APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This is a grandparent visitation case, in which Mother appeals the trial court’s award of specific visitation to Appellee grandparents under Tennessee Code Annotated Section 36-6306. Specifically, Mother argues that the trial court incorrectly determined that she opposed visitation, that she had failed to rebut the presumption of substantial harm under Tennessee Code Annotated Section 36-6-306(b)(4),and that grandparent visitation was in the children’s best interests. Discerning no error, we affirm.

Former owner of condominium unit whose unit was ordered sold after being determined, due to unsanitary conditions and offensive odors, to constitute a nuisance, appeals the trial court’s order permanently enjoining her from acquiring a unit in the condominium. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment.

The defendant, Brenda Woods, was convicted by a Hardeman County jury of three counts of procuring an illegal vote, a Class E felony, and was sentenced by the trial court to concurrent terms of two years for each offense, with credit given for one day’s jail service and the remainder of the time on supervised probation. The defendant was also disqualified from holding public office for the duration of her sentence pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-20-114(a). She raises the following four issues on appeal: (1) whether the prosecutor engaged in misconduct that deprived her of a fundamentally fair trial; (2) whether the trial court erred by overruling her Batson challenge to the prosecutor’s exercise of a peremptory challenge; (3) whether the evidence is sufficient to sustain her convictions; and (4) whether the trial court erred by allowing testimony from an investigator about his telephone conversations with her. Fpllowing our review, we reverse and remand for a new trial.

A Hamilton County Jury convicted Defendant, Montez Davis, of second-degree murder, reckless endangerment, and unlawful possession of a weapon. He received sentences of twenty-one years for second degree murder, one year for reckless endangerment, and one year for unlawful possession of a weapon, to be served concurrently for an effective twentyone-year sentence in confinement. On appeal, Defendant argues: (1) that the trial court erred in denying the motion to suppress his statement; (2) that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for second degree murder; and (3) that the trial court improperly sentenced him. After a thorough review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This appeal involves a claim of retaliatory discharge. The plaintiff was employed by the defendant shipping company, working in a job position that required physical labor. The plaintiff seriously injured his back in the course of his employment. As a result, he underwent surgery and took an extended leave of absence. After his leave of absence, the plaintiff returned to his former position with no restrictions. A month later, he suffered another back injury that necessitated another leave of absence. Pursuant to its medical leave policy, the defendant company terminated the plaintiff’s employment. Eight months after his employment was terminated, the plaintiff filed this lawsuit, alleging that he was discharged in retaliation for his workers’ compensation claim. The plaintiff’s employment contract included a contractual six-month limitations period. The defendant company filed a motion for summary judgment based on the six-month contractual limitations period, and also asserting that it was entitled to judgment on the merits based on the undisputed facts. The trial court declined to grant the company’s motion for summary judgment based on the six-month limitation period, but it granted summary judgment in favor of the company on the merits. The plaintiff now appeals. We reverse in part but affirm the trial court’s grant of summary judgment on a different basis than that upon which the trial court relied, holding that the plaintiff employee’s lawsuit is time-barred under the contractual limitations period in the plaintiff’s employment contract.

The defendant, Winston C. McClain, appeals the sentencing decision of the Marshall County Circuit Court. After entering an open plea agreement, and following merger, the defendant stands convicted of: (1) sale of less than .5 grams of a Schedule II controlled substance, a Class C felony; (2) possession with intent to sell .5 grams or more of a Schedule II controlled substance, a Class B felony; (3) simple possession of marijuana, a Class A misdemeanor; (4) unlawful possession of drug paraphernalia, a Class A misdemeanor; (5) evading arrest, a Class A misdemeanor; and (6) resisting arrest, a Class B misdemeanor. Following a sentencing hearing, the defendant was sentenced to an effective term of twelve years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, he contends that the sentence is excessive and contrary to law. Following review, we affirm the sentence as imposed.
 

A jury convicted the defendant, Anthony Benton, of reckless endangerment, a Class E felony; aggravated assault, a Class C felony; and possessing a handgun after having been convicted of a felony, a Class C felony. The reckless endangerment count was merged into the aggravated assault conviction. The defendant received an effective sentence of nineteen years. On appeal, the defendant asserts that the evidence at trial was insufficient to support the verdicts. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court, but remand for a corrected judgment.

Anton Carlton (“the Petitioner”) filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus, alleging that he received a sentence for an offense for which he was not convicted. The habeas corpus court dismissed his petition without a hearing, and the Petitioner now appeals. After a thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the habeas corpus court’s summary dismissal of habeas corpus relief. However, we remand the case to the sentencing court to enter a corrected judgment as specified in this opinion.

