Daryl Turner vs. State of Tennessee
01C01-9608-CR-00374
Authoring Judge: Judge William M. Barker
Trial Court Judge: Judge Jane Wheatcraft

The appellant, Daryl Turner, appeals the Sumner County Criminal Court’s dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief. In 1993, appellant was convicted of selling a Schedule II controlled substance, to wit: cocaine, and was sentenced to twelve (12) years as a Range III persistent offender. His conviction and sentence were affirmed by this Court on direct appeal. See State v. Darrel Tucker1, No. 01-C-01-9310-CR00347 (Tenn. Crim. App. at Nashville, Oct. 6, 1994), per. app. denied (Tenn. 1995). The appellant, thereafter, filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief alleging ineffective assistance of counsel, malicious prosecution, and invalid “reasonable doubt” jury instructions.2 Following an evidentiary hearing, the trial court dismissed appellant’s petition upon finding no ground to warrant post-conviction relief. We affirm the  judgment of the trial court pursuant to Rule 20 of the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals.

Patricia Herndon, Next of Kin of Warren G. Price, Deceased, v. Michael and Jeanette Hughes, and Jeff McAlpin, D/B/A Pyramid Motors and McAlpin Enterprises
02A01-9706-CV-00128
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge W. Frank Crawford
Trial Court Judge: Judge James E. Swearengen

This appeal involves an automobile accident and the subsequent wrongful death action brought by the daughter of the decedent. Plaintiff-appellant, Patricia Herndon, filed suit against
Michael Hughes, the driver of the other automobile, the driver’s wife Jeanette Hughes, co-owner 2 of the vehicle, and Jeff McAlpin & Associates, Inc., (McAlpin), the car dealership that sold Mr. Hughes the automobile. Ms. Herndon appeals the order of the trial court granting summary judgment to McAlpin.

Ronald E. Nelson v., James P. Everett, et al.
02A01-9707-CV-00150
Authoring Judge: Judge Alan E. Highers
Trial Court Judge: Judge James E. Swearengen

Plaintiff/Appellant, Ronald E. Nelson (“Nelson”) appeals the judgment of the trial court granting defendants/appellees’, James P. Everett (“Everett”) and Memphis Publishing Company, Inc., d/b/a The Commercial Appeal (“Memphis Publishing Company”) (collectively “defendants”), motion for summary judgment. For reasons stated hereinafter, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

State of Tennessee vs. William F. Hegger
01C01-9607-CR-00283
Authoring Judge: Judge Jerry L. Smith
Trial Court Judge: Judge Thomas H. Ware

On May 17, 1994, a Davidson County jury found Appellant, William F. Hegger, guilty of driving under the influence of an intoxicant, first offense. The trial court sentenced Appellant as a Range I standard offender to eleven months and twenty-nine d ays incarceration (all but ten days suspended), imposed a two-hundred and fifty dollar fine, ordered Appellant to attend alcohol treatment school, and suspended Appellant’s driver’s license for a period of one year. Appellant was further ordered to perform two hundred hours of public service work. On February 22, 1996, following a hearing upon Appellant’s motion, the trial court modified Appellant’s sentence, waiving the fine and public service work. The trial court found that Appellant had completed his jail time and the one year suspension of his license. Appellant filed a timely notice of app eal, raising several issues, namely:

1) whether the trial court erred in allowing evidence regarding the horizontal gaze nystagmus HGN) test;

2) whether the trial court erred in admitting the testimony of Lt. Louise Kelton;
3) whether the evidence was sufficien t to suppo rt the jury verdict;
4) whether the defense counsel provided effective assistance of counsel.

After a review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial co urt.

