WORKERS COMPENSATION PANEL OPINIONS

This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 5-6-225(e) (3) for hearing and reporting of findings of fact and conclusions of law. On this appeal, the sole issue presented is whether the trial court erred by failing to cap the recovery of the employee, Holly Young, at 2.5 times the medical impairment as required by Tennessee Code Annotated section 5-6-241(a)(1). In this case, Ms. Young sustained a shoulder injury to her right shoulder resulting in surgery. Following the first surgery, Ms. Young was returned to work performing light duty for her employer, Cumberland County Medical Center (CCMC). She resigned that employment due to progressively intense pain. Thereafter, Ms. Young underwent a second surgery. She was not offered employment by CCMC following her second surgery or after she had reached maximum medical improvement. The trial court determined Ms. Young's anatomical impairment to be fifteen percent to the body as a whole, held the statutory cap of benefits contained in Tennessee Code Annotated section 5-6- 241(a)(1) did not apply, and awarded benefits based upon a fifty percent disability to the body as a whole. We affirm.

This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The trial court sustained the employee's complaint by concluding that the claimant had suffered a compensable, work related injury. The court awarded benefits based upon a permanent, partial disability rating of ten (10) percent to the body as a whole. On appeal, the employer contends that the evidence does not support a determination that the employee suffered a compensable injury. The employee contends that the trial court's award of permanent, partial disability should be increased to the maximum allowed under the Act. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The trial court sustained the employee's complaint by concluding that the claimant had suffered a compensable, work related back injury. The court awarded benefits based upon a permanent, partial disability rating of thirtytwo (32) percent to the body as a whole. On appeal, the employer contends that the evidence does not support a determination that the employee suffered a compensable injury. The employer also challenges the court's determination as to the extent of vocational disability. The employee contends that the trial court's award of permanent, partial disability should be upheld. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers'
Compensation Appeals Panel in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated § 50-6-225 (e)(3) (2005) for hearing and reporting of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The Employer appeals an order requiring it to furnish certain medical treatment for a previous injury. We Affirm in part, and Modify in part.

This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel in accordance to Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225 (e)(3) (25) for hearing and reporting of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The employee appeals a finding of non-compensability due to a lack of causation. We affirm.

This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers'
Compensation Appeals Panel in accordance to Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-225 (e)(3) (2005) for hearing and reporting of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The Employee appeals, claiming he is entitled to permanent, or at least temporary, benefits. We affirm the trial court's finding that the Plaintiff failed to prove a permanent injury, but we remand the case for a determination of whether any temporary total disability benefits are payable.

This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The trial court dismissed the employee's complaint. On appeal, the employee contends that the evidence supports a determination that she suffered a compensable aggravation of her preexisting degenerative disc disease. The employer contends that the trial court properly found that the employee did not sustain a compensable injury and that an award of costs, including discretionary costs, is appropriate. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The only issue presented in this case is whether the trial court erred in finding Terry Blake was an employee of Southside Baptist Church within the meaning of the Tennessee Workers’ Compensation Act at the time of his fatal injury on April 29, 2004. In our view, the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s finding that Blake was an employee, and we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) (25) for hearing and reporting of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The employee appeals from a judgment of non- compensability. We affirm.

This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The only issue presented in this case is whether the trial court erred in finding Terry Blake was an employee of Southside Baptist Church within the meaning of the Tennessee Workers’ Compensation Act at the time of his fatal injury on April 29, 2004. In our view, the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s finding that Blake was an employee, and we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel of the Tennessee Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-225(e)(3) for hearing, findings of fact, and conclusions of law. The trial court awarded the employee benefits based on 17.5 percent permanent partial disability to the whole body for an
injury to the left shoulder. On appeal, the employer contends that the award of 17.5 percent should be reduced to 7.5 percent based upon an anatomical impairment rating of 3 percent by the employee’s treating physician. After a careful review of the record, we find no error in the trial court’s award of 17.5 percent vocational disability. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

This worker's compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 50-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The trial court awarded the employee, Steven Quincy Manchester (Manchester), an eighteen percent permanent partial disability award based upon a twelve percent impairment rating. The trial court also determined the employer, Bridgestone Firestone, Inc. (Bridgestone) was not entitled to a credit for a portion of the temporary total benefits it paid to the employee. Bridgestone has appealed, contending the trial court erred in that the impairment rating was not supported by the medical evidence and in not allowing the credit it claimed. We modify the trial court's judgment by reducing the impairment rating to ten percent to conform to the evidence presented, and remand the case to the trial court for determination of permanent partial disability. We affirm the trial court's judgment disallowing a set off for the temporary total benefits paid by Bridgestone.

This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The employer asserts that the trial court erred in finding the employee's back injury compensable, in finding the employee to be permanently and totally disabled, and in apportioning the permanent total disability award between the employer and the Second Injury Fund. The Second Injury Fund also asserts the trial court erred in finding employee to be permanently and totally disabled and in calculating the award. The employee asserts the trial court erred in allocating a setoff for disability insurance payments. We reverse in part and modify in part. Tenn. Code. Ann. _ 5-6-225(e) (1999) Appeal as of Right, Judgment of the Macon County Circuit Court is reversed in part and modified in part. HOWELL N. PEOPLES, SP. J., in which WILLIAM M. BARKER, CHIEF JUSTICE, and JEFFREY S. BIVINS, SP. J. joined. M. Clark Spoden, Julie A. Schreiner-Oldham, Brian Neal, Frost Brown Todd, LLC, Nashville, Tennessee, for Appellant, Unipres, U.S.A., Inc. Paul G. Summers, Attorney General, Lauren S. Lamberth, Assistant Attorney General, Nashville, Tennessee, for Appellant Second Injury Fund. William Joseph Butler, E. Guy Holliman, Farrar, Holliman & Butler, Lafayette, Tennessee, for Appellee, Lona Swindle. 1 MEMORANDUM OPINION Facts Lona Swindle filed her complaint against Unipres U.S.A., Inc. ("Unipres") for workers' compensation benefits on April 1, 22 alleging that she sustained "cumulative injuries to both of her hands, elbows and arms." She also alleged that she had received court awarded vocational disability for previous work injuries for which the Second Injury Fund would be responsible. The complaint did not mention any claim that she had sustained a work-related injury to her back. On January 14, 23, Ms. Swindle amended her complaint to add the assertion that she was permanently and totally disabled as a result of a "combination of the Plaintiff's pre-existing non-work-related injuries and/or conditions and the subject work-related injuries . . ." The amended complaint also did not mention any claim of a work-related back injury. In January 22, Ms. Swindle was diagnosed with bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome. She was treated by Dr. Roy Terry, who performed surgeries on both wrists. He released her to return to work without restrictions on June 27, 22. Ms. Swindle returned to work at Unipres with activities that were less repetitive, but involved heavier lifting and more bending than the job that caused the carpal tunnel syndrome. On September 13, 22, Ms. Swindle saw Jennifer Dittes, a certified physician's assistant with complaints of back pain. Ms. Swindle testified that she stopped working at Unipres on October 21, 22 because of back pain. She did not report a back injury to her employer as being work related. On April 8, 23, Ms. Swindle filed an application for long-term disability benefits for the back injury and represented her injuries were not work related. Decision Below The trial court found that the Ms. Swindle's bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome was work- related, that the back injury resulted from the carpal tunnel syndrome, and that the combination of the injuries and her pre-existing condition caused her to be permanently and totally disabled. The trial court apportioned 7 percent of the award to Unipres and 3 percent to the Second Injury Fund. The trial court also granted Unipres an offset for payments to Ms. Swindle made by a disability insurance policy for long-term disability due to her back injury. Standard of Review The standard of review in a workers' compensation case is de novo upon the record of the trial court, accompanied by a presumption of the correctness of the findings, unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise. Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(2); Houser v. BiLo, Inc., 36 S.W.3d 68, 7-71 (Tenn. 21). The application of this standard requires this Court to weigh in more depth the factual findings and conclusions of the trial court in workers' compensation cases to determine where the preponderance of the evidence lies.

This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 5-6-225(e) (3) for hearing and reporting of findings of fact and conclusions of law. At trial, the Appellant, Christopher Harville, was awarded benefits for total loss of his left arm. He has appealed alleging that the trial court erred in limiting benefits to those provided for a scheduled member under the Workers' Compensation Law and in not finding him permanently and totally disabled. We affirm.

This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated §50-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The employer contends the trial court erred in (a) holding the employee’s right shoulder injury could not be considered in determining vocational disability resulting from carpal tunnel syndrome, (b) accrediting the testimony of one physician over that of another, (c) finding the employee sustained a 75 percent vocational disability to the arm, and (d) permitting codefendant CNA Insurance to participate in the trial. We affirm.

This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated §50-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The Second Injury Fund contends the trial court erred in (a) finding the employee gave notice of injury to her left arm and shoulder, (b) awarding separate scheduled member and body as a whole awards for one gradually occurring injury, (c) failing to find the employee permanently and totally disabled from the last injury if notice was properly given, and (d) finding that an award on appeal constituted a “prior award” for the purposes of assigning liability to the Second Injury Fund under Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-208(b). We modify and remand

This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated §50-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting of findings of fact and conclusionsof law. The employer asserts that the evidence preponderates against a finding that the employee’s injury is work-related, that the award is excessive, and that the employee failed to give appropriate or reasonable notice of the claimed injury. We affirm.

This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-226(e)(3) for hearing and reporting of findings of fact and conclusions of law. In determining the appropriate vocational disability rating, the trial court considered conflicting medical testimony, the employee's work duties, and other factors such as the employee's education, age, and skill level. The employer contends the trial court erred when it awarded a 10% vocational disability rating to the plaintiff's right leg. After a careful review of the record, we conclude that the trial court's judgment should be affirmed.

This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-226(e)(3) for hearing and reporting of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The employer, Aerostructures Corporation, has appealed the trial court’s award of permanent total disability benefits of 539.28 weeks in a reconsideration hearing. The employer asserts that Tennessee Code Annotated sections 50-6-241(a)(2) and (b) and 50-6-242(a) prevent a trial court from granting, in a reconsiderationhearing, any award greater than six times the employee’s medical impairment rating and in excess of 400 weeks. The employer claims that the trial court erred because it granted, in a reconsideration hearing, a permanent total disability award that exceeded such amounts. We disagree and hold that Tennessee Code Annotated sections 50-6-241(a)(2) and (b) and 50-6-242(a), which place limitations on permanent partial disability awards in a reconsideration hearing, do not apply to awards of permanent total disability. We therefore affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This worker's compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The trial court determined the employee, Donald E. Black, Jr. (Black), had sustained a work-related injury resulting in a permanent partial disability amounting to 26% of the body as a whole, and awarded temporary total disability and future medical benefits. The employer, Yates Services, L.L.C. (Yates) has appealed and contends that the trial court erred (1) by allowing Black to present his evidence first at trial, (2) by holding that Black sustained a gradual back injury caused by his employment, and (3) by finding that Black had given adequate notice of his injury to his employer. We affirm the judgment of the trial court

This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation
Appeals Panel in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The employer, Sprint Corporation (Sprint), and its insurer, American Casualty Company of Reading, PA., appeal from the trial court’s determination that the claim of the employee, Bobbie Jane T. Hagewood (Hagewood), for benefits relating to a carpal tunnel injury was not barred by the statute of limitations, res judicata, or the last injurious injury rule. Appellee, Second Injury Fund (Fund), joins the statute of limitations argument and further claims that the trial court erred in apportioning the award between Sprint and the Fund. After reviewing the record, we have determined that the evidence does not preponderate against the findings of the trial court concerning the statute of limitations and the last injurious injury rule. We decline to review the res judicata issue because it was not decided by the trial court. We do,
however, find that the trial court erred in its apportionment of the award and modify the award to
reflect the correct apportionment.

This appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeal Panel pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting of findings of fact and conclusions of law. On April 29, 2003, the appellant, Paul J. Simms, fractured his ankle at a construction site in Spring Hill, Tennessee. The trial court determined Mr. Simms' injury did not arise out of or in the course of employment. Mr. Simms has appealed, contending that the evidence preponderates against the trial court's holding. Mr. Simms also alleges the trial court erred in allowing the testimony of Jack Russell, the subcontractor whom Mr. Simms claims employed him on the day of his accident, because Mr. Russell invoked the Fifth Amendment at trial. After carefully considering the evidence adduced at trial, we affirm the trial court's judgment.

This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation
Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. In this appeal, the employer, TDY Industries Inc., asserts that the trial court erred in awarding the employee 60% permanent partial disability to the right upper extremity and 40% permanent partial disability to the left upper extremity for injuries he incurred during the course of his employment. We conclude that the evidence presented does not preponderate against the findings of the trial judge, and, in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-225(e)(2), affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation
Appeals Panel in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. In this appeal, the
employer asserts that the trial court erred in finding the employee’s injury compensable, awarding
the employee workers’ compensation benefits, and finding the employee seventy-five (75%) percent disabled as a result of her employment with National Health Corporation. The employee asserts that the trial court erred in not finding the employee totally disabled and that summary judgment should not have been granted with respect to the tort claim brought against employee’s supervisor. We conclude that the findings of the trial court should be affirmed with regard to issues relating to workers’ compensation benefits. Appellate jurisdiction with regard to the granting of summary judgment on Ms. McCall’s tort claim lies with the Court of Appeals and, pursuant to Rule 17, T. R. App. P., the cause is transferred to that court for appropriate review.

This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation
Appeals Panel of the Tennessee Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated
section 50-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and
conclusions of law. On appeal, the employer contends that the trial court erred in failing to dismiss
this claim based on the statute of limitations. After carefully reviewing the record, we agree and
reverse the judgment of the trial court.