Linda F. Seals v. H & F, Inc., et al - Dissenting
This Court has accepted three questions certified by the United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee in accordance with Tenn. S. Ct. R. 23 that require us to determine how existing Tennessee law addresses certain questions involving the cremation of human remains. I regret that I am able to concur with the Court’s answers to only the second and third questions. I cannot concur with the Court’s answer to the first question because it overlooks that, by virtue of the definitive actions of the Tennessee General Assembly in 2000, the common-law right of sepulchre, recognized by this Court over eighty years ago, provides the basis for answering the question. |
Supreme Court | ||
Linda F. Seals v. H & F, Inc., et al
The defendants, a funeral home and a crematory operator, arranged for and conducted a cremation at the joint request of the decedent’s fiancée and his fourteen-year-old son. The decedent’s mother, who claims the entitlement to have directed the disposal of his body, filed suit in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee contending wrongful cremation and seeking damages under a variety of theories in tort. Three certified questions of state law have been presented to this Court for consideration. Our responses are as follows: (1) where decedent did not make a pre-mortem election for the method of disposal of his remains, a parent has a right of control superior to that of a fiancée or minor child; (2) while a minor may be an “heir” under the safe harbor provisions for crematory operators under our statute, reliance on the instructions of a minor may qualify as so reckless as to subject the operator to liability; and (3) a funeral home that merely makes arrangements for a cremation and contracts for another party to perform the cremation is not the operator of a crematory facility for purposes of the statutory safe harbor. |
Supreme Court | ||
Ricky Harris v. State of Tennessee - Concurring
I concur with the Chief Justice’s conclusion that Mr. Harris is not entitled to coram nobis relief with regard to either of his newly discovered evidence claims. Her conclusion that the claim based on the evidence regarding the “Bill” letters is time-barred is correct. I cannot, however, concur in her conclusion that the claim based on the evidence regarding the alibi witness is likewise time-barred because Mr. Harris has made out a prima facie case for equitable tolling with regard to that claim. Apart from the question of the timeliness of these claims, I would affirm the trial court’s denial of coram nobis relief on both claims because of fatal substantive deficiencies in Mr. Harris’s petition for coram nobis relief. |
Carter | Supreme Court | |
Ricky Harris v. State of Tennessee
We granted the State’s appeal to determine whether the Court of Criminal Appeals erred in reversing the trial court’s summary dismissal of the petition for writ of error coram nobis and remanding for a determination of whether due process requires tolling of the one-year statute of limitations. We conclude that the delay in seeking coram nobis relief is unreasonable as a matter of law under the circumstances of this case, and therefore due process considerations do not preclude application of the statute of limitations to bar the petition. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals and reinstate the judgment of the trial court dismissing the petition. |
Carter | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Tommy Holmes
We granted permission to appeal in this case to address whether the trial court erred in ruling that an indigent defendant forfeited his right to counsel at trial by telling his appointed lawyer, “I know how to get rid of you,” and, at a subsequent meeting, physically assaulting his lawyer by striking the lawyer’s eyeglasses with his finger. The defendant was tried by a jury pro se and convicted of aggravated rape. We hold that, under the facts and circumstances of this case, the trial court committed reversible error in ruling that the defendant had forfeited his right to appointed counsel at trial. While the defendant’s physical attack on his lawyer was serious misconduct, it did not rise to the level of “extremely serious misconduct” sufficient to warrant an immediate forfeiture. State v. Carruthers, 35 S.W.3d 516, 548 (Tenn. 2000). Because the defendant was erroneously denied his fundamental constitutional right to counsel, we must reverse his conviction and remand this matter for appointment of new counsel and a new trial. The judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals is reversed. |
Shelby | Supreme Court | |
James L. Milligan, Jr. v. Board of Professional Responsibility of the Supreme Court of Tennessee
In this direct appeal, the issue presented is whether the trial court properly affirmed a Board of Professional Responsibility hearing panel’s denial of a suspended attorney’s petition for reinstatement of his law license. The trial court affirmed the hearing panel’s decision that the attorney failed to present sufficient proof of his moral qualifications to practice law in this state and that his reinstatement will not be detrimental to the integrity and standing of the bar or the administration of justice or subversive to the public interest. After reviewing the entire record, we hold that the attorney failed to present sufficient evidence that he has the moral qualifications to practice law in this state and that his reinstatement will be not detrimental to the integrity and standing of the bar or the administration of justice or subversive to the public interest. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court denying the petition for reinstatement is affirmed. |
Knox | Supreme Court | |