Randy Hicks v. State of Tennessee
03C01-9608-CR-00296
Authoring Judge: Judge Curwood Witt
Trial Court Judge: Judge Mayo L. Mashburn

Randy Hicks appeals the McMinn County Criminal Court's summary dismissal of his "Motion for New Trial Based on Newly Discovered Evidence Rule 22, FRCrP." The lower court considered this "motion" under the law applicable to motions for new trial, petitions for writ of error coram nobis, and petitions for post-conviction relief, found it without merit, and summarily dismissed Hicks's claim without conducting a hearing. Hicks's underlying conviction is for criminal facilitation of first degree murder, for which he is serving a 25 year sentence. State v. Hicks, 835 S.W.2d 32 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1992). In his pro se appellate brief, Hicks never directly attacks the lower court's denial of his "motion," but he does raise several issues relating to the admission of evidence, denial of a severance and the sufficiency of the convicting evidence at his trial. He also filed with his pro se appellate brief a document entitled Petition for Writ of Error Coram Nobis, in which he alleges that the district attorney knowingly and willfully submitted false evidence in his trial.1 Having painstakingly reviewed the record and Hicks's brief, we affirm the trial court's summary dismissal of the claim. Likewise, we find the petition filed in this court proper for dismissal.

Meese & Associates, Inc., v. Eddie Powers and David Hicks, Rebecca Car Kirklin, v. Meese Associates, Inc.
03A01-9705-CH-
Authoring Judge: Judge Alan E. Highers
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Billy Joe White

Plaintiff, Meese & Associates, Inc. (“plaintiff”), appeals the judgment of the trial court 2 awarding Intervening Plaintiff/Appellee, Rebecca Kirklin (“Kirklin”), the real estate commission for the sale of Defendants/Appellees’, Eddie Powers (“Powers”) and David Hicks (“Hicks”) (collectively “defendants”), property by Kirklin. For reasons stated hereinafter, we reverse the decision of the trial court and remand.

Alexander Jackson Bullard vs. The City of Chattanooga Fireman's & Policeman's Insurance & Pension Fund Board - Concurring
03A01-9705-CH-00193
Authoring Judge: Judge Herschel P. Franks
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Howell N. Peoples

In this action plaintiff sought job-related disability benefits from his pension plan, administered by the City of Chattanooga Firemen’s and  Policemen’s Insurance and Pension Fund Board (“Board”). The Board, after an evidentiary hearing, voted 3 to 2 to deny benefits. An appeal was taken to the Chancery Court, and the Chancellor overturned the decision of the Board and awarded benefits. For reasons hereinafter stated we affirm and adopt from the Chancellor’s Opinion.

Interstate Mechanical Contractors, Inc., v. MCH Partners: Jimmy R. Reagan, d/b/a Precision Construction Company, et al. - Concurring
03A01-9706-CH-00234
Authoring Judge: Judge Don T. McMurray
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Chester S. Rainwater

This appeal involves a payment dispute between the plaintiff, Don Conseen, a subcontractor doing business as DC Service & Sales, and defendants Jimmy R. Reagan and Howard Sexton, doing business as Precision Construction Company, a general contractor. Plaintiff sued for payment for construction work which he testified was requested and approved by defendants, and for which he was promised payment by the defendants. An evidentiary hearing was held. The defendants presented no proof at trial. The chancellor granted plaintiff a judgment for $19, 267.45, the amount sought by the plaintiff. The defendants appealed. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Russell Keith Berry v. Bryan Lee Berry and Paula Faye Berry
03A01-9707-CH-00410
Authoring Judge: Judge Don T. McMurray
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Lewis W. May, Jr.

Plaintiff Russell Keith Berry, brought this action on behalf of himself and his grandmother. He alleged that his grandmother, Lorena Beryl Berry, is mentally incompetent and physically ill and that the defendants, his brother and sister-in-law, gained unfair advantage of her incompetency by fraudulently taking control of all her worldly possessions. The plaintiff also alleged the defendants converted his personal property while he was incarcerated. Defendants move for summary judgment. The motion was granted and the complaint dismissed. This appeal resulted. We find there are genuine issues of material fact and revers the trial court's judgment.

