnvonta Sain, pleaded nolo contendere to aggravated assault with an agreed upon sentence of four years, suspended upon time served. The Petitioner filed a petition seeking post-conviction relief on the basis that his plea was involuntary and that he had received the ineffective assistance of counsel. After a hearing, the post-conviction court denied the Petitioner relief. The Petitioner now appeals, maintaining that his guilty plea was involuntary and asserting that the post-conviction court should have recused itself in this matter. After a thorough review of the record, the briefs, and relevant  athorities, we affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment.

A Madison County jury convicted the Petitioner, Carl Randle, of aggravated assault and attempted voluntary manslaughter. The trial court merged the convictions and ordered the Petitioner to serve six years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The Petitioner appealed, and this Court affirmed the judgments of the trial court. State v. Carl Randle, No. W2011–02374–CCA–R3-CD, 2012 WL 3642730, at *11 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Jackson, Aug. 27, 2012), no Tenn. R. App. P. 11 filed. The Petitioner filed a petition for postconviction relief, in which he alleged that his trial counsel was ineffective. The postconviction court dismissed the petition after a hearing, and the Petitioner appealed that dismissal. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the postconviction court’s judgment.

Petitioner, Vincent Hunt, was convicted of first degree murder and especially aggravated kidnapping in Shelby County. On direct appeal, his convictions and sentences were affirmed. See State v. Vincent Hunt, No. W2009-00165-CCA-R3-CD, 2010 WL 1407236, at *1-5 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Jackson, Apr. 8, 2010), perm. app. denied, (Tenn. Sept. 23, 2012). Petitioner then sought post-conviction relief on the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel and that the trial court issued improper jury instructions at trial. The post-conviction court denied relief and Petitioner appeals. After a review of the record and applicable authorities, we determine that Petitioner failed to establish that he is entitled to post-conviction relief. Accordingly, the judgment of the post-conviction court is affirmed.

Petitioner, Jarvis Payne, pled guilty to second degree murder pursuant to a plea agreement and was sentenced to fifteen years as a violent offender. He filed a post-conviction petition in which he alleged that a dying declaration by the victim showed that he lacked the requisite intent for second degree murder. He claimed that his attorney was ineffective because she did not make him aware of the victim’s dying declaration and urged him to plead guilty without explaining the importance of intent in the charged offense. After listening to testimony from Petitioner’s public defender and the prosecuting attorney, the post-conviction court dismissed the petition. We affirm.

Husband and paramour are represented by two partners in the same law firm. Wife sought to disqualify Husband’s attorney. The trial court granted the motion to disqualify, citing the inevitability of conflict. Husband appealed. We reverse and remand for an evidentiary hearing on the motion.

The defendant, William Avery Crisp, pled guilty to one count of driving under the influence of an intoxicant (“DUI”), a Class A misdemeanor; one count of vehicular homicide, a Class C felony; one count of vehicular homicide as a proximate result of intoxication, a Class B felony; one count of vehicular assault as a proximate result of intoxication, a Class D felony, and one count of a violation of the open container law, a Class C misdemeanor.  The defendant’s guilty pleas reserved four certified questions of law having to do with the trial court’s denial of his motions to suppress certain evidence.  He also appeals the trial court’s denial of alternative sentencing.  We conclude that the trial court properly determined that there was probable cause to believe the defendant was driving while intoxicated even if he passed the field sobriety tests administered by law enforcement.  The other certified questions are not dispositive of any of the defendant’s convictions, and the trial court did not err in sentencing.  Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

In this post-divorce action, the petitioner sought to terminate or modify his spousal and child support payments. The trial court terminated the petitioner’s child support obligation, lowered the monthly spousal support amount, and reduced the spousal support arrearage owed. The petitioner appeals. We affirm.

Parents of a child born of a surrogate mother with an anonymously donated egg and the father’s sperm and Tennessee Department of Health appeal order entered in consolidated parentage and adoption proceedings which required the live birth certificate issued for the child to list the mother as “unknown.” Having determined that the definition of “mother” for the purpose of completing the birth certificate is the same as that used in preparing the standard birth certificate promulgated bythe National Center for Health Statistics,we reverse the trial court’s decision and hold that the gestational carrier should be listed as the mother.