Julie A. Bellamy v. Cracker Barrel Old Country Store, Inc., et al - Dissenting
I applaud the majority’s willingness to decide this case in an expeditious manner. I disagree, |
Wilson | Supreme Court | |
Julie A. Bellamy v. Cracker Barrel Old Country Store, Inc., et al
The Applicants, Cracker Barrel Old Country Store, Inc., and Paul Ludovissie (“Cracker Barrel” and |
Wilson | Supreme Court | |
Julie A. Bellamy v. Cracker Barrel Old Country Store, Inc., et al
This cause was heard upon the record on appeal from the trial court and the application of |
Wilson | Supreme Court | |
Robin Lee Stanfill, et al v. John T. Mountain, et al. - Concurring/Dissenting
I concur in most of the majority’s well-reasoned analysis. I write separately, however, to state my disagreement that Mr. and Mrs. Mountain and Mr. Brooks shifted the burden of production to the Stanfills with respect to the allegation of fraudulent concealment of mold. |
Maury | Supreme Court | |
Robin Lee Stanfill, et al v. John T. Mountain, et al
The buyers of real property brought this action against the sellers and the real estate agent after discovering numerous allegedly dangerous and defective conditions in the house and on the property. The issue in this case is the propriety of the trial court’s grant of summary judgment to the defendants. After review, we conclude that there are no genuine issues of material fact and the defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the plaintiffs’ claims regarding the alleged mold infestation of the house, and that Mrs. Mountain is entitled to summary judgment on the plaintiffs’ claim regarding the underground fuel storage tanks. As to the remainder of the plaintiffs’ claims, we conclude that summary judgment was improper because the plaintiffs met their burden in establishing the existence of several genuine issues of material fact. We affirm in part and reverse in part the trial court’s judgment and remand for further proceedings |
Maury | Supreme Court | |
Robert Philip Rayburn, Sr. v. Board of Professional Responsibility of the Supreme Court of Tennessee
This opinion addresses an appeal from a judgment affirming the disbarment of an attorney by a hearing panel designated by the Board of Professional Responsibility. The first issue presented is whether the panel was divested of jurisdiction when the Board approved a proposed offer of a conditional guilty plea that the attorney later accepted with modifications. A second issue is whether the attorney was entitled to a voluntary nonsuit in the trial court after filing a petition for writ of certiorari seeking review of the adverse decision by the panel. Initially, the panel retained jurisdiction to enter the order of disbarment. Further, because the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure apply to our rules of disciplinary enforcement, an attorney who files a petition for writ of certiorari is entitled to a voluntary nonsuit; however, principles of sovereign immunity preclude the application of the one-year savings statute, Tennessee Code Annotated section 28-1-105(a). A petition for certiorari must, therefore, be filed within sixty days of the panel judgment in order to preserve an appeal. In summary, the voluntary nonsuit is granted; however, the appeal is dismissed because a second petition for writ of certiorari was not timely filed. We, therefore, reverse the judgment of the trial court as to the denial of a voluntary nonsuit; we affirm the judgment of disbarment by the panel. |
Hamilton | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Jerry Lee Hanning - Concurring
I concur, but on a different basis. “Whether the stop of a vehicle is considered ‘reasonable’ depends on whether the officer had either probable cause or an ‘articulable and reasonable suspicion’ that the vehicle or its occupants were subject to seizure for a violation of the law . . . . The level of reasonable suspicion required to support an investigatory stop is lower than that required for probable cause.” State v. Day, 263 S.W.3d 891, 902 (Tenn. 2008). Reasonable suspicion must be supported “by specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion.” Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968); Hughes v. State, 588 S.W.2d 296, 305 (Tenn. 1979). |
Loudon | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Jerry Lee Hanning
This appeal involves the detention and questioning of the driver of a truck tractor and trailer based upon an anonymous tip of reckless driving from a citizen. A police officer received a dispatch that a caller had reported a black “18-wheeler” bearing a “Smith Brothers” logo was being driven recklessly in a northbound direction on the interstate and had just exited at the Highway 72 ramp. The police officer was in a parking lot very close to the exit ramp at the time he received the call. He responded immediately and observed a black “semi-truck” parked in the emergency lane of the northbound exit ramp. The officer turned his blue lights on, drove down the ramp, and pulled in front of the truck. After observing a Smith Transport logo on the door of the truck tractor, questioning the driver, and administering field sobriety tests, the officer arrested the driver for driving under the influence. The driver entered a conditional guilty plea to driving under the influence and reserved the certified question of whether the warrantless detention and questioning of the driver violated the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 7 of the Constitution of the State of Tennessee. We hold that in this case the anonymous tip reporting reckless driving indicated a sufficiently high risk of imminent injury or death to members of the public to warrant immediate intervention by law enforcement officials and justified the brief investigatory stop because the offense was reported at or near the time of its occurrence, and the report indicated that the caller was witnessing an ongoing offense; the report provided a detailed description of the truck, its direction of travel and location; and the investigating officer verified these details within moments of the dispatch reporting the tip. |