Petitioner, Junior Lenro Smothers, filed a pro se petition for writ of error coram nobis (“coram nobis petition”) in the Madison County Circuit Court attacking his two convictions for aggravated statutory rape and one conviction for delivery of a schedule II controlled substance. The coram nobis trial court summarily dismissed the petition without an evidentiary hearing. Petitioner appeals, and we reverse the judgment of the trial court in part, affirm in part, and remand for further proceedings.

The defendant was convicted of two counts of reckless aggravated assault, Class D felonies, and sentenced to serve two concurrent three-year terms, split six months in confinement with the balance to be served on probation. On appeal, she contends that the evidence was insufficient to support her convictions, that double jeopardy prevented her dual convictions, and that the trial court erred in denying her judicial diversion. After careful review, we conclude that sufficient evidence exists to support her convictions, that double jeopardy requires her two convictions be merged and that the trial court did not abuse his discretion in denying judicial diversion. The defendant’s convictions and sentence of three years with six months served in confinement and the balance on probation are affirmed This case is remanded to the trial court solely for purposes of entering a single corrected judgment.

This case involves a traffic ticket for speeding received by the Defendant, Joe Clyde Tubwell, in Memphis, Tennessee. The Defendant was found guilty by the Memphis City Court. The Defendant contends that he was denied the right to appeal that decision as an indigent. In Shelby County Circuit Court, he subsequently filed a “Petition for Mandamus or for Order Directing that Indigent Be Allowed to Appeal.” The Circuit Court dismissed this filing. The Defendant now appeals. After review, based on the specific facts of this case, we now dismiss the appeal without prejudice and remand this action to the Shelby County Circuit Court with instructions to hold an evidentiary hearing in this matter.

Jeremy Taylor (“the Petitioner”) entered a guilty plea to charges of aggravated rape, aggravated robbery, aggravated kidnapping, and aggravated assault. The Petitioner subsequently filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus, alleging that the speedy trial provisions of the Interstate Detainer Act were violated as to the Petitioner. The habeas corpus court dismissed his petition without a hearing, finding that the Petitioner’s claim did not render the judgments against him void. The Petitioner now appeals. After a review of the record and the applicable law, we dismiss the appeal.

Mother of two children appeals the trial court’s finding of a material changeof circumstances and modification of the parenting plan; Mother also appeals the requirement that she reimburse Father for certain costs incurred. Finding no error, we affirm.

Following a bench trial, the trial court convicted the Defendant, Johnny E. Monk, of violation of the Habitual Motor Vehicle Offender Act, violation of the vehicle registration law, and violation of the financial responsibility law. The trial court sentenced the Defendant, as a multiple offender, to a four year sentence to be served in confinement. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court erred when it: (1) denied his motion to suppress the evidence from the traffic stop as an illegal search and seizure; and (2) allowed evidence of unindicted criminal behavior contrary to Tennessee Rule of Evidence 404(b). After a thorough review of the record and relevant law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This matter is before the Court upon the State’s motion to dismiss or in the alternative to affirm the judgment of the trial court by memorandum opinion pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Petitioner, Donald Clark, has appealed the Davidson County Circuit Court order dismissing his second petition for writ of habeas corpus in which Petitioner alleged that: (1) he received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial; (2) his indictments were "faulty"; and (3) he was illegally arrested. Upon a review of the record in this case, we are persuaded that the trial court was correct in dismissing the motion for new trial as duplicitous and that this case meets the criteria for affirmance pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Accordingly, the State’s motion is granted, and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The Defendant, Jason Lee Biles, appeals as of right from his jury conviction for delivery of a Schedule II controlled substance, a Class C felony, and the trial court’s subsequent sentence of ten years. The Defendant contends that the evidence submitted to the jury was insufficient to support his conviction and that the trial court’s ten-year sentence was excessive and inconsistent with the Sentencing Act. After reviewing the record and relevant authorities, we conclude that the evidence is sufficient to support the Defendant’s conviction and that the trial court’s ten-year sentence is neither excessive nor inconsistent with the Sentencing Act. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Appellant, Otis B. Owens, pled guilty to arson and vandalism of property valued at over $60,000. As per the guilty plea the length and manner of service of sentence was to be determined by the trial court after a hearing. The trial court sentenced Appellant to an effective sentence of eight years. Appellant appeals, arguing that the trial court improperly denied an alternative sentence and that the trial court improperly applied enhancement factors in determining the length of the sentence. After a review of the record, we determine that the trial court properly sentenced Appellant to an effective eight-year sentence, and, in order to avoid depreciating the seriousness of the offense, did not abuse its discretion in denying an alternative sentence. Consequently, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed.
 