Petitioner, Brandon Alexander Rankin, pled guilty to second degree murder and accessory after the fact or facilitation to commit first degree murder, to which he was sentenced to concurrent 40-year sentences at 100%. Petitioner subsequently filed a timely motion to withdraw his guilty plea, and trial counsel filed a motion to withdraw as counsel on the same date. A hearing was conducted on the two motions. The trial court elected to classify petitioner’s motion to withdraw the guilty plea as a post-conviction petition. Trial counsel’s motion to withdraw was sustained. Petitioner’s “Amended Petition for Post-Conviction Relief combined with Rule 36 Motion to Correct Clerical Error in Order” was filed through newly appointed counsel. The post-conviction court dismissed the amended petition as time barred. Petitioner timely appealed. After a review of the record and applicable authorities, we conclude that the trial court erred in construing Petitioner’s motion to withdraw his guilty pleas as a petition for post-conviction relief. As a result, we reverse the judgment of the post-conviction court and remand for consideration of Petitioner’s motion to withdraw his guilty pleas.

This is a conservatorship proceeding. The ward’s wife filed a petition to appoint a conservator in which she asked to be appointed as conservator for the ward. After a trial, the trial court held that the ward was disabled and in need of a conservator but appointed a public conservator instead of the wife. The trial court also set aside a transfer of real property, purportedly made by the ward prior to the filing of the conservatorship action. The wife now appeals, arguing that the trial court erred in setting aside the transfer of real property and in rejecting her request to be appointed conservator. Discerning no error, we affirm.

The Petitioner, Charlie Lovell Leavy, III, appeals the post-conviction court’s denial of relief from his convictions for aggravated burglary, burglary of a building, theft over $1,000, felony evading arrest, and simple assault. On appeal, the Petitioner argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. Upon our review, we affirm the judgment of the postconviction court.

The Chief Executive Officer of a Company and the Company executed an Employment Agreement that covered, among other issues, consequences of termination with or without cause, either by the Officer or by the Company. A year or so later, the Officer called a meeting and issued an ultimatum to the board of directors threatening to resign if certain changes were not made. The Company later wrote a letter to the Officer accepting his resignation without “Good Reason” as defined in the Employment Agreement. The Officer asserted the Company terminated him “without cause” and that he did not resign. The Company responded that it did not terminate the Officer,but simply accepted his resignation. The Officer filed a complaint seeking severance pay and other benefits he claimed he was entitled to pursuant to the Employment Agreement.  The trial court agreed with the Officer and granted his motion for summary judgment.  The Company appealed, and we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

Metropolitan Government filed suit for recovery of delinquent real property taxes on property leased by the Metropolitan Nashville Airport Authority. Taxpayers filed a motion to dismiss the proceeding, asserting that its obligation to pay taxes arose from its lease obligation and was extinguished when the Airport Authority released taxpayers from all obligations under the lease. Metropolitan Government moved for summary judgment on the ground, inter alia, that the taxpayers did not have standing to challenge the taxes because they had failed to pay the tax under protest as required by Tenn. Code Ann. § 67–1-901; the trial court granted the motion. We affirm the judgment.

The employee sustained a work-related injury to his cervical spine. The trial court found permanent and total disability as a result of the injury. The employer has appealed, contending that the evidence preponderates against the trial court’s finding. The appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Scott Ostendorf, et al. (“Plaintiffs”) sued R. Stephen Fox, Mark S. 1 Dessauer (“Attorney Dessauer”), and Hunter, Smith & Davis, LLP (“the Firm”) with regard to a transaction involving the sale of substantially all of the assets of Mothwing Camo Technologies, Inc. The defendants filed motions to dismiss. After a hearing, the Chancery Court for Scott County (“the Trial Court”) granted the motions to dismiss. Plaintiffs appeal to this Court. We find no error in the Trial Court’s finding and holding that Plaintiffs’ claims against Attorney Dessauer and the Firm are barred by the statute of limitations. We, however, find error in the sua sponte dismissal of Plaintiffs’ claims against Mr. Fox for improper venue. We affirm the dismissal of the claims against Attorney Dessauer and the Firm, vacate the dismissal of Plaintiffs’ claims against Mr. Fox, and remand this case for further proceedings.