Loudon | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Charlotte Yvonne Turner - Dissenting
I respectfully disagree with the majority. In my view, the police officers’ search of Ms. Turner’s residence without reasonable or individualized suspicion violates article I, section 7 of the Tennessee Constitution. While the United States Supreme Court has ruled in Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843 (2006), that such a search, without reasonable or individualized suspicion, does not violate the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, I would hold the Tennessee Constitution provides a greater degree of protection against suspicionless searches than does the federal Constitution. |
Obion | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Charlotte Yvonne Turner
We granted permission to appeal in this case to determine whether the police violated the constitutional rights of the defendant, a parolee, when they searched her residence without a warrant but pursuant to a condition of her parole. We adopt the reasoning of the Supreme Court in Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843 (2006), and hold that parolees who are subject to a warrantless search condition may be searched without reasonable or individualized suspicion. The officers who searched the defendant’s residence knew about her parole status, were aware of the warrantless search condition of her parole, and did not conduct the search in an unreasonable manner. Accordingly, the trial court erred in suppressing evidence found during the search of the defendant’s residence. The judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals is reversed, and this matter is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. |
Obion | Supreme Court | |
Iris Kay Snodgrass v. Robert H. Snodgrass - Concurring/Dissenting
I concur in the majority’s conclusion that Mr. Snodgrass’s 401(k) account was not transmuted to marital property when he withdrew a portion of its funds for the purchase of a family home, as well as its holding regarding the division of the parties’ pensions. I further agree with the majority’s determination that 401(k) accounts are “retirement . . . benefit rights relating to employment” for the purposes of Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-4-121(b)(1)(B), and that the contributions made by Mr. Snodgrass and Mrs. Snodgrass prior to the marriage (the “premarital contributions”) should be classified as separate property because they did not, as the statute requires, “accrue[] during the period of the marriage.” I disagree, however, with the rationale by which the majority concludes that the increase in the value of the premarital contributions qualified as marital property. Instead, I would remand for consideration of whether the increases in value could be traced to the premarital contributions of each to their respective 401(k)s and have not been subjected to commingling (inextricably mingled with marital property) or, in the alternative, whether the increases became marital through the concept of substantial contribution (to the preservation and appreciation of the premarital contributions). |
Supreme Court | ||
In Re: Estate of Martha M. Tanner - Concurring
I concur with the Court’s conclusion that the nonclaim statutes in Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 30-2- |
Davidson | Supreme Court | |
In Re: Estate of Martha M. Tanner, deceased
The decedent, Martha M. Tanner, died intestate while a resident of a nursing facility. Nineteen months later, the Bureau of TennCare filed a complaint in the Davidson County Chancery Court seeking the appointment of an administrator of her estate. The case was transferred to the probate court, and the decedent’s son, Thomas Tanner, was appointed administrator. The Bureau of TennCare then filed a claim seeking recovery of “medical assistance correctly paid” on behalf of the decedent pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 71-5-116 (1995 & Supp. 2002) and 42 United States Code section 1396p (2003 & Supp. 2009). The probate court dismissed the claim as untimely, and, upon direct appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed. We granted application for permission to appeal in order to consider whether the claim is procedurally barred. Because section 71-5-116 places an obligation on the representative of an estate to obtain a waiver or release from the Bureau, the claim is not subject to a one-year statute of limitations. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is, therefore, reversed, and the cause is remanded to the probate court. Tenn. R. App. P. 11; Judgment of the Court of Appeals Reversed |
Davidson | Supreme Court | |
Mike Allmand v. Jon Pavletic, et al. - Dissenting
This Court accepted a question of law certified by the United States District Court for the Western District of Tennessee regarding the authority of municipal utility boards to enter into employment contracts with at-will employees that provide for severance benefits if the employee is terminated without cause. While the Court has decided that “some form of severance compensation . . . [may be] permissible,” it has concluded that the particular severance provisions in the two employment contracts at issue in this case are not enforceable. I respectfully disagree. |
Jackson | Supreme Court | |
Mike Allmand v. Jon Pavletic, et al.
