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	Warren County	Workers Compensation Panel	11/30/98
	Sumner County	Workers Compensation Panel	11/30/98
	Sequatchie County	Workers Compensation Panel	11/30/98
	Franklin County	Workers Compensation Panel	11/30/98
	Franklin County	Workers Compensation Panel	11/30/98
	Smith County	Workers Compensation Panel	11/30/98
	Davidson County	Workers Compensation Panel	11/25/98
	Wayne County	Workers Compensation Panel	11/25/98
	Sumner County	Workers Compensation Panel	11/17/98
	Chester County	Workers Compensation Panel	11/17/98
	Warren County	Workers Compensation Panel	11/17/98
Dorothy Marable v. Key Industries, Inc. 01S01-9709-CH-00209 Authoring Judge: Joe C. Loser, Jr., Special Judge Trial Court Judge: Hon. Robert E. Burch, This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. section 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The employer, Key, and its insurer, Travelers, insist the chancellor erred in (1) awarding benefits as a percentage to the body as a whole, (2) making an award in excess of six times the highest medical impairment rating and (3) awarding benefits based on one hundred percent to the body as a whole. As discussed below, the panel has concluded the award should be modified down to one based on forty-eight percent to the body as a whole. Our review is de novo upon the record of the trial court, accompanied by a presumption of correctness of the findings of fact, unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise. Tenn. Code Ann. section 5-6-225(e)(2). Conclusions of law are subject to de novo review on appeal without any presumption of correctness. Spencer v. Towson Moving and Storage, Inc., 922 S.W.2d 58 (Tenn. 1996). The employee or claimant, Marable, was 62 years old at the time of the trial. She has less than a high school education. She worked in Key's shirt factory for 23 years, sewing stays in collars of dress shirts. She has suffered three separate work related injuries, all three of which are the subject of this litigation. (1) The employer and its insurer contend first that because the claimant has three separate injuries to three separate scheduled members, or to two separate scheduled members if the arms are considered together, the claimant's injury should somehow be considered a scheduled injury and recovery limited to a percentage of weeks provided in the statutory schedule. From a consideration of the authorities cited and others, we respectfully disagree. Where a worker's only injury is to a scheduled member, he may receive only the amount of compensation provided by the schedule for his permanent disability. Genesco, Inc. v. Creamer, 584 S.W.2d 191 (Tenn. 1979). This claimant has three separate injuries to three separate members, all of them scheduled separately. If an employee suffers permanent partial disability to two members listed together as a scheduled injury, it is proper to compute the period of disability according to the schedule. Queen v. New York Underwriters Ins. Co., 222 Tenn. 235, 435 S.W.2d 122 (1968). While both arms are listed together as a scheduled injury, we find no listing in the schedule for both arms and a foot. See Tenn Code Ann. section 5-6-27(3)(A)(II). In all other cases of permanent partial disability, benefits are payable according to the percentage of disability to the body as a whole, which is valued at four hundred weeks; Tenn. Code Ann. section 5-6-27(3)(F); Kerr v. Magic Chef, 793 S.W.2d 927 (Tenn. 199); and an injury to three or more members of the body, whether or not any of the members is included in the schedule, is not a scheduled injury and, in such case, benefits are allowable to the body as 2	Houston County	Workers Compensation Panel	11/10/98
Henry A. Sherrill v. Pulaski Rubber Company 01S01-9802-CH-00035 Authoring Judge: John K. Byers, Senior Judge Trial Court Judge: Hon. Jim T. Hamilton, This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The trial judge found the plaintiff was permanently disabled and awarded a lump sum judgment of $81,953.2 on November 3, 1997. The defendant says the record does not support the finding that the lump sum award is proper because the record fails to show that the lump sum award is in the plaintiff's best interest or that he can wisely manage the lump sum payment. We remand this case to the trial court for further proceedings. The record in this case is sparse on the issue of a lump sum payment. The plaintiff testified he wished to pay off his mortgage and invest any remaining portion of the award. On appeal, the plaintiff's brief presents a mathematical computation showing how much the plaintiff would save if he payed off his mortgage. This was not presented at trial. The trial court made no finding of whether a lump sum award was in the plaintiff's best interest. This brings the case in line with the case of Huddleston v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 858 S.W.2d 315 (Tenn. 1993), where an issue of a lump sum award was raised. The Supreme Court said in that case: "W hat is missing from the trial court's order, as well as from the record, is a determination that full commutation under these circumstances is in the injured worker's best interest, as required by T.C.A. _ 5-6-229(a), as amended (199)." Id. at 318. In Huddleston, the Supreme Court remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings to determine what amount, if any, should be commuted and to determine if the plaintiff could manage the commuted amount. Further, the Supreme Court noted that the trial judge may well consider, if a finding of a lump sum is made, how to insure that the sum will be applied in the manner the plaintiff asserts it would be used. We remand this case to the trial court for such proceedings as are necessary consistent with this opinion. 2	Henry County	Workers Compensation Panel	11/10/98
