In Re David P. Et Al.
This is an appeal from an order terminating the parental rights of the appellant to his minor children. The only Notice of Appeal filed by the appellant within the time provided in Rule 4(a) of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure for the filing of a notice of appeal, did not comply with Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-1-124(d), which states: “Any notice of appeal filed in a termination of parental rights action shall be signed by the appellant.” Because this Notice of Appeal was insufficient to invoke the jurisdiction of this Court, this appeal is dismissed. |
Claiborne | Court of Appeals | |
Sonja Broyles Williams v. Stewart Ashley Williams
This is an appeal from a divorce case dissolving a long-term marriage with two minor children. Following a four and one-half day trial, the court awarded Wife a divorce, designated Husband as the primary residential parent of the parties’ children, distributed the marital property, awarded Wife rehabilitative alimony, and denied Wife’s request for attorney’s fees. Wife appeals the designation of Husband as primary residential parent, the value and division of certain items within the marital estate, the court’s decision to award her rehabilitative alimony rather than alimony in futuro, and the denial of her request for attorney’s fees. We vacate the trial court’s order regarding retroactive child support and remand the issue for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. We affirm the remainder of the judgment of the trial court. We deny Wife’s request for attorney’s fees incurred on appeal. |
Hardin | Court of Appeals | |
Mardoche Olivier v. City of Clarksville, et al.
This action arises out of an alleged violation of the plaintiff’s civil rights by the City of Clarksville (“the City”) and a group of police officers employed by the City (“the Officers”) (collectively, “Defendants”). The plaintiff was arrested on June 1, 2015, for driving on a revoked or suspended license, see Tenn. Code Ann. § 55-50-504 (2012), and making a 911 telephone call in a nonemergency situation, see Tenn. Code Ann. § 7-86-316 (2015). The plaintiff filed a complaint on August 11, 2016, alleging that as a result of his arrest, the Officers caused him to suffer damages from false imprisonment, malicious prosecution, malicious harassment, outrageous conduct, intentional infliction of emotional distress, conversion, and inverse condemnation. The plaintiff also alleged violations of his civil rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Defendants filed a motion to dismiss on October 5, 2016, asserting, inter alia, that the plaintiff’s claims were statutorily barred due to the immunity granted to Defendants by the Tennessee Governmental Tort Liability Act (“GTLA”). See Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-20-205 (2012). The trial court entered a final order regarding Defendants’ motion to dismiss on November 17, 2016, granting the motion and dismissing all claims. The plaintiff has appealed. Discerning no error, we affirm the trial court’s dismissal of the plaintiff’s claims. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
Latisia Upshaw v. Sunrise Community Of Tennessee, Inc.
This appeal concerns a claim of retaliatory discharge. After a trial before a jury, judgment was entered against the defendant employer. The plaintiff was awarded $225,000 in compensatory damages and $200,000 in punitive damages. The employer appeals. We affirm. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Sue Ann Templeton v. Jackson-Madison County General Hospital District
This is an appeal from the grant of summary judgment in a Tennessee Governmental Tort Liability Act (“GTLA”) premises liability case. Appellant was exiting Jackson-Madison County General Hospital/Appellee when she was hit by an automatic door, fell, and sustained a broken femur. Appellee moved for summary judgment on the ground that it was immune from suit under the GTLA. Appellant argued that Appellee failed to make a reasonable inspection of the automatic door, so as to discover the alleged dangerous or defective condition. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Appellee, finding that the condition was not dangerous or defective, the condition was latent, and Appellee had no actual or constructive notice of the condition. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Madison | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Estate of Charles Edward Fant, III
This is a will contest. The affidavit attached to the purported will was signed, in the presence of the testator, by two witnesses. At the hearing on the will contest, both witnesses and the notary public testified as to the validity of signatures on the purported will. The trial court held that the will and accompanying affidavit were not in strict compliance with the statute and denied admission of the will to probate. On appeal, the proponent of the purported will argues that the will satisfied the recent statutory requirements of Tennessee Code Annotated Section 32-1-104(b) such that the signatures of both witnesses were integrated into the will. Concluding that the witnesses’ signatures were integrated into the will pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated Section 32-1-104(b), and that the other statutory requirements were met, we reverse the trial court’s ruling. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Audrina E. et al.
This is an appeal from an order terminating the parental rights of the appellant to his minor children. The only notice of appeal filed by the appellant within the time provided in Rule 4(a) of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure for the filing of a notice of appeal did not comply with Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-1-124(d), which states: “Any notice of appeal filed in a termination of parental rights action shall be signed by the appellant.” Because this notice of appeal was insufficient to invoke the jurisdiction of this Court, this appeal is dismissed. |
Sullivan | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Nevaeh B.
This is a termination of parental rights case. The trial court terminated Appellant’s parental rights to the minor child by order of July 15, 2016. Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal. However, Appellant failed to comply with Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-1-124(d) (Supp. 2016) in that she failed to sign the notice of appeal. Because this Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, we dismiss the appeal. |
Chester | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Nevaeh B. - Dissent
The majority opinion dismisses this appeal due to the failure of the appellant, Makayla B., the child’s mother, to sign the notice of appeal as required by Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-124(d). The majority has concluded, “[i]n the absence of full compliance with the statutory requirements, this Court does not have subject-matter jurisdiction over the appeal.” I recognize that the majority opinion is based on a prior Court of Appeals decision, but I respectfully disagree with the decision and the notion that Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-124(d) is jurisdictional or that the statute compels this court to dismiss appeals in parental termination cases when the parent fails to sign the notice of appeal without affording the parent the opportunity to cure the defect. |
Chester | Court of Appeals | |
Deborah J. Meadows v Ronald E. McCarter Et Al.
The Defendant, Ronald E. McCarter (“Defendant”), seeks to appeal from a ruling of the Trial Court which does not constitute a final judgment. Specifically, the ruling to which the Notice of Appeal is directed in this case did not resolve the amount of attorney’s fees awarded to the Plaintiff, Deborah J. Meadows (“Plaintiff”), nor did it fully resolve Plaintiff’s claims against Tiffany Sharp. As such, it is clear that there is not a final judgment from which an appeal as of right would lie. We therefore lack jurisdiction to consider this appeal |
Sevier | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Kendall H.
This is an appeal from an order terminating the parental rights of the appellant to her minor child, Kendall H. The only Notice of Appeal filed by the appellant was signed only by her attorney. The appellees have filed a motion to dismiss this appeal arguing that the Notice of Appeal was insufficient to invoke this Court’s jurisdiction because it did not comply with Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-1-124(d), which states: “Any notice of appeal filed in a termination of parental rights action shall be signed by the appellant.” The absence of appellant’s signature on the notice of appeal deprives us of jurisdiction in this case. Accordingly, this case is dismissed. |
Hamblen | Court of Appeals | |
Dewayna M. Killen v. Phillips Wrecker Service And Garage
This dispute stems from an agreement for the purchase and installation of a used automobile motor. The parties to the agreement both claim the other breached the agreement. Following a trial, the circuit court determined that the purchaser breached the agreement. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Monroe | Court of Appeals | |
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company v. James T. Jones, et al
The trial court dismissed plaintiff’s claim for failure to prosecute and for failing to respond to affirmative defenses. The trial court also denied plaintiff’s motion to alter or amend the judgment. Because disposition of litigation on the merits is favored over procedural dismissals, we reverse. |
Hickman | Court of Appeals | |
Alfonzia Biles, et al. v. Tiffany Roby
This case involves residential property that was purchased after a foreclosure. The purchaser filed this detainer action against the original homeowners, who refused to vacate the property. The general sessions court ruled in favor of the purchaser, and after a de novo trial in circuit court, the circuit court ruled in favor of the purchaser as well. We do the same. The decision of the circuit court is hereby affirmed and remanded for further proceedings. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Michael B., Jr., Et Al
The trial court found clear and convincing evidence to terminate Mother’s parental rights to her two children on the grounds of abandonment by failure to establish a suitable home, substantial noncompliance with permanency plans, and persistence of conditions. The trial court also found clear and convincing evidence that termination was in the children’s best interest. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Washington | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Jayden R., et al.
This appeal concerns termination of parental rights. The Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) filed a petition in the Juvenile Court for Warren County (“the Juvenile Court”) seeking to terminate the parental rights of Dara C. (“Mother”) to her minor children Jayden R., Kara C., and Jaxson C. (collectively, “the Children”). DCS also sought to terminate the parental rights of Jonathan C. (“Father”) to Kara C. and Jaxson C. After a trial, the Juvenile Court entered an order terminating Mother’s parental rights to the Children and Father’s parental rights to Kara and Jaxson. Mother and Father appealed. DCS argues that Mother’s and Father’s failure to sign their notices of appeal renders this appeal jurisdictionally deficient. We agree that Mother’s and Father’s failure to sign their notices of appeal as required by Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-124(d) renders this appeal jurisdictionally deficient, and it is dismissed on that basis. Even if the appeal were not jurisdictionally deficient, we would, given this record, affirm the Juvenile Court’s judgment terminating Mother’s and Father’s parental rights. We dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction. |
Warren | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Jayden R., et al. - dissenting
The majority opinion dismisses this case due to the failure of Mother and Father to sign the notice of appeal pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-124(d). I recognize that the majority opinion is based on a prior Court of Appeals decision, but I respectfully disagree with the majority’s conclusion. |
Warren | Court of Appeals | |
Homelift Of Nashville, Inc v. Porta, Inc.
This appeal involves a claim for attorney’s fees and other litigation expenses incurred by a third-party defendant in a wrongful death action. The third-party plaintiff filed the third-party complaint against the third-party defendant seeking indemnity. A jury found both the third-party plaintiff and third-party defendant at fault for the death in the underlying action, but because the third-party plaintiff was allocated more than 50% of the fault, the jury determined that the third-party plaintiff was not entitled to indemnification. The third-party defendant filed a post-trial motion for attorney’s fees and expenses incurred in defending the third-party action. The trial court denied the motion, concluding that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction. Although we conclude that it did not lack subject matter jurisdiction, we affirm the denial of the third-party defendant’s motion. |
Wilson | Court of Appeals | |
Judith Husk v. Brandon Thompson
The trial court granted a default judgment against the appellant for claims of conversion, unjust enrichment, and malicious prosecution. Immediately after granting the default judgment, the trial court awarded the appellee damages without hearing proof. The appellant filed a motion to set aside the default judgment. The trial court denied the appellant’s motion. We affirm the trial court’s decision in all regards except for its award of damages. The case is remanded for a hearing on damages. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
Betty Graham v. Stacy Lynn Archer, Et Al.
This is an invasion of privacy case filed by Betty Graham. It arises out of disclosures made by the defendants in an underlying health care liability action. In the underlying case, the defendants moved to dismiss Graham’s case on the ground that she (1) had failed to file a statutory-mandated pre-suit notice and (2) had failed to file with her complaint a certificate of good faith, all as required by the Health Care Liability Act (the Act). Graham claims that she could not comply with the Act because the defendants failed to provide her with the relevant medical records. To demonstrate that they had complied or attempted to comply with Graham’s requests for records, the defendants filed in the earlier case two affidavits detailing their response to her requests. After the dismissal of her health care liability action, Graham filed this case for invasion of privacy, alleging that the defendants had wrongfully disclosed her personal medical information by filing the affidavits in the underlying case. The trial court granted the defendants’ motions to dismiss. Graham appeals. We affirm |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Billy Butler, ET AL., v. Malvin Carvin Pitts, Jr., ET AL.
This is the second appeal of this easement case. Appellants, the servient land owners, appeal the trial court’s award of a monetary judgment in favor of Appellees, the owners of the dominant estate. On remand, the parties agreed to have the trial court determine the precise location of the easement, but the trial court refused to hear the issue, and also refused to allow Appellants to make an offer of proof. We vacate the damage award due to the trial court’s failure to make sufficient findings. We also conclude that the trial court erred by refusing to determine the location of the easement. Vacated and remanded. |
Haywood | Court of Appeals | |
Frederick Copeland v. Healthcare/Methodist Rehabilitation Hospital LP ET AL.
This is an appeal from the grant of summary judgment in favor of Appellee. Following Appellant’s knee surgery, Appellee provided Appellant transportation, by wheelchair van, from the rehabilitation hospital to a follow-up appointment with his surgeon. Prior to transport, Appellant signed an exculpatory agreement, releasing Appellee from all claims of ordinary negligence. Appellant was injured when he fell while trying to enter the van and filed suit against Appellee for negligence. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Appellee, finding that the exculpatory agreement was enforceable. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Timothy Alan Portice v. Roshawnda Lynn Foster Portice
This case involves a post-divorce motion for contempt. In her motion, Appellant/Wife averred that Appellee/Husband was in violation of the final decree of divorce. The trial court did not find Appellee in contempt, but entered an order enforcing its final decree of divorce regarding sale of the marital residence, Appellant’s access to the marital residence, and division of Appellee’s 401-K. The trial court also declined to award Appellant half of Appellee’s 2015 tax return. Because the trial court’s order, on the motion for contempt, appears to deviate from its previous order regarding division of Appellee’s 401-K, we reverse this portion of the trial court’s order. The order is otherwise affirmed. |
Campbell | Court of Appeals | |
Marcus Johnsonv. Tennessee Department of Correction, et al.
An inmate in the custody of the Tennessee Department of Correction filed a petition for writ of certiorari challenging the revocation of his parole. Because the inmate failed to file his petition within the sixty-day period required by statute, the chancery court lacked jurisdiction. We, therefore, affirm the chancery court’s judgment dismissing the case. |
Bledsoe | Court of Appeals | |
Donna Maria Vetrano, et al. v. State of Tennessee
Former inmate and her husband filed a complaint against the State of Tennessee, alleging that state employees negligently supervised and retained a prison guard who sexually assaulted the inmate. The Tennessee Claims Commission determined it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to hear the claim and dismissed the complaint. We conclude that the former inmate’s claim falls within a category of claims for which the Claims Commission has exclusive jurisdiction, specifically the “[n]egligent care, custody and control of persons.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 9-8-307 (Supp. 2016). We also conclude the complaint does not seek to hold the State liable for the willful, malicious, or criminal act of a state employee. Accordingly, we reverse. |
Court of Appeals |