The United States District Court for the Western District of Tennessee has submitted a certified question of law pursuant to our Rule 23 as to the validity of certain provisions within two separate employment contracts: “Whether a municipal utility board has the authority to enter into a contract with an appointed city official who serves at the will and pleasure of the Board of Mayor and Aldermen whereby the utility board contracts to continue to pay the official’s salary for a multiyear time period [8 and 14 years] after the official’s employment is terminated.” Because it is within our discretion to do so, we have elected to answer the question in a manner designed to fit the facts and circumstances in this particular case. Our conclusion is that neither Ripley Power and Light nor Ripley Gas, Water, and Wastewater, utility boards for the City of Ripley, Tennessee, had the authority to enter into multi-year contracts with Mike Allmand, the former superintendent of the two utilities, or to obligate the City for the payment of salary and benefits as provided by the terms. |
Jackson | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Neddie Mack Lawson
The defendant was originally indicted for driving under the influence, second offense. More than one year after the arrest, the grand jury returned a second indictment, charging the defendant with driving under the influence, fourth offense, a Class E felony. The State filed a nolle prosequi as to the first indictment and, upon motion by the defendant, the trial court granted an order to expunge these records. At trial, the defendant was convicted of driving under the influence, third offense, a misdemeanor. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed. This Court granted review in order to determine whether the one-year statute of limitations applicable to misdemeanors barred the prosecution. Because the trial court properly took judicial notice of the pendency of the first indictment at the time of the second, the statute of limitations, regardless of the efficacy of the order of expunction, was tolled and the prosecution was timely. The judgment is, therefore, affirmed. |
Claiborne | Supreme Court | |
Lincoln General Insurance Company v. Detroit Diesel Corporation, et al.
We accepted the following question of law certified by the United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee: Does Tennessee law recognize an exception to the economic loss doctrine under which recovery in tort is possible for damage to the defective product itself when the defect renders the product unreasonably dangerous and causes the damage by means of a sudden, calamitous event? We answer this question in the negative. |
Supreme Court | ||
State of Tennessee v. Brandon Keith Ostein and Teresa Gale Foxx
We granted permission to appeal in this case to address the circumstances under which the identity of a confidential informant must be disclosed pre-trial to a criminal defendant. Defendants Brandon Keith Ostein and Teresa Gale Foxx were arrested and charged with drug offenses after police officers executed a search warrant at Foxx’s apartment. The affidavit in support of the search warrant referred to information provided by a confidential informant. Ostein and Foxx filed motions for disclosure of the informant’s identity. After a hearing, the trial court concluded that the confidential informant was a material witness and ordered disclosure. The State sought and obtained an interlocutory appeal, and the Court of Criminal Appeals reversed the trial court. Ostein and Foxx sought permission to appeal, which we granted. Upon our close review of the limited record before us, we hold that Ostein and Foxx have failed to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that the confidential informant is a material witness or otherwise important to their defense. The trial court ordered disclosure based on a clearly erroneous assessment of the evidence, resulting in reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals. |
Davidson | Supreme Court | |
Highwoods Properties, Inc. et al. v. City of Memphis - Dissenting
At the heart of this case is the operation of the checks and balances that influence and control a municipality’s exercise of its power to annex adjoining property. The controversy involves a duly enacted annexation ordinance that was substantially altered in a negotiated settlement of litigation between some of the affected property owners and the attorney representing the municipality. Other affected property owners filed suit in the Chancery Court for Shelby County seeking a declaratory judgment regarding the validity of the effectively amended annexation ordinance that had not been ratified by the municipality’s legislative body. The trial court, the Court of Appeals, and now this Court have dismissed the complaint because it was not filed within the thirty-day period within which a quo warranto action challenging the reasonableness of the annexation must be filed. I respectfully dissent. The aggrieved property owners are entitled to their day in court. They are not challenging the reasonableness of the original annexation ordinance. To the contrary, they are challenging the legality of the negotiated settlement that effectively amended the original annexation ordinance without the approval of the Memphis City Council. |
Shelby | Supreme Court |