Melissa Cooper v. Xerox Corporation 02S01-9710-CH-00091 Authoring Judge: John K. Byers, Senior Judge Trial Court Judge: Hon. Floyd Peete, This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Review of the findings of fact made by the trial court is de novo upon the record of the trial court, accompanied by a presumption of the correctness of the findings, unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise. Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(2); Stone v. City of McMinnville, 896 S.W.2d 548, 55 (Tenn. 1995). The application of this standard requires this Court to weigh in more depth the factual findings and conclusions of the trial court in a workers' compensation case. See Corcoran v. Foster Auto GMC, Inc., 746 S.W.2d 452, 456 (Tenn. 1988). The trial court awarded the plaintiff ten percent permanent partial disability to the body as a whole, half of certain medical expenses, and discretionary costs. The defendant appeals and raises the following issues for our review: I. Whether or not the preponderance of the evidence supports the Trial Court's finding that the Plaintiff sustained a 1% permanent partial disability to the body as a whole as a result of this injury. II. Whether or not the preponderance of the evidence supports the Trial Court's award of _ of the medical expenses incurred by Plaintiff as a result of the medical expense of chiropractor Joseph Lipkowitz. III. Whether or not the Trial Court abused its discretion in awarding discretionary costs to Plaintiff in the above matter. We find that the award of ten percent is contrary to the weight of the evidence and that the judgment of the trial court should be reversed and dismissed. Because of this decision, we do not reach the last two issues on appeal.	Shelby County	Workers Compensation Panel	11/02/98
	Shelby County	Workers Compensation Panel	10/29/98
Norma J. Baker v. Sally Beauty Supply and The Travelers Insurance Co. 02S01-9709-CH-00078 Authoring Judge: John K. Byers, Senior Judge Trial Court Judge: Hon. Joe C. Morris, This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The trial judge found the plaintiff had suffered a 55 percent vocational impairment to her left leg and also awarded medical expenses in the amount of $1,112., which the defendant says were unauthorized. The defendant raises the following issues: I. Whether the evidence presented at trial preponderates against the trial court's award of 55% permanent partial disability to plaintiff's left lower extremity as a result of plaintiff's work related accident? II. Whether the medical expenses incurred by the plaintiff were reasonable, necessary and causally related to an injury arising out of the course and scope of employment? We affirm the judgment of the trial court. The plaintiff was injured on December 14, 1994 when a car backed into her and penned her legs between the bumpers of two cars. The plaintiff was performing duties in the course of her work for the defendant when this occurred. The plaintiff had significant injuries to her left leg. As near as we can tell from this record, the plaintiff was absent from work for a week. W hen she wished to return to work, the employer told her she would have to have a release from a physician to return. The employer had not then, nor so far as this record shows never, furnished the plaintiff with a panel of doctors for examination or treatment. The plaintiff was 53 years of age at the time of trial, has a high school education, and has nine months of beauty training. She testified that she continued to work for the defendant for one and a half years after her injury but had difficulty in doing the work because she could not stand for long periods of time and had trouble stooping and bending. We are of the opinion that the resolution of this case turns upon whether the medical evidence offered by the defendant was admissible. The defendant offered as medical proof a memorandum report by James G. Warmbrod, an orthopedic surgeon, as well as various reports from physical 2	Madison County	Workers Compensation Panel	10/26/98
Linda Butler v. Lumbermen's Mutual Ins. 01S01-9709-CH-00192 Authoring Judge: William H. Inman, Senior Judge Trial Court Judge: Hon. Jeffrey F. Stewart, This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The Chancellor found that the plaintiff sustained an injury to her left foot which resulted in a 3 percent vocational impairment. This finding is challenged on appeal. Review of the findings of fact made by the trial court is de novo upon the record of the trial court, accompanied by a presumption of the correctness of the finding, unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise. TENN. CODE ANN. _ 5-6-225(e)(2). Stone v. City of McMinnville, 896 S.W.2d 548, 55 (Tenn. 1995). The plaintiff is 59 years old. She finished the 11th grade and has extensive industrial training. She was employed by Lanier Clothes, a textile manufacturer in Franklin County, for 22 years. Her duties required a substantial amount of walking. In April 1995, she developed a problem with her left foot, caused by a calcaneal spur. Her attending physician, Dr. Richard Bagby, prescribed custom molded inserts for her shoes, with anti-inflammatory medication. The footware was modified from time to time. She never missed work at Lanier, which closed its factory in October, 1995. About ten weeks later, the plaintiff was employed by Wal-Mart, where she functions satisfactorily so long as she utilizes the orthotic inserts. Dr. Bagby assessed her impairment at five percent to her left foot. He imposed no restrictions but thought she could experience some difficulty if she stood on hard surfaces all day. 2	Franklin County	Workers Compensation Panel	10/26/98
Connie Covington v. Nagle Industries, Inc. 01S01-9709-CH-00183 Authoring Judge: William H. Inman, Senior Judge Trial Court Judge: Hon. Robert E. Burch This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. In this case the plaintiff ran afoul of the well-settled principle that the issues in a workers' compensation case, like any other, must be proved by a preponderance of the evidence. The trial judge ruled that the appealing plaintiff failed to carry her burden of proving causation and dismissed her claim for permanent, partial disability benefits. Our review of the findings of fact made by the trial court is de novo upon the record of the trial court, accompanied by a presumption of the correctness of the finding, unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise. TENN. CODE ANN. _ 5-6-225(e)(2). Stone v. City of McMinnville, 896 S.W.2d 548, 55 (Tenn. 1995). The plaintiff alleged that on September 9, 1993 she sustained an injury to her elbow, arm, and both wrists, diagnosed as bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome which in the passage of time resulted in permanent, partial disability. The defendant filed its answer admitting that the "plaintiff sustained an injury in the course and scope of plaintiff's employment,"1 and denying all other allegations. The plaintiff testified that she began working for the defendant in May, 1991, doing assembly line work which she described as repetitive.2 After four or five months "into the job," her hands became swollen at the end of the 1But wh en the case was called for trial, the parties stipulated that causatio n was an issue. It prov ed to be dispositive. The answer was not amended, but the case was tried as if the defendant denied causation. 2Likely over-done, since she testified that she processed 8 parts per day. 2	Houston County	Workers Compensation Panel	10/26/98
Bruce W. Link v. The Aerostructures 01S01-9710-CH-00217 Authoring Judge: William H. Inman, Senior Judge Trial Court Judge: Hon. Carol L. Mccoy, This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. A finding of 12 percent disability to the plaintiff's left leg is derided by the employer who strenuously argues that the evidence strongly weighs against the judgment and that the claim for permanent, partial disability should be denied. The plaintiff is 56 years old, and is a resident of Bowling Green, Kentucky. His vocational history reveals his talents for things mechanical: mill operator, aircraft assembler, machine shop supervisor, fabricator, turbine repair, back dump operator, precision grinder. He has also worked as an insurance salesman, automobile salesman and manager of a truck stop. He is experienced in computer fundamentals, blueprint and problem solving. All of this by way of his own testimony. He alleged that he injured his left knee and hip as a result of slipping which jammed his knee into a machine. His testimony was divergent; he testified that he slipped on a "metal thing" and fell, and complained only of his left knee. The first report of work injury recites that the plaintiff reported a twinge in his left knee while stepping down from a machine on October 12, 1994. Several months earlier, in April, he complained of slipping and striking a fixture. He was treated by Dr. William Gavigan, an orthopedic specialist, who testified that x-rays of the plaintiff's knee were normal and an MRI study revealed no problems. An arthroscopic examination revealed no evidence of a 2	Davidson County	Workers Compensation Panel	10/26/98
William Mcdowell v. Henry I. Siegel Co., Inc. and Royal Insurance Co. 02S01-9710-CV-00088 Authoring Judge: F. Lloyd Tatum, Special Judge Trial Court Judge: Hon. C. Creed Mcginley, Judge This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The trial judge found that the plaintiff had sustained thirty percent permanent partial disability to each arm and entered judgment accordingly. The defendant employer, Henry I. Siegel Company, Inc. (HIS), and its insurance carrier, Royal Insurance Company, present issue that the thirty percent permanent partial disability to each arm is excessive and should be reduced to approximately ten percent permanent disability to each arm. It was stipulated before trial that the plaintiff had a gradually occurring injury in both arms. The only question that was presented to the trial court was the extent of the disability. The plaintiff testified that he is a high school graduate. He was 47 years of age at the time of his injury. He has worked for the defendant since May, 1967 and continues to work for the defendant as a "packer." The plaintiff testified that in October, 1994 his hands and wrists began hurting. His right hand and wrist hurt more than the left. His hands and wrists continued to hurt, but he continued to work until he had surgery on the right hand on January 9, 1995. After surgery to his right hand, his left hand and arm became much worse. Ultimately he had surgery on the left hand and arm on February 8, 1995. After the surgery on his left hand, both hands continued to pain but the left hand was much worse than the right hand. He went to see Dr. Eugene F. Gulish who performed a second surgery on the left hand on March 12, 1996. Plaintiff testified that after the repeat surgery on the left hand, it improved. However, he continued to have wrist pain and tingling running down three fingers. It was not as bad at the time of trial as before the second surgery, but at times he could not pick up a cup of coffee, open cans of Coke, or open jars. He does not have the grip strength he once had in the left hand. 2	Carroll County	Workers Compensation Panel	10/26/98
Robbie Bickers v. Cigna Insurance Company 02S01-9710-CH-00097 Authoring Judge: F. Lloyd Tatum, Special Judge Trial Court Judge: Hon. D. J. Alissandratos, Chancellor This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The complaint filed by the plaintiff, Robbie Bickers, alleges that on February 24, 1996 he was injured while employed for Parsec, Inc. at its Memphis, Tennessee rail yard. The complaint further charges that, as a result of the accident, he sustained injuries to his arms, chest, neck, and back. After considering the evidence, the chancellor found that the plaintiff failed to carry the burden of proof and rendered judgment in favor of the defendant, CIGNA Insurance Company, which is the workers' compensation carrier for the plaintiff's employer. In his only issue, the plaintiff states: Whether the proof supports a finding that the plaintiff suffered a compensable injury to his right wrist for which he retains permanent impairment. Since the issue presented to us questions only the action of the trial judge in failing to compensate plaintiff for permanent impairment to the right wrist, we will not elaborate in this opinion on the evidence concerning the other alleged injuries of the plaintiff. On February 24, 1996, plaintiff was operating a "yard mule," which is a half- truck. While removing heavy loads from a railcar, a container box separated from the frame, lifting plaintiff's truck-tractor rig off the ground and then slamming it back on the ground, allegedly injuring the plaintiff. The plaintiff was taken to the St. Joseph Hospital emergency room in Memphis and was treated briefly by Drs. Vernon Miller and Thomas Fowlkes. These doctors later referred the plaintiff to Dr. Mark Harriman, an orthopedic surgeon, who continued to treat the plaintiff. He was later examined by Dr. Joseph C. Boals, on two occasions. The plaintiff testified that because of his wrist injury, he had a lack of grip and "catching." He stated that due to this he could not use a hammer or turn wrenches. He also complained of difficulty with his back and shoulder. 2	Shelby County	Workers Compensation Panel	10/21/98
Cherre Howard v. Granite State Ins. Co. 01S01-9708-CH-00179 Authoring Judge: Joe C. Loser, Jr., Special Judge Trial Court Judge: Hon. Ellen Hobbs Lyle, This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. section 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The employer's insurer, Granite State Insurance Company, contends the chancellor erred in awarding permanent partial benefits based on sixty-five percent to the body as a whole. As discussed below, the panel has concluded the judgment should be affirmed. Our review is de novo upon the record of the trial court, accompanied by a presumption of correctness of the findings of fact, unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise. Tenn. Code Ann. section 5-6-225(e)(2). The extent of an injured worker's vocational disability is an issue of fact. Jaske v. Murray Ohio Mfg. Co., Inc., 75 S.W.2d 15 (Tenn. 1988). The employee or claimant, Cherre Howard, is sixty-four years old and has a high school education and experience in collections and clerical work. For the sixteen years preceding her injury, she worked as a collector for Professional Adjustment Service. On February 29, 1996, she fell down a flight of stairs while leaving work, dislocating her left shoulder. She later reported to the emergency room at Southern Hills Hospital, where a physician fractured both bones in her forearm, while unsuccessfully attempting to manipulate her shoulder into its socket. She subsequently saw another doctor at the same hospital, who twice performed open surgery to cure the injuries. The claimant returned to the operating doctor for follow-up care and he ultimately released her with an estimated eight percent permanent whole body impairment rating. However, the doctor concedes the claimant's condition worsened after he last saw her. When her condition worsened, she was referred to Dr. Allen Anderson, who assigned a permanent whole person impairment rating of nineteen percent and who restricted her from lifting more than ten pounds, from lifting any weight frequently and from pushing, pulling or climbing. The doctor diagnosed arthrofibrosis and a torn rotator cuff, which could not be repaired because of lack of bone. He testified the claimant could not use her injured arm. The chancellor, giving greater weight to Dr. Anderson's opinion, first awarded disability benefits based on seventy percent to the body as a whole, then reduced the award to one based on sixty-five percent to the body as a whole. The claimant has returned to work, but earns less than before the accident. The employer's insurer insists the chancellor erred in accepting the opinion of Dr. Anderson, who saw the claimant only once, instead of the opinion of the operating surgeon and because the claimant has been reasonably successful in her return to work. The employee insists the testimony of the operating surgeon can be discounted because her condition admittedly worsened 2	Davidson County	Workers Compensation Panel	10/21/98
	Henry County	Workers Compensation Panel	10/21/98
Elizabeth A. Wilson v. Worthco, Inc., et al 02S01-9712-CH-00113 Authoring Judge: John K. Byers, Senior Judge Trial Court Judge: Hon. William Michael Maloan, This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The trial judge found the plaintiff had suffered a compensable injury and entered a judgment in her favor of 5 percent vocational impairment to the body as a whole. The defendant raises the following issues: I. Whether the trial court erred in rejecting Defendant's Motion to Dismiss on grounds that the statute of limitations had expired prior to the filing of Plaintiff's claim. II. Whether the trial court erred in finding that Plaintiff's alleged injury was compensable and not a non-compensable aggravation of a pre-existing condition. III. Whether the trial court erred in finding that the Plaintiff sustained a fifty percent (5%) permanent partial disability to the body as a whole. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. Review of the findings of fact made by the trial court is de novo upon the record of the trial court, accompanied by a presumption of the correctness of the findings, unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise. Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(2); Stone v. City of McMinnville, 896 S.W.2d 548, 55 (Tenn. 1995). The application of this standard requires this Court to weigh in more depth the factual findings and conclusions of the trial court in a workers' compensation case. See Corcoran v. Foster Auto GMC, Inc., 746 S.W.2d 452, 456 (Tenn. 1988).	Wilson County	Workers Compensation Panel	10/21/98
Willie Gooch v. Mckinnon Bridge Company 01S01-9708-CH-00169 Authoring Judge: Joe C. Loser, Jr., Special Judge Trial Court Judge: Hon. Ellen Hobbs Lyle, This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. section 5-6-225(e) for hearing and reporting of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The issue on appeal is whether the denial of the employee's motion to set aside the workers' compensation settlement was an abuse of discretion. As discussed below, the panel has concluded the trial court did not err and that the trial court's action should be affirmed. The employee, Mr. Willie Gooch, a manual laborer, injured both hands on March 14, 1995 during the course and within the scope of his employment for McKinnon Bridge Company. Dr. Fred Torstrick had assigned the following impairment ratings: eight percent to the left index finger, twenty-nine percent to the left long finger, twenty-nine percent to the left ring finger, twelve percent to the left small finger, fifteen percent to the right index finger, fifteen percent to the right long finger, and twelve percent to the right ring finger. Mr. Todd Smith, a representative for the insurance adjusting agency, advised Mr. Gooch of the treating physician's disability ratings and offered him a settlement based on those ratings. However, the settlement eliminated any future medical benefits for the injury. Mr. Smith, admittedly, did not read the documents to Mr. Gooch, who cannot read and can barely write his name. The settlement proposed a lump sum payment in the sum of $11,962.19, in addition to medical expenses already paid totaling $2,766.1. Mr. James Tucker, attorney for McKinnon Bridge Company, testified that he personally called Mr. Gooch and explained the settlement, including the omission of any future medical expenses and the settlement's finality. Mr. Tucker and Mr. Gooch met and went over the prepared documents, which Mr. Gooch then signed. Mr. Tucker testified that he did not read the documents to Mr. Gooch verbatim but that he did cover the substance of the material portions in question. On October 31, 1996, McKinnon Bridge Company and the injured employee filed a Petition for Approval of Final Settlement in the Chancery Court of Davidson County. Mr. Gooch was not represented by counsel. A hearing was held that same day. The chancellor repeatedly told Mr. Gooch he would likely receive more money if he took his case to trial. The chancellor further informed Mr. Gooch that he certainly would be awarded future medical benefits if taken to trial. Moreover, the chancellor advised Mr. Gooch that he was entitled to hire an attorney. Despite the information provided by the insurance adjuster, the defendant's attorney, as well as the chancellor, Mr. Gooch still expressed a desire to settle the matter. Thus, the chancellor entered an Order Approving the Settlement, after finding the settlement to be in the employee's best interest. On his drive home from the courthouse, Mr. Gooch concluded he had made a mistake. He hired an attorney, who, on November 8, 1996, filed a timely Motion to Set Aside The Order Approving the Workers' Compensation Settlement, grounded on his lack of sophistication and illiteracy, and that he had changed his mind after considering what he had been told by the judge and 2	Davidson County	Workers Compensation Panel	10/12/98