Sheila Long Pless v. Robert Eugene Pless, Jr.
In this divorce, Wife appeals the trial court’s decision to deny her alimony notwithstanding a previously executed separation agreement that provided a non-modifiable award of alimony in futuro. Wife also appeals the trial court’s denial of a arrearage judgment for school and extracurricular expenses under the separation agreement. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
Andrea (Messer) Schwager v. Timothy Scott Messer
In this post-divorce action concerning modification of the father’s child support obligation, the trial court determined that a significant variance existed between the parties’ incomes at the time of the modification hearing and the amount of income the parties earned at the time of the divorce. The trial court modified the father’s child support obligation accordingly. The trial court declined, however, to modify the father’s child support obligation for any time period prior to the filing of the mother’s modification petition in 2015 despite language in the parties’ agreement providing that recalculation would take place in 2011. The trial court also ordered that the father would pay 65% of the children’s private school tuition and the mother would pay 35%. The trial court further awarded to the mother a portion of her attorney’s fees and expert witness fees incurred up to the time of the hearing. The mother has appealed. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm the trial court’s judgment in all respects. We decline to award attorney’s fees to either party on appeal. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
PMFS H-VIEW I, LLC v. METROPOLITAN GOVERNMENT OF NASHVILLE AND DAVIDSON COUNTY ET AL.
This appeal concerns a municipality’s authority to order structures demolished pursuant to the Slum Clearance and Redevelopment Act, Tenn. Code Ann. § 13-21-101 et seq., and local ordinances implementing that Act. The trial court vacated a decision of the Metropolitan Board of Property Standards and Appeals that required demolition of the structures at issue. In light of the evidence that the cost to repair the structures exceeds fifty percent of their value, we reverse the decision of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Bradley Jetmore v. City of Memphis
In this case involving the Tennessee Public Records Act (“TPRA”), Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 10-7-101 – 10-7-702 (2012 & Supp. 2019), the petitioner filed a petition alleging that the respondent, the City of Memphis (“the City”), had violated the TPRA by failing to promptly disclose unredacted crash reports for all traffic accidents to which the City’s police officers had responded on two specific days in November 2017. The City filed a motion to dismiss the petition or, in the alternative, to stay proceedings pending resolution of what it averred would be a determinative issue in a related federal case. Following a non-evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied the City’s motion to dismiss and motion to stay pending resolution of the federal action. Finding that the City had violated the TPRA by failing to promptly disclose unredacted crash reports for public inspection, the trial court ordered such disclosure; however, upon also finding that a substantial legal issue was to be determined, the trial court stayed its disclosure order pending resolution of this appeal pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 10-7-505(d)-(e) (2012). Upon finding that the City’s violation of the TPRA had not been willful, the trial court denied the petitioner’s request for attorney’s fees. The City timely appealed. During the pendency of this appeal, the federal district court in the related case certified the legal question posed by the City for presentation to the Tennessee Supreme Court, but the High Court subsequently entered an order declining certification. By the time of oral arguments before this Court, the parties acknowledged that the sole issue remaining for adjudication in this appeal was the petitioner’s request for attorney’s fees. We determine that under the version of the TPRA in effect at the time this action was filed, the trial court properly found that the City failed to promptly disclose the public records at issue. We further determine that the City’s violation of the TPRA was willful pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 10-7-505(g) (2012). We therefore reverse the trial court’s finding in this regard. We remand for the trial court to consider, in light of our determination concerning willfulness, whether reasonable attorney’s fees incurred during the trial court proceedings should be awarded to the petitioner. However, because the petitioner has not properly raised an issue concerning attorney’s fees on appeal, we deem the petitioner’s request for attorney’s fees on appeal to be waived. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Joeel Byrd Et Al. v. Mrs. Grissom's Salads, Inc.
