SUPREME COURT OPINIONS

Timothy Kendrick v. Judy Shoemake
E2000-01318-SC-R11-CV
Authoring Judge: Justice Janice M. Holder
Trial Court Judge: William M. Dender

Ralph Richards v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co.
M2000-01255-SC-WCM-CV
Authoring Judge: Justice E. Riley Anderson
Trial Court Judge: John W. Rollins
We granted review in this workers' compensation case to determine whether the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel erred in concluding that the evidence preponderated against the trial court's finding that the employee's injury did not arise out of and in the course of his employment. After reviewing the record and applicable authority, we conclude that the evidence did not preponderate against the trial court's finding that the employee's injury did not arise out of and in the course of his employment. We therefore reject the Panel's findings and conclusions and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Robert Davis, et al v. Wilson County
M2000-00785-SC-R11-CV
Authoring Judge: Justice E. Riley Anderson
Trial Court Judge: John D. Wootten, Jr.
We granted this appeal to determine whether county employees had a vested interest after retirement in health care benefits provided under resolutions passed by the Wilson County Commission. The chancellor found that the appellants had a vested interest in health care benefits because they were county employees who met the requirement of ten years of service and eight years of continuous service with Wilson County under a 1992 resolution. The Court of Appeals reversed the chancellor's judgment, concluding that the health care benefits were welfare benefits in which the appellants did not have a vested interest. After reviewing the record and applicable authority, we hold that the health care benefits were welfare benefits that did not vest automatically and that there was no clear and express language in the resolutions that the health care benefits were intended to vest or could not be terminated. We therefore affirm the Court of Appeals' judgment.

Heirs of Neil Ellis v. Estate of Virgie Ellis
M1999-00897-SC-R11-CV
Authoring Judge: Justice William M. Barker
Trial Court Judge: David Loughry
The issue in this case is whether property held in a tenancy by the entirety is subject to the 120-hour survival rule contained in section 31-3-120 of the Tennessee Uniform Simultaneous Death Act. Three days after her husband's death, Mrs. Ellis died of unrelated natural causes, and her will was admitted to probate. The husband's heirs sought to intervene in the probate proceeding, claiming that because Mrs. Ellis did not survive her husband for 120 hours, section 31-3-120 deems both to have died "simultaneously." Consequently, they argued, Tennessee Code Annotated section 31-3-104 authorized them to seek a one-half interest in the entireties property. The trial court denied the motion to intervene, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. On appeal to this Court, we hold that section 31-3-120 does not require one spouse to survive the other by 120 hours in order to obtain fee simple title to property formerly held by the entirety. We also hold that the General Assembly, in enacting section 31-3-120, did not intend to define the term "simultaneously" in section 31-3-104 as meaning "within 120 hours." Instead, we conclude that the legislature intended that this term should continue to receive its ordinary construction, meaning "at the same time." The judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.

Exxon Corporation v. Metropolitan Government Of
M2000-00614-SC-R11-CV
Authoring Judge: Justice Frank F. Drowota, III
Trial Court Judge: Carol L. Mccoy

Ernest Frye v. Blue Ridge Neuroscience Center
E2000-02155-SC-R11-CV
Trial Court Judge: John S. Mclellan, III
We granted this appeal to determine whether process issued upon a second complaint satisfies Rule 3 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure when the plaintiff failed to serve process on the original complaint. After careful consideration of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure and applicable case law, we hold that a plaintiff may rely upon the initial filing date to satisfy a statute of limitations if that plaintiff, having failed to issue or serve process within thirty days of filing the complaint, continues the action by issuing new process on the original complaint as required by Rule 3. In addition, a plaintiff may request a voluntary dismissal within the one-year time period under Rule 3, without having served process, and still rely on the original date of commencement to satisfy a statute of limitations if the plaintiff serves a copy of the Notice of Voluntary Dismissal and the complaint on the defendant as required by Rule 41.01. Because the plaintiff in this case failed to comply with either Rule 3 or Rule 41.01, the plaintiff may not rely on the filing date of the original complaint for purposes of satisfying the applicable one-year statute of limitations. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals granting the defendants summary judgment is affirmed.

