Sherry Hunter v. Jay Michael Ura, M.D., et al.
We granted this appeal to determine whether the trial court committed reversible error in granting the plaintiff eight peremptory challenges during jury selection, whether the trial court properly denied a motion for a mistrial after the plaintiff cross-examined a defense expert witness with a prior statement, whether the trial court properly allowed the plaintiff to cross-examine a defense expert with an alleged learned treatise, and whether the trial court properly excluded the deposition of a defense expert witness. The Court of Appeals held that the trial court committed reversible error on these four issues, reversed the jury’s verdict in favor of the plaintiff, and remanded for a new trial. The intermediate court chose not to review numerous remaining issues raised by the parties. After carefully reviewing the record and authority, we conclude: 1) that the trial court erred in granting the plaintiff eight peremptory challenges but the error did not affect the outcome or prejudice the administration of justice, 2) that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying a motion for a mistrial after the plaintiff had cross-examined an expert witness with a prior statement, 3) that the trial court did not err in allowing the plaintiff to cross-examine a defense expert witness with an alleged learned treatise, and 4) that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the deposition testimony of a defense expert witness. In addition, after reviewing the remaining issues, including those that were pretermitted by the Court of Appeals, we hold: 1) that the trial court erred in remitting the jury’s verdict by $1,500,000, 2) that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying prejudgment interest to the plaintiff, 3) that awarding damages for the loss of consortium did not violate the defendants’ rights under the United States or Tennessee constitutions, 4) that the trial court did not err in finding that the plaintiff’s expert witness established the professional standard of care in the community in which the defendants practiced and in denying the defendants’ motion for directed verdict on this basis, 5) that the trial court did not err in allowing the plaintiff to introduce hearsay statements from medical literature or make arguments as to the presence or absence of medical literature, 6) that the trial court did not err in denying a motion for a mistrial or a continuance based on the unavailability of a defense expert witness, and 7) that the trial court did not err in refusing to allow the defendants a credit against the jury’s verdict based on a payment received by the plaintiff under the decedent’s executive insurance plan. Accordingly, we reverse the Court of Appeals’ judgment and reinstate the jury’s verdict in favor of the plaintiff. |
Davidson | Supreme Court | |
Sherry Hunter v. Jay Michael Ura, M.D., et al. - Concurring and Dissenting
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Davidson | Supreme Court | |
Staubach Retail Services v. H. G. Hill Realty Co.
We granted this appeal to determine whether an unexecuted brokerage agreement incorporated into an executed lease constitutes an enforceable contract, thereby requiring payment of a brokerage fee to one of the real estate brokers who provided services pursuant to the unexecuted agreement. We conclude that all parties to the brokerage agreement assented to its terms and that the brokerage agreement's "occupancy" requirement was satisfied. Accordingly, we hold that the agreement is enforceable, and we affirm the Court of Appeals' award of the unpaid commission to the real estate broker. |
Davidson | Supreme Court | |
Tennessee Waste Movers, Inc. v. Loudon County, et. al.
We granted review in this case to determine the proper standard of review required by Tennessee Code Annotated section 68-211-704(c) (1996). We hold that the de novo review required by Tennessee Code Annotated section 68-211-704(c) requires the trial court to conduct an independent evaluation of all of the evidence before it. We overrule Tucker v. Humphreys County, 944 S.W.2d 613 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1996), upon which the Court of Appeals relied, and reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals. We remand this case to the chancery court for a review of the county commission's findings using the proper de novo standard as required by Tennessee Code Annotated section 68-211-704(c) and this decision. |
Loudon | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. William Timothy Carter, et al.
We granted this appeal to determine whether evidence seized from the defendants’ residence |
Carroll | Supreme Court | |
Drexel Wayne Long v. Mid-Tennessee Ford Truck Sales Inc. et al
We granted review in this workers' compensation case to determine whether "nursing services," as used in Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-204(a) (1999), includes care provided by an injured employee's spouse where the spouse is a certified nurse technician. After reviewing the record and applicable authority, we conclude that care provided by a certified nurse technician is compensable under the Workers' Compensation Law irrespective of the relationship between the caregiver and the employee. We further hold that the care here was reasonably necessary and was provided pursuant to what the employee understood to be the physician's orders. Accordingly, we reverse the findings of fact and conclusions of law of the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel as to this issue and remand to the trial court for a determination of the value of the nursing services rendered by Mrs. Long. We affirm as to the other issues raised by the appellant employee. |
Rutherford | Supreme Court | |
Judith Christenberry v. Stanley F. Tipton, et. al.
