Nielsen Bainbridge, LLC v. Thomas Shinn M2008-01639-WC-R3-WC Authoring Judge: Justice William C. Koch Trial Court Judge: Judge Clara Byrd This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation |
Carter County | Workers Compensation Panel | ||
Arnold Lynn Bomar v. Hart & Cooley Flex Division, et al. W2008-02827-WC-R3-WC Authoring Judge: Special Judge Roger A. Page Trial Court Judge: Chancellor James F. Butler Employee received an award of workers’ compensation benefits for a 1994 injury that |
Madison County | Workers Compensation Panel | ||
Donnie D. McNeely v. Ucar Carbon Co., Inc., et al. M2008-02407-WC-R3-WC Authoring Judge: Special Judge E. Riley Anderson Trial Court Judge: Judge Jim T. Hamilton This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-225(e)(3) for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Employee had several compensable work injuries, the last of which was carpal tunnel syndrome. The trial court awarded benefits for permanent total disability (“PTD”). Liability was apportioned 90% to the Second Injury Fund (“The Fund”) and 10% to the employer. The Fund has appealed, contending, inter alia, that Employee’s claims as to it are barred by the applicable statute of limitations. We agree, and modify the judgment accordingly. |
Maury County | Workers Compensation Panel | ||
Chattanooga Area Regional Transit Authority et al. v. Mary K. Coleman E2008-02160-WC-R3-WC Authoring Judge: Special Judge Jeffrey S. Bivins Trial Court Judge: Judge W. Neil Thomas, III This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code |
Hamilton County | Workers Compensation Panel | ||
Bertha Mai Claiborne v. Abc Group Fuel Systems, Inc. M2008-02292-WC-R3-WC Authoring Judge: Senior Judge Allen W. Wallace Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Tom E. Gray This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated § 50-6-225(e)(3) for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The Employee alleged that she injured her back and neck as a result of an accident at work. Her authorized treating physician released her with no impairment. Employee’s examining physician assigned 10% impairment. The parties invoked the Medical Impairment Registry (“MIR”) process. The MIR physician assigned to Employee found 0% impairment. The trial court awarded benefits based upon the rating of Employee’s physician. The trial court did not explain how the opinion of Employee’s physician rebutted the MIR physician’s opinion. Upon review, we conclude that the trial court erred by not accepting the impairment as determined by the MIR doctor. The judgment for permanent partial disability benefits is reversed, and the case is remanded to the trial court for additional proceedings. |
Sumner County | Workers Compensation Panel | ||
Tammie Haake v. Saturn Corporation M2008-02476-WC-R3-WC Authoring Judge: Special Judge Donald P. Harris Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Jeffrey S. Bivins In this workers’ compensation case, the employee, Tammie Haake, sustained compensable injuries which required her to have surgery on both wrists. After the first procedure, she was able to return to work, although with modified duties. While she was temporarily disabled from the second surgery, her employer, Saturn Corporation, offered its workers an early retirement incentive program. She accepted the offer, and, as a result, did not return to work. The trial court found that her retirement was reasonably related to her work injuries, and therefore did not apply the “cap” of one and one-half times impairment contained in Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-241(d)(1)(A) Employer has appealed from that decision. We affirm the judgment. 1 |
Williamson County | Workers Compensation Panel | ||
Donny Ray Thompson v. City of Lawrenceburg, et al. M2008-02662-WC-R3-WC Authoring Judge: Senior Judge Allen W. Wallace Trial Court Judge: Judge Jim. T. Hamilton This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated § 50-6-225(e)(3) for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The trial court found Employee to be permanently and totally disabled as a result of a compensable injury. It apportioned benefits 70% to Employer and 30% to the Second Injury Fund. Employer appealed. Employer and Employee then reached an agreement to compromise Employer’s portion of the claim for a lump sum payment. The appeal was voluntarily dismissed. Employee thereafter filed a motion requesting that the Fund immediately commence paying its share of the judgment. The trial court granted that |
Lawrence County | Workers Compensation Panel | ||
