APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The Petitioner, Fred Smith, appeals the Lake County Circuit Court’s dismissal of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus, arguing that his fifty-year sentence for second degree murder is illegal. Upon review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we conclude that the habeas corpus court properly dismissed the petition.

In this post-divorce dispute, Father challenges the trial court’s modification of the parenting plan to designate Mother as primary residential parent and the trial court’s calculation of his income and monthly child support obligation. Discerning no error, we affirm.

Inmate appeals the dismissal of his petition for writ of certiorari. The chancery court dismissed the petition for lack of subject matter jurisdiction based upon the expiration of the applicable statute of limitations and because inmate failed to show that the prison disciplinary board acted illegally, fraudulently, or arbitrarily. We affirm, finding the inmate failed to show that the disciplinary board exceeded its jurisdiction or acted illegally, fraudulently, or arbitrarily.

Married couple sought judicial review of decision of Department of Human Services holding that they were not eligible for medicaid under an amendment to the Social Security Act known as the “Pickle Amendment.” Upon consideration of the record we affirm the judgment of the Chancery Court.

Pro se Petitioner, Marlon O. Walls, appeals the Montgomery County Circuit Court’s denial of his motion to re-open his petition for post-conviction relief.Because the Petitioner failed to comply with the statutory requirements for seeking discretionary review of the dismissal of his motion, this court is without jurisdiction to review the appeal, and it is dismissed.

The issue in this appeal is whether the statutory requirements for execution of an attested will prescribed by Tennessee Code Annotated section 32-1-104(1) (2007) were satisfied when the decedent failed to sign the two-page will but signed a one-page affidavit of attesting witnesses. We conclude that the decedent’s signature on the separate affidavit of attesting witnesses does not satisfy the statute requiring the testator’s signature on the will. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the judgment of the trial court that the will was not properly executed is reinstated.

Appellant, Harry Pearson, was indicted, tried, and convicted of especially aggravated kidnapping and aggravated robbery, for which he received sentences of thirty years and twenty years, respectively. Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This appeal involves the efforts of a grandmother to obtain court-ordered visitation with her granddaughter in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-306 (2010). Shortly after the death of her daughter, the grandmother filed a petition in the Chancery Court for McNairy County seeking visitation with her granddaughter. Following a two-day hearing, the trial court denied the grandmother’s request for visitation because she had failed to prove the statutory grounds necessary to permit a court to order grandparental visitation over a parent’s objection. The grandmother did not appeal this decision. After the decision became final, the Tennessee General Assembly amended the burden of persuasion in the grandparental visitation statute by creating a new rebuttable presumption that a child whose parent dies will be substantially harmed by the cessation of an existing relationship with a grandparent who is the parent of the deceased parent. Without alleging new facts and relying solely on the change in the statutory burden of persuasion, the grandmother filed a second petition in the trial court seeking visitation with her granddaughter. The trial court granted the child’s father’s motion to dismiss on the ground of res judicata. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s order. Jackson v. Smith, No. W2011-00194-COA-R3-CV, 2011 WL 3963589 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 9, 2011). We granted the grandmother’s application for permission to appeal to determine whether the intervening change in the burden of persuasion in the grandparental visitation statute provided an exception to the operation of the res judicata doctrine. We have determined that it does not and that, without some material change in the facts, the doctrine of res judicata bars relitigation of the grandmother’s petition for grandparental visitation.

This is an appeal from a judgment affirming the disbarment of an attorney. After considering evidence presented incident to five complaints against the attorney, a hearing panel designated by the Board of Professional Responsibility concluded that disbarment was warranted. On appeal, the trial court affirmed. In this appeal, the attorney has raised the following issues for review: (1) whether the panel erred by denying his motion to continue the hearing; (2) whether the panel erred by considering the attorney’s conduct in a case based upon a complaint by another attorney who had no involvement in the case; (3) whether the evidence supports the panel’s findings; (4) whether disbarment is an appropriate punishment; and (5) whether the trial court erred by denying the attorney’s post-judgment motion to supplement the record. We affirm the judgment.