Appellant, Mark Edward Greene, appeals the denial of his Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36 motion to correct a clerical error.  He alleges that the trial court should have granted pretrial jail credits from the time that Williamson County lodged a detainer against him until the date he was sentenced.  Following our review, we affirm the circuit court’s decision.

Appellant, Kevin Lamont French, was convicted by a Davidson County jury of premeditated murder, felony murder, and especially aggravated robbery.  He received life sentences for the murder convictions, and the trial court sentenced him to a concurrent sentence of twenty-one years for his especially aggravated robbery conviction.  On appeal, he argues that: (1) the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions; (2) the trial court erred by admitting prior bad act testimony; (3) the trial court erred by admitting a letter purportedly written by appellant; (4) the trial court erred by admitting testimony regarding weapons found in appellant’s home; (5) the assistant district attorney general committed prosecutorial misconduct during closing arguments; and (6) the trial court erred by admitting certain autopsy photographs.  Following our review of the record, the arguments of the parties, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court but remand the case for the trial court to merge the two murder convictions.

The petitioner, Blake Delaney Tallant, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that he was denied the effective assistance of trial and appellate counsel due to counsel’s failure to properly educate him on the importance of testifying in his own defense, to press the issue of the bill of particulars in the trial court or to raise it as an issue on direct appeal, and to include the jury questionnaires in the record on direct appeal. Following our review, we affirm the denial of the petition.

This appeal involves the manner in which a trial court granted motions for summary judgment in a proceeding involving the death of a patient whose treatment for viral encephalitis was delayed because he was also being assessed for involuntary commitment to a psychiatric hospital. The widow of the deceased patient filed suit against three health care providers in the Circuit Court for Shelby County. In her original complaint and four subsequent amended complaints, the widow asserted eight causes of action against one or more of the providers. The trial court eventually granted a series of summary judgments dismissing all the claims against one of the providers without explaining the grounds for its decisions and requested counsel for the provider to prepare appropriate orders “establish[ing] the rationale for the [c]ourt’s ruling in quite specific detail.” The provider’s counsel prepared detailed orders adopting all the arguments the provider had made in favor of its summary judgment motions, and the trial court signed these orders over the widow’s objections. The widow appealed, arguing that the trial court had failed to provide reasons for its decisions and that the orders did not accurately reflect what had occurred at the summary judgment hearings. The Court of Appeals vacated the disputed orders because the trial court had failed to state the legal grounds for its decisions as required by Tenn. R. Civ. P. 56.04 and remanded the case to the trial court. Smith v. UHS of Lakeside, Inc., No. W2011-02405-COA-R3-CV, 2013 WL 210250, at *12-13 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 18, 2013). We granted the provider’s application for permission to appeal. We have determined that the record establishes that the contested orders were not the product of the trial court’s independent judgment, and therefore, we hold that the trial court failed to comply with Tenn. R. Civ. P. 56.04.

The Petitioner, George A. Wylie, appeals the Criminal Court for Shelby County’s denial of his pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus. The State has filed a motion requesting that this court affirm the trial court’s judgment pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Following our review, we grant the State’s motion and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Wendell Guinn, was indicted for aggravated kidnapping, a Class B felony; rape, a Class B felony; aggravated burglary, a Class C felony; and domestic assault, a Class A misdemeanor. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-13-111, -13-304, -13-503, -14-403. The State ultimately dismissed the domestic assault charge, and, following a jury trial, the Defendant was acquitted of the aggravated kidnapping and aggravated burglary charges. The jury convicted the Defendant of rape as charged in the indictment. The trial court imposed a sentence of nine years, with two years to be served in confinement and the remainder on probation. On appeal, the Defendant contends (1) that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction; (2) that the trial court improperly admitted hearsay evidence; and (3) that the trial court erred in providing a supplemental instruction to the jury in response to a question from the jury during deliberations. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.