Dept. of Children's Svcs. vs. Pamela Cox, et al M1999-01598-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge William B. Cain
Trial Court Judge: Robert L. Holloway
This case presents two issues. The first is whether proper notice was given to the mother of a dependent and neglected child to meet due process requirements and allow adjudication of her right to visitation and of the goal of the permanency plan for the child. The second issue is whether the evidence preponderated against the trial court's decision to change the goal of the permanency plan to termination of parental rights and terminate the mother's visitation. We affirm the circuit court on both issues finding no due process violation and more than adequate evidence to support the trial court's decision.
Lawrence
Court of Appeals
James Dortch, Sr. vs. Evonne Dortch M1999-02053-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge William C. Koch, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Muriel Robinson
This appeal involves a dispute over the division of a marital estate following a seventeen-year marriage. Both parties sought a divorce in the Circuit Court for Davidson County. During a short bench trial, they stipulated that each of them had grounds for divorce but contested the classification, valuation, and division of their separate and marital property. The trial court declared the parties divorced and undertook to divide their marital estate equally. Both parties are dissatisfied with the division of the marital estate. The husband asserts that the trial court made a significant mathematical error in calculating the amount required to equalize the division. For her part, the wife asserts that the trial court misclassified items of separate property as marital property. We have determined that the trial court properly determined that the parties should receive equal shares of the net marital estate. However, we also find that the trial court misclassified a number of items of the wife's separate property and erroneously calculated the amount to be awarded to the wife to equalize the division of the marital estate. Accordingly, we have corrected the errors and affirm the judgment as modified herein.
Davidson
Court of Appeals
Investors Group I, LTD. vs. Knoxville's Community Dev. Corp. E1999-00395-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Sr. Judge William H. Inman
Trial Court Judge: Sharon J. Bell
The complaint seeking damages for breach of contract was signed and filed by a general partner of Investors Group I, Ltd., a limited partnership. The Chancellor dismissed the case, holding the complaint was void because a limited partnership is a legal entity, and can neither appear pro se nor by a general partner who is not a licensed attorney. We affirm.
Knox
Court of Appeals
Shirley Shelburne vs. Frontier Health, et al E2000-02551-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Charles D. Susano, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Thomas J. Seeley, Jr.
This is a negligence action that finds its genesis in the suicide of a county jail inmate. Prior to his death, the decedent had been evaluated by Richard Kirk, a member of a crisis response team operated by the defendant Woodridge Hospital, a facility owned and operated by the defendant Frontier Health. Kirk concluded the decedent did not suffer from any psychiatric illness and did not require further care or treatment. The widow of the decedent, Shirley A. Shelburne, individually and as the next friend of her son, Travis Lee Shelburne, sued Frontier Health on the basis of vicarious liability. In response to the defendant's third motion for summary judgment, the trial court dismissed the plaintiff's action. The plaintiff filed a motion to alter or amend the grant of summary judgment, which was denied. The plaintiff appeals, arguing (1) that this case should be remanded for the trial court to reconsider the evidence submitted in support of the plaintiff's motion to alter or amend in light of the Supreme Court's decision in Harris v. Chern, 33 S.W.3d 741 (Tenn. 2000); (2) that Frontier Health is not entitled to summary judgment, which was granted on the basis of Kirk's alleged statutory immunity; and (3) that Frontier Health's third motion for summary judgment constitutes an improper "appeal" of the denial of its second summary judgment motion by a different trial judge. We affirm.
Carter
Court of Appeals
Arvil Holt, et a; vs. Zula Parton E2000-02695-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge David Michael Swiney
Trial Court Judge: Ben W. Hooper, II
Arvil A. Holt and Beulah Holt Jones ("Plaintiffs") filed this will contest against one of their sisters, Zula Holt Parton ("Defendant"), regarding their Mother's will ("Will"). The case was tried by a jury. During the second day of the jury's deliberations, the Trial Court engaged in ex parte communications with the jury regarding their answers to special interrogatories in a "Special Verdict Form" and their apparent deadlock on the general verdict. The jury foreperson indicated on two occasions that the jury would like to deliberate further. Over objection of Defendant's counsel, however, the Trial Court did not allow for further jury deliberations and entered its judgment. Defendant appeals. We vacate and remand.
Sevier
Court of Appeals
Jerry Grace, et al vs. Mountain States Health Alliance E2000-03031-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Houston M. Goddard
Trial Court Judge: Thomas J. Seeley, Jr.
In this medical malpractice suit the Trial Court granted a summary judgment in favor of Mountain States Health Alliance, d/b/a/ Johnson City Medical Center Hospital and five Doctors. The Trial Court overruled the Plaintiffs' motion to alter or amend his determination that all Defendants were entitled to summary judgment. As to the Doctors, the determination was predicated upon the motion to alter or amend not being timely filed, and as to the Medical Center on the grounds that the delay in submitting materials accompanying the motion to alter or amend was not justified. We affirm.
Washington
Court of Appeals
Kimberly J. Svacha, et al vs. Waldens Creek Saddley Club, et al E2000-03121-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge David Michael Swiney
Trial Court Judge: Rex Henry Ogle
The trial court granted defendants' motion for summary judgment relying, at least in part, on oral testimony from one of the plaintiffs. This testimony was not transcribed, filed with the trial court, and provided to this court as part of the record on appeal. Due to the somewhat peculiar procedural aspects of this case, we conclude that defendants had the responsibility to file a transcript of this testimony. Because we cannot evaluate the propriety of the grant of summary judgment without having before us this evidence relied on by the trial court, we vacate the grant of summary judgment.
Tex Helton, et al vs. Colonial Loan Assoc., Inc. et al E2001-00060-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Houston M. Goddard
Trial Court Judge: John K. Wilson
Tex Helton and his wife sue Colonial Loan Association, Inc., and Lakeview Motors, Inc., seeking damages in connection with Colonial Loan's repossession of an automobile sold to them by Lakeview Motors. The Trial Court granted a summary judgment as to Colonial Loan. The claim as to Lakeview Motors has been concluded and this appeal only concerns the granting of a summary judgment in favor of Colonial Loan. We vacate the order granting summary judgment and remand.
Hawkins
Court of Appeals
Tex Helton, et al vs. Colonial Loan Assoc., Inc. et al E2001-00060-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Houston M. Goddard
Trial Court Judge: John K. Wilson
Tex Helton and his wife sue Colonial Loan Association, Inc., and Lakeview Motors, Inc., seeking damages in connection with Colonial Loan's repossession of an automobile sold to them by Lakeview Motors. The Trial Court granted a summary judgment as to Colonial Loan. The claim as to Lakeview Motors has been concluded and this appeal only concerns the granting of a summary judgment in favor of Colonial Loan. We vacate the order granting summary judgment and remand.
Hawkins
Court of Appeals
Peggy Lane, et al vs. Luella Spriggs, et al E2001-00163-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Charles D. Susano, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Telford E. Forgerty, Jr.
This case involves the validity of an unsigned warranty deed in the plaintiffs' chain of title. Following a bench trial, the court below reformed the deed to add the missing signature. The defendants appeal, arguing, among other things, that the unsigned deed is inoperative and cannot be reformed. We affirm.
Cocke
Court of Appeals
Dennis Mauk vs. Debra Perry, et al E2001-00485-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Charles D. Susano, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Thomas R. Frierson, II
The plaintiff seeks a judicial declaration regarding the proper interpretation of a will. The trial court found a will provision leaving "real property and contents" to the decedent's son, the plaintiff Dennis Mauk, is not ambiguous and that the word "contents" includes a 27-year old mobile home on the decedent's property. The decedent's other four children appeal, contending the will is ambiguous. They argue the trial court erred in failing to consider parol evidence as to the meaning of the subject language. They further contend the trial court erred in ordering a $6,000 bequest to the appellants to be paid into court, thus making it subject to the debts of the estate. We modify the trial court's judgment to provide that the share of personal property bequeathed to each of the decedent's children should be burdened with one-fifth of the decedent's debts. In all other respects, the trial court's judgment is affirmed.
Kenneth Warren v. Columbia/HCA Healthcare, Nashville Memorial Hospital M2000-02579-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Holly M. Kirby
Trial Court Judge: Barbara N. Haynes
This is a malicious prosecution case. The defendants obtained a warrant against the plaintiff after observing a man matching the plaintiff's description attempting to break into a car on the defendants' property. After a jury trial, the plaintiff was found not guilty. Subsequently, the plaintiff instituted a lawsuit against the defendants for malicious prosecution. The trial court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment and the plaintiff now appeals. We affirm, finding that the defendants acted with probable cause and without malice in obtaining the warrant.
Davidson
Court of Appeals
Humphreys County Utility Dist. vs. Schatz Underground Cable, Inc. M2000-02650-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge W. Frank Crawford
Trial Court Judge: Allen W. Wallace
In this negligence action, Plaintiff sued Defendant for damages in connection with the rupture of a gas line. Following a bench trial, the trial court entered judgment for Plaintiff. Defendant appeals. We affirm.
Humphreys
Court of Appeals
Thomas White v. Kathy White M2000-02674-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Alan E. Highers
Trial Court Judge: Arthur E. Mcclellan
This appeal arises from the Appellant's filing of a Petition to Modify the Final Decree of Divorce in the Circuit Court of Sumner County. The Appellant requested a downward deviation in child support and a reduction in alimony. The Appellant also requested that he no longer be required to reimburse the Appellee for health insurance coverage. The Appellee filed a Counter-Petition requesting an upward deviation in child support. Following a trial on the Petition and Counter-Petition, the trial court entered an order reducing the Appellant's child support obligation to $1,000.00 per month. The trial court declined to modify the award of rehabilitative alimony and health insurance coverage. The Appellant appeals the decision of the Circuit Court of Sumner County setting child support at $1,000.00 per month and refusing to modify the award of rehabilitative alimony and health insurance coverage. For the reasons stated herein, we affirm in part and reverse in part the trial court's decision.
Sumner
Court of Appeals
Susan Green v. Leon Moore, et al. M2000-03035-COA-R3-CV
Trial Court Judge: Robert E. Lee Davies
This appeal arises from the breach of a settlement agreement entered into by the Appellants and the Appellee. The Appellee filed a complaint against the Appellants in the Circuit Court for Williamson County, seeking damages for loss of reputation, embarrassment, humiliation, lost wages, loss of earning capacity, and loss of the ability to advance. The Appellants filed a motion to dismiss on the basis that the action was barred by the statute of limitations. The trial court granted in part and denied in part the motion to dismiss.
Williamson
Court of Appeals
Provident Life & Accident Ins. vs.Tina Shankles, et al E2000-02073-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Houston M. Goddard
Trial Court Judge: W. Neil Thomas, III
This is an interpleader bill filed by Provident Life and Accident Insurance Company against four named Beneficiaries in a policy of insurance issued to their father, Arnold Joe Johnson. Two of the Beneficiaries were children by a former marriage of Mr. Johnson, who were added as such shortly before his death. The two Beneficiaries by a subsequent marriage insisted that the provisions of a divorce decree precluded Mr. Johnson from adding his other two children as Beneficiaries. The Trial Court found that all four should share in the proceeds of the policy equally and entered a summary judgment to that effect. We vacate and remand.
Hamilton
Court of Appeals
E2000-02221-COA-R9-CV E2000-02221-COA-R9-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Houston M. Goddard
Trial Court Judge: W. Neil Thomas, III
Hamilton
Court of Appeals
Jerome Felix Havely vs. Almeda Matthews Havely E2000-02275-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge David Michael Swiney
Trial Court Judge: Joyce M. Ward
In 1983, Jerome Felix Havely and Almeda Matthews Havely were divorced. They had entered into a Property Settlement Agreement which was incorporated into the Judgment of Divorce ("Divorce Judgment"). Neither the Divorce Judgment nor the Property Settlement Agreement mentioned the military pension of Jerome Felix Havely ("Plaintiff"). Approximately one month after the entry of the Divorce Judgment, Almeda Matthews Havely ("Defendant") filed a motion essentially seeking relief under Tenn. R. Civ. P. 60.02 in which she alleged that the Divorce Judgment should be set aside because she had not been aware of her entitlement to Plaintiff's military pension. This motion was dismissed in 1984 by the trial court for failure to prosecute. This matter lay dormant for fourteen plus years until Defendant filed two more Rule 60.02 motions. Defendant's third and final Rule 60.02 motion, filed in 1999, is the subject of this appeal. After three notices of hearing were filed, the trial court dismissed Defendant's motion without providing its reasons for the dismissal. Defendant appeals. We affirm.
Hamblen
Court of Appeals
Sherri Vaughn vs. Nathan Vaughn E2000-02281-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Herschel P. Franks
Trial Court Judge: L. Marie Williams
In this divorce case, the husband has appealed the award of alimony, child visitation and support, and the Court's division of marital property. We affirm.
Hamilton
Court of Appeals
Kelly Stillwell vs. Thomas Stillwell E2001-00245-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge David Michael Swiney
Trial Court Judge: John B. Hagler, Jr.
Thomas Stillwell ("Father") appeals the Trial Court's order which he claims improperly modified the original decree establishing child visitation. Father claims this was in error because there was no showing of a material change in circumstances. Father also appeals the Trial Court's order which prohibited him from possessing a firearm when he is exercising visitation with his son. We affirm the Trial Court's determination on visitation, as modified, and vacate the prohibition on Father's possessing a firearm in the presence of his child.
Bradley
Court of Appeals
Catherine Jackson vs. Bruce Jackson E2001-00287-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge David Michael Swiney
Trial Court Judge: Samuel H. Payne
Catherine Dean Jackson ("Plaintiff") filed a Complaint for divorce against her husband, Bruce Lane Jackson ("Defendant"). The parties entered a stipulation, which was approved by the Trial Court, in which they agreed both parties were entitled to a divorce and agreed that Plaintiff be granted custody of their minor child. The parties, however, did not agree on the remaining issues of alimony and the division of marital property and liabilities. Over approximately four years, the Trial Court referred these issues to a Special Master on three occasions. Upon each referral by the Trial Court, the Special Master held a hearing in which he heard arguments and, during the first two hearings, heard testimony from the parties and witnesses. After each hearing, the Special Master filed his report, but did not file a transcript of the hearing with the report as required by Tenn. R. Civ. P. 53.04(1). Among other findings, the Special Master recommended that Plaintiff receive "rehabilitative alimony for life . . . " in the amount of $1,000 per month and that Defendant pay the parties' entire 1994 tax liability. With the exception of modifying the Special Master's alimony recommendation to alimony in futuro, the Trial Court adopted the Special Master's recommendations which precipitated Defendant's appeal. Due to the Special Master's failure to comply with Tenn. R. Civ. P. 53.04(1), we vacate the portion of the the Trial Court's judgment relative to alimony and the 1994 tax liability, affirm the remainder of the judgment, and remand.
Hamilton
Court of Appeals
James Ferguson vs. Debbie Warren W2001-00217-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Holly M. Kirby
Trial Court Judge: J. Steven Stafford
This case involves child visitation with a prison inmate. The child's father has been incarcerated since 1994 at the Northwest Correctional Facility in Lake County, Tennessee. The child resides with his mother in Weakley County, Tennessee. In 1997, the father filed a petition in the Lake County Chancery Court seeking an order requiring the child's mother to allow the father to communicate with his child. The mother failed to respond to the petition. In April 1999, the Lake County Chancery Court sua sponte dismissed the petition, finding that it should have been filed in Weakley County. This Court reversed, holding that lack of venue was a defensewhich was waived when the mother failed to respond. After the case was remanded, the mother sent a letter to the Lake County Chancery Court, advising that a paternity petition had been filed in the Weakley County Juvenile Court. Thereafter, the Lake County Chancery Court transferred the father's petition to the Weakley County Juvenile Court to be determined in conjunction with the paternity petition. The father now appeals the transfer of his petition. We affirm, finding that the trial court acted within its authority in transferring the case to a court with concurrent jurisdiction.
