SUPREME COURT OPINIONS

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State vs. Pierce
E1997-00053-SC-R11-CD
Authoring Judge: Justice Frank F. Drowota, III
Trial Court Judge: R. Jerry Beck

Appellate Court To Apply a Clearly Erroneous Standard of Review, Coln v. City of Savannah, 966
1998-00091-SC-R11-CV
Trial Court Judge: George H. Brown

State vs. Owens
W1997-00237-SC-R11-CD
Authoring Judge: Justice Adolpho A. Birch, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Joseph B. Dailey

State vs. Winfield
E1996-00012-SC-R11-CD
Authoring Judge: Justice E. Riley Anderson
Trial Court Judge: Douglas A. Meyer

State vs. Fowler
E1997-00037-SC-R11-CD
Authoring Judge: Justice E. Riley Anderson
Trial Court Judge: Rex Henry Ogle

John Paul Seals v. State of Tennessee
E1998-00367-SC-R11-PC
Authoring Judge: Justice E. Riley Anderson
Trial Court Judge: James E. Beckner

John Paul Seals v. State of Tennessee
E1998-00367-SC-R11-PC
Authoring Judge: Justice E. Riley Anderson
Trial Court Judge: James E. Beckner

State vs. Dennis Ray Gilliland
M1997-00072-SC-R11-CD
Authoring Judge: Justice William M. Barker
Trial Court Judge: Allen W. Wallace

Dan Alexander vs. Jay Armentrout, Jr. and Patricia Ruth Armentrout
E1998-00136-SC-R11-CV
Authoring Judge: Justice Frank F. Drowota, III
Trial Court Judge: Judge Lewis W. May

This appeal arises from a dispute between brothers-in-law over the sale of a partnership interest in a family dairy business. After reaching an oral  agreement regarding the price of the interest to be sold, the buyer tendered $50,000 of the purchase price to the seller and later  presented a promissory note evidencing an obligation for the $61,000 balance of the sale. The seller’s home subsequently burned and the note was destroyed.  A dispute arose between the parties as to the validity of the note and the existence of an agreement. The seller  contends that the note handed to him by the buyer does not contain the true terms of the contract. He argues that his agreement was with the buyers and not with the buyer's corporation. The buyer contends that his corporation is liable on the note and not him personally. A jury found that the note was not accepted by the seller and rendered judgment against the buyer and his wife, rather than against the corporation. In reviewing the trial court’s denial of the buyer’s motion for a directed verdict, the Court of Appeals reversed the jury’s findings and held that the seller accepted the promissory note and was estopped from denying his acceptance. Accordingly, the intermediate court reversed the judgment against the buyer and his wife, finding them not to be personally liable on the promissory note. After a close review of the record, we have concluded that while the Court of Appeals correctly  reversed the judgment against the buyer’s wife, it erred by reversing the jury’s verdict with respect to the buyer personally. We therefore reinstate the jury’s verdict and judgment against the buyer.

State of Tennessee v. Dennis R. England
M1999-00254-SC-R11-CO
Trial Court Judge: Jane W. Wheatcraft

State vs. England
M1997-00254-SC-R11-CO
Authoring Judge: Justice E. Riley Anderson
Trial Court Judge: Jane W. Wheatcraft

In re: Appalachian School of Law
M2000-00053-SC-BLE-CV

Berryhill vs. Rhodes
W1997-00167-SC-R11-CV
Authoring Judge: Justice Janice M. Holder
Trial Court Judge: Kenneth A. Turner

Berryhill vs. Rhodes
W1997-00167-SC-R11-CV
Authoring Judge: Justice Janice M. Holder
Trial Court Judge: Kenneth A. Turner

Barnes vs. Goodyear
W1997-00247-SC-R11-CV
Authoring Judge: Justice Janice M. Holder
Trial Court Judge: W. Michael Maloan

LeMay vs. TDOC
M1998-00317-SC-R11-CV
Authoring Judge: Justice E. Riley Anderson
Trial Court Judge: Carol L. Mccoy
We granted this appeal to determine whether the Governor has the authority to revoke a conditional commutation during the term of the commuted sentence only, or whether the commutation may be revoked during the term of the original sentence. We conclude that the Governor has the authority to revoke a conditional commutation during the term of the original sentence. We therefore hold that the Governor's revocation of the prisoner's commutation after the expiration of the commutated sentence but before the expiration of the original sentence was valid, and affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.

Reeves vs. Granite State Ins. Co.
M1998-00286-SC-R11-CV
Authoring Judge: Justice Adolpho A. Birch, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Jeffrey F. Stewart
We accepted review in this case to determine whether the rights of Ed Reeves, the loss payee, were extinguished by cancellation of an automobile policy by the issuer, Granite State Insurance Co., where the cancellation had been occasioned by the insured's misrepresentation. The trial court found that the policy should be construed to require notice to the loss payee before cancellation could affect the loss payee, that any ambiguity should be resolved in favor of the loss payee, and that the loss occurred prior to the notice of cancellation of the policy. The Court of Appeals affirmed. We conclude that Granite State cannot extinguish the loss payee's interest because of acts or omissions of the insured except those enumerated in the loss payable clause, which is of the standard/union type. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.

