In re Candace J., et al.
This is a termination of parental rights case. The Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) filed a petition seeking to terminate the mother’s parental rights with respect to the minor child. The juvenile court found that statutory grounds existed to terminate the mother’s parental rights upon its finding by clear and convincing evidence that the mother (1) abandoned the child by her willful failure to visit, (2) abandoned the child by her willful failure to provide a suitable home, (3) failed to substantially comply with the requirements of the permanency plans, and that (4) the conditions that led to the child’s removal still persisted. The juvenile court further found by clear and convincing evidence that termination of the mother’s parental rights was in the child’s best interests. Having thoroughly reviewed the record and considered the arguments presented on appeal, we affirm the juvenile court’s judgment in all respects. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
In re K.F.R.T. et al.
This is a termination of parental rights case. The case proceeded to trial on the amended petition of the Department of Children's Services seeking to terminate on multiple grounds the parental rights of L.M. to his children, K.F.R.T., L.E.M.R., and B.A.M.R. (collectively the children). The trial court dismissed the petition after a bench trial, finding and holding that DCS “ha[d] failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence any ground sufficient to justify termination of [father's] parental rights.” Whittney N.L. Good, guardian ad litem for the children, appeals. We reverse because we hold that the evidence clearly and convincingly shows that father is guilty of a pattern of criminal conduct “exhibit[ing] a wanton disregard of the child[ren].” Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-102(1)(A)(iv) (2014). We find clear and convincing evidence that it is in the best interest of the children to terminate father's parental rights. |
Hamblen | Court of Appeals | |
In re K.F.R.T. et al. - Concurring and Dissenting
D. MICHAEL SWINEY, C.J., concurring and dissenting. I concur in most of the majority’s opinion. I, however, cannot concur with the majority in its decision to reverse the Juvenile Court’s finding as to wanton disregard. I would affirm the Juvenile Court on this issue as well as on all other issues. As such, I also cannot agree with the majority’s decision concerning best interest as that issue never is reached if there is no ground for termination.
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Hamblen | Court of Appeals | |
Bryan McNeese v. Wendolyn Carol Williams, et al.
This appeal involves a Rule 60 motion to set aside an agreed order on the basis that the petitioner withdrew his consent to the agreement prior to the entry of the agreed order. The trial court denied the Rule 60 motion. We reverse and remand for further proceedings. |
Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
In re Landon T.G. et al.
This appeal concerns a mother’s petition to set aside an order terminating her parental rights and permitting the adoption of her minor children. The mother alleged that the order is void for lack of personal jurisdiction because service of process was ineffective. The trial court denied the petition. The mother appeals. We hold that the order is void for lack of personal jurisdiction. We reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand this case for further hearing to determine whether exceptional circumstances justify the denial of relief in accordance with Turner v. Turner, 473 S.W.3d 257 (Tenn. 2015). |
Hamblen | Court of Appeals | |
Kathryn E. Mitchell Et Al. v. Charles Wesley Morris Et Al.
This action concerns the decedent’s purchase of several investment products from the defendants. Following the decedent’s death, his daughter filed suit, alleging violations of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act, codified at 47-18-101, et. seq., breach of contract, promissory fraud, negligent misrepresentation, and breach of fiduciary duty. The defendants sought summary judgment. The court granted summary judgment, finding that the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act claims were untimely and that the evidence was insufficient to establish the other claims without consideration of parol evidence and inadmissible hearsay testimony. The daughter appeals. We affirm. |
Washington | Court of Appeals | |
Kathryn E. Mitchell et al v. Charles Wesley Morris et al. - Concurring
I concur fully in the majority’s decision in this case. I write separately only to express my opinion that the appropriate summary judgment standard to be applied by Tennessee courts now is as set forth in Rye v. Women’s Care Center of Memphis, MPLLC, ___ S.W.3d ___, 2015 WL 6457768 (Tenn. 2015), rather than Tenn. Code Ann. § 20-16-101. I believe our Supreme Court intended for the retroactive application of Rye when it stated: “In civil cases, judicial decisions overruling prior cases generally are applied retrospectively.” Rye, ___ S.W.3d at ___n.9, 2015 WL 6457768 at *35 n.9. While there may be very little, if any, difference between the summary judgment standard as set forth in Rye and as contained in Tenn. Code Ann. § 20-16-101, I believe Rye sets the standard and is controlling on the courts of this State. |
Washington | Court of Appeals | |
David Bryan Hawk v. Crystal Goan Hawk
This post-divorce appeal concerns the mother’s petition to modify the residential schedule in an agreed parenting plan. Following a hearing, the trial court found that a material change in circumstances had occurred that necessitated a change in the plan. The court modified the plan by order and further required the parties to attend parenting classes and mediation before seeking further relief from the court. The mother appeals. We affirm the court’s modification of the plan. We reverse the requirement imposed upon the parties to attend parenting classes before seeking further relief from the court. We remand for entry of a permanent parenting plan and child support worksheet. |
Greene | Court of Appeals | |
John Jason Davis v. Johnstone Group, Inc. v. Appraisal Services Group, Inc.