Tammy Kline. for herself and for the use and benefit of Lori Michelle Kline, Kristy Lane Kline, and Diana Marie Kline v. Daniel Eyrich, et al.
E2000-01890-SC-R11-CV
Authoring Judge: Justice William M. Barker
Trial Court Judge: Judge Wheeler A. Rosenbalm

The primary issue in this case is whether a trial court may use the common fund doctrine in a wrongful death action to spread attorneys' fees equitably among the surviving beneficiaries of the action. The trial court consolidated two wrongful death actions, which were brought by the surviving spouse and children of the decedent, and it gave the surviving spouse control of the consolidated action. After the suit was settled, the trial court awarded the surviving spouse's attorney one-third of the settlement proceeds as a fee. On appeal, the children argued that the trial court improperly awarded fees to the surviving spouse's attorney from their share of the settlement because they possessed no contract with that attorney. A majority of the Court of Appeals held that although the award of fees could be proper under the common fund doctrine, the case should be remanded to resolve factual ambiguities in the record. We granted permission to appeal and hold that a trial court has the discretion to apply the common fund doctrine to the proceeds of a wrongful death action, thereby obliging the beneficiaries of that action to pay a reasonable fee to the attorney procuring the judgment or settlement. We also hold that the record contains no evidence showing that the trial court abused its discretion in awarding fees to the surviving spouse's attorney. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed in part and reversed in part.

Woodlawn Memorial Park, Inc. vs. Roger Keith, et al.
M2000-00612-SC-WCM-CV
Authoring Judge: Justice William M. Barker
Trial Court Judge: Judge Carol L. Soloman

In this workers' compensation appeal, an employee was allegedly injured in the course and scope of her employment. While purportedly seeking medical treatment for these injuries, she contracted an infection and died. The employer filed suit in the Davidson County Chancery Court claiming that no compensable injury occurred and that the employee used the excuse of an injury to seek prescription drugs for her addiction. The trial court held for the employer and later granted the employer's motion for discretionary costs. The Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel reversed, finding that a preponderance of the evidence established that a work-related injury did occur and that the employee died as a result of seeking treatment for those injuries. We then granted the employer's application for full court review and hold that the trial court's findings are supported by a preponderance of the evidence. We also hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding discretionary costs to the employer. The judgment of the Davidson County Chancery Court is affirmed.

State vs. Walter Lee Allen
E1998-00416-SC-R11-CD
Authoring Judge: Justice Janice M. Holder
Trial Court Judge: Ben W. Hooper, II

State vs. Walter Lee Allen
E1998-00416-SC-R11-CD
Authoring Judge: Justice Janice M. Holder
Trial Court Judge: Ben W. Hooper, II

State of Tennessee v. Jerry W. Yancey, Jr.
M1999-02131-SC-R11-CD
Authoring Judge: Justice E. Riley Anderson
Trial Court Judge: Judge Timothy L. Easter

We granted this appeal to determine the following issues: (1) whether the Court of Criminal Appeals, in reviewing the denial of pretrial diversion, erred by considering evidence presented at trial and failing to limit its review to evidence considered by the district attorney general; and (2) whether the trial court applied the correct standard in reviewing the district attorney general’s denial of pretrial diversion pursuant to a petition for writ of certiorari. After a thorough review of the record and relevant authority, we hold that in reviewing the denial of pretrial diversion, the Court of Criminal Appeals erred in failing to limit its review to the evidence that was considered by the district attorney general and any factual disputes resolved by the trial court. We also hold that in considering the petition for writ of certiorari, the trial court failed to apply the proper standard of review, which requires that it determine whether the district attorney general has considered and weighed all of the relevant factors and whether there is substantial evidence to support the district attorney general’s decision. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals is reversed, and this case is remanded to the trial court to apply the appropriate standard of review.

State of Tennessee v. Jerry W. Yancey, Jr. - Dissenting
M1999-02131-SC-R11-CD
Authoring Judge: Justice Janice M. Holder
Trial Court Judge: Judge Timothy L. Easter

An abuse of discretion in denying pretrial diversion should be found only when the record
shows an absence of any substantial evidence supporting the district attorney general’s decision.
State v. Pinkham, 955 S.W.2d 956, 960 (Tenn. 1997); State v. Hammersley, 650 S.W.2d 352, 356
(Tenn. 1983). When the reasons cited by the district attorney general are sufficient to support the
denial of pretrial diversion, I would hold that there is no abuse of discretion in the district attorney
general’s failure to make specific reference to every non-statutory, judicially-imposed factor. I
continue to adhere to my separate opinion in State v. Curry, 988 S.W.2d 153 (Tenn. 1999), and
therefore must respectfully dissent.