Scenic Helicopters, Inc., Scenic Helicopter Rides , Limited, v. City of Sevierville, Tennessee
03A01-9709-CH-00439
Authoring Judge: Senior Judge William H. Inman
Trial Court Judge: Judge Chester S. Rainwater, Jr.

This complaint sought a writ of mandamus to require the City to issue a sign permit, or, alternatively, to review the action of the City in denying the application for a permit. The Chancellor found that the action of the Board of Zoning Appeals in denying the permit was arbitrary and ordered the issuance of the permit. We affirm.

Lawrence Dixson and wife, Mary Dixson, v. Atlantic Soft Drink Company, also D/B/A Pepsi Cola Company
03A01-9709-CV-00417
Authoring Judge: Judge Don T. McMurray
Trial Court Judge: Judge Wheeler A. Rosenbalm

At approximately 1:00 on Christmas morning of 1995, a pickup truck which had been stolen from the defendant Atlantic Soft Drink Company's business compound, crashed into the plaintiffs' residence, allegedly causing property damage and personal injury to the plaintiffs. Plaintiffs, in their complaint asserted that the defendant was negligent in leaving the keys inside the unlocked
truck and providing inadequate security for the parking lot where company vehicles were left. The plaintiffs also sought to impose liability on the defendant under the doctrine of respondeat superior. The defendant moved for summary judgment. Summary judgment was granted and the complaint dismissed. This appeal resulted. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

W. Stephen Renfro, Jr., v. John Doe
03A01-9710-CV-00447
Authoring Judge: Per Curiam
Trial Court Judge: Judge Dale Workman

This is an appeal from a summary judgment entered i favor of Ohio Casualty Insurance Company, an unnamed party brought before the court pursuant to T.C.A. § 5 6 - 7 - 1 2 0 6 .  The question before us is whether the plaintiff, Steven Renfro, is an insured within th emeaning of Ohio Casualty's uninsured motorist (UM) policy provisions. The precise issues, whether the plaintiff, at the time of his injury, was "occupying" the covered vehicle as that term is defined in the policy under consideration. The trial court fond, on motion for summary judgment, that the plaintiff was not "occupying" the ehicle. we reverse the judgment of the trial court.

Southland Realtors Inc., v. Tabor Construction Company, Inc., - Concurring
03A01-9710-CV-00455
Authoring Judge: Judge William H. Inman
Trial Court Judge: Judge Harold Wimberly

The trial court allowed the plaintiff a recovery of a commission for the sale of real estate. The defendant appeals, insisting that (1) the plaintiff was not a party to the sales agency contract and thus had no standing to file this action, (2) the agency contract expired before performance, (3) the plaintiff “performed no useful work,” and (4) the record “cannot support a judgment for anyone.” Each of these issues alleges that the trial court erred in failing to grant summary judgment.

Page G. Stuart v. State of Tennessee, Dept. of Safety
01-S-01-9612-CH-00239
Authoring Judge: Justice Adolpho A. Birch, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Irvin H. Gilcrease, Jr.

During a wide-ranging investigation, law enforcement officers located and seized several items of property thought to be used in the conduct of an illegal drug enterprise. Criminal charges followed the several seizures, and Page Stuart, the appellant, pleaded guilty to offenses involving delivery and conspiracy to deliver large quantities of marijuana. The State thereafter instituted administrative proceedings under Tenn. Code Ann. § 53-11-201 et seq. (1991 & Supp. 1992) for the forfeiture of the property seized. Although Stuart challenged the forfeiture of some of the property,1 he was not successful, and both the Chancery Court and the Court of Appeals upheld the forfeiture. We granted Stuart’s application for review under Rule 11

Sandra Sanders v. David W. Lanier and State of Tennessee - Concurring
02S01-9706-CH-00060
Authoring Judge: Justice Janice M. Holder
Trial Court Judge: Judge William H. Inman

The issue with which we are confronted is whether the State may be liable to a county employee for employment discrimination under the Tennessee Human Rights Act ("THRA") when the county employee is under the  supervision of a state judge who commits quid pro quo sexual harassment against the county employee. The trial court answered the question in the negative holding that the State was not the plaintiff's employer under the THRA. The Court of Appeals reversed and held that the THRA imposed liability on the State under an economic realities test. For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we affirm as modified the appellate court's reversal of the trial court's judgment.

