State of Tennessee v. Wendi Hope Tunny
The Defendant, Wendi Hope Tunny, appeals as of right from the Sevier County Circuit Court’s denial of her request for judicial diversion and order that she serve her five-year sentence in split confinement following her guilty-pleaded conviction for theft of property valued at $10,000 or more but less than $60,000, a Class C felony. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-14-103; -13-105(a)(4). On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred by failing to consider all of the applicable factors for judicial diversion and by failing to conduct a proper weighing of those factors. Following our review, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. |
Sevier | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Michael Tyrone Gant v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Michael Tyrone Gant, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. He argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel based on trial counsel’s failure to present evidence on his behalf that would have established both his innocence and the victim’s bias. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Bedford | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Marcus Levy
The defendant, Marcus Levy, was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of first degree premeditated murder and sentenced to life imprisonment. On appeal, the defendant argues that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction and that the trial court erred in allowing the State to enter the witness statements of three witnesses into evidence at trial. After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Glendall D. Verner
The defendant pled guilty on March 21, 2013, to one count of the theft of $1,000 or more, a Class D felony, and one count of the theft of $60,000 or more, a Class B felony. The defendant was given an effective ten-year sentence, all of which was to be served on probation. As part of his probation, the defendant was required to complete two hundred hours of community service work and was forbidden to sell securities or to work in the financial services or insurance business. On April 26, 2014, the defendant’s probation officer signed a violation of probation affidavit alleging that the defendant was terminated from his community service program for noncompliance. On May 22, 2014, a second affidavit was issued, averring that the defendant violated the special condition forbidding him from working in the financial services industry when he attempted to solicit investors for a project. The trial court held a hearing on three separate days over the course of four months, and the court ultimately concluded that the defendant had violated the terms of his probation. The trial court revoked the defendant’s probation and ordered him to serve one year of his sentence in confinement, to be followed by a new probationary period. The defendant appeals, asserting that his due process rights were violated because the terms of his probation were unconstitutionally vague, because the evidence did not establish a violation of his probation, because he was given inadequate notice of the violation, and because the trial court’s written findings were inadequate. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Denny K. Reynolds
A jury in the Maury County Circuit Court convicted the Appellant, Denny K. Reynolds, of simple possession of cocaine. The trial court sentenced the Appellant to eleven months and twenty-nine days in the Maury County Jail. On appeal, the Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence sustaining his conviction. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Maury | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Bobby Lee Miles, Jr.
The Defendant, Bobby Lee Miles, Jr., pleaded guilty in 1999 to aggravated burglary and received a three-year sentence. On October 21, 2015, the Defendant filed a Rule 36.1 motion to correct an illegal sentence, alleging that the pretrial credit on the judgment form is incorrect. The trial court summarily dismissed the motion, and the Defendant appeals the dismissal, maintaining that his sentence is illegal. After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that the trial court properly dismissed the Defendant’s motion to correct his sentence. |
Robertson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Markhayle Jackson
The Defendant, Markhayle Jackson, entered a guilty plea in 2011 to first degree premeditated murder and was sentenced to life without the possibility of parole pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement. In 2015, the Defendant filed a motion pursuant to Tennessee Criminal Procedure Rule 36.1 requesting the correction of an illegal sentence. The trial court summarily dismissed the motion for failure to state a colorable claim. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred by dismissing the motion. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Quantel Taylor v. State of Tennessee