On April 23, 2012, the petitioner, Ronald L. Taylor, filed pro se a petition for post-conviction relief challenging his 2005 conviction of aggravated assault. The post- onviction court summarily dismissed the petition based, in part, upon the bar of the statute of limitations. The State has moved this court pursuant to this court’s rule 20 to summarily affirm the postconviction court’s order of dismissal. Because the record evinces no basis for tolling the statute of limitations and because the petition was untimely and barred by the statute, we grant the State’s motion and affirm the post-conviction court’s order.

This is a divorce case in which the husband challenges the award of alimony. After the divorce trial, the trial court awarded the wife transitional alimony and alimony in futuro. It also awarded the wife a monetary amount per month for her share of the husband’s military pension benefits. The husband filed a motion to alter or amend arguing inter alia that the military would not make direct payments to the wife from his military benefits because the marriage did not overlap the husband’s active-duty military service for the requisite number of years. Based on the husband’s argument, the trial court modified the alimony award by deleting the requirement that the husband divide his military pension benefits with the wife, but increasing the husband’s in futuro alimony obligation by an equal amount. The husband now appeals. Discerning no error, we affirm.

Mother of two children appeals an order terminating her parental rights. Both children were taken into Department of Children’s Services custody after they tested positive for cocaine. The trial court found several grounds for termination and determined that termination is in the children’s best interests. Mother contends the trial court erred in finding clear and convincing evidence that termination of her rights is in the best interest of the children. Finding no error, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

The parties, owners of adjoining rural property in Hickman County who shared a single driveway that was used as access to their respective properties, filed competing pleadings to establish the common boundary line and to quiet title. On the day of trial, the parties announced their agreement to settle the dispute; the agreement was read in open court, counsel for both parties acknowledged their client’s consent to the settlement as read, and a diagram of the new boundary line was made an exhibit to the transcript of the evidence. The court approved the parties’s settlement in open court; however, before the judgment could be entered, Plaintiffs’ withdrew their consent to the settlement. Over Plaintiffs’ objections, the trial court entered judgment based upon the settlement announced in open court. Plaintiffs filed a Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 60.02 motion to set aside the judgment. The trial court denied the motion. In this appeal, Plaintiffs contend the trial court abused its discretion in failing to allow Plaintiffs’ to withdraw from the agreement or, alternatively, in failing to conduct a hearing on the issue of whether or not Plaintiffs were bound by the agreement. Finding no error, we affirm.

This appeal arises from the denial of Plaintiff/Appellant’s claim for unemployment compensation benefits. We affirm.

A homeowner sued builders for the defective construction of a house, alleging breach of contract, intentional misrepresentations, and violations of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act. The trial court dismissed the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act claims, but found the builders liable for intentional misrepresentations and breach of the contract by failing to build the house in a workmanlike manner. The trial court awarded the homeowner the full amount she paid to have the house built as well as her attorney’s fees. The builders appealed, claiming the evidence did not support the amount of damages awarded, the evidence did not support the court’s finding of intentional misrepresentation, and the homeowner was not entitled to attorney’s fees. We modify the damages awarded to the homeowner to conform to the evidence presented. We reverse the court’s award of attorney’s fees, and we reverse the court’s finding that the builders intentionally misrepresented material facts.

The Defendant, Malcolm H. Jones, appeals from his dual jury convictions for aggravated robbery, a Class B felony, and the trial court’s subsequent sentence, after merging the two convictions, to serve nine years in the Department of Correction (DOC). He contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions for, that the trial court erred in denying his motion for a continuance, and that the trial court’s sentence of nine years was excessive because the trial court misapplied an enhancement factor, and the remaining two enhancement factors are not sufficient to support a one-year enhancement beyond the minimum in the range. Following our review of the record and the applicable authorities, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant-Appellant, Carolyn Nadine Killian, appeals her conviction for driving under the influence (DUI), first offense, and her sentence of eleven months and twenty-nine days with ten days to be served in confinement and the remainder of the sentence to be served on probation. On appeal, she argues that (1) the evidence was insufficient to support her conviction and (2) the trial court imposed an excessive sentence by failing to consider the purposes and principles of the sentencing act. Upon review, we affirm the trial court’s judgment, but we remand the case for entry of a percentage of service for the DUI conviction.