The defendant was convicted of aggravated burglary, possession of 26 grams or more of cocaine with intent to sell or deliver within 1000 feet of a school zone, and possession of drug paraphernalia and was sentenced to ten years, twenty-five years, and eleven months, twenty-nine days, respectively. The ten-year and twenty-five-year sentences were ordered to be served consecutivelyfor a total effective sentence of thirty-five years in the Department of Correction, with fifteen years to be served at 100%. On appeal, the defendant argues that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his possession of cocaine conviction and that the trial court erred in imposing consecutive sentencing. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

I concur in the result in this case. My only departure from the majority opinion stems from the majority’s use of abuse-of-discretion review of the sentence alignment issue.

The defendant, Reginald W. Davis, was convicted by a Montgomery County jury of aggravated burglary, theft under $500, three counts of especially aggravated kidnapping, aggravated robbery,and possession of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony and was sentenced by the trial court to an effective term of thirty-seven years in the Department of Correction. In a timely appeal to this court, he argues that his due process rights were violated by his especially aggravated kidnapping convictions, which were incidental to his aggravated burglary and aggravated robbery convictions. Following our review, we affirm the convictions for aggravated burglary, theft under $500, aggravated robbery, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, but we reverse the especially aggravated kidnapping convictions and remand for a new trial on those counts of the indictment.

The Defendant-Appellant, Robert Edward Williams, III, appeals the Davidson County Criminal Court’s imposition of an effective twenty-year sentence for his guilty pleas to theft of property valued at $10,000 or more but less than $60,000, a class C felony; criminal simulation of $1,000 or more but less than $10,000, a Class D felony; and failure to appear, a Class E felony. On appeal, he argues that the trial court erred by failing to: (1) impose the minimum sentence in the applicable range for each of his sentences, and (2) grant a community corrections sentence. Upon review, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

This is an administrative appeal in which an employer challenges the decision of the Tennessee Department of Labor & Workforce Development finding the employer in violation of the Tennessee Child Labor Act for failing to furnish, within one hour of demand, personnel files of each of its minor employees. The trial court affirmed the decision of the Department and this appeal followed. Tennessee Code Annotated § 50-5-111(1) & (4) require employers to “make, keep and preserve a separate and independent file record for each minor employed, which shall be kept at the location of the minor’s employment” and to “furnish” the records relative to the minor employees. On appeal, the employer contends it maintained the records on site as required, thus it did not violate Subsection (1) of the statute. The employer also asserts that it has a Fourth Amendment right to object to a warrantless search by the Department and it may not be penalized for asserting its constitutional right. We have determined the Department’s decision to assess penalties for violating Subsection (1) of Tennessee Code Annotated § 50-5-111 is not supported by substantial and material evidence and the inference drawn by the Department that the records were not maintained on site based upon a mere inference drawn from the fact they were not produced within one hour of demand is insufficient. Therefore, the assessments for allegedly failing to maintain personnel records of minor employees on site is reversed. As for the requirement under Subsection (4) of Tennessee Code Annotated § 50-5-111 that employers of minor employees furnish and allow inspection of the separate and independent file records for each minor employed upon request by the Department, the Act expressly provides that if the Department is denied permission to make an inspection, Tennessee Code Annotated § 50-4-101 provides that the Department employee or official may obtain an administrative inspection warrant in accordance with the procedures outlined in the statute; the Department did not seek to obtain a warrant in this case. As for refusing the Department’s request to inspect the records without an administrative warrant, in order for a warrantless search or inspection to be constitutionally permissible under the Fourth Amendment, the Department must establish that the employer was part of a pervasively regulated industry or that the employer had weakened or reduced privacy expectations that are significantly overshadowed by the Department’s interests in regulating the employer’s industry. We have determined the Department failed to establish either; accordingly, the Department cannot assess a penalty against an employer for asserting its constitutional rights under the Fourth Amendment.Thus, the penalty assessed for allegedly violating Subsection (4) of the statute is reversed. Pursuant to the foregoing, we remand with instructions for the trial court to order the Department to vacate the citations and penalties against the employer.

I fully concur in parts A and B of the opinion’s analysis section; however, I have some reservations regarding part C. I have chosen to write separately to highlight my concerns about the implications of this opinion for administrative inspections generally.
 

The trial court dismissed this medical malpractice claim on the defendants’ motion for summary judgment and motion to dismiss, after excluding the testimony of the plaintiff’s expert witness. Because the trial court erred in its application of the locality rule and Rule 702 of the Rules of Evidence, we reverse.

