Kenneth Beal v. Nashville Electric Service a/k/a Electric Power Board of Nashville and Davidson County
Employee had been absent from work on paid sick leave for an extended period of time when employer conducted an investigation and learned that he was working as a real estate agent. An administrative law judge conducted a hearing and recommended termination. The Board unanimously upheld the ALJ's findings and terminated employee. The chancery court affirmed. We affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Estate of David Holt Ralston, Deceased by John A. Ralston, Personal Representative v. Fred R. Hobbs, et al.
The personal representative of a decedent's estate filed This action to rescind twelve deeds, all of which were executed by the decedent's attorney-In-fact without the decedent's knowledge and for which the decedent received no consideration, or alternatively for damages. the attorney-In-fact conveyed the property to himself, his mother, and his daughter. the personal representative alleges that the attorney-In-fact breached his fiduciary duty In making the transfers. the trial court agreed, and rescinded the conveyances for property still owned by the attorney-In-fact and awarded monetary damages against the attorney-In-fact for the value of property subsequently conveyed to innocent third parties. the attorney-In-fact appeals claiming, inter alia, the personal representative lacks standing to bring a claim on behalf of the estate involving real property, that the action is barred by the statute of limitations, and that the trial court erred In finding that the durable power of attorney did not authorize him to transfer the property. We have determined the personal representative has standing to maintain This action and the action was timely filed. We affirm the trial court's finding that the attorney-In-fact breached his fiduciary duty by conveying the property to himself, his mother, and his daughter for no consideration to the decedent. We also affirm the rescission of the deeds to property the attorney-In-fact still owns and the award of damages against the attorney-In-fact for the value of the real property that has since been conveyed to innocent third parties. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
Janson Pope v. Sayuri Pope
In this divorce action, Wife appeals the trial court's division of property and award of alimony and attorney's fees to Husband and asserts that the manner and conduct of the hearing violated her right to procedural due process. We reverse the judgment in part and remand the case for the court to classify the parties' property, to value and divide the property it determines to be marital property, and to redetermine the amount of attorney's fees to Husband. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
James Rainwater, et al. v. Sumner County, Tennessee, et al.
Plaintiffs sought a declaratory judgment that a gravel drive running through their property is a private easement rather than a public road. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants, finding that the drive is a public road. Finding this case inappropriate for summary judgment, we reverse the trial court's grant of summary judgment and remand for a trial on the merits. |
Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
Teresa L. Weaver, et al. v. Travis K. Pardue, et al.
This appeal arises out of a primary care physician's alleged negligent and tortious treatment of a longtime patient. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the physician, questioning the credibility of the patient's allegations and holding in part that the physician's alleged conduct could not support a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress. We reverse and remand. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Shirley Nicholson v. Lester Hubbard Realtors, et al.
After plaintiff appealed from general sessions to circuit court, the circuit court entered an order requiring her to file a formal complaint. The circuit court then granted the defendants' motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim. We find no error in the trial court's decision to require plaintiff to file a formal complaint, but we reverse its determination that the amended complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Dawn Lyn Tousignant Gordon vs. Robert Frank Gordon
In this divorce action, the trial court awarded Dawn Lyn Tousignant Gordon ("Wife") 59% of the marital estate, or approximately $231,100. It also ordered Robert Frank Gordon ("Husband") to pay Wife "permanent spousal support" of $2,200 per month. Husband appeals and challenges both the division of marital property and the court's award of alimony in futuro. We modify the trial court's division of marital property and its award of alimony. As modified, the trial court's judgment is affirmed. |
Washington | Court of Appeals | |
Kenneth Ray Fox, Jr. v. Kristi Danielle Fox
The trial court found Husband guilty of two counts of criminal contempt for violation of a court order. Husband appeals the findings of contempt on the ground that he did not receive proper notice. The trial court dismissed a third count of criminal contempt without prejudice and allowed Wife to re-file her claim so as to provide Husband with proper notice. We affirm the court's two findings of contempt and reverse its dismissal of the third count of contempt, finding that Husband was given sufficient notice. We remand the matter to the court for a determination of whether Husband violated the order. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
Tonya Gager v. River Park Hospital
Plaintiff, a nurse practitioner formerly employed by a staffing service and supplied to a hospital emergency department, sued the hospital for retaliatory discharge under Tennessee common law and the Tennessee Public Protection Act, Tenn. Code Ann. _ 50-1-304. The hospital moved for summary judgment, which the trial court granted. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court. |
Warren | Court of Appeals | |
Roy Odom v. Lisa Odom
Father appeals the denial of his Tenn. R. Civ. P. 60 motion to void an order appointing a parenting coordinator. We find that the appeal is now moot. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
Amy Goolsby James v. Chadwick Ryan James
This is a divorce action. Wife asserts the trial court erred by not granting her a new trial, by declaring the parties divorced rather than awarding the divorce to her, and in its division of property, award of alimony, and by not naming her the primary residential parent and setting child support accordingly. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Victor L. Dobbins v. Tennessee Department of Correction, et al.