Appellant appeals the trial cour's grant of Appelle's complaint for declaratory judgment and the trial court's denial of Appellant's counter-complaint for injunctive relief. After Appellee filed notice with Appellant of his intent to leave Appellant's employ and join a competing appraisal firm, Appellant sought to enforce the non-competition provision of the parties' agreement. Appellee then filed for a declaratory judgment that the non-competition provision was unenforceable. The trial court determined that there were no special facts present over and above ordinary competition or any legitimate protectable business interests to warrant enforcement of the non-competition agreement. Appellant appeals. Discerning no error, we affirm and remand. |
Madison | Court of Appeals | |
Circle C. Construction, LLC v. D. Sean Nilsen, et al. - Concurring in Part and Dissenting in Part
I must respectfully dissent from the majority’s conclusion in this case that the lawsuit refiled by Plaintiff Circle C Construction is timely under the savings statute, Tennessee Code Annotated § 28-1-105(a). |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Brett R. Carter v. Larry B. Martin, et al
Plaintiff filed a public records request for tax study documents. The request was denied, and Plaintiff filed a lawsuit for access to the records. The trial court denied access to the records, and Plaintiff appealed. This Court has determined that the plain language of Tenn. Code Ann. § 67-1-1701(6)’s definition of “tax administration” encompasses the documents in question and that Tenn. Code Ann. § 67-1-1702(a) makes “tax administration information” confidential. The trial court is affirmed. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
John Hamer v. Southeast Resource Group, Inc., et al.
Plaintiff, a member of a Limited Liability Company that sells insurance products to credit union members, filed this declaratory judgment action seeking a determination that the LLC’s operating agreement does not require him to make a “telemedicine counseling” business opportunity available to the LLC. The operating agreement requires members to “disclose and make available to [the LLC] each and every business opportunity that is within the scope and purpose of [the LLC] . . . .” However, “no such disclosure or offer shall be required with respect to business opportunities that are not within the scope and purpose of [the LLC].” The trial court granted Plaintiff summary judgment, finding that the undisputed facts demonstrated that the “scope” of the LLC’s business was selling insurance and that the telemedicine opportunity was not an insurance product. We have determined that the parties intended “scope” to have its ordinary meaning and that the undisputed facts show that the scope of the LLC’s business at the relevant time was the sale of insurance products and the telemedicine counseling business opportunity is not an insurance product. Consequently, we affirm. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
Justin R. Rogers v. Blount Memorial Hospital, Inc. et al.