Harold P. Cousins, D/B/A Cousins Construction, v. MK Ferguson of Oak Ridge Company
03A01-9709-CV-00435
Authoring Judge: Senior Judge WIlliam H. Inman
Trial Court Judge: Judge James B. Scott, Jr.

This is an action to recover profits the plaintiff contractor alleges he would have made had he been allowed to construct an additional four warehouses similar in design and usage to a fifth warehouse he constructed and for which he was paid.

David E. Lind, et ux. Myra Gwinn Lind, v. Allen M. Well, Clyde N. Well, and Aster Vance Webb
03A01-9710-CH-00473
Authoring Judge: Judge Herschel P. Franks

In this boundary line dispute the defendants appeal from a judgment in favor of plaintiffs, insisting that the evidence established their right to the disputed area by adverse possession.

Lucy B. Anderson v. Lenzing U.S.A
03S01-9704-CV-00036
Authoring Judge: Roger E. Thayer, Special Judge
Trial Court Judge: Hon. Ben K. Wexler,
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The appeal has been perfected by Lucy Anderson, widow and administratrix of the Estate of Billy Joe Anderson, deceased, from a ruling by the trial court that her claim for death benefits was not compensable as she failed to establish her husband's death was caused by his work activities. At the time of his death, Mr. Anderson was 54 years of age, was six foot four inches tall and weighed between 26-28 pounds. He had been employed as a cutter operator with defendant, Lenzing U.S.A., for about six years but had worked a total of 21 years for the company. Plaintiff testified her husband was in good health, took no medication and never complained of chest pains. She said he smoked cigars sometimes but did not appear to inhale the smoke. She also stated he had no complaints before reporting to work on March 11, 1993. He was working the "C" shift which started at 12 midnight and ended at 7: a.m. Arvine Taylor, decedent's shift supervisor, testified and described the duties of a cutter operator. The employer is engaged in the business of producing rayon fiber. As the material moves through the production line, it is called a "tow." A cutter operator is responsible for keeping the tow moving down the production line. If knots appear in the tow, the operator uses a knife and cuts the knot out. If the tow stops for any reason, the operator reels it back up on the machine and continues the process. Also, if co-workers spot a knot along the production line, a horn is sounded to alert the cutter operator. It appears a cutter operator has the responsibility of watching over several machines involved in this process. On the night in question, the deceased was looking after four units on the production line. The evidence indicates that among the four machines, there were 42 breaks during the shift. Records showed there was a break on unit #2 at 5:25 a.m. and at 6:3 a.m., unit #4 and unit #1 were down. Supervisor Taylor told the court the records indicated it was an average night on the production line. He said it would normally take ten to fifteen seconds to remove a small knot and that there was very little physical exertion in cutting out a knot or resuming a tow if it was down. 2

Douglas Bumpus v. Birmingham-Nashville Express, et al.
01S01-9707-CV-00144
Authoring Judge: William H. Inman, Senior Judge
Trial Court Judge: Hon. James E. Walton,
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. I This is another gradually-occurring injury case involving physical disability not caused by trauma, specific episode, or `accidental injury' as the term is historically used, that would best be resolved by appropriate legislation. The plaintiff is a career truck driver who developed osteoarthritis in both knees to the extent that full knee replacements were required. The prostheses were successful and after three months the plaintiff resumed his truck driving career. Nevertheless, the trial judge found that the plaintiff suffered a 7 percent vocational disability to both legs. His monetary recovery was limited to 26 weeks because of his age. The employer appeals, insisting that: (1) the plaintiff's arthritic condition is not compensable because non-job related; (2) the award is excessive; and (3) the lump sum order is improper. II The plaintiff was born in August, 1934. While he has held a number of jobs, he is a career over-the-road truck driver. He began working for the defendant in 1984. He is described as a freight peddler, meaning that he delivers and unloads the cargo he transports. Over the years the wear and tear occasioned by lifting and carrying heavy loads began to affect his bodily joints, particularly his knees. In 1987 or 1988, he sought treatment for his knees from Dr. James R. Smith, who diagnosed arthritis, about which nothing could be done. The condition worsened, his legs bowed, and knee replacements were recommended. III 2