Judy Minutella v. Ford Motor Credit Company M2008-01920-WC-R3-WC Authoring Judge: E. Riley Anderson, Sp. J. Trial Court Judge: Robert E. Corlew, III, Chancellor This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 5- 6-225(e)(3) for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Employee sought post-judgment medical care for a knee injury after the trial court approved a settlement agreement wherein Employer agreed that it would be responsible for medical expenses related to the injury. Employer declined to authorize the original treating physician to provide additional care and instead offered Employee a choice from a panel of three physicians. The first physician Employee chose declined her as a patient. The second physician she chose opined that her need for treatment was unrelated to her work injury and did not treat her. Employee then sought and received further treatment from her original treating physician. At the same time, Employee petitioned the trial court for an order authorizing Employee's original physician to act as her treating physician, requesting that Employer be held in contempt for failing to comply with the order of settlement, and requiring that Employer pay for all of Employee's past and future medical treatment for her injury, along with all attorney fees and costs. The trial court ordered that Employer pay only a portion of Employee's attorney fees, denied Employee's request that Employer be held in contempt, and otherwise granted Employee's petition in full. We reverse the judgment of the trial court as to the award of attorney fees and remand for further proceedings in that regard but otherwise affirm the judgment in full. Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e) (28) Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Chancery Court Affirmed in Part, Reversed in Part and Remanded E. RILEY ANDERSON, SP. J., in which SHARON G. LEE, J., and ALLEN W. WALLACE, SR. J., joined. Colin M. McCaffrey, Nashville, Tennessee for the appellant, Ford Motor Credit Company. Robert P. Gritton, Murfreesboro, Tennessee for the appellee, Judy Minutella. MEMORANDUM OPINION FACTS/PROCEDURAL HISTORY On September 19, 25, Judy Minutella ("Employee") fell in the parking lot of her employer Ford Motor Credit ("Employer") and injured her right knee. Employer offered her a panel of three physicians for treatment, but she declined medical treatment at that time and, therefore, did not select a physician from the panel. However, the injury apparently worsened, and Employee sought medical treatment from Dr. Roderick Vaughan, who was not on the Employer's panel. On February 23, 26, Dr. Vaughan, an orthopedic surgeon, performed anterior cruciate ligament reconstruction, partial medial and lateral meniscectomies and a chondroplasty on Employee's right knee. Dr. Vaughan's medical records indicate that he administered a steroid injection to Employee's right knee on June 19, 26, and Visco supplement injections on July 24, 26; July 31, 26; and August 11, 26. He informed Employee that this injection series could be repeated at six month intervals, and additional surgery was discussed as a "last resort." In November of 26, while under the care of Dr. Vaughan, Employee pursued a workers' compensation claim with respect to her fall and resulting injuries. The parties eventually settled this claim, as approved by order entered August 2, 27, the pertinent language of which provides as follows: The Defendant employer and the Defendant insurer have agreed to pay any authorized, reasonable and necessary future medical expenses incurred by the employee caused by this injury in accord with the Workers' Compensation Law of the State of Tennessee for a period of life, pursuant to statute, from the date of this settlement, provided that the employer and/or insurer has granted permission for future medical treatment prior to said treatment being rendered, but they will not be liable for any unauthorized, unreasonable or unnecessary past, present, or future medical expenses caused by this injury. The settlement agreement does not specify an authorized treating physician. After the settlement was approved, Employee began experiencing additional problems with her right knee. On September 4, 27, Employee wrote Employer a letter advising that Dr. Vaughan had been administering injections to her right knee "to postpone inevitable knee replacement surgery" and requesting that Employer approve Employee's return to Dr. Vaughan for "another round of injections." Employer refused to authorize Dr. Vaughan as Employee's treating physician and instead, presented Employee with the option of selecting her treating physician from a panel of physicians, consisting of Dr. James Renfro, Dr. Michael LaDouceur, and Drs. David Moore and Burton Elrod, who practice medicine in the same office. When Employee selected Drs. Moore and Elrod, Dr. Elrod declined to accept her as a patient and Employer instructed Employee to select one of the two remaining physicians on the panel. On November 28, 27, Employee selected Dr. James Renfro from the proffered list, and 2 ****** Document Outline ****** * Page_1 * Page_2 * Page_3 * Page_4 * Page_5 * Page_6 * Page_7 * Page_8 * Page_9 |
Rutherford County | Workers Compensation Panel | ||
Delorris Bates v. Tullahoma City Schools M2008-02192-WC-R3-WC Authoring Judge: Special Judge E. Riley Anderson Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Jeffrey F. Stewart This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-225(e)(3) for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The trial court found that the employee, who was over sixty years of age at the time of her permanent injury, was not subject to the cap set forth at Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-241(d)(1)(A), which limits disability benefits to one and one-half times the medical impairment rating and that she had proved three of the four elements in Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-242 and could therefore exceed the six-fold medical impairment cap set forth at Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-241(b). The court further found that the employee was not totally and permanently disabled and awarded ninety-eight percent permanent partial disability to both arms, a scheduled injury under Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-207(3)(A)(ii)(w). The trial court also ordered that the entire award of benefits in the amount of $108,587.92 be paid as |
Franklin County | Workers Compensation Panel | ||
Robbie Edwina Elmore v. Fleetguard, et al. M2008-02374-WC-R3-WC Authoring Judge: Senior Judge Donald P. Harris Trial Court Judge: Judge John Maddux In this workers’ compensation case, the employee, Robbie Edwina Elmore, sustained compensable gradual injuries to her neck, shoulders and arms. The trial court made three separate awards, which totaled 122% to the body as a whole. On appeal, the employer, Fleetguard, and the Second Injury Fund contend that the trial court erred by failing to make a single award pursuant to the concurrent injury rule, and by finding that she was not permanently and totally disabled. We conclude that the concurrent injury rule is applicable. We therefore modify the judgment to award 65% permanent partial disability, and find it unnecessary to address the remaining argument.1 |
Putnam County | Workers Compensation Panel | ||
Frankie Blankenship v. Masterbrand Cabinets, Inc., et al. E2008-02582-WC-R3-WC Authoring Judge: Justice Gary R. Wade Trial Court Judge: Judge John A. Turnbull Frankie Blankenship sought reconsideration of her workers’ compensation award after her employer, Masterbrand Cabinets, Inc., discontinued its operations. The trial court granted a multiplier of 6 times her permanent partial disability rating of 3 percent. In accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-225(e)(3) (2008), the appeal by the Employer has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Panel for findings of fact and conclusions of law. Because the trial court specifically accredited the testimony of the Employer and properly addressed each of the factors pertinent to an award upon reconsideration, our scope of review is limited. The judgment is, therefore, affirmed. |
Cumberland County | Workers Compensation Panel | ||
Barry R. Moore v. Howard Baer, Inc., et al. M2008-02357-WC-R3-WC Authoring Judge: Senior Judge Donald P. Harris Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Richard H. Dinkins In this workers’ compensation case, the employee, Barry R. Moore, was a truck driver. He was employed by a small corporation owned by a senior vice president of a large trucking company, Howard Baer, Inc. The smaller company leased his services to the larger one. He suffered a significant on-the-job injury. Mr. Moore obtained a judgment for workers’ compensation benefits against his employer, Ronald Baker, Inc. That corporation did not have workers’ compensation insurance and immediately discharged the debt in bankruptcy. He sought to receive benefits from Howard Baer, Inc., that he had been leased to, arguing that his employer was the “alter ego” of the larger company. The trial court found that the larger company was not liable for benefits, based upon the provisions of Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-106(1)(A). We reluctantly affirm the judgment.1 |
Davidson County | Workers Compensation Panel | ||
Reginald G. Peck v. Hochman Family Partners, L.P., et al. E2008-2118-WC-R3-WC Authoring Judge: Senior Judge Donald P. Harris Trial Court Judge: Chancellor W. Frank Brown, III The employee, Reginald G. Peck, sought benefits for an alleged work-related injury to his lower back. The trial court found for the employer, Hochman Family Partners, L.P., and dismissed the complaint. Mr. Peck has appealed, contending that the trial court erred by entering judgment for the employer, and by denying his motion to alter or amend the judgment. 1 We affirm the judgment. |
Hamilton County | Workers Compensation Panel | ||
James R. Shirley v. Bi-Lo, LLC E2008-02452-WC-R3-WC Authoring Judge: Special Judge E. Riley Anderson Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Howell Peoples This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated § 50-6-225(e)(3) for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Employee suffered a compensable injury to his lower back, which resulted in two surgical procedures and a 12% anatomical impairment. Subsequently, his treating physician recommended an additional surgical procedure. Employer declined to pay for the procedure, contending that intervening events caused the need for surgery. The trial court awarded Employee 18% permanent partial disability to the body as a whole. The trial court also found that the additional procedure was related to the original work injury, and ordered Employer to pay for it. On appeal, Employer contends that the evidence preponderates against the trial court’s ruling. We disagree, and affirm the judgment. |
Hamilton County | Workers Compensation Panel | ||
Eddie Ainsworth v. Iwash One, LLC M2008-02460-WC-R3-WC Authoring Judge: Special Judge Jeffrey S. Bivins Trial Court Judge: Chancellor C. K. Smith This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code |
Smith County | Workers Compensation Panel | ||
Mary Jo Patterson v. Clarksville-Montgomery County School System M2007-01115-WC-R3-WC Authoring Judge: Senior Judge Donald P. Harris Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Laurence M. Mcmillan, Jr. This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-225(e)(3) (Supp. 2007) for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The trial court found that the employee complied with the notice requirement of Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-201(a) (Supp. 2003). It further found that she had sustained a compensable injury to her lower back and awarded 30% permanent partial disability. The employer has appealed, contending that the claim is barred by failure to provide timely notice and that the evidence preponderates against the finding of causation. We affirm the judgment. |
Montgomery County | Workers Compensation Panel | ||
Lori Ann Patton v. Hartco Flooring Company, a Division of Armstrong Products, Inc., et al. E2008-01829-WC-R3-WC Authoring Judge: Special Judge . Riley Anderson Trial Court Judge: Judge Billy J. White This appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-225(e)(3) for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The issue raised on appeal is whether the Employee, who suffered a neck, arm and shoulder injury in the course and scope of her employment, made a meaningful return to work after her injury. The trial court ruled that the Employee did not make a meaningful return to work, and that, therefore, the cap on benefits of one and one-half times the impairment rating provided for in Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-241(a)(1) did not apply. The trial court applied a multiplier of four times the impairment rating. The Employer appealed. We agree with the trial court that the Employee did not have a meaningful return to work, and thus the benefits cap does not apply. Moreover, the multiplier of four times the impairment rating was not excessive. We affirm the judgment. |
Scott County | Workers Compensation Panel | ||
Jimmy Collins v. Coca-Cola Bottling Company Consolidated, et al. W2008-01889-SC-WCM-WC Authoring Judge: Special Judge William C. Cole Trial Court Judge: Chancellor James F. Butler Employee alleged that he sustained a gradual injury to his lower back as a result of his work as a route salesman for a soft drink company. He was treated by several doctors, to whom he gave differing histories concerning how his injury occurred. The trial court found that he had sustained a compensable injury and awarded 70% permanent partial disability apportioned between Employer and the Second Injury Fund. Employer appeals, contending the evidence preponderates against the trial court’s finding. We affirm the judgment.1 |
Madison County | Workers Compensation Panel | ||
Larry Eugene Douglas v. Dura-Craft Millwork, Inc., et al. W2008-02010-SC-WCM-WC Authoring Judge: Senior Judge Walter C. Kurtz Trial Court Judge: Judge C. Creed McGinley Employee injured his neck in the course of his employment. While he was receiving treatment for that injury, his doctors discovered that he had a serious spinal condition. The treating doctors testified that this condition was unrelated to his work injury. After receiving treatment, Employee returned to work at his previous job. Several months later, his position was eliminated. He declined an offer of alternate employment. The trial court found that he did not have a meaningful return to work and awarded 65% permanent partial disability (“PPD”) to the body as a whole. On appeal, Employer contends that the trial court erred by adopting the impairment rating of an evaluating physician and by finding that Employee did not have a meaningful return to work. We agree and modify the judgment accordingly.1 |
Benton County | Workers Compensation Panel | ||
Kyle McDonnell v. Continental Machine Movers M2008-00968-WC-R3-WC Authoring Judge: Senior Judge Donald P. Harris Trial Court Judge: Judge Lee Russell In this workers’ compensation action, the employee, Kyle McDonnell, was assigned to work at a job site in Kentucky. His employer, Continental Machinery Movers, paid for food and lodging. While waiting in a truck for his co-workers to return from breakfast, he suffered an apparent seizure. Subsequently, his shoulder was painful and he sought and received medical care at a local emergency room. An evaluating physician testified that the seizure had caused a dislocation of his shoulder joint. Mr. McDonnell sought workers’ compensation benefits, but the employer denied liability. The trial court found that Mr. McDonnell was a “traveling employee,” and that the injury was compensable. Continental Machinery Movers has appealed.1 We conclude that the injury did not arise from the employment and, therefore, reverse the trial court’s decision. |
Marshall County | Workers Compensation Panel | ||
James M. Jacks v. East Tennessee Mechanical Contractors, Inc. E2008-02501-WC-R3-WC Authoring Judge: Justice Gary R. Wade Trial Court Judge: Judge Donald R. Elledge The employee filed a workers' compensation complaint against his employer for hearing loss and tinnitus, injuries which he claimed had occurred gradually over his nearly four years of working as a truck driver. Shortly before trial, the employee voluntarily dismissed his tinnitus claim but proceeded with his hearing loss claim. The trial court awarded the employee compensation for permanent partial hearing loss and the Employer appealed. Upon referral, the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel, sitting in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-225(e)(3), affirms. |
Anderson County | Workers Compensation Panel | ||
Raymond D. Plunk v. Ozburn-Hessey Logistics, LLC W2008-01160-SC-WCM-WC Authoring Judge: Special Judge D. J. Alissandratos Trial Court Judge: Judge D'Army Bailey This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-225(e)(3) for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Employee alleged that he sustained a hernia in the course of and arising from his employment. Employer denied liability. After a trial on the merits, the trial court ruled in favor of Employer. Employee has appealed, contending that the evidence preponderates against the trial court’s finding. Because Employee has not filed a transcript or statement of the evidence, we find that the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s finding and affirm the judgment. |
Shelby County | Workers Compensation Panel | ||
Franklin James Williams v. The Goodyear Tire & Rubber Company, et al. W2008-00640-SC-WCM-WC Authoring Judge: Special Judge D. J. Alissandratos Trial Court Judge: Chancellor William Michael Maloan This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-225(e)(3) for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Employee alleged that he developed carpal tunnel syndrome as a result of his work for Employer. Employer denied the claim. At trial, an evaluating physician opined that the condition was work-related but admitted that he had no specific knowledge of the tasks performed by Employee in the course of his job. Employer sought to exclude the testimony of the physician, contending that it was based upon speculation. The trial court admitted the testimony, found the condition to be compensable, and awarded benefits. On appeal, Employer contends that the trial court erred by admitting the physician’s testimony, that the evidence preponderates against the judgment, and by not applying the missing witness rule as to the treating physician, who did not testify. Further, Liberty Mutual contends that there is no evidence in the record that it was Employer’s insurer at the time of this injury. We dismiss the complaint against Liberty Mutual and otherwise affirm the judgment. |
Obion County | Workers Compensation Panel | ||
Raymon Douglas v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Company W2008-00533-SC-WCM-WC Authoring Judge: Special Judge D. J. Alissandratos Trial Court Judge: Chancellor William Michael Maloan This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeal Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. On appeal, Employer contends that the trial court erred in finding that Employee suffered a compensable work-related injury and that Employee’s workers’ compensation claim was not barred by the oneyear statute of limitations. Because the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s findings, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Obion County | Workers Compensation Panel | ||
Kevin Clifton v. Nissan North America M2008-01640-WC-R3-WC Authoring Judge: Justice William C. Koch Trial Court Judge: Judge Jim T. Hamilton This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-225(e)(3) (2008) for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The employee filed a workers’ compensation action in the Chancery Court for Maury County, alleging that he developed occupational asthma as a result of exposure to a substance in his workplace. The employer denied liability. Following a bench trial, the trial court awarded benefits for temporary total and permanent partial disability. The employer has appealed, contending that the trial court erred by finding that the employee sustained a compensable injury, by finding that the statutory notice requirement was satisfied, and by awarding temporary disability benefits. In the alternative, the employer asserts that the judgment is excessive. We have determined that the awards for temporary total and permanent partial disability should be reduced. |
Maury County | Workers Compensation Panel |