Petitioner, Quantel Taylor, appeals from the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief following remand from the Tennessee Supreme Court. See Taylor v. State, 443 S.W.3d 80 (Tenn. 2014). In his post-conviction petition, Petitioner alleged, in part, that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to interview his three co-defendants. Petitioner subpoenaed the co-defendants to testify at the post-conviction hearing. The post-conviction court granted the State's motion to quash subpoenas for the co-defendants, who were incarcerated. A panel of this court concluded that the post-conviction court erred, but held that the error was harmless under the circumstances. Quantel Taylor v. State, No. W2012-00760-CCA-R3-PC, 2013 WL 6228151 (Tenn. Crim. App., Nashville, April 29, 2013). Our supreme court reversed the decision of this court, holding that the post-conviction court committed prejudicial error by granting the State's motion to quash because the post-conviction court applied an incorrect legal standard. Taylor, 443 S.W.3d at 86. The court remanded the case for reconsideration of the motion to quash under the proper standard. On remand, the post-conviction court denied the State's motion to quash, and all three co-defendants were subpoenaed for an evidentiary hearing. Two of Petitioner's co-defendants, Allen and Bricco, refused to take the stand. The third co-defendant, Spivey, took the stand and refused to testify. The post-conviction court denied post-conviction relief. Petitioner appealed. We conclude that he has failed to establish that he is entitled to post-conviction relief. The judgment of the post-conviction court is affirmed. |
Crockett | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Travis Tate
Defendant, Travis Tate, appeals from his convictions of second degree murder, attempted voluntary manslaughter, and employment of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony and from his effective sentence of forty years. Defendant raises the following issues on appeal: (1) whether there was sufficient evidence to support the convictions; (2) whether the trial court erred by admitting hearsay evidence at trial; (3) whether the trial court inaccurately advised Defendant during the Momon hearing; (4) whether the trial court erred by refusing to instruct the jury on self-defense; (5) whether the trial court erred by instructing the jury to correct its verdict on employment of a firearm; and (6) whether the trial court abused its discretion during sentencing. We affirm the judgments of the trial court with respect to the first two convictions, but we modify the judgment with respect to the employment of a firearm conviction. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Kenderick Michael Tucker
Defendant, Kenderick Michael Tucker, appeals from the trial court’s revocation of probation. Defendant contends that the trial court denied him due process by relying upon evidence that was not alleged in the probation violation warrant. Defendant also contends that he was denied due process because the warrant provided insufficient notice and because the trial court made insufficient findings of fact. The State argues that Defendant admitted his probation violation, and therefore, the evidence supports the trial court’s order of revocation. After a careful review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Rutherford | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Joseph Tolbert III a/k/a Micah Joshua Ford
The Defendant, Joseph I. Tolbert III, was convicted by a Knox County Criminal Court jury of three counts of first degree felony murder, first degree premeditated murder, attempt to commit first degree murder, two counts of especially aggravated robbery, and two counts of especially aggravated burglary. See T.C.A. §§ 39-13-202 (2014) (first degree murder), 39-13-403 (2014) (especially aggravated robbery), 39-14-404 (2014) (especially aggravated burglary), 39-12-101 (2014) (criminal attempt). The convictions for felony murder and premeditated first degree murder were merged and the Defendant received an effective sentence of life plus twenty-two years. On appeal, the Defendant contends that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions, (2) his convictions for especially aggravated burglary are statutorily barred, and (3) his convictions for especially aggravated burglary violate double jeopardy principles. We affirm the judgments of the trial court relative to first degree felony murder, attempted first degree murder, and one of the especially aggravated robbery convictions. We merge the convictions for especially aggravated burglary to reflect one conviction for aggravated burglary and reduce the second conviction for especially aggravated robbery to aggravated assault and remand for resentencing relative to these counts. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In re Jenkins Bonding Company
The Appellant, Jenkins Bonding Company, appeals the Davidson County Criminal Court’s judgment of final forfeiture of bail bonds. The Appellant argues that its obligation to secure the appearance of a defendant had been released; therefore, the trial court erred in issuing a judgment of final forfeiture. Upon review, we reverse the judgment of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Dinnie Merel Robertson