This case involves a claim for personal injuries sustained in an automobile accident. The accident occurred when the vehicle in which the plaintiff was a guest passenger was forced off the road by an unidentified motorist. The plaintiff asserted a claim for uninsured motorist benefits under the provisions of an insurance policy issued to her former husband and his company. The issue on appeal is whether the trial court erred in granting summary judgment for the defendant insurance company after concluding the undisputed facts revealed that, under the circumstances of this case, the plaintiff was not insured under the policy. The Court of Appeals affirmed the grant of summary judgment. Upon appeal to this Court, we conclude that the undisputed facts in the record do not support the trial court's grant of summary judgment for the insurance company. After thoroughly reviewing the record, we conclude that there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the plaintiff was insured under the automobile insurance policy at the time of the accident and therefore entitled to uninsured motorist coverage. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. |
Knox | Supreme Court | |
Ronnie Dotson v. Rice-Chrysler-Plymouth-Dodge, Inc., et. al.
In this workers' compensation action, the plaintiff sought compensation for a work-related injury which caused reflex sympathetic dystrophy in his left arm, a scheduled member for workers' compensation purposes. The plaintiff contended that reflex sympathetic dystrophy which affects only a scheduled member nevertheless entitles a claimant to body-as-a-whole compensation because the American Medical Association's Guides to the Evaluation of Permanent Impairment convert reflex sympathetic dystrophy to a rating for the body as a whole. Alternatively, the plaintiff contended that his condition extended beyond his arm because he was denied potential future treatment options for other, non-work-related injuries and because his arm's hypersensitivity and pain caused insomnia, chronic fatigue, and a diminished ability to concentrate. Holding that reflex sympathetic dystrophy must always be apportioned to the body as a whole, the trial court awarded the plaintiff permanent total disability benefits. Reversing the trial court, we hold that an award for reflex sympathetic dystrophy may be limited to the compensation for scheduled members as provided in Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-207(3)(A) to (D) (1999). Further, we hold that for reflex sympathetic dystrophy to be properly apportioned to the body as a whole under Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-207(3)(F) (1999), the claimant's injury must affect a portion of the body not statutorily scheduled, affect a particular combination of members not statutorily provided for, or cause a permanent injury to an unscheduled portion of the body. Having so held, we determine that the preponderance of the evidence fails to show that the plaintiff's condition has extended beyond his arm as a scheduled member. Therefore, we vacate the trial court's award of permanent total disability benefits to the plaintiff and hold that the plaintiff's permanent disability award is limited exclusively to 200 weeks of benefits pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-207(3)(A)(ii)(m) (1999). We remand this case to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion, as may be necessary. |
Blount | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Andrew Thomas, et al. - Concurring and Dissenting
I concur in the conclusion of the majority that Thomas’s conviction should be affirmed. As to the sentence of death, however, I respectfully dissent. As I have previously expressed in a long line of dissents, I believe that the comparative proportionality review protocol currently embraced by the majority is inadequate to shield defendants from the arbitrary and is proportionate imposition of the death penalty. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-206(c)(1)(D) (1995 Supp.). I have consistently expressed my displeasure with the current protocol since the time of its adoption in State v. Bland, 958 S.W.2d 651 (Tenn. 1997). See State v. Robinson, 146 S.W.3d 469, 529 (Tenn. 2004) (Birch, J., concurring and dissenting); State v. Leach, 148 S.W.3d, 42, 68 (Tenn. 2004) (Birch, J., concurringand dissenting); State v. Davis, 141 S.W.3d 600, 632 (Tenn. 2004) (Birch, J., concurring and dissenting); State v. Berry, 141 S.W.3d 549, 589 (Tenn. 2004) (Birch, J., concurring and dissenting); State v. Holton, 126 S.W.3d 845, 872 (Tenn. 2004) (Birch, J., concurring and dissenting); State v. Davidson, 121 S.W.3d 600, 629-36 (Tenn. 2003) (Birch, J., dissenting); State v. Carter, 114 S.W.3d 895, 910-11 (Tenn. 2003) (Birch, J., dissenting); State v. Reid, 91 S.W.3d 247, 288-89 (Tenn. 2002) (Birch, J., concurring and dissenting); State v. Austin, 87 S.W.3d 447, 467-68 (Tenn. 2002) (Birch, J., dissenting); State v. Stevens, 78 S.W.3d 817, 852 (Tenn. 2002) (Birch, J., concurring and dissenting); State v. McKinney, 74 S.W.3d 291, 320-22 (Tenn. 2002) (Birch, J., concurring and dissenting); State v. Bane, 57 S.W.3d 411, 431-32 (Tenn. 2001) (Birch, J., concurring and dissenting); State v. Stout, 46 S.W.3d 689, 720 (Tenn. 2001) (Birch, J., concurring and dissenting); Terry v. State, 46 S.W.3d 147, 167 (Tenn. 2001) (Birch, J., dissenting); State v. Sims, 45 S.W.3d 1, 23-24 (Tenn. 2001) (Birch, J., concurring and dissenting); State v. Keen, 31 S.W.3d 196, 233-34 (Tenn. 2000) (Birch, J., dissenting). As previously discussed, I believe that the problem with the current proportionality analysis is threefold: (1) the proportionality test is overbroad, (2) the pool of cases used for comparison is inadequate, and (3) review is too subjective. These flaws seriously undermine the reliability of the current proportionality protocol. See State v. Godsey, 60 S.W.3d at 793-800 (Birch, J., concurring and dissenting). In my view, the current comparative proportionality protocol is woefully inadequate to protect defendants from the arbitrary or disproportionate imposition of the death penalty. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent from that portion of the majority opinion affirming the imposition of the penalty of death. |
Shelby | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Charles Sawyer
The defendant, Charles Sawyer, was arrested by the police for aggravated sexual battery. Following his arrest, Sawyer made an oral statement to the police after an officer read to Sawyer an affidavit supporting the arrest warrant but before the officer advised Sawyer of his Fifth Amendment rights pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). Sawyer filed a motion to suppress his oral statement. Based upon the nature of the facts contained in the affidavit supporting the issuance of the arrest warrant and the circumstances surrounding his arrest and detention, we conclude the statement resulted from an unconstitutional custodial interrogation and therefore should be suppressed. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals and remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. |
Marshall | Supreme Court | |
Terry Ruddle Mahoney v. Nationsbank of Tennessee, N.A.
We granted review in this workers’ compensation case to determine whether the trial court erred in awarding benefits against the defendant employer where the employee was first injured and missed work while employed by a previous employer. After reviewing the record and applicable authority, we conclude that the trial court erred in awarding benefits against the defendant employer because the preponderance of the evidence is that the employee’s gradually-occurring injury became compensable while working for the prior employer and did not progress while working for the defendant employer. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s judgment. |
Shelby | Supreme Court | |
Michael R. Moody v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Michael Robert Moody, filed a "Motion to Correct Errors in Judgment" in which he claimed that the two sentences requiring him to register as a sexual offender are illegal. The trial court dismissed the motion, and the Court of Criminal Appeals denied Moody's request for discretionary review through the common law writ of certiorari. We conclude that the writ of certiorari is not available to review the denial of a motion to correct an illegal sentence and that a habeas corpus action, not a motion, is the proper procedure for collaterally attacking an illegal sentence. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals. |
Knox | Supreme Court | |
Carolyn Curtis v. G. E. Capital Modular Space, et al
Pursuant to Rule 23 of the Supreme Court of Tennessee, this Court accepted certification of the following two questions from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee, at Greeneville: (1) In an action instituted against an employer for workers' compensation benefits and in which the employer files an answer or amended answer naming a third party as having caused all or a part of the plaintiff's injuries, does Tennessee Code Annotated section 20-1-119 extend the limitation period and allow the filing of an amended complaint against the third party named by the employer and/or other persons named as tortfeasors(s) by the third party in its answer? In the event the first question is answered in the affirmative, then the second question is posed: (2) In Tennessee Code Annotated section 20-1-119(a), does the term "applicable statute of limitations" appearing in the phrase "or named in an amended complaint filed within the applicable statute of limitations" refer to the one year limitation period for personal injury only or to the limitation period as extended by the ninety-day "window" provided by Tennessee Code Annotated section 20-1-119(a)? As to the first question, we answer in the negative. We hold that because Tennessee Code Annotated section 20-1-119 applies only to cases in which comparative fault is or becomes an issue, and because workers' compensation benefits are awarded without regard to fault, section 20-1-119 may not be invoked as authority to amend a complaint in a workers' compensation action to include a claim against a third party tortfeasor that would otherwise be time-barred. Because our answer to this first question renders the second question moot, we do not address it at this time. |
Supreme Court | ||
Frank Fetzer Mills, Jr., et al. v. Luis L. Wong, M.D., et al.