Both the plaintiffs and the defendant have appealed from an order granting in part and denying in part the defendant’s motion for summary judgment. The trial court determined that there was no just reason for delay and directed the entry of a final judgment under Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 54.02. Because the partial summary judgment is not appropriate for certification as a final judgment under Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 54.02, we dismiss the appeal. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Donald Eugene Winder, III v. Kara Elizabeth Winder
This is an interlocutory appeal as of right, pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10B, from the trial court’s denial of a motion for judicial recusal filed by the wife during the course of the parties’ divorce proceedings. Having determined that the trial court made insufficient findings in denying the motion as required by Section 1.03 of Rule 10B, we vacate the trial court’s order denying wife’s motion to recuse—as well as any other orders entered subsequent to the filing of Wife’s recusal motion—and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. |
Meigs | Court of Appeals | |
Broderick D. V. Carmen v. Jessica Ann Murray
In this post-divorce dispute, Father petitioned to modify custody, and Mother filed a counter-petition to modify child support. At trial, both parents agreed to specific modifications to the parenting plan and to set child support according to the Child Support Guidelines. But they could not agree on a location for exchanging the children. After hearing limited testimony from the parents, the court chose an exchange location, set child support, and approved the agreed parenting plan. Unhappy with aspects of the new plan, Father filed a motion to alter or amend or for a new trial. The court denied Father’s motion but granted Mother’s motion to recalculate child support to reflect the parents’ actual parenting time. Because the court’s order approving the modified plan does not comply with Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 52.01 and the record lacks a sufficient basis to support a best interest determination, we vacate the modification of the parenting plan and remand for the court to conduct a new evidentiary hearing on whether modification of the parenting plan is in the children’s best interest and enter an order compliant with Rule 52.01. In all other respects, the decision of the trial court is affirmed. |
Putnam | Court of Appeals | |
John Riebsame v. Brad Schemel
The facts before the court on appeal depend upon the procedural posture of the case. John Riebsame, a former employee of Holland Enterprises (“Holland”), filed a complaint in the Circuit Court for Hamilton County, Tennessee on June 18, 2018, against Bradley Schemel, the vice president of Holland, a trucking company headquartered in Mapleton, North Dakota. On July 20, 2018, Mr. Schemel filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(2) and (4) for lack of personal jurisdiction and insufficient service of process. With his motion, Mr. Schemel submitted his own affidavit, the contents of which will be detailed as relevant below. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
JOANNE ACKERMAN v. SCOTT ACKERMAN
In this divorce appeal, Wife argues that the trial court erred in dividing the equity in the marital home and in calculating her net award. We find no error in the trial court’s division of the equity in the marital home, but we have determined that the court erred in its calculation of the net award by crediting the marital debt against Wife twice. We, therefore, affirm in part and reverse in part. |
Sequatchie | Court of Appeals | |
Melanie Lemon v. Williamson County Schools, Et Al.
The plaintiff, a former tenured schoolteacher, sued the Williamson County Board of Education and three administrators alleging that she was forced to resign after the defendants “bullied, stalked, intimidated, and defamed” her during the 2015–2016 school year. She asserted claims for wrongful termination, breach of contract, negligence, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and negligent infliction of emotional distress. The trial court dismissed all of the claims asserted in the original complaint pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted but permitted the plaintiff to file an amended complaint to revise and restate her claims for breach of contract and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Following discovery, the court summarily dismissed the two remaining claims as asserted in the amended complaint. On appeal, the plaintiff challenges the Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(6) dismissal of her wrongful termination and negligence claims, and the summary dismissal of her claims for breach of contract and intentional infliction of emotional distress. We affirm the trial court’s determination the plaintiff’s negligence and intentional infliction of emotional distress claims are barred by the Governmental Tort Liability Act and Teachers’ Tenure Act, respectively. We have also determined that the plaintiff failed to produce evidence of a compensable injury in her claim for breach of contract. As for the plaintiff’s claim of wrongful termination, we respectfully disagree with the trial court’s determination that the doctrine of constructive discharge is inapplicable to wrongful termination claims under the Teachers’ Tenure Act. Therefore, we reverse the dismissal of the plaintiff’s wrongful termination claim and remand this claim for further proceedings. We affirm the trial court in all other respects. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Estate of Henry C. Ellis, III and In Re Conservatorship of Henry C. Ellis, III
This is an interlocutory appeal as of right, pursuant to Rule 10B of the Rules of the Supreme Court of Tennessee, filed by Nancy Neely (“Petitioner”), seeking to recuse the trial judge in these companion cases involving a conservatorship and an estate. Having reviewed the petition for recusal appeal filed by Petitioner, and the answer ordered by this Court, and finding no error in the orders of the Circuit Court for Shelby County (“the Trial Court”) denying recusal, we affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Don Gatlin, Et Al. v. Linda L. Scott
This appeal concerns the alleged formation of a contract for the sale of real property. The court ruled that text messages concerning the sale of the property did not constitute a present offer and acceptance sufficient to form a contract for the purchase of the property at issue. We affirm. |
Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
Travis Morgan, Et Al. v. Land Design Company, Inc., Et Al.