State vs. Johnnie Bell, Jr.
E1999-00819-SC-S09-CD
Authoring Judge: Justice E. Riley Anderson
Trial Court Judge: Phyllis H. Miller

State vs. Johnnie Bell, Jr.
E1999-00819-SC-S09-CD
Authoring Judge: Justice E. Riley Anderson
Trial Court Judge: Phyllis H. Miller

State of Tennessee v. Gerald Powers - Dissenting
W1999-02348-SC-DDT-DD
Authoring Judge: Justice William M. Barker
Trial Court Judge: Judge Joseph B. Dailey

At the outset, I recognize that the facts and evidence surrounding the heinous murder of Shannon Sanderson are certainly indicative of guilt on the part of the defendant, Gerald Powers. Indeed, even without the disputed testimony of the defendant’s wife, the evidence implicating Mr. Powers is convincing, if not overwhelming. However, I am unwilling to affirm a criminal conviction based upon a flawed interpretation of the marital communication privilege as codified in Tennessee Code Annotated section 24-1-201(b) (Supp. 1998). In my opinion, the statutory marital communications privilege codified at Tennessee Code Annotated section 24-1-201(b) should have resulted in the exclusion of the defendant’s wife’s testimony relating to the defendant’s confidential communications. Because I am of the opinion that reversible error occurred in this respect, I respectfully dissent.

State v. John R. Farner, Jr.
E1999-00491-SC-R11-CD
Authoring Judge: Justice Frank F. Drowota, III
Trial Court Judge: R. Jerry Beck
The primary issue presented in this appeal is whether Tennessee law recognizes a co-perpetrator rule which bars the defendant's convictions for criminally negligent homicide on the basis that the victims were co-participants in the drag race. After fully and carefully considering the record in this case in light of the relevant authorities, we conclude that no rule of Tennessee law bars the defendant's convictions for criminally negligent homicide as a matter of law. We hold that causation in criminal cases generally is a question of fact for a properly instructed jury, that a victim's contributory negligence is not a complete defense but may be considered in determining whether or not the defendant's conduct was a proximate cause of death, and that a jury's determination of the causation issue will be reviewed on appeal under the familiar sufficiency of the evidence standard and not disturbed so long as the evidence is sufficient to support the jury's determination. Because the trial court in this case failed to provide the jury with an instruction on proximate causation, an essential element of the offense, and because the jury was erroneously provided an instruction as to criminal responsibility, a theory that the State now concedes is inapplicable, the defendant's convictions for criminally negligent homicide must be reversed.

Heck Van Tran v. State of Tennessee
W2000-00739-SC-R11-PD
Authoring Judge: Justice E. Riley Anderson
Trial Court Judge: Judge John P. Colton, Jr.

We granted this appeal to determine whether the trial court and the Court of CriminalAppeals erred by denying the petitioner’s motion to reopen his post-conviction petition. In hismotion, the petitioner asserted that new evidence establishes that he is mentally retarded and,therefore, ineligible for the death penalty under Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-203, which prohibits theexecutionof the mentally retarded. The petitioner also argued on appeal that the Eighth Amendmentto the United States Constitution and article I, § 16 of the Tennessee Constitution prohibit the execution of mentally retarded individuals.

Heck Van Tran v. State of Tennessee - Concurring/Dissenting
W2000-00739-SC-R11-PD
Authoring Judge: Justice William M. Barker and Justice Janice M. Holder
Trial Court Judge: John P. Colton, Jr.

With its decision today, a majority of this Court has effectively permitted a defendant, who was sentenced to death in 1989 for the brutal execution of a 74-year-old grandmother, an opportunity to escape the ultimate punishment for his actions solely because he has managed to obtain a lower score on a revised I.Q. test than he was previously able to do. Before today, the Constitution of this State has never been held to provide blanket capital immunity to a class of persons based only on the fact of low intellectual ability and deficits in adaptive behavior. Instead, the Constitution has barred such executions only when the defendant’s mental condition displaces the following capacities: (1) the cognitive capacity to appreciate that certain action will lead to the death of others; (2) the moral capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of murder; or (3) the volitional capacity to behave in a lawful manner.

Bernice Rothstein, et al. v. Orange Grove Center, Inc., et al.
E1999-00900-SC-R11-CV
Authoring Judge: Justice Janice M. Holder
Trial Court Judge: W. Neil Thomas, III
We granted appeal to determine 1) whether the defendants are entitled to a new trial based upon their claim that the trial court erred in admitting certain evidence from four different sources, and 2) whether the trial court erred in dismissing the plaintiffs' claim for consortium damages and, if so, the proper remedy for that error. We hold that the four evidentiary issues are without merit. The defendants therefore are not entitled to a new trial. We further hold, pursuant to our decisions in Jordan v. Baptist Three Rivers Hospital, 984 S.W.2d 593 (Tenn. 1999), Hill v. City of Germantown, 31 S.W.3d 234 (Tenn. 2000), and Hancock v. Chattanooga-Hamilton Hospital Authority, 54 S.W.3d 234 (Tenn. 2001), that the plaintiffs may maintain a claim for loss of filial consortium. We remand this case for a trial on the issue of incidental damages, limited to loss of consortium.

State v. Bobby Godsey
E1997-00207-SC-R11-DD
Authoring Judge: Justice Frank F. Drowota, III
Trial Court Judge: R. Jerry Beck

State v. Bobby Godsey
E1997-00207-SC-R11-DD
Authoring Judge: Justice Frank F. Drowota, III
Trial Court Judge: R. Jerry Beck

Harry Kradel. v. Piper Industries
M2001-00338-SC-R23-CQ
Authoring Judge: Justice William M. Barker
Pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 23, this Court accepted certification of five questions of law from the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit concerning Tennessee's law of corporations. For the reasons given herein, we answer that the corporate statutes in effect before January 1, 1988, apply to determine the rights and remedies available against a corporation dissolved before that date and that section 48-1-1013(a) (repealed) applies to limit Piper's liability for post-dissolution claims. We further answer that Piper Industries, Inc. did comply with the dissolution statutes in effect before January 1, 1988, which require provisions to ensure the final distribution of corporate assets, but which do not require a corporation to establish a reserve fund for contingent claims arising more than two years after the dissolution. Finally, we answer that while the trust fund doctrine has been previously applied in Tennessee to solvent corporations, its application in this case is necessarily limited by Tennessee Code Annotated section 48-1-1013(a) (repealed).

Mary Johnson, et al. v. LeBonheur Children's Medical Center, et al.
W1999-01719-SC-R11-CV
Authoring Judge: Justice Janice M. Holder
Trial Court Judge: Robert L. Childers
We granted appeal to determine whether the vicarious liability of a private hospital may be based upon the acts or omissions of a state-employed physician resident. We hold that a private hospital may be vicariously liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior based solely upon the acts of a state-employed physician resident when the resident is acting as an agent of the hospital. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed, and the case is remanded to the trial court for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Billy Joe Childress v. Natasha Barnes Currie, et al.
W1999-00471-SC-R11-CV
Authoring Judge: Justice E. Riley Anderson
Trial Court Judge: Joseph H. Walker, III
The issue presented in this case is whether a confidential relationship arises as a matter of law when an unrestricted power of attorney is executed but not exercised. The trial court held that a confidential relationship existed and that the resulting presumption of undue influence could only be rebutted by proof of independent advice to the decedent. Because there was no such proof, the trial court set aside the jury's verdict and found that the will was invalid. On appeal, the Court of Appeals concluded that since the attorney-in-fact was unaware of the power of attorney at the time the decedent executed her will, there was not a confidential relationship between the attorney-in-fact and the decedent and, therefore, no presumption of undue influence. After a thorough review of the record and the relevant authority, we hold that a confidential relationship does not arise as a matter of law when an unrestricted power of attorney is executed without being exercised. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.

State v. Timothy McKinney
W1999-00844-SC-DDT-DD
Authoring Judge: Justice E. Riley Anderson
Trial Court Judge: Joseph B. Dailey