Jerry Britt v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Jerry Britt, entered Alford pleas in 1996 to three counts of attempted rape of a child and guilty pleas to one count of possession with intent to sell or deliver a Schedule II controlled substance, one count of possession with intent to sell or deliver a Schedule IV controlled substance, and six counts of delivery of a Schedule II controlled substance, and received an effective sentence as a Range I, standard offender of forty-eight years in the Department of Correction. He appeals the dismissal of his petition for writ of error coram nobis, arguing that the trial court should have granted him relief based on newly discovered evidence, the victim's recantation testimony. Following our review, we affirm the order of the trial court dismissing the petition. |
Hamblen | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Alonzo C. Williams v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Alonzo C. Williams, appeals the trial court's denial of his petition for habeas corpus relief. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court's denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Because Petitioner has failed to allege a ground for relief which would render the judgment void, we grant the State's motion and affirm the judgment of the lower court. |
Lauderdale | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Rose Marie Hernandez
The defendant, Rose Marie Hernandez, pled guilty to seventy counts of forgery, a Class E felony, which the trial court merged into thirty-five convictions of forgery, and the trial court sentenced her as a Range III, persistent offender to five years and six months for each conviction. The trial court ordered some of the sentences to run concurrently and others to run consecutively for an effective sentence of thirty-three years and six months in the Department of Correction. The defendant appeals, claiming the trial court erred in applying certain enhancement factors in violation of the rule announced in Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. __, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004), and in denying alternative sentencing. Although we conclude that the sentencing procedure violated the rule announced in Blakely, we hold it to be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. We affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Bedford | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Howard Lavelle Tate
The Defendant, Howard Lavelle Tate, was pulled over by a Metropolitan Police Officer in Nashville, Tennessee for violating the noise ordinance. The officer asked the Defendant for consent to search the Defendant's person and the Defendant's vehicle. The Defendant replied "whatever" to both these requests. The officer found scales with a white powder residue in the Defendant's vehicle. The Defendant then fled the officer. The officer and a second officer caught the Defendant who then told the officers that they could find the drugs in his pants leg. The officers retrieved the drugs and placed the Defendant under arrest. The Defendant filed a motion to suppress the evidence found as a result of the warrantless searches. The trial court denied this motion. The Defendant pled guilty to possession of over .5 grams of cocaine, a Class B felony, but reserved a certified question concerning whether the warrantless searches fell within an exception to the warrant requirement. The Defendant now appeals on the basis of the certified question. We find that the searches fell within an exception to the warrant requirement and affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
James David Alder v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, James David Alder, was found guilty by a jury of aggravated assault, kidnapping, and unlawful possession of a weapon. As a result, he received an effective sentence of twenty (20) years as a multiple offender. The judgments were affirmed on appeal. See State v. James David Alder, No. M2000-01804-CCA-R3-CD, 2001 WL 1285945 (Tenn. Crim. App. at Nashville, Oct. 25, 2001). In this post-conviction proceeding, the petitioner alleges that for various reasons his trial counsel was ineffective. For the following reasons, we affirm the dismissal of the post-conviction petition. |
Franklin | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Amy Jo Blankenship
Defendant, Amy Jo Taylor Blankenship, appealed the trial court's judgment revoking her probation and ordering her to serve the remainder of her sentence in confinement. We affirm the judgment of the trial court by memorandum opinion pursuant to Rule 20 of the Tennessee Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. |
Humphreys | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Orlando Crenshaw v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Orlando Crenshaw, convicted of attempted first degree murder, appeals the post-conviction court's denial of his petition for relief. He asserts that (1) the trial court erred by failing to provide jury instructions on the appropriate lesser included offenses and that his counsel was ineffective for failing to raise the issue on direct appeal; (2) that the trial court erred by failing to comply with the requirements of Momon v. State, 18 S.W.3d 152 (Tenn. 1999), and that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to adequately prepare him to testify at trial; (3) that the state failed to prove that the offense occurred before the return of the indictment; (4) that the state engaged in prosecutorial misconduct by using false statements to secure the indictment and soliciting false testimony at trial; (5) that the trial court erred by providing a misleading jury instruction on the issue of criminal responsibility and that his counsel was ineffective for failing to present the issue as a ground for relief on direct appeal; (6) that the trial court erred by failing to provide a limiting instruction with regard to certain of the evidence; (7) that he was denied the right to a fair trial because the same jury pool used in the trial of his co-defendant was used for his trial and that his counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the jury pool; (8) that he was denied the right to a fair trial because of a violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963); and (9) that the state denied his right to a fair trial by utilizing mutually exclusive theories in his trial and that of his co-defendant. For the reasons set forth in this opinion, the judgment of the post-conviction court is reversed, the conviction is set aside, and the cause is remanded for a new trial. |
