Samuel Adam Reese v. Lynette Erin Reese
This appeal arises from a divorce. After trial, the trial court entered a final decree of |
Court of Appeals | ||
Jon Vazeen v. Martin Sir
Former client sued his former attorney for legal malpractice and fraud. The trial court initially dismissed all claims, but was reversed on appeal as to the fraud claims. The trial court then held a bench trial and found in favor of the defendant attorney. In a second appeal, this Court affirmed the dismissal of all fraud claims except a fraud claim related to the hourly rate charged under the parties’ written contract. That claim was remanded to the trial court for purposes of consideration of the factors outlined in in Alexander v. Inman, 974 S.W.2d 689 (Tenn. 1998). On remand, the trial judge denied the plaintiff’s efforts to disqualify him from the case and to enlarge the scope of the trial. A bench trial was eventually held, despite the plaintiff’s multiple efforts to postpone. After a late motion to continue was denied, the plaintiff did not attend trial. Following the bench trial, the trial court once again ruled in favor of the defendant attorney, resulting in the dismissal of all claims against him. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee, ex rel., Nene Gloria Ananaba v. Okebugwu Sunju Ananaba
Mother filed a petition alleging civil and criminal contempt against the father of her child |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Benjamin McCurry v. Agness McCurry
Because the order from which the appellant has filed an appeal does not constitute a final |
Court of Appeals | ||
Mark T. Stinson, Sr. v. Mr. Cooper
Appellant, Mark T. Stinson, has appealed an order of the Shelby County Chancery Court |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Amayzha L.
This is an appeal of the termination of a father’s parental rights. The Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) filed a petition in the Juvenile Court for Davidson County (“Juvenile Court”) seeking the termination of the parental rights of Horace L. (“Father”) to his minor daughter Amayzha L. (“the Child”). The Juvenile Court found that DCS had established by clear and convincing evidence the following statutory grounds: (1) abandonment by failure to provide a suitable home, (2) persistence of conditions, and (3) failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume legal and physical custody of or financial responsibility for the Child. Determining that DCS presented insufficient evidence to establish that the Child was removed from Father’s home or physical or legal custody, we reverse the grounds of abandonment by failure to provide a suitable home and persistence of conditions. We affirm the Juvenile Court’s judgment in all other respects, including the termination of Father’s parental rights. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Tinsley L.
In this appeal from the termination of parental rights, the mother does not challenge the |
Court of Appeals | ||
In Re Conservatorship of Gregory Blake Arvin
This appeal arises from a conservatorship proceeding. The issues on appeal concern the assessment of the fees of the attorney ad litem in the amount of $1,060. The trial court assessed the fees against the petitioners and the respondent, jointly and severally. The petitioners appeal, contending that, pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 34-1-125, the court had no discretion but to assess the fees of the attorney ad litem against the respondent. The petitioners and the estate of the respondent also challenge the assessment of the fees against the respondent on other grounds. We have determined that the trial court was statutorily required to assess the fees of the attorney ad litem against the respondent and that it lacked the discretion to assess the fees against the petitioners. We have also determined that the petitioners have no standing to challenge the assessment of the fees against the respondent and that the issues raised by the estate of the respondent lack merit. Thus, we reverse the assessment of the fees of the attorney ad litem against the petitioners but affirm the assessment of the fees against the respondent. |
Bedford | Court of Appeals | |
CIC Services, LLC v. Suresh Prabhu, et al.
This case involves a dispute arising from services provided by the appellee, CIC Services, LLC (“CIC”), a creator and manager of “captive” insurance companies, to the appellant corporation, SRM Group, Inc. (“SRM”). SRM hired CIC to form and manage two captive insurance companies to serve SRM in risk management, and the parties memorialized their relationship in two management agreements, one for each of the newly formed captive insurance companies. When CIC subsequently ended its contractual relationship with SRM for cause, SRM demanded arbitration pursuant to the arbitration clauses contained in the agreements. The arbitrator dismissed all of SRM’s claims. CIC then demanded a second arbitration, seeking attorney’s fees, expenses, and costs incurred during the first arbitration and stating claims for breach of contract and fraudulent inducement against SRM. The second arbitrator ultimately awarded to CIC $261,487.04 in attorney’s fees, expenses, and costs incurred during the first arbitration proceeding, pursuant to the indemnity clauses in the parties’ management agreements, and $137,337.50 in attorney’s fees, expenses, and costs because CIC was the substantially prevailing party in the second arbitration. When SRM did not respond to CIC’s demand for payment of this award, CIC moved for confirmation of the award in the Shelby County Circuit Court (“trial court”). SRM responded by filing a motion with the trial court to modify or vacate the award. After the parties fully briefed the issues, the trial court confirmed the award in full and concomitantly denied SRM’s motion to modify or vacate. SRM timely appealed. Upon review, we affirm the trial court’s confirmation of the arbitration award, determining that because appellant Suresh Prabhu voluntarily participated in both arbitrations without raising objection to the potential attachment of liability against him as an individual, Mr. Prabhu and SRM have waived objection to the attachment of individual liability to Mr. Prabhu. We further determine that the trial court properly denied SRM’s motion to vacate the award because the second arbitrator acted within her discretion to direct the arbitration procedure and SRM has failed to show any of the criteria necessary to meet the high standard for vacatur pursuant to the Federal Arbitration Act or the Commercial Rules of the American Arbitration Association.
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Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Loretta Hartman v. Tina Massengill
This appeal concerns the ownership of property used by the defendant but owned by her |
Court of Appeals | ||
In Re Austin S. Et Al.
Mother appeals the termination of her parental rights to her children. Upon our review, we |
Court of Appeals | ||
Stephen Rushing v. Dawn Rushing (Strickland)
This is an appeal of a modification to a permanent parenting plan. Dawn Rushing |
Court of Appeals | ||
In Re Estate of Mary Hutcheson Moon Ballard
In this matter concerning the interpretation of a will, John Moon and Shannon Moon (“John” and “Shannon”) (“Claimants,” collectively) filed a claim in the Chancery Court for Hamilton County (“the Trial Court”) against the estate of their late sister, Mary Hutcheson Moon Ballard(“Mary”).1 Arthur Ballard (“Arthur”), Mary’s husband, filed an exception to the claim. Mary’s grandmother, Elise Chapin Moon (“Elise”), had established a trust for her grandchildren, including Mary. It is Claimants’ position that a bloodline provision in Elise’s will (“the Moon Will”) excludes spouses of grandchildren from receiving trust proceeds. The Trial Court, having put certain questions to a jury, ruled in favor of Arthur. Claimants appeal. We hold that once Mary received the funds from the trust, which dissolved in 2016, the funds were hers outright and no longer subject to the will’s “bloodline” restriction. We hold further that the Trial Court erred by putting questions to a jury when the case was resolvable as a matter of law. However, the error was harmless. We affirm the judgment of the Trial Court. |
Court of Appeals | ||
Rex Sullivan Ex Rel. Rose Sullivan v. James Carden Et Al.
This appeal concerns a claim of negligence. Rex Sullivan, individually and in his capacity as the Administrator Ad Litem for his deceased wife (“Plaintiff”),1filed a complaint in the Rhea County Circuit Court (“the Trial Court”), seeking damages from James Carden and Carden Trucking Company (“Defendants”)for injuries Plaintiff suffered in a November 2018 car accident. Plaintiff alleged that his accident was caused by Defendants’ failure to remove excessive mud they had deposited onto the rural road he drove on. The Trial Court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants. Plaintiff appeals. We affirm the Trial Court’s grant of summary judgment with respect to Plaintiff’s claim for punitive damages, which Plaintiff has not appealed. Otherwise, given the existence of genuine issues of material fact such as how much mud was deposited on to the road and the foreseeability of the risk of injury, we reverse the judgment of the Trial Court and remand for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion. |
Court of Appeals | ||
Timothy Hopson v. Smith Wholesale, LLC
This is an appeal from a final order entered on July 6, 2023. The Notice of Appeal was not |
Court of Appeals | ||
Mechelle Hollis Ex Rel. Nicole N. Et Al v. Manuel M. Sanchez
After a car accident, a plaintiff sued a defendant, but never served him with process. Almost two years later, the defendant moved to dismiss the case as time-barred. The plaintiff opposed the dismissal and moved for an enlargement of time to serve the defendant. The court denied the requested enlargement and dismissed the case. We affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Amanda B. Wolfe v. Surgoinsville Beer Board Et Al.
Following the denial of her application for a beer permit, Amanda B. Wolfe (“Ms. Wolfe”) |
Court of Appeals | ||
In Re Estate of Charles Leonard Welch
This appeal arises from a will contest by the decedent’s children. Counsel for the contestants and counsel for the executrix engaged in settlement negotiations on behalf of their clients. The executrix submitted a motion to enforce the settlement. After an evidentiary hearing on the motion, the Probate Court granted the motion and entered an order of voluntary dismissal of the contestants’ claims with prejudice. The contestants appeal. We affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Jayla S.
The parents of Jayla S. appeal the termination of their parental rights. Jayla was removed from her parents’ custody because Jayla tested positive for amphetamines at birth. The Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) subsequently filed a petition to terminate both parents’ parental rights. Following a two-day trial, the trial court found that multiple grounds for termination had been proven, including the ground of severe child abuse. Finding it also to be in the best interest of Jayla that her parents’ parental rights be terminated, the court terminated both parents’ parental rights. This appeal followed. Finding no error, we affirm. |
Lincoln | Court of Appeals | |
Roger Fulmer et al. v. Sarco, GP d/b/a Sarco et al.
This is an action to recover amounts due under a promissory note. The trial court awarded the plaintiffs $50,000.00 in compensatory damages, attorney’s fees of one-third of that amount, and prejudgment interest on both the compensatory damages and attorney’s fees. We affirm the trial court’s judgment that the individual defendants are individually liable on the obligation and that the ad damnum clause permitted the plaintiffs to recover $50,000.00 in compensatory damages, plus attorney’s fees and prejudgment interest. We vacate the attorney’s fees award and remand for a determination of the plaintiffs’ reasonable attorney’s fees. We reverse the award of prejudgment interest on the attorney’s fees award only. Affirmed in part, vacated in part, reversed in part, and remanded. |
Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
Cole Bryan Howell, III v. United Rentals (North America), Inc., Et Al.
The plaintiff appeals from the grant of summary judgment to the defendants in this action. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Alsco, Inc. v. Tennessee Department of Revenue
A taxpayer who rented hygienically-clean textiles to its customers challenged the revocation of three industrial machinery tax exemption certificates that it had previously been issued. An administrative judge determined that the taxpayer was not entitled to the exemption because the taxpayer’s operations did not constitute “manufacturing” as they were not necessary for processing tangible personal property. The taxpayer appealed to the Chancery Court for Davidson County. The chancery court reversed after concluding that the administrative decision was not supported by substantial and material evidence. Discerning no error, we affirm the chancery court’s decision. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Alsco, Inc. v. Tennessee Department of Revenue- Dissenting
I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion. As the majority notes, an administrative judge determined that the taxpayer’s sanitizing operations in this case do not constitute “manufacturing” as they are not “processing” tangible personal property. The administrative judge reasoned that a taxpayer is required to show that its activity fundamentally changes or transforms the property from the state or form in which it originally existed. Applying that standard, the administrative judge found that the state or form of the linens has not been changed or altered by the cleaning, as they remain the same linens before and after. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Monica A. Davalos (Dale) v. Douglas C. Dale
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Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Chad Aaron Reagan v. Rachel Bogart Reagan
The March 9, 2023 order from which the appellant has appealed was not effectively |
Court of Appeals |