The plaintiffs in this medical malpractice action filed their complaint approximately three weeks after the three-year medical malpractice statute of repose, Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26-116(a)(3) (1980), had expired. The defendants moved to dismiss the action as time-barred. In response, the plaintiffs argued that their action should not be time-barred because the primary plaintiff was mentally incompetent during most of the repose period. Specifically, the plaintiffs contended that due process requires tolling of the statute of repose during the period of a plaintiff’s mental incompetency. In support of their contention, the plaintiffs relied on Seals v. State, 23 S.W.3d 272 (Tenn. 2000), and other precedents which provide for tolling of the Post-Conviction Procedure Act statute of limitations, Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-102(a) (2003), on the basis of a petitioner’s mental incompetency. The lower courts granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. We affirm. We hold that due process does not require tolling of the medical malpractice statute of repose during the period of a plaintiff’s mental incompetency. The legislature has the constitutional power to place reasonable temporal limitations on rights of action in tort. By contrast, a post-conviction petition, despite its procedurally civil nature, is available only to a person who is in custody following a criminal conviction and sentence; such a petition thus implicates life and liberty interests in a way that materially differentiates it from civil actions. Therefore, the precedents which require tolling for mental incompetence in the context of post-conviction petitions are inapposite to questions of tolling statutes of repose in civil tort actions. |
Shelby | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Kevin L. Lawrence
We granted permission to appeal in this case pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 11 to determine whether the trial court properly denied the defendant’s motion to suppress evidence obtained during the investigation of a shooting death. To resolve this issue, we must determine whether the investigators had probable cause to arrest the defendant and whether the delay in taking him before a magistrate for a judicial determination of probable cause should independently require the exclusion of the evidence obtained during the first few hours of his detention. Because we are of the opinion that the officers had probable cause to arrest the defendant, we conclude that the evidence recovered at the scene was not subject to suppression. As to the defendant’s claim of “unreasonable delay,” it is obvious that the defendant was not taken before a magistrate for a judicial determination of probable cause within a constitutionally reasonable time. However, the evidence the defendant sought to suppress was obtained during the first few hours of his arrest. Thus, these evidentiary items were not tainted by exploitation of the constitutional violation and are not, therefore, subject to suppression. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals. |
Shelby | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Robert Faulkner
The defendant, Robert Faulkner, was convicted of the first degree premeditated murder of his wife, Shirley Faulkner. The jury imposed a sentence of death based upon the aggravating circumstance that the defendant was previously convicted of one or more violent felonies. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-204(i)(2) (1997). The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed. On automatic appeal under Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-206(a)(1) (2003), we designated the following issues for oral argument:1 1) whether the trial court improperly excluded testimony at the guilt phase regarding Faulkner’s “diminished capacity”; 2) whether the trial court committed harmful error in its instructions defining “intentionally” and “knowingly”; 3) whether the failure of the verdict form to recite that the jury found the aggravating circumstance “beyond a reasonable doubt” rendered the verdict invalid; and 4) whether the sentence of death is disproportionate or invalid under the mandatory review of Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-206(c)(1) (2003). Having carefully reviewed these issues and the issue of photographic evidence raised by Faulkner, we find no merit to his arguments. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals. |
Shelby | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Robert Faulkner - concurring/dissenting opinion
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Shelby | Supreme Court | |
Amy Butterworth, et al. v. John Butterworth, et al.
We granted this appeal to determine whether the doctrine of parental immunity bars recovery when a son is injured at his father’s place of employment. We conclude that the Court of Appeals erred in creating a bright-line rule prohibiting the application of the doctrine of parental immunity when the injury resulted from employment-related activities. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, we hold that the motion for summary judgment was improperly granted by the trial court. Thus, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals in this respect and remand this case to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. |
Dyer | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Detrick Cole
The defendant, Detrick Cole, was convicted of first degree premeditated murder. The jury imposed a sentence of death upon finding that the prosecution had proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant had been previously convicted of “one (1) or more felonies, other than the present charge, whose statutory elements involve the use of violence to the person,” and that this aggravating circumstance outweighed mitigating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt. The defendant appealed, challenging his conviction and sentence. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed. The case was docketed in this Court. Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-206(a)(1). After considering the briefs and the record, this Court entered an order requesting that the parties address at oral argument the following four issues: (1) whether the evidence is sufficient to support the conviction; (2) whether the defendant was deprived of his constitutional right to a fair trial when the trial court required the defendant to submit to fingerprinting in the presence of the jury; (3) whether, under Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000) and Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002), the jury rather than the judge must determine whether the statutory elements of prior convictions used to support the (i)(2)aggravating circumstance involve the use of violence to the person; and (4) whether the factors for mandatory review in Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-206 (c)(1) require reversal of the sentence of death. After carefully and thoroughly considering the issues in light of the record and the relevant authority, we affirm the defendant’s conviction and sentence. |
Shelby | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Detrick Cole - Concurring and Dissenting
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Shelby | Supreme Court | |
John Doe 1 ex rel. Jane Doe 1, et al. v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Nashville, et al.
In two separate civil actions, the plaintiffs, John Doe 1, Jane Doe 1 and John Doe 2 brought claims of reckless infliction of emotional distress against the defendant, the Roman Catholic Diocese of Nashville. The lawsuits were consolidated for certain pretrial purposes and also for purposes of appellate review. The trial court denied in part the plaintiffs' motion to compel the defendant to provide answers to discovery and ultimately granted the defendant summary judgment as to all plaintiffs. On appeal, the Court of Appeals, holding that reckless infliction of emotional distress must be based on conduct that was directed at the plaintiff, affirmed summary judgment for the defendant. The Court of Appeals also declined to consider the plaintiffs' appeal of the partial denial of their motion to compel, regarding the issue as moot. We granted the plaintiffs' application for permission to appeal. After carefully considering the relevant authority, we hold that to be actionable, reckless infliction of emotional distress need not be based upon conduct that was directed at a specific person or that occurred in the presence of the plaintiff. Applying this holding, we conclude that the defendant is not entitled to summary judgment. Furthermore, in light of our holding, we vacate the trial court's denial of the plaintiffs' motion to compel. We remand this case to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion, including reconsideration of the plaintiffs' discovery requests. |
Davidson | Supreme Court | |
Angela D. (Fezell) Taylor v. Douglas Fezell
We granted permission to appeal pursuant to Rule 11 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure to determine whether the retained earnings of an S corporation should be treated as income to the sole or majority shareholder of the corporation for the purpose of calculating child support in accordance with the Tennessee Child Support Guidelines. We conclude that absent a showing that the retained earnings are excessive or that an obligor is actually manipulating his or her income, the retained earnings of an S corporation should not be imputed as income to the sole or majority shareholder in calculating a child support obligation. Because there was no showing in this case that the retained earnings were excessive or that the obligor-father manipulated the funds of the S corporation to reduce his child support obligation, we hold that the trial court and the Court of Appeals erred by imputing to him as income the company's retained earnings. Further, we hold that the lower courts erred by failing to include the economic value of the obligor-father's company car in its calculation of income. Finally, we hold that the trial court and the Court of Appeals erred by not granting the obligee-mother's petition to have the obligor pay her attorney's fees in this cause. Based on the foregoing, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand to the trial court for a determination of child support that is consistent with this opinion and for a determination of attorney's fees. |
Greene | Supreme Court | |
Torian Benson a.k.a. Marcus Terry a.k.a. Marcus Benson v. State of Tennessee - Order
The petitioner, Torian Benson, has filed a pro se petition to rehear in this case. We note that the petitioner is represented by counsel and pro se petitions are not permitted in such cases. Nevertheless, having considered the merits of the petition to rehear, it is respectfully denied. |
Lake | Supreme Court | |
Jackie Bostic v. Paul Dalton
In this workers' compensation appeal, we must determine whether the appellee, a father who supervised the construction of his daughter's residence, is required to pay workers' compensation benefits to the appellant, the employee of a subcontractor who was injured during the construction of the residence. We hold that the father is an uncompensated agent of the owner and therefore falls within the owner's exemption of Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-113(f) (1999). Thus, we adopt the conclusions of the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel affirming the judgment of the trial court. |
Bradley | Supreme Court | |
Billy Gene Gray v. Cullom Machine Tool & Die, Inc., et al.
We granted review in this workers' compensation case to determine whether the trial court erred in 1) awarding temporary total benefits, 2) apportioning liability between the employer and the Second Injury Fund, and 3) awarding 180 weeks of lump-sum benefits. After reviewing the record and applicable authority, we conclude that the trial court erred in awarding temporary total benefits to the employee who continued to work for the employer following his injury and then later operated his own unprofitable business. We also hold that the trial court erred in limiting the employer's liability for permanent total disability benefits to 60% of 400 weeks and in awarding 180 weeks of lump sum benefits. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court's judgment and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. |
Bradley | Supreme Court |
