W1997-00023-SC-DDT-DD
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Madison | Supreme Court | |
Momon vs. State
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Supreme Court | ||
Momon vs. State
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Supreme Court | ||
E1998-00176-SC-R11-CV
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Supreme Court | ||
State of Tennessee v. Terry Allen Dominy
The dispositive issues in this appeal are as follows: (1) whether the indictment in this case charging the defendant with aggravated rape is sufficient to support a conviction for spousal rape, a “lesser grade” offense under this Court’s 1The defendant rais ed tw o oth er iss ues in this a ppeal: (1) whe ther th e trial c ourt e rred in refus ing to gran t the d efendant’s mo tion fo r recusal; and (2) w heth er the trial co urt er red in admitting into evidence a tape-recorded interview between the victim and the field supervisor of the Department of Human Services. Because we have reversed and remanded on other grounds, we need not address these issues in detail. However, we note that the proof in this record indicates that the trial judge was residing in a home owned by the assistant district attorney who prosecuted this case and was paying only the utilities and cable bills and not monthly rental. Under such circum stance s, recus al is appro priate. See Sup. C t. R. 10, Code of Judicial Conduct, Canons 2(A) 4(D)(5 ), and 3(E ). We also agree w ith the defen dant that th e trial court er red in allow ing the Sta te to offer into evidence the entire tape-recorded interview of the victim by the Department of Human Services field supervisor. While the State has the right to “convey the true picture of the prior statement alleged to be inconsistent,” State v. Boyd, 797 S.W .2d 5 89, 5 93-9 4 (Te nn. 1990), this rule does not form a basis for reference to portions of the statement which were not made an issue on cross-exam ination and which are not necessa ry to convey an acc urate picture of the matters discussed on cross-examination. The trial judge could have either allowed the State to question the witness concerning her prior statement to place her testimony on cross examination into context or permitted the State to use the transcript of the DHS tape to refresh the victim’s recollection. Neither the tape nor the transcript, how ever, should have been introduced as substantive evidence in this case. decision in State v. Trusty, 919 S.W.2d 305 (Tenn. 1996); and (2) if so, should this Court reconsider it decision in Trusty. We agree with the Court of Criminal Appeals that, under Trusty, the indictment in this case would be sufficient to support a conviction for the “lesser grade” offense of spousal rape. However, upon careful reconsideration, we overrule Trusty to the extent that it recognizes “lesser grade” offenses as distinct from lesser-included offenses and permits convictions of “lesser grade” offenses that are not lesser-included offenses embraced by the indictment. In light of our overruling of Trusty, the indictment in this case is not sufficient to support a conviction for spousal rape. Therefore, we vacate the defendant’s convictions, dismiss the indictments, and remand this case to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this decision. |
Lawrence | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee Henry Circuit v. Brenda Anne Burns
Defendant/appellee Brenda Burns was tried and convicted of criminal responsibility for the commission of first-degree murder in the death of her ex-husband, Paul Burns.1 The Court of Criminal Appeals reversed the conviction on the basis that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to interview two potential defense witnesses and present the testimony of those witnesses before the jury. The State filed an Application for Permission to Appeal contesting the intermediate court’s reversal of the defendant’s conviction on that basis. The defendant filed a Cross-Application for Permission to Appeal raising, among other issues, whether the trial court had committed reversible error by failing to instruct the jury on the lesser-included offenses of facilitation of a felony (i.e., first-degree murder), Tenn. Code Ann. § 39- 11-403 (1991), and solicitation to commit a criminal offense (i.e., first-degree murder), Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-12-102 (1991). We granted both Applications in order to address these important issues. |
Jackson | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Donald Ray Shirley
In this case we consider the proper standard of appellate review of a trial court’s denial of a motion to sever offenses under Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 14(b)(1). For the reasons set forth below, we hold that a denial of a severance will only be reversed for an abuse of discretion. We also hold that the trial 1 The first count alleged that the appellant robbed a convenience store on November 29, 1995, at 8:00 p.m. The second count alleged that ten days later on December 9, 1995, the appellant robbed a video rental store at 7:10 p.m. Counts three and four of the indictment alleged robberies of two conve nience s tores on December 10, 199 5, occu rring at 4:00 p.m. an d 4:30 p.m . respec tively. 2 court in this case abused its discretion in denying a severance because the methods used to commit the offenses were not so materially distinct or unique as to rise to an inference of identity. Because we find that this abuse of discretion was not harmless, the decision of the Court of Criminal Appeals is reversed, and this case is remanded to the trial court for new trials. |
Bradley | Supreme Court | |
Stephen A. Wakefield v. Michael F. Crawley, MacTenn Valve Company, a Tennessee Corp., and Macaweber Systems Inc., a Tennessee Corp.