The Petitioner, Paul David Childs, convicted of sexual battery, appeals from the summary dismissal of his pro se petition for post-conviction relief. The post-conviction court dismissed the petition on the basis that the Petitioner failed to provide any factual grounds in support of his claims for relief. The State concedes that the post-conviction court acted in error. Following our review, we reverse the order of summary dismissal and remand this case to the post-conviction court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

We accepted this appeal to determine whether a lawyer’s potential violation of the ethical rule governing communications with a person represented by another lawyer constitutes criminal contempt pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-9-102(1), (2). Although a lawyer’s violation of an ethical rule may in some circumstances constitute criminal contempt, the evidence in this case is insufficient to support the “willful misbehavior” element of the offense of criminal contempt. Therefore, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals, and we vacate Mr. Beeler’s conviction.

The defendant, Terry Sanders, was convicted after a jury trial of two counts of the sale of less than 0.5 grams of cocaine, a Class C felony, in violation of Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-17-417. He was sentenced, as a Range III persistent offender, to fifteen years for each count, to be run consecutively, for an effective sentence of thirty years. The defendant appeals his convictions, asserting that the trial court should have granted his motions for a mistrial based on testimony introduced at trial that the defendant was on community corrections and based on juror bias. After a careful review of the record, we conclude that the defendant is not entitled to a new trial and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

In this divorce case, the Trial Court awarded the wife her attorney's fees as alimony in solido. The husband appeals this issue arguing that the wife's property settlement was such that she should pay her attorney's fees out of the property settlement. On appeal, we affirm the Trial Court.

The petitioner, Betty L. Darden, appeals the Dickson County Circuit Court’s denial of her petition to waive court costs and fines. The petitioner pled nolo contendere to conspiracy to commit aggravated burglary and conspiracy to commit aggravated assault, both Class D felonies, and received an effective sentence of two years,which was suspended to probation. Her probation agreement required payment of court costs and fines on a monthly basis. The petitioner filed a “Petition to Remit Fines and Costs and Waive Probation Fees.” A hearing was held on the petition, after which the trial court waived probationary fees but ordered the petitioner to complete payment of her court costs and fines. Following review of the record, we find no abuse of discretion in the decision and affirm the denial.

The defendant, Jacque Michelle Lee, appeals the sentencing determination made by the Davidson County Criminal Court following the revocation of her alternative sentence. The defendant was sentenced to an effective ten-year sentence after she pled guilty to five counts of theft of property and one count of theft of services, and she was ordered to serve her sentence on community corrections. The defendant also agreed to participate in a drug court program. Within days of starting to serve her sentence, the defendant failed to attend two required program meetings. A violation warrant was issued. Following a hearing, the defendant’s alternative sentence was revoked, and the trial court ordered the defendant to serve the remainder of her sentence in confinement. On appeal, the defendant does not contest the trial court’s finding of a violation. Rather, she argues that the trial court erred by ordering her to serve her sentence in confinement rather than returning her to community corrections. After review, we affirm the decision of the trial court.

Lawrence Key (“the Defendant”) appeals his jury convictions for two counts of aggravated robbery. In his appeal, he asserts that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support his convictions. After a thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the Defendant’s convictions.

This appeal involves Father’s petition to be named primary residential parent of his son. The trial court held that a material change in circumstances had occurred and that it was in the child’s best interest to spend more time with the Father; however, the court determined that Mother should remain the child’s primary residential parent. Father appeals the trial court’s determination that it is in the best interest of the parties’ son for Mother to be the primary residential parent. Finding no error, we affirm.

This appeal involves a contract for the construction of a hotel. The project owner refused to make the final payment owed to the general contractor, claiming that it was entitled to withhold $237,000 in liquidated damages because the project was not completed on time, in addition to deducting other “offsets” under the contract. The general contractor claimed that the owner was not entitled to liquidated damages for several reasons, including the fact that the owner had caused delays, and the fact that the owner had failed to make a timely claim for liquidated damages as required by the contract. The trial court granted partial summary judgment to the owner on the issue of liquidated damages, allowing the owner to subtract $237,000 from the final payment it owed under the contract. The court also resolved several other issues between the parties. The trial court declared the owner to be the prevailing party in the litigation and awarded the owner its attorney’s fees. The general contractor appeals. We affirm in part and reverse in part and remand for further proceedings.