Stephanie Clinard v. Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Co.
01S01-9703-CV-00051
Authoring Judge: Joe C. Loser, Jr., Special Judge
Trial Court Judge: Hon. James E. Walton,
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. section 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The appellant here contends the evidence preponderates against the trial court's finding that the employee's injury was causally connected to her employment. The panel has concluded the judgment should be affirmed. The employee or claimant, Clinard, is approximately 4 years old and has a GED. She has worked as a cashier at a convenience market in Springfield since 1992, having previously worked as a cashier, as a baby sitter, as a production worker in a garment factory and as a homemaker. On March 24, she noticed a pop in her neck and a shooting pain in her left arm, while manually operating a credit card machine at work. She reported the event to her supervisor, who did not refer her to a physician or provide a list from which she could choose one. The claimant went to her own physician, Dr. Robert Ferland, who took her off work and prescribed physical therapy. She also saw two neurosurgeons, both of whom ordered diagnostic testing. One of them expressed doubt as to whether the injury was work-related, but was unable to point to any other possible cause. The other had no opinion as to the cause of injury. The claimant was unable to work from May 2, 1994 until she returned during the last week in July of the same year. She terminated her employment in November of that year after the pain worsened. The employer did not provide any medical benefits. Ultimately, the claimant sought outa Dr. Cantrell, who referred her to Dr. Arthur Cushman, another neurosurgeon. Dr. Cushman diagnosed a herniated disc in her neck and performed corrective surgery. The pain diminished following the surgery. Dr. David Gaw saw her after surgery and prescribed permanent limitations. The claimant took karate after the injury, but we find in the record no evidence that her injury was caused by karate lessons, as the employer's insurer contends. The lay proof supports the claimant's contention that her injury was work related. Dr. Cushman conceded the credit card machine incident and continued use of the arm at work was a possible cause of the injury. He estimated her permanent impairment at seven percent.. Dr. Gaw testified the credit card incident was the most likely cause, in the absence of any other explanation, and assigned a fifteen percent permanent impairment to the whole body. Both of these doctors based their opinions of permanent impairment on approved guidelines. The trial court found the injury to be work related and awarded benefits under the Tennessee Workers' Compensation Law (the Act). Appellate 2

Shannon Forrest v. Henry I. Siegel Co., Inc.
02S01-9705-CV-00050
Authoring Judge: William H. Inman, Senior Judge
Trial Court Judge: Hon. Creed Mcginley
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with T.C.A. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The trial court found that the plaintiff has a 7 percent permanent partial disability to her whole body as a result of a compensable injury she sustained in September 1993, and awarded benefits accordingly, together with medical payments and mileage. The employer appeals, insisting that these findings are not supported by a preponderance of the evidence. Our review of the findings of fact made by the trial court is de novo upon the record of the trial court, accompanied by a presumption of the correctness of the finding, unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise. T.C.A. _ 5-6-225(e)(2). Stone v. City of McMinnville, 896 S.W.2d 548, 55 (Tenn. 1995). The plaintiff is 3 years of age with limited marketable skills. She commenced work for the defendant in 1988 and quit in September 1996. In September 1993 she operated a "top press," and pressed upwards of 2, pairs of trousers each day. She testified that pain and a tingling sensation developed in her right leg and hip for which she sought medical attention, and advised her supervisor of her problems. Her physician was Dr. Lawrence, whom she heard call Jeff Harris, plant manager, to inform him of her condition and request lighter duty. She did not work for "six to eight weeks." Dr. Lawrence referred her to the Jackson Orthopedic Clinic for examination and treatment, and she was later examined and treated at the Semmes Murphey Clinic in Jackson. Various tests were performed, including a CAT scan and MRI. She was eventually referred 2