State of Tennessee v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Company, et al., v. Gregory Bennett Perry and Steve Lloyd Champion, et al.
M1999-00455-SC-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Per Curiam

A petition for rehearing has been filed on behalf of the Beckom appellants pursuant to Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure Rule 39. After consideration of the same, the Court is of the opinion that the petition should be and the same hereby is denied at the cost of the Beckom appellants. Enter this 24th day of May, 2000.

Harris vs. Chern
M1998-00250-SC-R11-CV
Authoring Judge: Justice Janice M. Holder
Trial Court Judge: Thomas W. Brothers
We granted this appeal to determine the standard to be applied in ruling upon a Tenn. R. Civ. P. 54.02 motion to revise a grant of partial summary judgment based upon evidence beyond that which was before the court when the motion was initially granted. For the reasons stated below, we reject the newly discovered evidence rule applied by the trial court and set forth in Bradley v. McLeod, 984 S.W.2d 929 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1998). We adopt a test requiring the trial court to consider, when applicable: 1) the movant's efforts to obtain evidence to respond to the motion for summary judgment; 2) the importance of the newly submitted evidence to the movant's case; 3) the explanation offered by the movant for its failure to offer the newly submitted evidence in its initial response to the motion for summary judgment; 4) the likelihood that the nonmoving party will suffer unfair prejudice; and 5) any other relevant factor. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand to the trial court for application of this standard.

State vs. Harris
M1998-00325-SC-R11-CD
Authoring Judge: Justice Adolpho A. Birch, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Bobby H. Capers
We grant permission to appeal as requested by Kenneth Bryan Harris in order to review the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The Court of Criminal Appeals found that the trial court had erred in making the following rulings: (1) overruling the State's motion to enter a nolle prosequi on an indictment for aggravated assault; (2) dismissing a superseding indictment for attempted first degree murder and aggravated assault; and (3) reversing the district attorney general pro tempore's rejection of the defendant's application for pretrial diversion on the original indictment. Accordingly, the Court of Criminal Appeals reversed each ruling and remanded the cause to the trial court for further proceedings. After careful consideration, we conclude that the trial court erred in overruling the State's motion for a nolle prosequi on the original indictment. We conclude also that the trial court erred in dismissing the superseding indictment for attempted first degree murder and aggravated assault. Moreover, because the superseding indictment contains a count charging Harris with an offense for which pretrial diversion is not available, we need not consider the question of pretrial diversion. Based on these conclusions, we affirm the decision of the Court of Criminal Appeals and remand the cause to the trial court for proceedings on the superseding indictment.

BVT Lebanon Shopping Cehter, Ltd. vs. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., et al
M1997-00059-SC-R11-CV
Authoring Judge: Justice Janice M. Holder
Trial Court Judge: Bobby H. Capers

BVT Lebanon Shopping Cehter, Ltd. vs. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., et al
M1997-00059-SC-R11-CV
Authoring Judge: Justice Janice M. Holder
Trial Court Judge: Bobby H. Capers

Dotson vs. Blake, et al
W1998-00710-SC-R11-CV
Authoring Judge: Justice Frank F. Drowota, III
Trial Court Judge: William B. Acree
This is an appeal from the Circuit Court of Weakley County, which refused to permit the jury in a personal injury case to allocate fault to tortfeasors who successfully asserted a statute of repose defense. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court. We granted review to decide whether fault may be attributed to tortfeasors who cannot be held liable because of a statute of repose. After examining the record, considering the arguments of the parties, and analyzing the applicable law, we conclude that the courts below erred in not allowing fault to be assigned to the tortfeasors who successfully asserted a statute of repose to the claims against them. Accordingly, for the reasons explained hereafter, the lower courts are reversed.

Dotson vs. Blake, et al
W1998-00710-SC-R11-CV
Authoring Judge: Justice Frank F. Drowota, III
Trial Court Judge: William B. Acree
This is an appeal from the Circuit Court of Weakley County, which refused to permit the jury in a personal injury case to allocate fault to tortfeasors who successfully asserted a statute of repose defense. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court. We granted review to decide whether fault may be attributed to tortfeasors who cannot be held liable because of a statute of repose. After examining the record, considering the arguments of the parties, and analyzing the applicable law, we conclude that the courts below erred in not allowing fault to be assigned to the tortfeasors who successfully asserted a statute of repose to the claims against them. Accordingly, for the reasons explained hereafter, the lower courts are reversed.