This appeal involves a health care liability action filed by the plaintiff against Blount Memorial Hospital, Inc. (“BMHI”) and the doctor who treated the plaintiff at BMHI from September 8, 2012, to September 13, 2012. The plaintiff filed his complaint on December 13, 2013, alleging that the defendant doctor had misdiagnosed his illness, causing a delay in treatment and resultant permanent injuries. Both defendants filed motions to dismiss, which were converted into motions for summary judgment with the filing of additional affidavits. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of BMHI based on, inter alia, the applicable statute of limitations and BMHI's immunity as a governmental entity. |
Blount | Court of Appeals | |
Justin R. Rogers v. Blount Memorial Hospital, Inc. et al. - Concurring
I concur fully in the majority’s decision in this case. I write separately only to express my opinion that the appropriate summary judgment standard to be applied by Tennessee courts now is as set forth in Rye v. Women’s Care Center of Memphis, MPLLC, ___ S.W.3d ___, 2015 WL 6457768 (Tenn. 2015), rather than Tenn. Code Ann. § 20-16-101. I believe our Supreme Court intended for the retroactive application of Rye when it stated: “In civil cases, judicial decisions overruling prior cases generally are applied retrospectively.” Rye, ___ S.W.3d at ___n.9, 2015 WL 6457768 at *35 n.9. While there may be very little, if any, difference between the summary judgment standard as set forth in Rye and as contained in Tenn. Code Ann. § 20-16-101, I believe Rye sets the standard and is controlling on the courts of this State. |
Blount | Court of Appeals | |
Cathy Turnbo Franks v. Ronald Franks
This is the second appeal of this case involving various financial issues relative to a divorce. Husband appeals the trial court‘s determination of several factual findings relative to alimony, including Wife‘s ability to secure employment, Husband‘s ability to earn in the future, the award of attorney‘s fees to wife, and the value of several marital assets divided in the property division, including the value of an LLC jointly owned by the parties. We now vacate the order of the trial court and remand for further proceedings. |
Hardin | Court of Appeals | |
Richard W. Gibbs, et al v. Clint Gilleland, et al.
Buyers of unimproved real property seek rescission of a Lot/Land Purchase and Sale Agreement on the ground of mutual mistake. Buyers purchased the property for the purpose of constructing a house. It is undisputed that at the time of contracting, Buyers and Sellers believed the property was suitable for that purpose. One week after obtaining the necessary building permits and commencement of construction, Buyers were informed by the county that the property was substantially below the required Base Flood Elevation (“BFE”) and that construction must cease immediately. Buyers halted construction and hired a professional engineer to address the issue. Based on unique drainage and flooding concerns, the engineer concluded that the property was not suitable for construction of a residential building and it had not been suitable for such purpose since the land was subdivided in 1999. After Buyers sued for rescission of the contract, both parties filed motions for summary judgment. The trial court found that when the contract was entered into the property was suitable for construction of a house and it only became unsuitable due to the subsequent action of the county in setting the BFE. Therefore, the court concluded there was no mutual mistake of fact. Based on this finding the court granted Sellers’s motion for summary judgment and summarily dismissed the complaint. Buyers appeal. We conclude that, at the time of contracting, the parties were operating under a mutual mistake as to a contemporaneously verifiable fact; nevertheless, the contract assigned the risk of mistake to Buyers. Therefore, rescission on the ground of mutual mistake is not available. Accordingly, we affirm. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
William L. Jenkins v. Tennessee Department of Corrections, et al.
Certiorari proceeding in which an inmate seeks review of a disciplinary proceeding finding him guilty of assault on another inmate. Petitioner asserts that the disciplinary board violated various Tennessee Department of Correction regulations in the conduct of the hearing and that the trial court erred in dismissing the petition. Finding no error, we affirm the decision of the trial court. |
Wayne | Court of Appeals | |
Shemeka Ibrahim v. Mark Williams, et al.