John W. Gray, Iii v. Gray and Williams, Inc., et al
02S01-9706-CH-00054
Authoring Judge: John K. Byers, Senior Judge
Trial Court Judge: Hon. Neal Small,
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Review of the findings of fact made by the trial court is de novo upon the record of the trial court, accompanied by a presumption of the correctness of the finding, unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise. Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(2). Stone v. City of McMinnville, 896 S.W.2d 548, 55 (Tenn. 1995). The trial judge awarded the plaintiff 6 percent permanent partial disability. The defendants say the evidence presented at trial preponderates against the trial court's award of 6 percent permanent partial disability to the plaintiff's body as a whole as a result of his work related accident. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Toby Hedgecoth v. Harold Moore & Assocs.
01S01-9702-CV-00033
Authoring Judge: William S. Russell, Retired Judge
Trial Court Judge: Hon.

Beryl Jack v. State
01S01-9706-BC-00136
Authoring Judge: Joe C. Loser, Jr., Special Judge
Trial Court Judge: Hon. William Robert Baker,
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. section 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The employee contends the evidence preponderates against the commissioner's finding that her claim is barred because of a false statement contained in her employment application. The panel has concluded the judgment should be affirmed. The claimant has been a certified nursing technician since 1973. She began working for Bethany Health Care, a nursing home, in May of 199 and soon thereafter injured her back while lifting a patient. As a result of that injury, she received two laminectomies at L5-S1. Following those surgeries, she had difficulty standing, bending and sitting for long periods of time. The operating surgeon imposed lifting and bending restrictions. She was awarded permanent partial disability benefits and applied for social security disability benefits. She was terminated from Bethany because that employer did not have work for her within her limitations. On October 1, 1991, she made written application for employment at Middle Tennessee Mental Health Institute. On that application, she was asked, "Do you have a limiting disability or handicap?" She responded, "No." In response to a question as to her reason for leaving Bethany, she wrote, "Illness in the family." On another document, she denied having any "history of physical defects." On the strength of that application, she was approved for employment by the state. We find in the record no evidence that the employer had any knowledge of her pre-existing disability. It is equally clear in the record that she could not have been employed as she was if the above questions had been accurately answered. The commissioner denied compensation benefits because of the false application. Appellate review is de novo upon the record of the trial court, accompanied by a presumption of correctness of the findings of fact, unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise. Tenn. Code Ann. section 5-6- 225(e)(2). Where the trial judge has seen and heard the witnesses, especially if issues of credibility and weight to be given oral testimony are involved, considerable deference must be accorded those circumstances on review. Kellerman v. Food Lion, Inc., 929 S.W.2d 333 (Tenn. 1996). A false statement in an employee'sapplication for employment will bar recovery of workers' compensation benefits if all three of the following elements exist: first, the employee must have knowingly and willfully made a false representation as to his physical condition; second, the employer must have relied upon the false representation and such reliance must have been a substantial factor in the hiring; and third, there must have been a causal connection between the false representation and the injury. Federal Copper and Aluminum Company v. Dickey, 493 S.W.2d 463 (Tenn. 1973). The causal 2

Beverly Riddle v. Murray Outdoor Products
02S01-9706-CH-00058
Authoring Judge: John K. Byers, Senior Judge
Trial Court Judge: Hon. Joe C. Morris,
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The trial judge awarded the plaintiff 58 percent permanent partial disability to each arm as a result of carpal tunnel syndrome. The defendant raises the following issues on appeal: I. Whether the trial court erred in finding that the plaintiff had properly satisfied notice and statute of limitations requirements for her alleged left upper extremity injury. II. Whether the trial court erred in awarding the plaintiff 58 percent impairment to each arm. We affirm the judgment.