In Re Ryat M.
In this dependency and neglect case, the juvenile court found the child dependent and neglected and awarded custody to Appellees, maternal grandparents. Appellant/father failed to timely perfect an appeal of the juvenile court’s final order in the dependency and neglect matter. However, father filed a petition to set aside or vacate the same, which the juvenile court denied. On appeal, the circuit court accepted jurisdiction over the dependency and neglect matter, and conducted a de novo hearing; however, the circuit court denied hearing as to “other issues,” including father’s petition to set aside or vacate order. We conclude that the circuit court lacked jurisdiction to review the dependency and neglect petition; as such, we vacate the circuit court’s order on dependency and neglect for lack of jurisdiction. Because there is a question as to whether father’s notice of appeal concerning his motion to set aside or vacate order conferred jurisdiction on the circuit court to review that motion, we vacate the portion of the circuit court’s order wherein it determined that it would hear no other issues on appeal. We remand to the circuit court for determination of whether father perfected an appeal of the juvenile court’s order denying his motion to set aside or vacate order. If the circuit court determines that father perfected the appeal, then the circuit court should proceed with de novo review of father’s motion. |
Macon | Court of Appeals | |
Sentry Select Insurance Company v. Tennessee Farmer's Mutual Insurance Company, Et Al.
This is an action to declare the rights and responsibilities of Sentry Select Insurance Company (“Sentry”) and Tennessee Farmer’s Mutual Insurance Company (“Farmer’s Mutual”). At issue is the meaning of the “other insurance” clauses in the respective policies—whether one of the carriers is the primary insurer or whether the coverage should be prorated. When the insured filed claims against both carriers for a loss in excess of one million dollars in farm equipment, each carrier insisted the other was the primary insurer. Following a hearing on cross motions for summary judgment, the trial court reasoned that the two-year gap between the insured’s purchase of the Sentry policies and subsequent purchase of the Farmer’s Mutual policy demonstrated that the Sentry policies were intended to be primary, and the Farmer’s Mutual policy was intended to be excess, “particularly in light of the clear unambiguous language of the [Farmer’s Mutual] ‘Other Insurance’ clause.” Thus, the court granted summary judgment in favor of Farmer’s Mutual and this appeal followed. Having realized, as other courts have, that “other insurance” clauses are problematic, in that, they have elevated hair splitting and nit picking to a new art form, and having done some hair splitting and nit picking ourselves, we affirm the trial court but on other grounds. Reading the Sentry and Farmer’s Mutual “other insurance” clauses together, we have determined that the Sentry policies were intended as primary and the Farmer’s Mutual policy was intended as excess. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s ruling that Sentry is the primary carrier. |
Macon | Court of Appeals | |
Christina Brooke Tigart v. Charles Shannon Tigart
Appellant/Father and Appellee/Mother’s Marital Dissolution Agreement (“MDA”) and agreed permanent parenting plan (“PPP”) were incorporated into the final decree of divorce. In the PPP, the parties agreed to an upward deviation in Father’s child support obligation. Mother subsequently petitioned the trial court to modify the parenting plan, to hold Father in contempt for failing to comply with certain provisions of the MDA, and to award her attorney’s fees and costs under the MDA. The trial court initially modified the PPP to lower Father’s child support obligations to comport with the child support guidelines; however, the trial court later granted Mother’s Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 59 motion to alter or amend the judgment and reinstated the original upward deviation. The trial court denied Mother’s petition for contempt and her request for attorney’s fees. For the reasons discussed herein, we vacate the trial court’s denial of Mother’s contempt petition and reverse the trial court’s denial of Mother’s request for attorney’s fees and costs under the MDA. The trial court’s orders are otherwise affirmed. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Artemas A., et al.
