Stargate Auto Sales, LLC v. David Gerregano, Commissioner of the Tennessee Department of Revenue
The Tennessee Department of Revenue audited a car dealership and assessed unpaid taxes against the business. After an informal review by the Commissioner of the Tennessee Department of Revenue, the auto dealership filed suit in the Chancery Court for Davidson County to challenge the assessment. The trial court found that the auto dealership’s complaint had been filed one day past the applicable filing period and dismissed the action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Finding no error, we affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Michael Beinke, et al. v. Adam Roberson d/b/a 38 Construction, et al.
This appeal involves the right to a nonsuit pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 41.01. Two plaintiffs (an individual and a limited liability company) filed this lawsuit against several defendants, asserting eight causes of action arising out of a construction contract. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss. At a hearing, the trial judge orally ruled that the motion to dismiss was denied as to all claims, with one exception. The trial judge took under advisement whether Count 2, asserting a violation of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act, was barred by the statute of limitations. Four days after the hearing, the plaintiffs filed a notice of voluntary dismissal without prejudice along with a proposed order to that effect. In response, the defendants filed a “motion in opposition” to the proposed order of voluntary dismissal, asking the trial court to delay entry of the order of voluntary dismissal until the trial court entered an order addressing the TCPA claim. The trial court ultimately ruled that the defendants had a “vested right” that prevented the plaintiffs from voluntarily dismissing the TCPA claim from the moment the trial court took the matter under advisement. The trial court then proceeded to analyze the TCPA claim. Although the issue taken under advisement related to the statute of limitations, the trial court sua sponte dismissed the TCPA claim asserted by the individual plaintiff because the court found that he did not meet the definition of a “consumer” pursuant to the TCPA. The trial court then considered the statute of limitations issue as it related to the TCPA claim asserted by the remaining plaintiff. The trial court found that the TCPA claim was not barred by the statute of limitations and denied the motion to dismiss on that basis. Having resolved the motion to dismiss as to the TCPA claim, the trial court ruled that the nonsuit then became “effective,” as of the date of the trial court’s order, resulting in voluntary dismissal of all claims except the individual plaintiff’s TCPA claim, which the trial court sua sponte dismissed with prejudice. The individual plaintiff appealed, asserting, among other things, that the trial court erred by concluding that the defendants had obtained a vested right and by delaying entry of the order of nonsuit so that the trial court could rule on the motion to dismiss. For the following reasons, we reverse the decision of the trial 06/12/2024 - 2 - court to the extent it dismissed the individual’s TCPA claim with prejudice and remand for entry of an order under Rule 41.01 dismissing all claims without prejudice. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
Robert R. Batson, Sr. Revocable Living Trust, by Sean Batson v. Diane Batson-Smith Et Al.
The Petitioners seek accelerated interlocutory review of an order denying their motion to |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Jaylynn J.
This appeal involves the termination of parental rights of a mother. The juvenile court found by clear and convincing evidence that five grounds for termination were proven and that termination was in the best interest of the child. The mother appeals. On appeal, DCS maintains that four grounds for termination were sufficiently proven against the mother. We vacate one ground due to insufficient findings by the trial court. We conclude that the three other remaining grounds for termination were sufficiently proven, but due to insufficient findings in the termination order, we vacate the court’s determination that termination of the mother’s parental rights was in the best interest of the child and remand for the court to consider all of the relevant best interest factors and detail its findings. Accordingly, we affirm in part, reverse in part, vacate in part, and remand for further proceedings. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Matthew Ooten v. Jason Baril
The plaintiff, a founding member of a law firm, filed this action against other members. The trial court found that the defendant members violated their duty of good faith and fair dealing, breached their contract with the plaintiff, violated their fiduciary duty toward the plaintiff, engaged in a conspiracy, and committed conversion. We affirm the ruling of the trial court. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Temperance A.
Mother appeals the termination of her parental rights. The trial court found four statutory grounds for termination: abandonment by failure to visit, abandonment by failure to support, persistent conditions, and failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody. The trial court also concluded termination was in the child’s best interest. Neither the guardian ad litem nor Mother received notice of the trial court’s Order. Becoming aware of the trial court’s Order more than thirty days after the decision, Mother filed a motion asking the trial court to set aside and then re-enter its final order, seeking to ensure that she could still appeal. The trial court granted Mother’s motion. Mother appeals, arguing the trial court erred with regard to each ground of termination that it found and that its conclusion as to the best interest of the child was also in error. On appeal, Petitioners, paternal grandparents seeking to terminate Mother’s parental rights, argue the trial court erred in setting aside and then re-entering its termination order and, consequently, that this court lacks jurisdiction over Mother’s appeal. The Petitioners also defend the trial court’s termination decision on the merits. We conclude this court has jurisdiction over Mother’s appeal, that the trial court did not err in finding that grounds were established for termination, and that the trial court did not err in finding that termination is in the best interest of the child. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
Magnolia Pointe Homeowners' Association v. Kathryn Mitchell
A homeowner’s association sought to enforce a recorded declaration of restrictive |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Miguel P., et al.
The Tennessee Department of Children’s Services filed a petition to terminate a mother’s parental rights to two of her children. The trial court found that two grounds had been proven and that termination of the mother’s parental rights was in the children’s best interests. Based on these findings, the court terminated the mother’s parental rights. The mother appeals. We reverse the trial court’s finding that the ground of persistence of conditions has been proven but affirm the trial court’s finding that another ground for termination has been proven and that termination of the mother’s parental rights is in the children’s best interests. Thus, we affirm the termination of the mother’s parental rights. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Estate of Jerry A. Dunn
This is a probate matter which concerns whether a decedent devised his widow a parcel of real estate in fee simple absolute or whether the real property at issue was to be placed in trust for the benefit of decedent’s children. The probate court rendered a declaratory judgment determining that decedent devised his widow the parcel in fee simple absolute. For the reasons stated herein, we affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Mary McCabe Peirce v. Lee Wesson Hope
This is a grandparent visitation case brought by the maternal grandmother of the child at issue. When the trial court dismissed the grandmother’s petition following a trial, it held, among other things, that there was no danger of substantial harm to the child in the absence of visitation. Although the trial court ruled in favor of the child’s father on the merits of the underlying case, it ultimately rejected the father’s request to recover attorney’s fees for his defense of the lawsuit. For the reasons stated herein, we affirm the trial court’s dismissal of the grandmother’s petition and also affirm the trial court’s denial of attorney’s fees to the father. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Teonnia Sykes v. Bristol Park at Riverchase
The plaintiff appeals the dismissal of her complaint against her former landlord. Because |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Abigail Lynn Sevigny v. Warren Maxwell Sevigny
This is the second post-divorce contempt case between the parties. While Mother’s petition |
Court of Appeals | ||
Hidden Lake Resorts Homeowners Association, Inc v. Charles Z. Moore, Et AL
This appeal arises out of a dispute between the homeowners’ association for a planned |
Cheatham | Court of Appeals | |
Cedric Crutcher v. Johnny B. Ellis, Et Al.
This appeal concerns the denial of a motion to set aside default judgment and the award of |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Edward Jones Trust Company, as personal representative of the Estate of Charles S. Woods, Jr. v. Kathy Marie Woods
A widow received pension benefits that were payable only to her as a surviving spouse. A |
Wilson | Court of Appeals | |
Jackie L. Jones v. Unrefined Oil Company, Inc. Et Al.
Upon competing motions for declaratory judgment in this action involving an oil and gas lease, the trial court granted declaratory judgment in favor of the plaintiff, who owned the mineral rights to the real property on which the oil well was located. The court found that although the oil well had been in production as required by the lease, the defendant corporation had failed to comply with the lease’s requirement that it make at least one oil sale within a one-year period. The court thereby found that the lease had terminated pursuant to its own terms. The defendant has appealed, and the plaintiff has raised an issue regarding the trial court’s finding that the well was in production as required by the lease. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm. |
Morgan | Court of Appeals | |
John Milton Arledge v. Darl Smith, Et Al.
John Milton Arledge (“Arledge”) filed a complaint seeking to quiet title to property he purported to own and the ejection of Darl Smith (“Smith”) from the disputed property. Smith filed a motion for summary judgment, which the Warren County Circuit Court (“the Trial Court”) granted. Arledge appeals. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm. |
Warren | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Azay C., et al.
In this case, Mother appeals the trial court’s severe abuse finding, after one of her children was killed in a car accident while she was driving. The trial court found that Mother failed to protect her children when she failed to ensure that the children were properly restrained in the automobile. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
William D. Crowder v. State of Tennessee
This case involves the claimant’s pro se appeal from the Tennessee Claims Commission’s dismissal, on res judicata grounds, of his claims of libel and malicious prosecution against the State of Tennessee. The claimant timely appealed to this Court. Because the claimant’s appellate brief does not comply with Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 27 and Tennessee Court of Appeals Rule 6, we hereby dismiss the appeal. |
Court of Appeals | ||
Aloha Pools & Spas of Jackson, LLC v. Khaled Eleiwa a/k/a Kevin Eleiwa
This appeal arises from a dispute over the construction of a swimming pool. The defendant entered into a written contract with the plaintiff for the construction of a pool at the defendant’s home. The plaintiff later filed a complaint alleging that the defendant failed to pay the amount due under the contract. The defendant filed a counter-complaint and alleged breach of contract, fraud and/or misrepresentation, and violations of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act. After a bench trial, the trial court found in favor of the plaintiff. The defendant subsequently filed a motion for relief from the judgment, which the trial court denied. The defendant appeals. We affirm the trial court’s decision and remand for determination of appellate attorney’s fees. |
Madison | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Isaiah M.
Because no final order has been entered in the underlying trial court proceedings, this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider this appeal. |
Washington | Court of Appeals | |
Vincent Stormes v. FF Property Holdings, LLC
This is a breach of contract action involving the sale of real property in which the plaintiff seller alleged that the defendant buyer withdrew from the sale in violation of the terms of the contract. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff. We affirm. |
Sevier | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Treylynn T., et al.
This appeal concerns the termination of a mother’s parental rights. Amanda L. W. (“Foster Mother”) and Brian L. W. (“Foster Father”) (“Foster Parents,” collectively) filed a petition in the Chancery Court for Madison County (“the Trial Court”) seeking to terminate the parental rights of Angel T. (“Mother”) and Fortrell C. (“Father”) to their minor children Treylynn T. and Amelia C. (“the Children,” collectively). The Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”), the Children’s legal custodian, supported the petition. This matter arose after Amelia received a suspicious head injury while in Father’s care. Mother never accepted that Father was responsible despite Father’s ensuing nolo contendere plea to attempted aggravated child abuse. After a hearing, the Trial Court terminated Mother’s parental rights on three grounds. The Trial Court found further that termination of Mother’s parental rights is in the Children’s best interest. Mother appeals, arguing only that the Trial Court erred in its best interest determination. We find, as did the Trial Court, that the grounds of substantial noncompliance with the permanency plan, persistent conditions, and failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody were proven against Mother by clear and convincing evidence. We further find by clear and convincing evidence, as did the Trial Court, that termination of Mother’s parental rights is in the Children’s best interest. We affirm. |
Madison | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Estate of Peggy Jean Semanek
This appeal concerns the trial court’s determination that Tennessee law does not require a testator to sign their will prior to an attesting witness subscribing their signature as a witness to the will. Upon review of the relevant statutory language and associated case law, we conclude that Tennessee law requires that a testator sign their will prior to an attesting witness subscribing their own signature, and therefore, we reverse the judgment of the trial court. |
Giles | Court of Appeals | |
George E. Gamble, III v. Patricia D. Morris
Because the order from which the appellant has filed an appeal does not constitute a final appealable judgment, |
Bradley | Court of Appeals |