Lawrence | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Jimmy Albert Warren
The defendant, Jimmy Albert Warren, indicted for second offense driving under the influence and DUI per se, filed a pre-trial motion to suppress all evidence. The trial court granted the motion in part and denied it in part, holding that the field sobriety tests and the statements made by the defendant prior to his arrest were admissible, but that the blood alcohol content test results were not. In this interlocutory appeal initiated by the state, each party claims that the trial court erred. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed. |
Tipton | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Jeffery D. Rhoades
The defendant, Jeffery D. Rhoades, appeals from the Dyer County Circuit Court’s 2004 revocation of his 1996 sentences for burglary and theft. We affirm the revocation of probation and the ordering of confinement for the balance of the original effective sentence, but we modify the provisions for sentence credits and remand. |
Dyer | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Darius Jones
The defendant, Darius Jones, was convicted of one count of felony murder, four counts of aggravated robbery, three counts of attempted especially aggravated robbery, two counts of attempted aggravated robbery, and one count of aggravated burglary. The trial court ordered consecutive sentences of life with the possibility of parole for the felony murder, ten years for each of the aggravated robberies and attempted especially aggravated robberies, and four years for each of the attempted aggravated robberies and the aggravated burglary, for an effective sentence of life plus eighty-one years 1. In this appeal of right, the defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient, that the trial court erred by admitting photographs of the crime scene, that the trial court erred by limiting the defense cross-examination of a homicide detective, that the trial court erred by admitting the videotaped preliminary hearing testimony of one of the victims, that the trial court erred in its instructions to the jury, that the sentence was excessive, and that cumulative error requires reversal. The conviction for felony murder and sentence of life with the possibility of parole are affirmed. The remaining judgments of conviction are affirmed, but the causes are remanded for resentencing. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. William Cartwright
Defendant, William Cartwright, pled guilty to one count of attempt to manufacture methamphetamine, a Class D felony. Pursuant to the plea agreement, Defendant received a sentence of three years as a Range I standard offender with the manner of service of his sentence to be determined by the trial court. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court ordered Defendant to serve his sentence in confinement. Defendant appeals, arguing that the trial court erred in denying him alternative sentencing. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Sequatchie | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Cumecus Rodrelle Cates
Following a jury trial, the Defendant was convicted of aggravated burglary and misdemeanor theft. On appeal, he challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence. We affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Dion A. Russell
On this consolidated appeal, the defendant challenges the manner and consecutive nature of his sentences. After analyzing the issues properly before us, we conclude that the trial court did not err in revoking the defendant's probation on the former sentence or in denying him probation on the latter. Further, we hold the consecutive sentences to be warranted and proper in this instance. Therefore, we affirm. |
Sullivan | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Martin Palmer Jones v. State of Tennessee
This is an appeal from denial of post-conviction relief. The Defendant, Martin Palmer Jones, was convicted of two counts of first degree felony murder upon entry of best-interest guilty pleas. He was sentenced to two terms of life imprisonment, which were to be served consecutively. The Defendant's sentences were affirmed on direct appeal. See State v. Martin Palmer Jones, No. 03C01-9803-CR-00084, 1999 WL 93144 (Tenn. Crim. App., Knoxville, Feb. 25, 1999). On petition for post-conviction relief, the Defendant claimed he received ineffective assistance of counsel in conjunction with his guilty pleas. The trial court denied the petition, and the Defendant appealed to this Court. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Unicoi | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Christopher A. Johnson v. State of Tennessee
The Defendant, Christopher A. Johnson, seeks to appeal as of right from the trial court's denial of his "Petition to Enforce the Plea Agreement." The State argues that this appeal should be dismissed because an appeal as of right does not lie from a trial court's denial of a petition to enforce a plea agreement. We agree with the State's argument and dismiss this appeal. |
Hamilton | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Eric Thomas v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Eric Thomas, appeals as of right from the dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief by the Shelby County Criminal Court. He seeks relief from his Class C felony conviction for robbery and resulting sentence of eight years and one day in confinement. He contends that the post-conviction court erred in dismissing his petition and that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
James W. Taylor aka Lutfi S. Talal v. Wayne Brandon, Warden
The Petitioner, James W. Taylor (aka Lutfi S. Talal), filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus seeking relief from an allegedly void judgment, which the trial court dismissed. The Petitioner now appeals contending that the trial court erred when it dismissed his petition because: (1) his presentments were fatally defective which deprived the trial court of proper jurisdiction; (2) the trial judge violated his constitutional rights; (3) the trial court erred when it ordered that the Petitioner's sentences run consecutively; (4) the trial court erred when it found that the Petitioner was a Range II offender; (5) the trial court erred when it approved an illegal judgment of conviction; and (6) the habeas corpus court erred when it denied the Petitioner a right to respond to the State. Finding no error in the judgment of the trial court, we affirm the trial court's dismissal of the Petitioner's petition for habeas corpus relief. |
Hickman | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Charles Jackson, Jr.