Plaintiff filed a health care liability action against multiple healthcare providers but did not comply with the statutes governing healthcare liability actions. Defendants filed motions to dismiss and for summary judgment. The trial court granted the motions. Plaintiff appeals, and finding no error, we affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Daniel W. Mithcell v. Tricia Lurlene Hall
This appeal arises from a dispute over modification of child support. Daniel W. Mitchell (“Petitioner”) filed a petition against his ex-wife Tricia Lurlene Hall (“Respondent”) in the Circuit Court for Sevier County (“the Trial Court”) seeking a modification of his child support obligation given the parties’ second oldest child turning 18. The matter was referred to a Special Master. The Trial Court designated the date of the final hearing, March 31, 2014, as the effective date for the modification of child support rather than the date when the child at issue reached age 18, and ordered Petitioner to pay an arrearage accordingly. |
Sevier | Court of Appeals | |
Stephanie Nichole Lee v. Christopher Cornell Eskridge
The trial court, upon finding that Christopher Cornell Eskridge (Respondent) repeatedly violated orders of protection issued to protect Stephanie Nicole Lee (Petitioner), sentenced him to ten days in jail and required him to post a $2,500 bond in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-3-610(b)(2) (2014). On appeal, Respondent challenges the constitutionality of this statute. None of the issues raised on appeal, including the constitutional issue presented by Respondent, were raised with the trial court. Furthermore, Respondent did not timely notify the Attorney General of his constitutional challenge, as required by Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-14-107(b) (2000) and Tenn. R. Civ. P. 24.04. We hold that Respondent waived these issues. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
James Burton v. Faye Barna
Due to the inadequacies of appellant’s brief and appellant’s failure to provide a transcript or statement of the evidence, we conclude that he has waived consideration of this appeal, and we affirm the judgment of the chancery court. |
Fentress | Court of Appeals | |
S. Carmack Garvin, Jr., et al v. Joy Malone
Plaintiffs and Defendant were involved in a motor vehicle accident. Plaintiffs allege Defendant was negligent in causing her van to run into the rear of their car and that as a result of Defendant’s negligence, Plaintiffs suffered damages. During trial, Defendant introduced photographs of the vehicles taken immediately after the collision, which the trial court permitted, over Plaintiffs’ objection, for the purpose of impeaching Plaintiffs’ testimony. The evidence was heard by a jury, which determined Defendant was not at fault. Plaintiffs filed a motion for a new trial, which the trial court denied. On appeal, Plaintiffs argue the trial court erred by allowing the jury to consider Defendant’s photographic evidence for purposes of impeachment. We conclude the trial court did not err and affirm its judgment. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
In re Lilly C. et al.
This appeal involves termination of a father's rights to three children. The trial court found the father, who was incarcerated at the time of the final hearing, had abandoned the children by engaging in such conduct prior to incarceration as to exhibit a wanton disregard for their welfare, in that there was a history of domestic violence between the father and the children's mother. Further, the father had violated his probation by failing a drug screen. The court also found clear and convincing evidence revealed the father had not substantially complied with the provisions of the permanency plans. As a result, the court found termination was in the best interest of the children. The father appeals. We affirm. |
Cumberland | Court of Appeals | |
Lamar Tennessee, LLC DBA Lamar Advertising of Knoxville v. City of Knoxville, Tennessee, Et Al.
In 2006, Lamar Tennessee, LLC began the conversion of two of its billboards from ―vinyl-faced to ―digital display‖ utilizing light-emitting diode (LED) technology. Before Lamar could complete these conversions, a sign inspector for the City of Knoxville issued a stop-work order on each of the billboards. A zoning inspector for the City, in her own name, subsequently filed a complaint against Lamar, grounded in Tenn. Code Ann. § 13-7-208(a)(2) (Supp. 2005), seeking temporary and permanent injunctive relief prohibiting Lamar from ―repurposing‖ the two vinyl-faced billboards into billboards featuring LED digital displays. In response, Lamar filed a complaint against the City seeking a declaration that the two billboards were not in violation of the zoning regulations and/or that the provisions of the zoning regulations pertaining to billboards with digital displays were unconstitutional. These cases were eventually consolidated. Each party filed a motion for summary judgment. The trial court granted the City‘s motion and permanently enjoined Lamar from converting the billboards at issue from vinyl structures into billboards with LED digital displays. Lamar appeals. We affirm. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
In re Landon H.
This case began as a petition for dependency and neglect filed in juvenile court by the child’s grandmother. The child’s father filed his own petition seeking custody. The juvenile court found the child to be dependent and neglected and awarded custody to the father. Upon appeal to circuit court, mother stipulated the child was dependent and neglected as of the date the petition was filed. The circuit court accepted the stipulation and found the child dependent and neglected on the date of the petition. After a five-day hearing on the proper disposition of the child, the circuit court awarded custody jointly to the child’s mother and grandmother, with certain conditions. The father appeals the circuit court’s decision, arguing the court erred in awarding custody to the mother and the grandmother. Because the circuit court failed to determine whether the child was dependent and neglected as of the date of the de novo hearing, we vacate the circuit court’s order and remand for a new hearing. |
Maury | Court of Appeals |