The plaintiffs have appealed from an order granting in part and denying in part the defendants’ motion for summary judgment. The trial court also directed the entry of a final judgment under Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 54.02. Because the ruling is not appropriate for certification as a final judgment under Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 54.02, we dismiss the appeal. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
James Moses, Et Al. v. Rebecca Elrod, Et Al.
The plaintiffs appeal the trial court’s decision concerning the ownership of real property. We affirm. |
Meigs | Court of Appeals | |
Clarissa Bidwell, Deceased, By Next Friend and Husband, James Bidwell, Et Al v. Timothy A. Strait, M.D., Et Al
Plaintiff, James Bidwell, took his wife, Clarissa Bidwell, to Starr Regional Medical Center for treatment. She was transferred to Chattanooga-Hamilton County Hospital Authority dba Erlanger Health System, a governmental hospital authority, where she was treated, but later died. Plaintiff provided statutorily compliant pre-suit notice of his intent to file a health care liability action against each health care provider that was named as a defendant in the complaint. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26-121(a). Plaintiff did not provide pre-suit notice to Erlanger. Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26-121(a)(5) requires a recipient of pre-suit notice to give written notice to a claimant of any other person, entity, or health care provider who may be properly named a defendant within thirty days of receiving pre-suit notice. However, Dr. Jeffery Colburn and Dr. Timothy A. Strait failed to identify Erlanger as their employer, i.e. a known and necessary party to the suit. Plaintiff timely filed his complaint within the 120-day extension of the statute of limitations provided by Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26-121. Defendants answered plaintiff’s complaint, each raising the affirmative defense of comparative fault. Dr. Colburn and Dr. Strait then moved for summary judgment arguing that, pursuant to the Governmental Tort Liability Act, without Erlanger as a party defendant no judgment could be rendered against them. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-20-310(b). In response, plaintiff filed two motions to amend his complaint to add Erlanger as a defendant, in reliance upon the extension to the statute of limitations provided in Tenn. Code Ann. § 20-1-119(a). After a hearing, the trial court held that plaintiff’s failure to provide pre-suit notice to Erlanger prevents him from adding them to his complaint. It granted Dr. Colburn and Dr. Strait’s motions for summary judgment. Plaintiff appeals. We hold that Tenn. Code Ann. § 2926-121(a)(5) required Dr. Colburn and Dr. Strait to identify Erlanger as a known and necessary party within thirty days after receiving pre-suit notice; they failed to comply with § 29-26-121(a)(5). We hold that, pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Douglas A. Messerli, E. AL. v. Vickie Sue Williams, Et Al.
This action was filed by two brothers, after the death of their father, contesting the validity of an amendment to their father’s trust agreement. The brothers alleged that their siblings coerced their infirmed father to amend his trust in such a manner that was favorable to the siblings’ pecuniary interests and that two sisters had a confidential relationship with their father. The trial court directed a verdict in favor of the defendants. The plaintiffs appealed. We affirm the decision. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Rachel Maddox v. Olshan Foundation Repair And Waterproofing Co. Of Nashville, L.P., Et Al.
This appeal involves a homeowner’s fraud claim against a foundation repair company. The trial court rejected the foundation repair company’s argument that the fraud claim was barred by the statute of limitations and the statute of repose. After a three-day bench trial, the trial court found that the foundation repair company had engaged in fraud. Specifically, the trial court found that the foundation repair company sold its systems to the homeowner representing that they would stabilize her house from further movement when in reality it did not have the knowledge or understanding to design an effective solution for the house and “simply did not really care” whether the systems would be effective in any way. The trial court further found that the company fraudulently misrepresented whether an engineer would be involved in the process and whether it would obtain a permit for the work. The home had been condemned by the time of trial, and the trial court awarded the homeowner $187,000 for the loss of the value of the structure. Based on the reckless and fraudulent conduct of the foundation repair company, the trial court also awarded $15,000 in punitive damages to the homeowner. The foundation repair company appeals. We affirm as modified. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Randy Lynn Simpkins v. Joe Ward, Et Al.
This appeal involves a boundary dispute. In resolving the dispute, the trial court made specific findings about the location of a |
Hickman | Court of Appeals | |
Billy Perdue, Et Al. v. Greg Kneedler, Et Al.
This appeal involves a breach of a lease agreement. At trial, both defendants, operators of a natural foods business, admitted that the lease had been breached. However, because only one of the Defendants had signed the lease, the other argued that he was not a party to and was therefore not responsible for the obligations of the lease. The Defendant who had signed the lease claimed he did so on behalf of and at the direction of the other. Finding that both Defendants had combined their efforts, skills, knowledge, and money for the purpose of operating the business, the trial court concluded on several bases that the Defendants were jointly liable for the obligations of the lease. Only the non-signing Defendant appeals. Because we agree with the trial court that the Defendants had formed a joint venture and, thus, were jointly liable, we affirm. |
Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
In Re John B.
This is an appeal in a proceeding to modify a residential parenting plan, established in January 2013. The initial petition to modify the plan was filed by the Father, accompanied by his proposed plan, in October 2016; Mother answered the petition in January 2017 and a hearing was set for two non-consecutive days in July 2018. During the hiatus in the hearing, the Mother filed a counter-petition and a proposed parenting time plan. The hearing resumed solely on Father’s plan and the court entered an order finding a material change of circumstance and reducing Father’s parenting time; Father appeals. Because the court has not yet resolved the claims between the parties, we dismiss the appeal for lack of a final judgment. |
Macon | Court of Appeals | |
Nationwide Investments, LLC v. Pinnacle Bank
In this case, the plaintiff-appellant, Nationwide Investments, LLC, brought suit against Pinnacle Bank for, among other things, an alleged violation of the state’s Financial Records Privacy Act. The case was dismissed at summary judgment, and sanctions were imposed against the plaintiff and its counsel. Although the plaintiff and its counsel now appeal, raising several issues for our review, for the reasons stated herein, we affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Steven Shao Ex Rel Elizabeth Shao v. HCA Health Services Of Tennessee, Inc., Et Al.
All claims on the plaintiff’s case in chief in this case have been non-suited. This is an appeal only from three orders for sanctions entered against plaintiff’s attorney. In the first order, the trial court awarded opposing counsel attorney’s fees and prohibited the attorney from making any threatening, insulting, or embarrassing communications regarding opposing counsel. In the second and third orders, the trial court found that the attorney had continued the prohibited conduct, suspending him from the practice of law in the Circuit Courts of Davidson County for a total of 240 days and awarding opposing counsel their attorney’s fees. The attorney appealed the three orders. We affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Timothy Hopson v. American Advisors Group
This is a consolidated appeal concerning real property granted to the defendant in a detainer action. We affirm. |
Carter | Court of Appeals | |
Timothy Hopson, Ex Rel Elizabeth Miller v. American Advisors Group
This is a consolidated appeal concerning real property granted to the defendant in a detainer action. We affirm. |
Carter | Court of Appeals | |
Tamala Teague, As Successor Personal Representative Of The Estate Of Lola Lee Duggan v. Garnett Kidd Et Al.
This case implicates the doctrine of res judicata. Tamala Teague (plaintiff) is the administrator of the estate of Lola Lee Duggan. Garnette Kidd and William Kidd (defendants) are Ms. Duggan’s daughter and son-in-law. In a previous lawsuit, the trial court determined that defendants wrongfully took more than $100,000 of Ms. Duggan’s assets and used some of that money to purchase 132 acres of real estate. After a bench trial, the court, in that first case, awarded money damages to Ms. Duggan’s estate. A few years later, plaintiff filed a second complaint against the defendants. The complaint alleged the same facts that precipitated the previous lawsuit. This time, however, plaintiff sought a different remedy – the entry of an order declaring the existence of a constructive trust with respect to the 132 acres of real estate. The trial court ruled that the doctrine of res judicata barred plaintiff from pursuing this alternative remedy in a second suit against the same defendants on the same cause of action. Accordingly, the court granted defendants’ motion to dismiss and denied plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment. Plaintiff appeals. We affirm. |
Polk | Court of Appeals |