This appeal involves a petition for writ of certiorari filed by a prisoner seeking review of a disciplinary conviction. The respondents did not oppose the issuance of the writ, and a certified copy of the record of the disciplinary proceedings was filed with the trial court. The respondents then filed a motion for judgment on the record. After review of the parties' briefs and the administrative record, the trial court granted the respondents' motion for judgment on the record. The petitioner inmate appeals. We affirm, concluding that material evidence supported the conviction, and that the petitioner's constitutional rights were not violated. |
Hickman | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee, ex rel., Michael Overton v. Kimberly Robb
The defendant was found in civil contempt for failure to pay child support and sentenced to serve 180 days in jail unless she purged her contempt with the payment of $2,200. Finding the evidence inadequate to support a finding that the defendant had the ability to pay child support when it was due or that she had the ability to pay $2,200 at the time of the hearing in order to purge the sentence, we reverse. |
Dickson | Court of Appeals | |
Allstate Insurance Company vs. Diana Lynn Tarrant, et al
Plaintiff insurer brought this declaratory judgment action to determine which of the two policies issued to defendants insured and their corporation, covered a van which had been involved in an accident. Plaintiff named the insureds as defendants, as well as the third party who had filed a tort action against the insureds for personal injuries. The trial court conducted an evidentiary hearing and ruled that the insureds had told the agency plaintiff to keep the van in dispute on the commercial policy, but it had transferred the van to the insureds' personal policy. The court further ruled that a notice of the transfer was sent to the insureds by plaintiff, and plaintiff sent at least five bills to the insureds that reflected the van was then insured under the personal policy and not the commercial policy. The court concluded that the insureds ratified the change and ruled that the van was insured under the insureds personal policy. On appeal, we reverse and dismiss the action. |
Sevier | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Kaylei M.D.T.
This is a termination of parental rights case. The appellee, Tennessee Department of Children's Services, has filed a motion to dismiss based upon its assertion that the Court "lacks jurisdiction to consider [the appellant's] appeal." We agree with the appellee. Accordingly, this appeal is dismissed with costs taxed to the appellant, Mark J.T. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Michael C.S. & Makanzie A.M.S.
This is a termination of parental rights case. The Department of Children's Services concedes that it did not prove the grounds for termination of parental rights by clear and convincing evidence. We likewise find that procedural errors were committed by the trial court. Accordingly, the trial court's decision is vacated. |
Cocke | Court of Appeals | |
Theo Kampert, et al. v. Valley Farmers Cooperative, et al.
We agreed to hear this extraordinary appeal in order to decide whether the proper venue for a case involving the breach of a construction contract is in the county named in the forum selection clause of the contract, or in the county where the realty is located upon which the construction took place. We hold that the forum selection clause determines the proper venue, because the underlying action cannot fairly be characterized as an action for injury to real property and is, thus, a transitory action. |
Giles | Court of Appeals | |
Performance Food Group of Georgia, Inc., d/b/a PFG Milton's vs. Healthlink, LLC., Healthlink Srvices, LLc. vs. HCC Healthcare of Charlotte, LLC., et al
Plaintiff brought this action against defendant for an unpaid debt. Both parties moved for summary judgment and the trial court granted plaintiff's summary judgment and denied defendant's summary judgment. On appeal, we affirm the trial court's decision. |
Bradley | Court of Appeals | |
Federal Insurance Company, A/S/O Robert and Joanie Emerson vs. Martin Edward Winters, D/B/A Winters Roofing Company
Plaintiff insurer of insured brought this action as a subrogee of the insureds, who had been paid under plaintiff's policy for a fire loss to their home. The insureds had employed a roofer to replace their roof, whose subcontractor caused the fire which destroyed the home. Plaintiff brought this action to recover from defendant roofer who filed a Motion for Summary Judgment and the trial court ruled defendant could not be held liable in tort for the negligent acts of his subcontractor under the facts of this case, and plaintiff could not recover under the theory of contract, because plaintiff could not show that the loss was caused by the contractual services or foreseeable. On appeal, we hold that summary judgment was inappropriate, because under contract law the defendant had a non-delegable duty to see that the work he was contractually obligated to perform was done in a careful, skillful and workmanlike manner. The case is remanded with instructions to proceed in accordance with this Opinion. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Gregory M. Nicholson v. Tonya S. Nicholson
In this divorce case, Wife/Appellant appeals the trial court's division of marital property and denial of her request for alimony. Finding that the trial court correctly valued the dental practice and properly awarded same to Husband/Appellant, we affirm that portion of the trial court's order. However, because the trial court did not specifically determine whether certain debt was separate or marital debt, and, consequently, did not allocate that debt, we vacate the trial court's division of marital property, and remand for a determination of the nature of the marital debt, and division of same. Because the trial court did not meet the requirements of Tenn. Code Ann. _ 36-5-121(i), we vacate the trial court's denial of alimony, and remand for further proceedings concerning Wife/Appellant's need for alimony, and Husband/Appellee's ability to pay same. Affirmed in part; vacated in part, and remanded. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
Bethany (Bumgarner) Schroedel vs. Timothy Adam Bumgarner
Bethany (Bumgarner) Schroedel ("Mother") and Timothy Adam Bumgarner ("Father") are the divorced parents of one minor child ("the Child"). In October of 2007, Mother filed a petition alleging, among other things, that Father was refusing to allow Mother her visitation with the Child. Mother's petition sought, in part, to modify the parenting plan to name Mother as the Child's primary residential parent. After a trial, the Trial Court entered an order on June 29, 2009 finding and holding that a change of circumstances existed that affected the Child's well-being in a meaningful way, but not one sufficient to justify a change in primary residential custody. The trial court's June 29, 2009 order did modify the parenting plan to allow Mother greater visitation. Mother appeals to this Court raising an issue regarding the trial court's refusal to change primary residential custody, and an issuec regarding the trial court's finding her in contempt. We affirm the trial court's order as to the parenting plan, vacate the trial court's order finding Mother in contempt, and remand for further proceedings in compliance with this Opinion. |
Hamblen | Court of Appeals | |
Julie-Cristie (Barone) Neal vs. Veronica Monde Barone, et al
Julie-Cristie (Barone) Neal ("Step-Daughter") brought an action to quiet title to a nearly three hundred acre farm in Cumberland County, Tennessee, against Veronica Monde Barone ("Ex-Wife") and Anthony F. Barone ("Father"). She primarily asserts that she has acquired adverse possession rights in the entire farm pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. _ 28-2-103. The disputed property was also the subject of prior litigation in a circuit court proceeding involving the enforcement of a foreign judgment and fraudulent conveyance claims against Father by Ex-Wife as a judgment creditor. In the present action Ex-Wife moved for summary judgment on several theories including the assertion that filing a lien lis pendens barred Step-Daughter's adverse possession claim. The trial court denied the motion for summary judgment on all grounds. Ex-Wife filed a motion asking the trial court for permission to submit an application for interlocutory appeal on one issue raised on summary judgment _ whether the lien lis pendens tolled the seven-year adverse possession statute found in Tenn. Code Ann. _ 28-2-103 during the circuit court proceeding. The trial court granted that motion and we likewise granted the application for interlocutory appeal on the asserted issue. We reverse the trial court's judgment on the sole issue presented to us. |
Cumberland | Court of Appeals | |
Tina Marie Hodge v. Chadwick Craig
This is a fraud claim between ex-spouses. While the petitioner mother and the respondent were dating, the mother became pregnant, and she told the respondent that the child was his. Consequently, she and the respondent married, and the child was born during the marriage. Years later, the parties divorced, and the respondent paid child support to the mother. After several years, the respondent obtained a DNA test, which revealed that he is not the child's biological father. After he told the mother of the test results, she filed a petition requesting a court-ordered paternity test and modification of the parenting plan. The respondent filed a counter-petition, alleging negligent and/or intentional misrepresentation by the mother for falsely representing that he was the child's biological father. After a bench trial, the trial court awarded the respondent compensatory damages for past child support, medical expenses, and insurance premiums paid for the child, compensatory damages for emotional distress, and attorney fees. The mother now appeals. We conclude that under Tennessee statutes, the respondent cannot recover the past child support, medical expenses, and insurance premiums, as this would be a retroactive modification of a valid child support order. We find that the remaining damages for emotional distress cannot be awarded for the tort of fraud and misrepresentation, because such damages are non-pecuniary. Therefore, we reverse the decision of the trial court. |
Maury | Court of Appeals | |
Roger A. Miller vs.Kimberly Summers Welch
Kimberly Summers Welch ("Mother") gave birth to Aaron A. (the "Child") on July 14, 2004. Prior to the birth, Roger A. Miller ("Father") filed a petition seeking to establish paternity. After the Child was born and a DNA test established that Father was the biological father, Father was ordered to pay $235 per month in child support. This amount was specifically held not to be presumptively correct and Mother was allowed additional time to pursue her claim that Father's income was such that he should pay more child support. The trial court eventually found that Father was capable of earning or presently was earning $40,000 annually. Father also was ordered to pay 10% of Mother's attorney fees. Father appeals both determinations. Mother requests an award of attorney fees incurred on appeal. We affirm the judgment of the trial court and award Mother her attorney fees incurred in this appeal. |
Anderson | Court of Appeals | |
Apac-Atlantic, Inc. et al vs. Samuel Robert Morton d/b/a Morton Construction
The plaintiff, APAC_Atlantic, Inc. ("APAC"), filed this lawsuit against the defendant, Samuel Robert Morton d/b/a Morton Construction, for breach of contract. APAC moved for a default judgment after Mr. Morton failed to answer APAC's complaint within the allowable time limit established by Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12.01. The trial court entered a default judgment, awarding APAC $106,776.20 in damages. Thereafter, Mr. Morton filed a motion to have the default judgment set aside under Tenn. R. Civ. P. 55.02. After a hearing, the trial court determined that Mr. Morton was not entitled to relief from the final judgment. Mr. Morton appealed. We affirm. |
Blount | Court of Appeals |