The Defendant, Dinnie Merel Robertson, was indicted for one count of attempted first degree murder, a Class A felony; one count of felony reckless endangerment, a Class E felony; three counts of aggravated cruelty to animals, a Class E felony; two counts of vandalism valued at $1,000 or more but less than $10,000, a Class D felony; and one count of carrying a firearm with the intent to go armed, a Class C misdemeanor. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-12-101, -13-103, -13-202, -14-105, -14-212, -14-408, -17-1307. Following a jury trial, the Defendant was convicted of one count of misdemeanor reckless endangerment, a Class A misdemeanor; three counts of cruelty to animals, a Class A misdemeanor; one count of vandalism valued at $1,000 or more but less than $10,000; one count of vandalism valued at more than $500 but less than $1,000, a Class E felony; and one count of carrying a firearm with the intent to go armed. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-13-103, -14-105, -14-202, -14-408. The jury acquitted the Defendant of the felony reckless endangerment charge. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed a total effective sentence of four years. On appeal, the Defendant contends (1) that the trial court erred by instructing the jury on cruelty to animals as a “lesser-included” offense of aggravated cruelty to animals; (2) that the trial court committed plain error by taking his motion for judgment of acquittal “under advisement”; and (3) that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his convictions for misdemeanor reckless endangerment and both of the vandalism charges. The State concedes that the indictments charging aggravated cruelty to animals failed to charge an offense; therefore, the trial court lacked the authority to instruct the jury on cruelty to animals. Following our review, we affirm the Defendant’s convictions for misdemeanor reckless endangerment, both vandalism charges, and carrying a firearm with the intent to go armed. However, the Defendant’s convictions for cruelty to animals are reversed and dismissed. |
Lawrence | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
John Smith v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, John Smith, appeals the post-conviction court's denial of relief from his convictions for first degree felony murder, second degree murder, aggravated burglary, and employment of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony. He argues that the post-conviction court erred in finding that he had received effective assistance of counsel. He further asserts for the first time on appeal that his conviction for employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony should be vacated because the indictment failed to specify the underlying dangerous felony. Upon our review, the judgments of the post-conviction court are affirmed. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Timothy Clark Naifeh
The Defendant, Timothy Clark Naifeh, was convicted by an Obion County jury of six counts of vehicular homicide. Prior to trial, the Defendant filed two motions challenging his competence to stand trial, both of which were denied by the trial court. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court merged his convictions into three counts of vehicular homicide by intoxication, a Class B felony. See T.C.A. § 39-13-213(a)(1). The sentence was to be served by split confinement, with one year of incarceration and the remainder on probation. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court erred in finding that he was competent to stand trial and that his sentence was improper. Upon our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. However, for purposes of clarity, we remand this matter for entry of corrected judgment forms in Counts 1, 2, and 3, specifying an effective sentence of ten years, with one year of incarceration and the remaining nine years on probation. |
Obion | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. George Coleman
The defendant, George Coleman, was convicted of one count of aggravated sexual battery, a Class B felony. The trial court imposed a ten-year sentence as a result of the conviction. On appeal, the defendant argues that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction for aggravated sexual battery, that the trial court erred by allowing the victim's brother to testify about why he followed the victim and the defendant to the bathroom, and that the trial court erred in imposing a ten-year sentence. Following our review of the record, the briefs of the parties, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Russell Dean Long v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Russell Dean Long, appeals as of right from the Washington County Criminal Court's denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. The Petitioner contends that he received ineffective assistance from his trial counsel (1) because a recording of a 911 call was not entered into evidence during the trial; and (2) because lead counsel told the jury during the opening statement that they would hear the recording. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Washington | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennesse v. Antonio Howard