This appeal involves a petition to terminate parental rights to four children. The juvenile court found by clear and convincing evidence that six grounds for termination were proven: (1) abandonment by failure to support; (2) abandonment by failure to provide a suitable home; (3) substantial noncompliance with the permanency plan; (4) persistent conditions; (5) severe child abuse; and (6) failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume legal and physical custody or financial responsibility of the children. The juvenile court also found that termination was in the best interests of the four children. Only the mother appeals. We affirm. |
Benton | Court of Appeals | |
Masterfit Medical Supply v. Samuel Bada D/B/A Primecare, D/B/A New Primecare
This is an appeal from a trial court’s grant of summary judgment. In a dispute involving unpaid invoices for medical supplies, the trial court ruled in favor of the appellee, finding that the appellant was personally liable for the indebtedness. In so doing, the trial court relied upon the unpaid invoices that were previously found to be admitted by the court pursuant to Rule 36.01 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure after the appellant failed to respond to the appellee’s request for admission. The appellant now appeals. Based on the record on appeal, we affirm the trial court’s grant of summary judgment. |
Madison | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Kaisona B., et al.
This is a termination of parental rights case. Appellant/Mother appeals the trial court’s termination of her parental rights to the two minor children on the grounds of: (1) abandonment by failure to provide a suitable home, Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 36-1-113(g)(1) and 36-1-102(1)(A)(ii); (2) substantial non-compliance with the requirements of the permanency plans, Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(2); (3) persistence of the conditions that led to the children’s removal, Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(3)(A); and (4) failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody, Tenn. Code Ann. §36-1-113(g)(14). Appellant/Father appeals the termination of his parental rights on the grounds of: (1) substantial non-compliance with the requirements of the permanency plans; and (2) failure to manifest an ability and willingness of ability to assume custody. Both Mother and Father also appeal the trial court’s determination that termination of their respective parental rights is in the children’s best interest. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Dyer | Court of Appeals | |
Jennifer King v. Delfasco, LLC Et Al.
This appeal concerns an alleged violation of Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-1-304, the Tennessee Public Protection Act (“TPPA”), as well as common law retaliatory discharge. Jennifer King (“King”), a former shipping and receiving coordinator for Delfasco, LLC, a company that manufactures defense-related products, sued Delfasco, LLC and related entity Delfasco Finance, LLC (“Delfasco” collectively) in the Circuit Court for Greene County (“the Trial Court”) alleging she was wrongfully fired for refusing to share with Delfasco owner Jack Goldenberg (“Goldenberg”) her government-issued password to the Department of Defense (“DOD”) Wide Area Workflow (“WAWF”) system. King had consulted a DOD representative who advised her not to reveal her password. After a trial, the Trial Court found in favor of King and awarded her damages. Delfasco appeals, arguing among other things that King was not asked to perform an illegal act. King raises her own issues concerning damages. We find, inter alia, that the evidence does not preponderate against the Trial Court’s factual findings, and we leave undisturbed the Trial Court’s credibility determinations. |
Greene | Court of Appeals | |
City of Memphis, Tennessee v. Beale Street Development Corporation
After counsel announced that the parties had settled their differences, the trial court entered a consent judgment dismissing all claims with prejudice. One year later, one of the litigants moved to set aside the judgment arguing lack of consent and fraud. The moving party claimed that it never approved the settlement or consented to entry of the dismissal order. The trial court denied the motion. Because the trial court’s decision was not an abuse of discretion, we affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Ronald Whitford Et Al. v. Village Groomer & Animal Inn, Inc.
A property owner filed suit against the owners of a neighboring property, alleging that the neighbors had created a nuisance and trespassed by diverting surface water onto his property and causing a sinkhole to develop. After a trial on the matter, a jury returned a verdict finding that the neighbor had not created a nuisance and had not trespassed. The trial court judge confirmed the jury’s verdict and dismissed all claims against the neighbor with prejudice. Because the record contains material evidence supporting the jury’s verdict, we affirm. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
Sarah H. Richardson v. Benjamin N. Richardson
Mother appeals the trial court’s decision to change the parties’ permanent parenting plan to designate Father as the primary residential parent of the children. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
Abraham Best v. City of Memphis
Former firefighter who alleged miscalculation of his Line of Duty disability benefits brought an action for breach of contract, negligence, and negligent infliction of emotional distress against the City of Memphis. In this appeal from the trial court’s dismissal of the complaint pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 12.02(1) we affirm the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
County of Sumner, In Its Own Capacity And For The Use And Benefit Of The State Of Tennessee, Et Al. v. Delinquent Taxpayers As Shown On The Real Property Tax Records, Jay Kalbes
This is an appeal by a pro se appellant. Due to the deficiencies in the appellant’s brief on appeal, we conclude that he waived consideration of any issues on appeal and hereby dismiss the appeal. |
Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Kendall K.
An issue regarding attorney’s fees remains pending. As such, the order appealed from does not constitute a final appealable judgment, and this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider this appeal. |
Robertson | Court of Appeals | |
Tennessee Farmers Mutual Insurance Co. v. John A. Simmons Et Al.
In the underlying declaratory judgment action, an insurance company sought a judgment that an automobile insurance policy issued to a mechanic does not provide coverage for an accident involving the mechanic. After examining the mechanic under oath, the insurance company moved for summary judgment, arguing that the policy contained a business purpose exclusion for accidents occurring while road testing a vehicle, which the mechanic stated he was doing at the time the accident occurred. The mechanic responded with an affidavit asserting that he was driving the vehicle for personal errands. The trial court denied the motion, finding that there was a genuine issue of material fact as to the mechanic’s purpose for driving the vehicle. At trial, the mechanic testified that he was running personal errands at the time of the accident but offered no explanation for his contradictory sworn statements. Following the close of proof, the insurance company renewed its argument regarding the policy’s exclusion and moved for a directed verdict. The trial court denied the motion and submitted the matter to a jury, which found that the exclusion did not preclude coverage of the accident. |
Loudon | Court of Appeals | |
Lee Ann Polster v. Russell Joseph Polster
In this divorce case, a husband appeals the trial court’s denial of his motion to alter or amend, arguing that the court should not have granted the divorce on the ground of irreconcilable differences or approved the parties’ marital dissolution agreement when the husband purportedly withdrew his consent to the divorce, lacked the capacity to enter into a marital dissolution agreement, and was under duress at the time he executed it. He also argues that his due process rights were infringed. Upon our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. We also award the wife her attorney’s fees for this appeal and remand to the trial court for a calculation of those fees. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Christopher L.
This case concerns the termination of a father’s parental rights to his son. The trial court predicated termination of parental rights on the ground of abandonment by failure to visit and found termination of the father’s parental rights was in the child’s best interest. We have determined that the record contains clear and convincing evidence to support the trial court’s findings and affirm the termination of the father’s parental rights. |
Lewis | Court of Appeals | |
E Solutions For Buildings, LLC v. Knestrick Contractors, Inc., Et Al.
This is the third appeal in a dispute among a general contractor, a subcontractor, and an equipment supplier. Each party blamed the others for delays in a construction project. After the first appeal was dismissed for lack of a final judgment, the trial court held each party partially responsible for the delays and partially responsible for liquidated damages assessed by the owner. In the second appeal, this court modified the judgment in part, reversed it in part, and remanded for further proceedings. On remand, the subcontractor sought to recover from the general contractor discretionary costs of $10,962.42, attorneys’ fees of $220,724.53 under the Prompt Pay Act of 1991, Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 66-34-101 to -704, and “[a]dditional charges.” The trial court awarded some of the requested fees but excluded $100,350 of attorneys’ fees attributed to legal services rendered during the first and second appeal because the subcontractor’s request for appellate attorneys’ fees was untimely, i.e., the relief had not been requested in the pleadings in the prior appeals. The trial court also denied $29,685 in fees incurred in the trial court proceedings for legal services that were “unrelated to [the general contractor].” The trial court also found the subcontractor was not entitled to recover the “[a]dditional charges” because the remand from the Court of Appeals did not authorize such expenses. This appeal followed. The principal issues in this appeal concern the subcontractor’s claims for attorneys’ fees and additional expenses and whether the general contractor’s surety is secondarily liable for one of the judgments. Finding no error, we affirm the trial court’s judgment in all respects. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Fred Auston Wortman, III v. State of Tennessee Board Of Parole, Et Al.
After being denied parole, Fred Auston Wortman, III (“Plaintiff”) filed suit against the State of Tennessee (the “State”), the Tennessee Board of Parole (the “Board”), several board members and other state employees, and two assistant district attorneys in the Chancery Court for Davidson County (the “trial court”). Several defendants moved for dismissal for failure to state a claim for which relief can be granted. The trial court granted the motion to dismiss and Plaintiff appealed to this Court. Because the trial court’s order is not final, however, we lack subject matter jurisdiction to hear this appeal. The appeal is therefore dismissed. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Hunter Ryan Ellis, Et Al. v. Christina L. Duggan, Et Al.
This is a case involving allegations of undue influence. The plaintiffs are the grandchildren of the decedent. The sole defendant at issue on appeal is the decedent’s niece, who also held power of attorney for the decedent during the last years of her life. The transaction at issue occurred roughly six months before the decedent died and consisted of a gift of $176,000 to the niece for the purchase of a house. The executor of the decedent’s estate declined to pursue the claim for undue influence and assigned the cause of action to the decedent’s four grandsons, who were the residuary beneficiaries of the estate. After a five-day bench trial, the trial court found that a confidential relationship existed between the decedent and the defendant niece and that multiple suspicious circumstances existed to support a finding of undue influence. As such, the trial court entered a judgment against the defendant niece for $176,000. However, the trial court denied the plaintiffs’ request for attorney fees on the basis that they were “not available under the current caselaw relating to undue influence.” The defendant niece appeals, challenging the finding of undue influence. The plaintiffs appeal the denial of their request for attorney fees. Having carefully reviewed the voluminous record, we affirm the finding of undue influence and the judgment against the defendant niece. We reverse the denial of the plaintiffs’ request for attorney fees and remand for a reasonable award of attorney fees incurred by the plaintiffs in the trial court and on appeal. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
IN RE A.W.
A mother and an unknown father were the subjects of a petition to terminate parental rights and to adopt a child. Only mother appeals. She argues that she lacked notice of the proceedings and that the petitioners failed to comply with the parental termination statutes. She also contests the statutory grounds relied on for terminating her parental rights and the trial court’s determination that termination was in her child’s best interest. We affirm the termination of the mother’s parental rights. But because the record does not reflect that the unknown father was served under the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure or the statutes governing substituted service, we vacate the judgment terminating his parental rights. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
Bobby Scott Smith v. Barbara Diane (Fuston) Smith
A husband and wife sought to end their long-term marriage. After a prolonged trial, the court classified, valued, and equitably divided the marital estate. The court also ordered both parties to pay their own attorney’s fees. The wife filed a motion to alter or amend the final decree. Acknowledging errors in the initial decree, the court issued an amended divorce decree. Among other things, the court amended the value of the marital residence. Both parties raise issues on appeal. We find the evidence does not preponderate against the court’s classification of the husband’s interest in several parcels of real property as marital property. We also conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion in amending the value of the marital residence, dividing the marital estate, or declining to award attorney’s fees to the wife. So we affirm. |
Wilson | Court of Appeals | |
Melissa Ann (Letner) Grayson v. Elmer Wayne Grayson
This appeal arose from a 2011 divorce decree awarding to the wife one-half of the husband’s military retirement pay that had accumulated during the term of the marriage. At the time of the husband’s retirement in 2018, the United States Defense Finance and Accounting Service would not disburse retirement funds to the wife due to deficient award language contained in the 2011 order. The Defense Finance and Accounting Service explained in a letter addressed to the wife that the 2011 order had failed to provide a method to calculate the marital portion of the husband’s retirement pay and that it had no way to calculate retirement pay that had “accumulated during the term of the marriage.” In order to effectuate the enforcement of its intended division of the husband’s military retirement pay, the trial court attempted to correct its order by replacing “accumulated during the term of the marriage” with language compliant with the United States Department of Defense Financial Management Regulations (“DoD Regulations”) and specifying that the wife should be awarded fifty percent of the husband’s disposable military retired pay based upon his military pay grade rank and his creditable service years as of the date of the divorce. |
Monroe | Court of Appeals | |
Tennessee Department of Human Services v. Andrew Jackson Heaton
A non-attorney filed a notice of appeal as next friend of Andrew Jackson Heaton. As a non-attorney next friend may not practice law while acting on behalf of an infant or incompetent, this appeal is hereby dismissed. |
Washington | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Kierani C.
This is a termination of parental rights case focusing on Kierani C., the minor child (“the Child”) of Christopher A., Sr. (“Father”), and Keona C. (“Mother”). In August 2017, Mother surrendered her parental rights to the Child before the Shelby County Chancery Court (“chancery court”).1 At that time, the Child was placed in the legal custody and partial guardianship of Hannah’s Hope United Methodist Adoption and Pregnancy Counseling (“Hannah’s Hope”) and the physical custody of pre-adoptive parents, Katherine B. and Adrian B. In September 2017, Hannah’s Hope filed a petition in the chancery court to terminate Father’s parental rights to the Child. In January 2018, Father filed a petition to establish parentage in the Memphis and Shelby County Juvenile Court (“juvenile court”), and in May 2018, Katherine B. and Adrian B. filed a petition in the Shelby County Circuit Court (“trial court”) to terminate Father’s parental rights to the Child. Upon motions filed by Katherine B. and Adrian B., all matters pertaining to the Child were subsequently transferred to the trial court, which consolidated the actions. Following a bench trial, the trial court granted both termination petitions upon its finding clear and convincing evidence of ten statutory grounds, including four abandonment grounds, specifically that Father had willfully failed to (1) visit the Child in the four months preceding the petition’s filing by Hannah’s Hope, (2) financially support the Child in the four months preceding each petition’s filing, (3) visit Mother during the four months preceding the Child’s birth, and (4) make reasonable payments toward Mother’s financial support during the four months preceding the Child’s birth, as well as six grounds applicable to a putative father, specifically that Father had failed to (5) pay a reasonable share of expenses related to the Child’s birth, (6) make reasonable and consistent payments for the Child’s support, (7) seek reasonable visitation with the Child, (8) file a petition to establish paternity within thirty days of receiving notice of alleged paternity, and (9) manifest an ability and willingness to assume legal and physical custody of the Child, and, additionally, that (10) placement of the Child in Father’s legal and physical custody would pose a risk of substantial harm to the Child’s welfare. The trial court further found by clear and convincing evidence that it was in the Child’s best interest to terminate Father’s parental rights. Father has appealed. We hold that under Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-1-113(g)(9)(A)(ii) and (iii), a putative father’s efforts made after the termination petition’s filing may be considered in reviewing the respective grounds involving failure to support the child and failure to seek or maintain visitation with the child. Therefore, having determined that clear and convincing evidence did not support the trial court’s findings that Father’s efforts to support and visit the Child made after the respective petitions’ filings were unreasonable or token, we reverse the trial court’s findings as to these two grounds. We affirm the trial court’s judgment terminating Father’s parental rights in all other respects. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Guidesoft, Inc. D/B/A Knowledge Services v. State Protest Committee, State of Tennessee, Et Al.
This appeal concerns a bid protest. UWork.com, Inc., d/b/a Covendis Technologies (“Covendis”) successfully bid on a contract to manage a network of temporary workers for the State of Tennessee. Guidesoft, Inc. d/b/a Knowledge Services (“Knowledge Services”), an unsuccessful bidder, filed a protest with the Central Procurement Office (“the CPO”). The CPO dismissed Knowledge Services’ bid for insufficient bond. Knowledge Services appealed to the State Protest Committee (“the Committee”), which denied the appeal. Knowledge Services then filed a petition for common law writ of certiorari in the Chancery Court for Davidson County (“the Trial Court”). After a hearing, the Trial Court dismissed Knowledge Services’ amended petition. Knowledge Services now appeals to this Court, arguing that under Tenn. Code Ann. § 12-3-514(d), its protest bond should be based on 5% of the lowest evaluated cost proposal rather than 5% of the State’s estimated maximum liability as found below. We hold, inter alia, that the protest bond statute is meant to protect the State, and the appropriate protest bond amount is based on the costs the State may incur rather than a bidder’s proposed cost. Further, the fee relied upon by Knowledge Services to calculate its protest bond is but a small portion of the contract at issue, which is estimated to cost the State $190,000,000. The Committee did not exceed its jurisdiction or act illegally, arbitrarily, or fraudulently. We affirm the Trial Court. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals |
