Mildred Louise McCollum vs. Kliff Andrew McCollum
02A01-9604-CH-00067
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge W. Frank Crawford
Trial Court Judge: Judge Joe G. Riley. Jr.

This case involves a petition to change child custody1 and modify child support. 2 Wife is employed by the State of Tennessee as a secretary in the District Attorney’s Office and earns a gross monthly salary of $1507.00. Husband is employed by Electric Motor Service and earns a gross monthly salary of $2,456.84. Respondent-appellant, Mildred Louise McCollum (Wife), appeals the trial court’s order reducing the amount of the future child support obligation of petitioner-appellee, Kliff Andrew McCollum (Husband), to reflect the change in the custody of one of the parties’ children.

William P. Newton v. James S. Cox
02A01-9604-CH-00086
Authoring Judge: Judge David R. Farmer
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Joe C. Morris

Plaintiff William P. Newton appeals the trial court’s order awarding him a $28,125 judgment against his former attorney, Defendant/Appellee James S. Cox, but denying Newton’s claim for prejudgment interest. Newton’s claim arose out of Cox’s retention of a contingency fee in excess of the maximum permitted by statute. We affirm the judgment entered in favor of Newton, but with certain modifications hereinafter set forth.

Estate of Marion English Truett (Deceased)
02A01-9605-PB-00118
Authoring Judge: Judge David R. Farmer
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Joe C. Morris

Rebecca H. Moore Brown appeals the trial court’s order which awarded Appellee 1In the event of a spouse’s death, the surviving spouse is entitled to the following exempt property from the deceased spouse’s estate: [T]he family Bible and other books, the family automobile, all wearing apparel of the deceased, all household electrical appliances, all household musical and other amusement instruments, and all household and kitchen furniture, appliances, utensils and implements. T.C.A. § 30-2-101(a)(1) (Supp. 1988). 2In the event a spouse dies intestate, the surviving spouse is entitled to [A] reasonable allowance in money out of the estate for such surviving spouse’s maintenance during the period of one (1) year after the death of the spouse,
according to such surviving spouse’s previous standard of living, taking into account the condition of the estate of the deceased spouse. T.C.A. § 30-2-102(a) (Supp. 1988). Ellis Truett, Jr., one year’s support in the amount of $21,500, as well as exempt property, from the estate of Truett’s deceased wife, Marian English Truett.

Ronald Wayne Hill v. Eagle Bend Manufacturing, Inc. and Transportation Insurance Company
03S01-9511-CH-00123
Authoring Judge: Frank F. Drowota, III
Trial Court Judge: Hon. Billy Joe White,
Campbell County finding the plaintiff, Ronald Wayne Hill, to be permanently and totally disabled. The Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel, upon reference for findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(5) (Supp. 1996), found that Hill had suffered only an increase in pain, not a compensable injury by accident, and dismissed the case. Thereafter, Hill filed a motion for full court review of the Panel decision pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(5)(B) (1996 Supp.). We granted the motion for review to determine whether Hill suffered a work-related injury by accident which would entitle him to receive workers' compensation benefits for the physical impairment and for any related mental disorder. After carefully examining the record before us and considering the relevant authorities, we affirm the trial court's finding that Hill suffered a work-related injury by accident which rendered him totally and permanently disabled.

Phillip Mark Nunley v. State of Tennessee
01C01-9602-CC-00066
Authoring Judge: Judge Jerry L. Smith
Trial Court Judge: Judge Buddy D. Perry

Appellant Philip Mark Nunley appeals from the dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief. On March 23, 1993, Appellant pled guilty to seconddegree murder and especially aggravated robbery. Appellant received a sentence of twenty-five years imprisonment for second-degree murder and twenty years imprisonment for especially aggravated robbery. The sentences were ordered to be served concurrently for an effective sentence of twenty-five years. On July 10, 1993, Appellant filed a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel and that he involuntarily entered his guilty plea. The post-conviction court dismissed his petition, finding Appellant’s petition without merit. On appeal, Appellant argues that his guilty plea was involuntarily entered. For the reasons discussed below, we reject Appellant’s claim and affirm the decision of the post-conviction court.

State of Tennessee vs. Billy Joe Baggett
01C01-9604-CC-00160
Authoring Judge: Judge Joe G. Riley
Trial Court Judge: Judge Robert E. Burch

The appellant, Billy Joe Baggett, was convicted by a jury of aggravated burglary. The trial court sentenced him to fifteen (15) years as a Range III, Persistent Offender. On appeal, he presents ten (10) issues for our review: (1) whether the evidence was sufficient to support a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt for aggravated burglary; (2) whether the trial court erred in allowing the state to introduce tape recordings of four (4) telephone conversations between Baggett and a state informant; (3) whether the trial court erred in allowing the state to introduce a prybar into evidence; (4) whether the trial court erred in allowing the state to use prior convictions for impeachment purposes; (5) whether the trial court erred in allowing the state to present evidence of Baggett’s escape from jail; (6) whether the trial court erred in not granting a mistrial following a state witness’ prejudicial remarks; (7) whether the trial court erred in allowing evidence of Baggett’s preferential treatment while in jail; (8) whether the charge to the jury as to reasonable doubt was unconstitutional; (9) whether the trial court erred in sentencing Baggett; and (10)  whether the delay in hearing the motion for new trial violated his right to a speedy appeal. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Michael Eugene Smith v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co With Order
02S01-9603-CH-00037
Authoring Judge: Joe C. Loser, Jr., Special Judge
Trial Court Judge: Hon. William Michael Malone,
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court inaccordance with Tenn. Code Ann. section 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting of findings of fact and conclusions of law. In this appeal, the employer contends the award of permanent partial disability benefits is excessive and, particularly, that the award exceeds the limitation contained in Tenn. Code Ann. section 5-6- 241(a)(1). As discussed below, the panel has concluded the award should be affirmed. The employee or claimant, Smith, is forty-seven and a high school graduate. He has worked for Goodyear since 1969, at several different jobs, all involving manual labor. On May 13, 1994, he injured his back lifting. The claimant was referred to an orthopedic surgeon, who diagnosed a central disc herniation at L5-S1, which was surgically repaired bilaterally. As a result of the injury and surgery, he can lift only 3 pounds frequently and 5 pounds occasionally. He is further limited in his bodily activities and has a permanent medical impairment of ten percent to the whole body. The operating surgeon testified that the claimant is medically disqualified from returning to his pre-injury job or any other one which would require heavy lifting or painful activity. When the claimant returned to work after a period of recuperation, he was offered a choice of jobs. The one he accepted was within his limitations, but he receives a lower hourly wage than he was earning before the injury. He continues to have pain and stiffness from working. The chancellor awarded permanent partial disability benefits on the basis of forty percent to the body as a whole. Appellate review is de novo upon the record of the trial court, accompanied by a presumption of correctness of the findings of fact, unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise. Tenn. Code Ann. section 5-6-225(e)(2). For injuries occurring after August 1, 1992, in cases where and injured worker is entitled to permanent partial disability benefits to the body as a whole and the pre-injury employer returns the employee to employment at a wage equal to or greater than the wage the employee was receiving at the time of the injury, the maximum permanent partial disability award the employee may receive is two and one-half times the medical impairment rating. Tenn. Code Ann. section 5-6-241(a)(1). If the offer of return employment is not reasonable in light of the circumstances of the employee's physical disability to 2

Michael Eugene Smith v. Goodyear Tire and Rubber Company
02S01-9603-CH-00037
Authoring Judge: Joe C. Loser, Jr., Special Judge
Trial Court Judge: Hon. William Michael Maloan,
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. section 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting of findings of fact and conclusions of law. In this appeal, the employer contends the award of permanent partial disability benefits is excessive and, particularly, that the award exceeds the limitation contained in Tenn. Code Ann. section 5-6- 241(a)(1). As discussed below, the panel has concluded the award should be affirmed.

Everlyn Hicks v. Tennessee Dept. of Labor, et al
02S01-9607-CH-00067
Authoring Judge: Joe C. Loser, Jr., Special Judge
Trial Court Judge: Hon. Dewey C. Whitenton,
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court inaccordance with Tenn. Code Ann. section 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The employee, Hicks, contends the evidence preponderates against the trial court's finding that she is less than permanently and totally disabled from her work-related accident and that the trial court erred in not applying Tenn. Code Ann. section 5-6-28(a). As discussed below, this panel concludes the trial court should be affirmed in both respects The employee or claimant is sixty-two years old and has an eighth grade education. She has worked for the employer, Harmon Automotive, since 1973. In 1983, she injured her hand at work and received an award of permanent partial disability benefits. Her present claim grows out of a second injury suffered by her on May 6, 1993, when she injured her back while lifting a box of mirror bases. As a result of this injury, she received back surgery and was released to return to light duty work in January of 1994. She did return to work in May of the same year, when light duty work became available. In the same month, she again injured her back. She testified that she is no longer able to work. She has settled with her employer and that settlement is not involved in this appeal. The chancellor found the claimant to be less than permanently and totally disabled and dismissed her claim against the Second Injury Fund. Appellate review is de novo upon the record of the trial court, accompanied by a presumption of correctness of the findings of fact, unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise. Tenn. Code Ann. section 5-6-225(e)(2). Conclusions of law are subject to de novo review on appeal without any presumption of correctness. Presley v. Bennett, 86 S.W.2d 857 (Tenn. 1993). Where the trial judge has seen and heard the witnesses, especially if issues of credibility and weight to be given oral testimony are involved, considerable deference must be accorded those circumstances on review. Humphrey v. David Witherspoon, Inc., 734 S.W.2d 315 (Tenn. 1987). An employee who has previously become disabled from any cause and who, as a result of a later compensable injury, becomes permanently and totally disabled, may receive disability benefits from his or her employer only for the disability that would have resulted from the subsequent injury. Tenn. Code 5-6-28, Cameron v. Kite Painting Co., 86 S.W.2d 41 (Tenn. 1993). However, such employee may be entitled to recover the remainder of the benefits allowable for permanent total disability from the Second Injury Fund. Id. 2

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02C01-9508-CR-00224
02C01-9508-CR-00224

02A01-9604-CH-00071
02A01-9604-CH-00071
Trial Court Judge: Crowson

02A01-9605-CV-00105
02A01-9605-CV-00105
Trial Court Judge: George H. Brown

02A01-9606-CH-00134
02A01-9606-CH-00134
Trial Court Judge: John Walton West

El Rayford vs. Stephen Leffler (Order)
02A01-9607-CV-00162
Trial Court Judge: D'Army Bailey

01A01-9603-CH-00138
01A01-9603-CH-00138

Abou-Sakher vs. Humphreys Co, et. al.
01A01-9604-CH-00185
Trial Court Judge: Leonard W. Martin

Harmon vs. Dunn
01A01-9607-CH-00344
Trial Court Judge: Jim T. Hamilton

Flowers vs. Traughber
01A01-9609-CH-00392
Trial Court Judge: Irvin H. Kilcrease, Jr.

Turner vs. Turner
01A01-9506-CV-00255
Trial Court Judge: Marietta M. Shipley

Mallard vs. Tompkins
M2000-00162-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Ben H. Cantrell
Trial Court Judge: Thomas W. Brothers
The trial court entered judgment on a jury verdict for the defendant. The plaintiff argues on appeal that the trial court committed reversible error by failing to exclude from the jury a woman who revealed that she knew some members of the defense attorney's family. We affirm the trial court.

03C01-9603-CC-00094
03C01-9603-CC-00094
Trial Court Judge: Rex Henry Ogle

03C01-9604-CR-00160
03C01-9604-CR-00160
Trial Court Judge: Stephen M. Bevil

03C01-9606-CC-00216
03C01-9606-CC-00216

03C01-9509-CC-00277
03C01-9509-CC-00277
Trial Court Judge: Mary Beth Leibowitz