Defendant, Antonio Howard, along with four co-defendants, was indicted by the Shelby County Grand Jury for six counts of aggravated rape, one count of especially aggravated robbery, two counts of aggravated robbery, and three counts of aggravated assault. Following a jury trial, he was convicted as charged following a jury trial. The trial court merged counts 4-6 of aggravated rape with counts 1-3 of aggravated rape and sentenced Defendant to consecutive sentences of 25 years on each count. The trial court merged Defendant's convictions for aggravated assault with his convictions for especially aggravated robbery and aggravated robbery and sentenced Defendant to consecutive sentences of 25 years for especially aggravated robbery and 12 years for each count of aggravated robbery. The total effective sentence imposed was 124 years. In this appeal as of right, Defendant raises the following issues for our review: 1) the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions, and the trial court erred by denying Defendant's motion for judgment of acquittal; 2) the trial court erred by imposing the maximum sentence within the applicable range and imposing consecutive sentencing; and 3) the trial court erred by allowing a co-defendant to testify wearing “street clothing,” by allowing a victim to testify to “prejudicial, irrelevant and inflammatory information,” and by not permitting Defendant to cross-examine a State's witness about the substance of her report. Following a careful review of the record, we conclude that Defendant is not entitled to relief. Accordingly, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Brandon Blount
Defendant, Brandon Blount, was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of aggravated burglary acting in concert with two or more other persons, a Class B felony, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, a Class D felony. He was sentenced by the trial court as a Range I offender to consecutive terms of eight years at 30% for the aggravated burglary conviction and three years at 100% for the firearms conviction. On appeal, Defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his convictions; that the trial court erred by denying Defendant's motion to suppress his statement to police; by failing to instruct the jury that unlawful possession of a weapon is a lesser included offense of possession of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony; and that the trial court committed plain error by not declaring a mistrial because of the prosecutor's improper comments during closing argument. After a thorough review of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Brian E. Dodson
The defendant, Brian E. Dodson, appeals the denial of his motion, filed pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1, to correct what he believes to be an illegal sentence. Because the defendant has failed to state a colorable claim for relief under Rule 36.1, the interests of justice do not require that we waive the timely filing of the notice of appeal in this case. Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed. |
Bradley | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Kavonda Renee Waters
Defendant, Kavonda Renee Waters, pleaded guilty to a Class A misdemeanor failure to appear in case number II-CR017036 and a Class E felony failure to appear offense in case number II-CR058059. The trial court imposed sentences of eleven months, twenty-nine days for failure to appear in case number II-CR017036 and two years for felony failure to appear in case number II-CR058059. On appeal, Defendant argues that her sentence is excessive and that the trial court erred by ordering her to serve her sentence in confinement. After review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court |
Williamson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Brandon Sutton v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Brandon Sutton, appeals the denial of post-conviction relief from his 2010 Jefferson County Criminal Court jury conviction of first degree murder, for which he received a sentence of life without parole. In this appeal, the petitioner contends only that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Jefferson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Stacy Ramsey v. State of Tennessee
Petitioner, Stacy Ramsey, appeals from the Carroll County Circuit Court’s summary dismissal of his second petition for post-conviction relief, which the trial court treated as a motion to reopen his post-conviction proceeding. We dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction because the Petitioner failed to comply with the statutory requirements governing an appeal from the denial of a motion to reopen post-conviction proceedings. If treated as a second post-conviction petition as styled by Petitioner, through counsel, then it was subject to summary dismissal because only one petition for post-conviction relief is permitted, T.C.A. § 40-30-102(c), and because the petition was barred by the applicable one-year statute of limitations, T.C.A. § 40-30-102(a). |
Carroll | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Austin Drummond
Defendant, Austin Drummond, was indicted by the Madison County Grand Jury with one count of aggravated robbery. Following a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of the offense. The trial court sentenced Defendant to serve ten years in the Department of Correction. In this appeal as of right, Defendant asserts that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction and that his sentence is excessive. Having carefully reviewed the record before us and the briefs of the parties, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Jeffrey Wayne Moore
The Defendant-Appellant, Jeffrey Wayne Moore, entered a guilty plea to driving under the influence (DUI) in exchange for a sentence of eleven months and twenty-nine days to be served on probation after the service of forty-eight hours in jail. As a condition of his plea, Moore reserved a certified question of law challenging the denial of his motion to suppress, which was based upon an alleged unconstitutional seizure. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Wilson | Court of Criminal Appeals |