We granted this appeal to determine whether stock in a closely-held corporation is a “security,” as defined by Tenn. Code Ann. § 47-8-102 (1992 Repl. & Supp. 1998)1, so that Chapter 8 of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) governs its sale or transfer. In Blasingame v. American Materials, Inc., 654 S.W.2d 659, 664 (Tenn. 1983), we concluded that closely-held stock was not a security within the meaning of Chapter 8 of the UCC. Because we have determined that the Official Comments of the 1977 version of the UCC, adopted by the Tennessee General Assembly in 1986, as well as the 1995 and 1997 amendments to the Code, overrule the reasoning in Blasingame, we now hold that closely-held stock is a security within the meaning of the UCC’s Chapter 8, and that the closely-held stock at issue in this case is governed by Chapter 8. Because the plaintiff cannot produce a signed writing that comports with the statute of frauds found at Tenn. Code Ann. § 47-8-319 (1992 Repl. & 1996 Repl.), nor can he satisfy one of the statutory exemptions, we reverse the judgments of the lower courts and find in favor of the defendant. |
Blount | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Donald Terry Moore
We granted the appeal in this case to address the proper application of Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 14(b)(1), which is used to sever criminal offenses. For the reasons set forth below, we hold that the Court of Criminal Appeals erred in affirming the trial court’s denial of appellant’s motion to sever one count of child rape based upon a finding that the offense was part of a common scheme or plan. However, we also hold that the error is harmless because the appellant was acquitted on two of the three counts of child rape, and the evidence is entirely sufficient to support the appellant’s conviction on the remaining count. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals is affirmed. |
Davidson | Supreme Court | |
State vs. Fowler
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Coffee | Supreme Court | |
M1996-00011-SC-R11-CD
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Supreme Court | ||
State vs. Fowler
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Coffee | Supreme Court | |
Overnite Transportation Co. v. Teamsters Local Union No. 480, et al.
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Davidson | Supreme Court | |
Goodwin vs. Hendersonville Police Dept.
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Sumner | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Albert Dewaynn Porter - Concurring
We granted this appeal to determine whether the common law "procuring agent defense" has been abolished by statute. We hold that the procuring agent defense was abolished by Tenn. Code Ann. §39-11-203 (e)(2) which expressly states that "[d]efenses available under common law are here by abolished." The trial court appropriately declined to instruct the jury on the procuring agent defense, and the defendant's conviction for selling a controlled substance was supported by the evidence. |
Hardin | Supreme Court | |
In re: Brittany Swanson, a Minor, Tennessee Baptist Children's Homes, Inc., v. Harry Lee Swanson
This case concerns the termination of appellant Harry Swanson’s parental rights over his biological child, Brittany Swanson, who is now nine years old and in the custody of the appellee Tennessee Baptist Children’s Homes, Inc. (Baptist Children’s Home). Although Mr. Swanson’s parental rights were originally terminated by the Tipton County Juvenile Court, the circuit court of Tipton County denied the petition to terminate parental rights on an appeal by Mr. Swanson. The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the circuit court and found that Mr. Swanson had “abandoned” Brittany because he had “willfully failed to support” her or “willfully failed to make reasonable payments toward [her] support” within the meaning of Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-1-102(1)(D) (1996). We hold that the statutory definition of “willfully failed to support” and “willfully failed to make reasonable payments toward such child’s support” is unconstitutional because it creates an irrebuttable presumption that the failure to provide monetary support for the four months preceding the petition to terminate parental rights constitutes abandonment, irrespective of whether that failure was intentional. This presumption violated Mr. Swanson’s federal and state constitutional right to the care and custody of his daughter. Accordingly, for the reasons discussed below, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and this case is remanded to the circuit court for entry of an order returning custody to Mr. Swanson. |
Tipton | Supreme Court | |
Doe vs. Sundquist
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Supreme Court | ||
Mulheim vs. Knox Co. Board of Education
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Knox | Supreme Court | |
State vs. Lane
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Bradley | Supreme Court | |
Doe vs. Sundquist
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Supreme Court | ||
State vs. Ferguson
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Washington | Supreme Court | |
Stephens vs. Henley's Supply & Industry
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Franklin | Supreme Court | |
Ivey vs. Trans Global Gas & Oil
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Supreme Court | ||
C.L. Randolph v. Virginia Henley Randolph
We granted this appeal to clarify the statutory standard by which the validity of antenuptial agreements should be judged. The trial court in this case held the antenuptial agreement invalid, finding the wife did not “knowledgeably” sign the agreement, as required by statute1. The Court of Appeals, in a split decision, reversed, finding the totality of the circumstances established that the wife possessed sufficient knowledge of the husband’s business affairs and financial status at the time she signed the agreement to meet the statutory requirement of "knowledgeably" executing the agreement and that the agreement was therefore enforceable. We interpret the statutory requirement that an antenuptial agreement is enforceable only if entered into "knowledgeably" to mean that the spouse seeking to enforce an antenuptial agreement must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, either that a full and fair disclosure of the nature, extent and value |
Knox | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Pat Bondurant
In this appeal, the defendant, Pat Bondurant, was convicted of premeditated first degree murder and arson. Upon finding that the State had proven two statutory. The jury found the following two aggravating circumstances: (1) “[t]he defendant was previously convicted of one or more felonies, other than the present charge, which involve the use or threat of violence to the person;” and (2) “[t]he murder was especially heinous, atrocious or cruel in that it involved to rture or de pravity of m ind.” Ten n. Code Ann. § 39 -2-203( i)(2) and (5 ) (1982). These statutory aggravating circumstances were redefined in 1989 and are currently codified at Tenn. Code A nn. § 39-13-204(i)(2) and (5) (1998 Sup p.). 2Tenn. Code A nn. § 39-13-206(a)(1) (1997 R epl.). |
Maury | Supreme Court |