Defendant, Charles Jackson, Jr., entered a plea of guilty to possession of cocaine of over 0.5 grams with intent to sell, a Class C felony. The trial court imposed the recommended sentence of eight years as a Range II multiple offender. As a part of the plea agreement, Defendant reserved two certified questions of law under Rule 37(b)(2)(i) of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure arguing that the trial court erred in not suppressing items found during a search of his vehicle. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Robertson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Larry E. Shannon
The defendant, Larry E. Shannon, appeals the trial court's order extending his probation by an additional eighteen months. He contends that the trial court lacked jurisdiction because his sentence expired before the probation revocation warrant was issued. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Rutherford | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Lawrence Allen Hodge v. David Mills, Warden
The Petitioner, Lawrence Allen Hodge, appeals the trial court's denial of his petition for habeas corpus relief. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court's denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Because Petitioner has failed to show either that his sentence has expired or that the trial court was without jurisdiction, we grant the State's motion and affirm the judgment of the lower court. |
Lauderdale | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Roderick Davis
The defendant, Roderick Davis, was convicted by a ShelbyCountyCriminal Court jury of especially aggravated robbery, for which he received a sentence of 24 years, and especially aggravated burglary, for which he received a sentence of eleven years. The trial court imposed the sentences to run consecutively. On appeal, the defendant claims that the convicting evidence is insufficient and that the trial court erroneously excluded alibi evidence, instructed the jury, and sentenced him. Upon review, we affirm the conviction of especially aggravated robbery, reverse the conviction of especially aggravated burglary and modify it to aggravated burglary, and modify the sentences. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Roderick Davis - Dissenting
The majority concludes that modification of the defendant’s sentences for especially aggravated robbery and aggravated burglary is required in light of Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. __, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004). I must respectfully dissent. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Kevin Taylor v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner appeals the trial court's denial of his petition for writ of error coram nobis. Particularly, he avers that the court abused its discretion in summarily dismissing his petition solely on the lack of credibility of the affiant supporting the petition. We remand the matter to the trial court for an evidentiary hearing. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Ricky Grover Aaron
In June of 2001, the appellant, Ricky Grover Aaron, was convicted by a jury of especially aggravated sexual exploitation of a minor and false imprisonment. As a result of his convictions, the trial court sentenced the appellant to eleven (11) years for the conviction for especially aggravated sexual exploitation of a minor and eleven months, twenty-nine days on his conviction for false imprisonment. The trial court further ordered that the appellant’s sentences be served concurrently to each other, but consecutively to a federal sentence he was already serving. On July 8, 2004, this Court affirmed both the appellant’s convictions and the sentence imposed by the trial court. See State v. Ricky Grover Aaron, No. M2002-02288-CCA-R3-CD, 2004 WL 1533825 (Tenn. Crim. App. at Nashville, Jul. 8, 2004). On July 14, 2004, the appellant filed a petition to rehear, urging this Court to consider the impact of the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. ___, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004), delivered on June 24, 2004, on his sentence. Finding the position well-taken due to the potential impact of the Blakely decision upon the current Tennessee Sentencing Act, this Court granted the petition to rehear on August 2, 2004. The parties filed supplemental briefs fully addressing their view of the impact of Blakely on the appellant’s sentence. After a thorough review, we conclude that in light of Blakely, the trial court impermissibly considered certain enhancement factors to arrive at the appellant’s sentence for especially aggravated sexual exploitation of a minor. Therefore, we modify the appellant’s sentence for especially aggravated sexual exploitation of a minor from eleven (11) years to nine (9) years. Accordingly, the portion of the previous opinion of this Court affirming the appellant’s sentence is vacated. All other portions of this Court’s previous opinion are affirmed. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Ricky Grover Aaron - Concurring
I concur with Judge Smith’s lead opinion; however, I am writing separately for two reasons. First, I have reconsidered, and upon further reflection, retreat from my earlier position that sentences found to be in violation of Blakely should be remanded for a new sentencing hearing in the trial court. Until such time as there is clear authority for our courts to deal with Blakely issues, whether by case law or by statute, judicial economy and sentencing considerations, including uniformity of application of sentencing factors, dictates that most sentences found to be in violation of Blakely should be modified, if at all, by the appellate courts. Clearly, the appellate courts have been given the authority to do so by the legislature Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-401(c). |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals |
